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THE NATIONS OF TO-DAY
A New History of the World
EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN

YUGOSLAVIA

**THE NATIONS
OF TO-DAY**

A New History of the World

EDITED BY

JOHN BUCHAN

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


YUGOSLAVIA

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THIS series has been undertaken to provide for the ordinary citizen a popular account of the history of his own and other nations, a chronicle of those movements of the past of which the effect is not yet exhausted, and which are still potent for the peace and comfort of the present. The writers conceive history as a living thing of the most urgent consequence to the men of to-day; they regard the world around us as an organic growth dependent upon a long historic ancestry. The modern view of history—apart from the pedantry of certain specialists—is a large view, subordinating the mere vicissitudes of dynasties and parliaments to those more fateful events which are the true milestones of civilisation. Clio has become an active goddess and her eyes range far. History is, of course, like all sciences, the quest for a particular kind of truth, but that word “truth” has been given a generous interpretation. The older type of historian was apt to interest himself chiefly in the doings of kings and statesmen, the campaigns of generals and the contests of parties. These no doubt are important, but they are not the whole, and to insist upon them to the exclusion of all else is to make the past an unfeatured wilderness, where the only personalities are generals on horseback, judges in ermine and monarchs in purple. Nowadays, whatever we may lack in art, we have gained in science. The plain man has come to his own, and, as Lord Acton has put it, “The true historian must now take his meals in the kitchen.”

The War brought the meaning of history home to the world. Events which befell long ago suddenly became disruptive forces to shatter a man's ease, and he realised that what had seemed only a phrase in the textbooks might be a thing to die for. The Armistice left an infinity of problems, no one of which could be settled without tracing its roots into the past. Both time and space seemed to have “closed up.” Whether we like it or not, our isolation is shattered, and not the remotest nation can now draw in its skirts from its neighbours. The consequence must be that even those who are averse to science, and prefer to settle everything by rule of thumb, will be forced

to reconsider their views. Foreign politics have become again, as they were in the age of Pitt and Castlereagh, of Palmerston and Disraeli, urgent matters for every electorate. The average citizen recognises that the popular neglect of the subject contributed in no small degree to the War, and that problems in foreign affairs are as vital to him as questions of tariff and income tax. Once it used to be believed that a country might be rich while its neighbours were poor; now even the dullest is aware that economically the whole world is tightly bound together, and that the poverty of a part lessens the prosperity of the whole. A merchant finds his profits shrinking because of the rate of exchange in a land which was his chief market; he finds his necessary raw material costly and scarce because of the dislocation of industry in some far-away country. He recognises that no nation is commercially sufficient to itself, and he finds himself crippled, not by the success, but by the failure of his foreign colleagues. It is the same in other matters than commerce. Peace is every man's chief interest, but a partial peace is impossible. The world is so closely linked that one recalcitrant unit may penalise all the others.

In these circumstances it is inevitable that interest in foreign countries, often an unwilling and angry interest, should be compulsory for large classes which up to now have scarcely given the matter a thought. An understanding of foreign conditions—though at first it may not be a very sympathetic understanding—is forced upon us by the needs of our daily life. This understanding, if it is to be of the slightest value, must be based upon some knowledge of history, and Clio will be compelled to descend from the schools to the market-place. Of all the movements of the day none is more hopeful than the spread through all classes of a real, though often incoherent, desire for education. Partly it is a fruit of the War. Men realise that battles were not won by “muddling through”; that as long as we muddled we stuck fast, and that when we won it was because we used our brains to better purpose than our opponents. Partly it is the consequence of the long movement towards self-conscious citizenship, which some call democracy. Most thinking people to-day believe that knowledge spread in the widest commonalty is the only cure for many ills. They believe that education in the most real sense does not stop with school or college; indeed, that true education may only begin when the orthodox curriculum is finished. They believe, further, that this fuller training comes by a man's own efforts and is not necessarily dependent

upon certain advantages in his early years. Finally, they are assured that true education cannot be merely technical or professional instruction; that it must deal in the larger sense with what are called the "humanities." If this diagnosis is correct, then the study of history must play a major part in the equipment of the citizen of the future.

I propose in these few pages to suggest certain reasons why the cultivation of the historical sense is of special value at this moment. The utilitarian arguments are obvious enough, but I would add to them certain considerations of another kind.

Man, as we know, is long-descended, and so are human society and the State. That society is a complex thing, the result of a slow organic growth and no mere artificial machine. In a living thing such as the State growth must be continuous, like the growth of a plant. Every gardener knows that in the tending of plants you cannot make violent changes, that you cannot transplant a well-grown tree at your pleasure from a wooded valley to the bare summit of a hill, that you cannot teach rhododendrons to love lime, or grow plants which need sun and dry soil in a shady bog. A new machine-made thing is simple, but the organic is always subtle and complex. Now, half the mischiefs in politics come from a foolish simplification. Take two familiar conceptions, the "political man" and the "economic man." Those who regard the citizen purely as a political animal, divorce him from all other aspects, moral and spiritual, in framing their theory of the State. In the same way the "economic man" is isolated from all other relations, and, if he is allowed to escape from the cage of economic science into political theory, will work havoc in that delicate sphere. Both are false conceptions, if our problem is to find out the best way to make actual human beings live together in happiness and prosperity. Neither, as a matter of fact, ever existed or could exist, and any polity based upon either would have the harshness and rigidity and weakness of a machine.

We have seen two creeds grow up rooted in these abstractions, and the error of both lies in the fact that they are utterly unhistorical, that they have been framed without any sense of the continuity of history. In what we call Prussianism a citizen was regarded as a cog in a vast machine called the State, to which he surrendered his liberty of judgment and his standard of morals. He had no rights against it and no personality distinct from it. The machine admitted no ethical principles which might interfere with its success, and the

citizen, whatever his private virtues, was compelled to conform to this inverted anarchy. Moreover, the directors of the machine regarded the world as if it were a smooth, flat high-road. If there were hollows and hills created by time, they must be flattened out to make the progress of the machine smoother and swifter. The past had no meaning; all problems were considered on the supposition that human nature was like a mathematical quantity, and that solutions could be obtained by an austere mathematical process. The result was tyranny, a highly efficient tyranny, which nevertheless was bound to break its head upon the complexities of human nature. Such was Prussianism, against which we fought for four years, and which for the time is out of fashion. Bolshevism, to use the convenient word, started with exactly the same view. It believed that you could wipe the slate quite clean and write on it what you pleased, that you could build a new world with human beings as if they were little square blocks in a child's box of bricks. Karl Marx, from whom it derived much of its dogma, interpreted history as only the result of economic forces; he isolated the economic aspect of man from every other aspect and desired to re-create society on a purely economic basis. Bolshevism, though it wandered very far from Marx's doctrine, had a similar point of view. It sought with one sweep of the sponge to blot out all past history, and imagined that it could build its castles of bricks without troubling about foundations. It also was a tyranny, the worse tyranny of the two, perhaps because it was the stupider. It has had its triumphs and its failures, and would now appear to be declining; but it, or something of the sort, will come again, since it represents the eternal instinct of theorists who disregard history, and who would mechanise and unduly simplify human life.

There will always be much rootless stuff in the world. In almost every age the creed which lies at the back of Bolshevism and Prussianism is preached in some form or other. The revolutionary and the reactionary are alike devotees of the mechanical. The safeguard against experiments which can only end in chaos is the wide diffusion of the historical sense, and the recognition that "counsels to which Time hath not been called, Time will not ratify."

The second reason is that a sense of history is a safeguard against another form of abstraction. Ever since the War the world has indulged in a debauch of theorising, and the consequence has been an orgy of catchwords and formulas, which,

unless they are critically examined, are bound to turn political discussion into a desert. The weakening of the substance of many accepted creeds seems to have disposed men to cling more feverishly to their shibboleths. Take any of our contemporary phrases—"self-determination," "liberty," "the right to work," "the right to maintenance," "the proletariat," "class consciousness," "international solidarity," and so forth. They all have a kind of dim meaning, but as they are currently used they have many very different meanings, and these meanings are often contradictory. I think it was Lord Acton who once said he had counted two hundred definitions of "liberty." Abraham Lincoln's words are worth remembering: "The world has never yet had a good definition of the word 'liberty,' and the American people just now are much in want of one. We are all declaring for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. We assume the word 'liberty' to mean that each worker can do as he pleases with himself and the product of his labour, while, on the other hand, it may mean that some man can do as he pleases with other men and the product of other men's labour." Are we not in the same difficulty to-day? Perhaps the worst sinner in this respect is the word "democracy." As commonly used, it has a dozen quite distinct meanings, when it has any meaning at all, and we are all familiar in political discussions with the circular argument—that such and such a measure is good for the people because it is democratic; and if it be asked why it is democratic, the answer is, "Because it is good for the people." "Democratic" really describes that form of government in which the policy of the State is determined and its business conducted by the will of the majority of its citizens, expressed through some regular channel. It is a word which denotes machinery, not purpose. "Popular," often used as an equivalent, means merely that the bulk of the people approve of a particular mode of government. "Liberal," the other assumed equivalent, implies those notions of freedom, toleration and pacific progress which lie at the roots of Western civilisation. The words are clearly not interchangeable. A policy or a government may be popular without being liberal or democratic; there have been highly popular tyrannies; the German policy of 1914 was popular, but it was not liberal, nor was Germany a democracy. America is a democracy, but it is not always liberal; the French Republic has at various times in its history been both liberal and democratic without being popular. Accurately employed, "democratic" describes a

particular method, "popular" an historical fact, "liberal" a quality and an ideal. The study of history will make us chary about the loud, vague use of formulas. It will make us anxious to see catchwords in their historical relations, and will help us to realise the maleficent effect of phrases which have a fine rhetorical appeal, but very little concrete meaning. If political science is to be anything but a vicious form of casuistry it is very necessary to give its terms an exact interpretation, for their slipshod use will tend to create false oppositions and conceal fundamental agreements, and thereby waste the energy of mankind in empty disputation.

The third reason for the study of history is that it enables a man to take a balanced view of current problems, for a memory stored with historical parallels is the best preventive both against panic and over-confidence. Such a view does not imply the hard-and-fast deduction of so-called laws, which was a habit of many of the historians of the nineteenth century. Exact parallels with the past are hard to find, and nothing is easier than to draw false conclusions. A facile philosophy of history is, as Stubbs once said, "in nine cases out of ten a generalisation founded rather on the ignorance of points in which particulars differ, than in any strong grasp of one in which they agree." Precedents from the past have often been used with disastrous results. In our own Civil War the dubious behaviour of the Israelites on various occasions was made an argument for countless blunders and tyrannies. In the same way the French Revolution has been used as a kind of arsenal for bogus parallels, both by revolutionaries and conservatives, and the most innocent reformers have been identified with Robespierre and St. Just. During the Great War the air was thick with these false precedents. In the Gallipoli Expedition, for example, it was possible to draw an ingenious parallel between that affair and the Athenian Expedition to Syracuse, and much needless depression was the consequence. At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution there were many who saw in it an exact equivalent to the Revolution of 1788 and imagined that the new Russian revolutionary armies would be as invincible as those which repelled the invaders of France. There have been eminent teachers in recent years whose mind has been so obsessed with certain superficial resemblances between the third century of the Christian era and our own times that they have prophesied an impending twilight of civilisation. Those of us who have been engaged in arguing the

case for the League of Nations are confronted by its opponents with a dozen inaccurate parallels from history, and the famous plea of the "thin edge of the wedge" is usually based upon a mistaken use of the same armoury.

A wise man will be chary of drawing dapper parallels and interpreting an historical lesson too rigidly. At the same time there are certain general deductions which are sound and helpful. For example, we all talk too glibly of revolution, and many imagine that, whether they like it or not, a clean cut can be made, and the course of national life turned suddenly and violently in a different direction. But history gives no warrant for such a view. There have been many thousands of revolutions since the world began; nearly all have been the work of minorities, often small minorities; and nearly all, after a shorter or longer period of success, have utterly failed. The French Revolution altered the face of the world, but only when it had ceased to be a revolution and had developed into an absolute monarchy. So with the various outbreaks of 1848. So conspicuously with the Russian Revolution of to-day, which has developed principles the exact opposite of those with which it started. The exception proves the rule, as we see in the case of our own English Revolution of 1688. Properly considered, that was not a revolution, but a reaction. The revolution had been against the personal and unlimited monarchy of the Stuarts. In 1688 there was a return to the normal development of English society, which had been violently broken. It may fairly be said that a revolution to be successful must be a reaction—that is, it must be a return to an organic historical sequence, which for some reason or other has been interrupted.

Parallels are not to be trusted, if it is attempted to elaborate them in detail, but a sober and scientific generalisation may be of high practical value. At the close of the Great War many people indulged in roseate forecasts of a new world—a land fit for heroes to live in, a land inspired with the spirit of the trenches, a land of co-operation and national and international goodwill. Such hasty idealists were curiously blind to the lessons of the past, and had they considered what happened after the Napoleonic wars they might have found a juster perspective. With a curious exactness the history of the three years after Waterloo has repeated itself to-day. There were the same economic troubles—the same rise in the cost of living, with which wages could not keep pace; the same shrinking of foreign exports owing to difficulties of

exchange ; the same cataclysmic descent of agricultural prices from the high levels of the war ; the same hostility to profiteers ; the same revolt against high taxation, and the same impossibility of balancing budgets without it. The Property tax then was the equivalent of our Excess Profits tax, and it is interesting to note that it was abolished in spite of the Government because the commercial community rose against it. There was the same dread of revolution, and the same blunders in the handling of labour, and there was relatively far greater suffering. Yet the land, in spite of countless mistakes, passed through the crisis and emerged into the sunlight of prosperity. In this case historic precedent is not without its warrant for hope.

One charge has been brought against the study of history—that it may kill reforming zeal. This has been well put by Lord Morley : “ The study of all the successive stages and beliefs, institutions, laws, forms of art, only too soon grows into a substitute for practical criticism of all these things upon their merits and in themselves. Too exclusive attention to dynamic aspects weakens the energetic duties of the static. The method of history is used merely like any other scientific instrument. There is no more conscience in your comparative history than there is in comparative anatomy. You arrange ideals in classes and series ; but the classified ideal loses its vital spark and halo.” There is justice in the warning, for a man may easily fall into the mood in which he sees everything as a repetition of the past, and the world bound on the iron bed of necessity, and may therefore lose his vitality and zest in the practical work of to-day. It is a danger to be guarded against, but to me it seems a far less urgent menace than its opposite—the tendency to forget the past and to adventure in a raw new world without any chart to guide us. History gives us a kind of chart, and we dare not surrender even a small rushlight in the darkness. The hasty reformer who does not remember the past will find himself condemned to repeat it.

There is little to sympathise with in the type of mind which is always inculcating a lack-lustre moderation, and which has attained to such a pitch of abstraction that it finds nothing worth doing and prefers to stagnate in ironic contemplation. Nor is there more to be said for the temper which is always halving differences in a problem and trying to find a middle course. The middle course, mechanically defined, may be the wrong course. The business of a man steering up a difficult estuary is to keep to the deep-water channel, and that channel

may at one hour take him near the left shore and at another hour close to the right shore. The path of false moderation sticks to the exact middle of the channel, and will almost certainly land the pilot on a sandbank. These are the vices that spring from a narrow study of history and the remedy is a broader and juster interpretation. At one season it may be necessary to be a violent innovator, and at another to be a conservative; but the point is that a clear objective must be there, and some chart of the course to steer by. History does not provide a perfect chart, but it gives us something better than guess-work. It is a bridle on crude haste; but it is not less a spur for timidity and false moderation. Above all it is a guide and a comforter to sane idealism. "The true Past departs not," Carlyle wrote, "nothing that was worthy in the Past departs; no Truth or Goodness realised by man ever dies, or can die; but all is still here, and, recognised or not, lives and works through endless change."

JOHN BUCHAN.

NOTE

THIS volume has been prepared under the care of Major-Gen. Lord Edward Gleichen. The Geographical Introduction and first ten chapters of the *History of Serbia* are the work of Miss H. L. Lorimer, M.A. (late Scholar of Girton College, Cambridge, Fellow and Tutor of Somerville College, Oxford), and the last four that of the Rev. R. G. D. Laffan (Fellow and Chaplain of Queens' College, Cambridge, sometime Brackenbury Scholar of Balliol College, Oxford), who is also responsible for *The Yugoslav Movement* and *Yugoslavia to Date*. The Geographical Introduction and first four chapters of the *History of Montenegro* are by Miss L. F. Waring, B.A. (Trinity College, Dublin), and the last three by Mr. H. Baerlein. *The Former Austro-Hungarian Lands*, as well as *The Economics and Resources of Yugoslavia*, are written by Dr. Marion Newbigin, D.Sc. (Editor *Scottish Geographical Magazine*). The Bibliography has been compiled by the respective authors concerned.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION	V
NOTE	X

A. HISTORY

PART I—SERBIA

(FROM THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY)

CHAPTER	
GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION	11
I. THE MEDIÆVAL EMPIRE	15
II. TURKISH SUPREMACY	24
III. SERBIA AND AUSTRIA	29
IV. FROM THE PEACE OF SISTOVA TO THE FIRST REVOLT	36
V. THE FIRST REVOLT. KARA GEORGE	41
VI. THE SECOND REVOLT. MILOŠ OBRENOVIĆ AND ALEXANDER KARAGEORGEVIĆ	46
VII. MILOŠ AND MICHAEL OBRENOVIĆ	53
VIII. MILAN AND ALEXANDER OBRENOVIĆ	57
IX. PETER KARAGEORGEVIĆ. THE TARIFF WAR AND THE ANNEXATION CRISIS	65
X. MACEDONIA AND THE BALKAN WARS	70
XI. THE AUSTRIAN INVASIONS	80

CHAPTER	PAGE
XII. THE CRUSHING OF SERBIA	86
XIII. WAITING FOR THE TURN	92
XIV. VICTORY	100
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE	103

PART II—MONTENEGRO

GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION	107
I. EARLY HISTORY: TO THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	108
II. THE FIRST BISHOPS OF THE PETROVIĆ-NJEGUŠ DYNASTY	112
III. THE LAST BISHOP-PRINCES	117
IV. MONTENEGRO UNDER SECULAR PRINCES	123
V. NICHOLAS AND THE CONSTITUTION	128
VI. THE GREAT WAR	135
VII. AFTER THE FLIGHT OF NICHOLAS	140
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE	143

PART III—THE FORMER AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN LANDS

GENERAL CHARACTERS	147
I. BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA	155
II. CROATIA AND SLAVONIA	165
III. DALMATIA	177
IV. THE SLOVENE LANDS	185
V. THE YUGOSLAV LANDS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM 1914 TO THE PACT OF CORFU (1917)	190

PART IV—THE YUGOSLAV MOVEMENT

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE YUGOSLAV RACE	203
II. THE RISE OF THE YUGOSLAV MOVEMENT	208
III. THE COALITION STRUGGLE	213
IV. THE PROBLEM IN 1914	219
V. REPRESSION, GROWTH, AND CONSUMMATION	224

PART V—YUGOSLAVIA TO DATE

I. NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1918	239
II. 1919 TO DATE	245

B. ECONOMICS

THE ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES OF YUGOSLAVIA

I. GENERAL	253
II. THE INDIVIDUAL KINGDOMS AND PROVINCES	264

C. MISCELLANEOUS

APPENDICES

DEFENCE :

ARMY AND NAVY	279
-------------------------	-----

BIBLIOGRAPHY :

	PAGE
SERBIA	280
MONTENEGRO	281
THE FORMER AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN LANDS	282
INDEX	285

MAPS

YUGOSLAVIA	<i>Frontispiece</i>
SERBIA IN THE MIDDLE AGES	17
THE EXPANSION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO	75
THE ADRIATIC COAST OF YUGOSLAVIA (1)	} <i>Between pp. 152-3</i>
THE ADRIATIC COAST OF YUGOSLAVIA (2)	

A. HISTORY

PART I . SERBIA

*τὸ εὐδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ' ἐλεύθερον
τὸ εὐψυχον κρίναντες. . . .*

THUCYDIDES.

THE spelling of Serbo-Croatian names and place-names in this volume is given according to the Croatian script.

The following consonants differ in their pronunciation from the English, thus :

Croatian.	English.	Examples.	Pronunciation.
c	ts	Toplica, Šabac .	Toplitsa, Shabats
ć	ty, t' ¹	Bileća, Balšić .	Biletya, Balshich
č	ch	Gučko, harač .	Guchko, kharach
dj, gj	dy, d'	Djurić, Gjurić .	Dyurich
dž, ğ	j	Džep, Ğep .	Jep
h	kh ²	Hrvat (Croat) .	Khrvat
j	y	Nemanja, Jastrebac .	Nemanya, Yastrebats
lj	ly, l'	Ljubljana .	Lyublyana
nj	ny, n'	Njeguš .	Nyegush
š	sh	Niš, Šumadija .	Nish, Shumadiya
ž	zh ³	Župan, Požarevac .	Zhupan, Pozharevats

¹ Between t'yě (as in *tune*) and ch. Final ć is transliterated here as ch.

² As ch in Scottish *loch*.

³ As s in *pleasure*.

The initial Slovene V before a consonant is pronounced like a short u (as in *pull*) ; e.g. Vrh is pronounced Urkh.

GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

THE state of Serbia has seen many changes of frontier since the northern region was in 1817 emancipated from the direct government of the Turk. The tiny Principality then created, bounded to the north by the Danube and the Sava, and to the south by an E. and W. line just north of Niš, was but a fraction alike of the mediæval Serbian Kingdom of Raška (Rascia)¹ and of the modern state of 1913, when it had received by the Treaty of Bucharest its final extensions to the south and east (v. p. 75). For the purposes of this sketch Serbia will be taken to denote the kingdom as then (1913) delimited. It was bounded on the north by the Sava and the Danube, and on the east for a short distance by the Danube and the Timok; from the Timok the line followed for some way the crest of the Stara Planina (the Balkan range proper), and then cut across mountainous country to Lake Doiran. Here it turned westward and ran south of Bitolj (Monastir) to Lake Okhrida, and thence northwards, partly by valleys and partly by mountain crests, to the valley of the Drina, whose course it followed to the Sava.

This block of territory falls naturally into three divisions. The first slopes upward from the Sava and Danube to the Kopaonik and Jastrebac mountains, and is drained by the Morava, which falls into the Danube below Semendria (Smederevo); the second consists in the elevated central region in which the great streams that flow to the Adriatic, the Ægean, and the Danube take their rise; the third slopes southward and is drained by the Vardar, which reaches the Ægean at Salonika. The northern region begins with a broad strip

¹ Raška or Rascia, the name of the mediæval Serb state which roughly corresponds to modern Serbia, is derived from the river Raška (near Novi Pazar), a tributary of the Ibar, whose basin was the centre of the original Serbian community. Its connotation extends with the expansion of the Serbian state. Under the Nemanjids of the thirteenth century Raška included the basin of the Ibar and the upper basins of the Drina, Western Morava and Toplica, besides the valley of the Lab. By the end of the century it reached to the Sava and Danube on the north, and included Skoplje to the south.

of level ground, the continuation of the great Hungarian plain, which forms the best and most extensive cornland of the kingdom. To the south succeed uplands, formerly covered with forest, but cleared in the course of the nineteenth century by their peasant holders and now entirely under cultivation. The two main products are cereals, especially maize, and plums, which latter were before the war exported to Hungary and elsewhere. As the land rises to the greater heights of the Kopaonik and Zlatibor mountains, agriculture is replaced by stock-raising, and especially by the traditional industry of pig-breeding, in which maize has replaced as a feeding-stuff the acorns and beech-mast of vanished forests.

The central region is characterised by higher mountains and wider and more fertile valleys. There is no well-defined watershed, and the great depressions of the Morava and Vardar valleys run almost continuously from north to south, separated only by the plains of Preševa and Kosovo, where tributaries seem at first undecided which stream to join. The railway from Belgrade to Salonika, following this great furrow, encountered no serious engineering difficulties. Cereals and live-stock form the staple products of this region also. Corn is grown in the fertile basins of Niš, Kosovo, Metohija, Skoplje, and others of less extent, and the mountain slopes afford excellent pasturage.

The northern and central regions of Serbia contain some of the richest mineral deposits in the Balkan Peninsula. Copper and coal are mined in the Timok basin, coal is known to exist in the Morava region, iron-mining has begun in the Kopaonik mountains, and antimony is found over a very wide area. Nor are the mineral resources of the country as yet fully known.

In the decade immediately preceding the European War, about 30 per cent. of Serbian territory was forest land, and 37 per cent. was cultivated, but these statistics do not include the country south of Vranja, which was acquired only in 1913.

If we seek on the map the natural commercial outlets for this land-locked territory, our eyes are drawn first to the great waterways which link it with Central and Western Europe, and to the two main railways which perform the same function. The Sava, the Drava, the Danube and the Theiss (Tisza) form a great river system converging towards Belgrade. The Danube in particular has great commercial importance: but it must be noted that as an outlet to the sea its utility to Serbia

has in the past been limited. High tolls were imposed at the Iron Gates, which were completely under the control of Hungary, and Serbia was consequently at a disadvantage compared with Bulgaria, who with the same products to export utilised only the last section of the river below the Gates. On the other side, the jealousy of Austrian and especially Hungarian land-owners operated to restrict the entry of Serbian products into the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy. But if the Danubian states should in the future form a federation with a rational commercial policy, the Danube should become a valuable channel of Serbian trade with Central Europe.

Belgrade is the meeting-point not only of rivers but of railways. Here lies the terminus of the line which *viâ* Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Milan connects Serbia directly with the West, and also, by a branch from Zagreb, gives her access to the Adriatic through the now independent state of Fiume. Through Belgrade passes also the great line which links the European capitals with Constantinople, and from which the line to Salonika diverges at Niš. The Constantinople railway has hitherto had little economic significance for Serbia. Not so the Salonika line; affording Serbia her only practicable outlet to the sea, it has been her one important internal artery. These modern connections in part reproduce, in part supersede, the trade routes of the Middle Ages. The orientation of Raška was towards the Bosphorus, the Ægean, and the Adriatic; hence her capital lay far south, fixed successively near Novi Pazar, at Priština, at Prizren and at Skoplje, a region to which roads converged not only from Constantinople and Salonika, but from Ragusa, and which by somewhat circuitous routes had connections with other points on the Adriatic coast. If the routes to the Bosphorus and the Ægean were of paramount political and strategic importance, the most active trade routes were those which linked her with the western sea. Commercial relations with the lands beyond the Danube were of small importance. Imports from northern Europe (such as cloth from Ypres) came, it is true, *viâ* Hungary, but were insignificant compared with the manufactured metal, the silks and glassware which reached her from the Adriatic coast-towns and from Venice herself, and for which she exchanged her metal ores, her furs, and her meat. The Turkish conquest ended this intercourse; and even before the liberation those relations with Austria and Russia had arisen which after it made Serbia politically an extension of Central Europe, while territorially she was severed from the great inlets of the Medi-

terranean by the Turkish Empire and the dominions of the Habsburgs. It is evident that the close relations of Serbia with Central Europe are geographically natural and under modern conditions are bound to continue; but it is also clear that her exclusion from the Adriatic has been artificial and should cease together with the Habsburg control of the coast.

CHAPTER I

THE MEDIÆVAL EMPIRE

THE fourteenth century offers in several respects a convenient starting-point for a sketch of the development of Serbia into a modern state. It is true that many events of supreme importance lie farther back in her history. Her conversion to Christianity in the ninth century and her final adhesion to the Orthodox form, her subjugation by the Bulgars in the tenth century, and the creation of something like a national state by Stefan Nemanja in the twelfth—all these have determined her destiny and left ineffaceable marks on her memory and her character. But there are other memories more vivid still. The fourteenth century saw the creation of the short-lived empire of Stefan Dušan, which in its hour of pride stretched from Albania eastwards to the Struma and beyond it, and from the Danube well-nigh to the Morea—an empire which its founder hoped to base securely on the ruin of the Byzantine power. The same century witnessed not only the crumbling of that empire, but the advance of the Turk, and the fall of Serbian freedom on the field of Kosovo.

History lives for the Serbs as for few other nations. Every peasant knows the great names of the past, enshrined in the poetic tradition which is the glory and the unique heritage of the race; and the memory of former greatness and freedom moulded the consciousness and fed the hopes of enslaved generations.

Before the rise of Stefan Nemanja there was nothing which can properly be called a Serbian State. Society had advanced little beyond the tribal stage. The unit was the *Zadruga*, a patriarchal family living in a single large building to which a room was added as each son married, and governed by an elected "father" or elder. A group of *Zadugas* constituted a *Rod* or "kindred," and a group of Rods a *Pleme* or Clan. The *Pleme* was governed by a *Zupan*, who was originally elected, usually from the same family, by the *Sabor* (assembly) of free

warriors; but under Byzantine authority, partial as it was, from the ninth to the eleventh century, the Župan was employed to collect the imperial taxes, and for imperial convenience his office became hereditary. As the local officials to whom he delegated his functions also tended to become hereditary, a class of nobles, greater and less, arose in course of time. But their privileges never equalled those of the nobles of Western Europe. Primogeniture was not recognised, and by the equal division of property among the children the growth of great estates was prevented. The administration of justice belonged to the King or to the community, and very few nobles acquired the right of exercising it over their free tenants. A serf class existed, but was not numerous. Every village had its free Sabor, and no superior authority could effect much against the spirit of local independence. The survival of so democratic an organisation was dangerous for a mediæval nation which, hemmed in by powerful and warlike states, depended for its existence on its military efficiency. It proved inevitably fatal when confronted with the most professional army of the time, inspired by religious fervour and directed by despotic authority.

Before the end of the tenth century the Župans were electing a Grand Župan to rule over Raška, the germ of the Serbian state; and the Grand Župan developed into something like a hereditary king, though the succession was rarely undisputed. But there was no machinery comparable to the feudalism of the West for enforcing military service and putting an army promptly in the field; and the power of the King was effectually limited by the development of the National Assembly, or Sabor. This body consisted of the nobility and higher clergy, and also contained a strong popular element in the village headmen, who were at first popularly-elected officials. Like the Župans they tended to become hereditary, but none the less they represented local sentiment, which was frequently in opposition to the kingly power.

In the twelfth century Raška was still a loose confederation of tribes maintaining with the help of the Magyars a precarious independence against the attacks of the Byzantine Empire. Out of these centrifugal elements Nemanja built up a national state. Originally the Župan of a small district, he not only asserted his authority over the whole of Raška, but united to it Zeta,¹ and a good deal of territory conquered from the Byzantines. His dominions stretched from the Adriatic and

¹ Roughly corresponding to the present Montenegro.

actually received his crown from the Pope in 1217. But his brother, the monk Sava, a man of statesmanlike gifts who after his death became the great national saint of Serbia, foresaw that the Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople in their exile at Nicæa would be more indulgent to national aspirations than ever Rome would be, and induced him to reverse this policy. Sava himself proceeded on a mission to Nicæa, easily secured, as the price of Serbia's return to the Orthodox confession, the recognition of his Church as autonomous and autocephalous and the creation of an Archbishopric subject only to the authority of Constantinople, and was himself consecrated the first Archbishop. The effect of the new arrangement was to supersede in the Nemanjid realm the authority of the Archbishops of Okhrida, who were Greeks by race but under Bulgarian domination, by that of the new Archbishop, and to make the authority of the Serbian Church coextensive with that of the sovereign. The change had all the immediate consequences which Sava foresaw, and others not less important in the dark days of Turkish supremacy. The national Church became the chief refuge of the national spirit, and preserved it when the Greek Church, or, rather, the miserable gang which directed its affairs, allied itself with the infidel oppressor.

The later Nemanjids were for the most part inferior in force and ability to the founders of the line, and were engaged in constant strife with their nobles and their sons. They were hemmed in on the east and south by the Bulgars, and were often embroiled with them and with the people of Ragusa, a town which Nemanja himself had failed to conquer, and which never became subject to Serbia.

The next sovereign of note was Uroš II (Milutin), who reigned from 1282 to 1321. He extended his domains to the south and east, acquiring the town of Skoplje, which became his capital; but the internal development of Serbia under his rule is more important than his military successes. Under him the foundations of economic prosperity were laid, and thus the empire of Stefan Dušan was rendered possible.

A period of confusion followed his death in 1321. Ultimately his son was elected and crowned as Uroš III, the young son of this latter, Stefan Dušan, being made under-king of Zeta at the same time. The new king found himself at once involved in war with the rulers of Bosnia for the province of Zahumlje,¹ which he lost to them, and therewith the trade

¹ This province included part of the modern Hercegovina. Its centre was at Trebinje.

route down the Narenta to the Adriatic. But though himself unwarlike, he was urged to exertion by his spirited son, and fortune smiled on him elsewhere. Taking advantage of the civil war then raging in the Byzantine Empire, he seized Prilep, thus opening the way to Monastir, and when the new Emperor Andronicus III formed an alliance with Bulgaria, Uroš advanced with his son Dušan, now about twenty-two years of age, to meet the enemy at Kyustendil. The defeat of the Bulgars (July 8th, 1330) was complete, and in the short period of freedom which remained to both nations they were never again a danger to the Serbs. Uroš next turned against the Emperor and drove him back, capturing Veles, Prošenik, and Ištup. This was the end of his good fortune. Envious of Dušan's powers, he seems to have contemplated setting him aside in favour of a younger son and probably intended to take his life. Dušan forestalled him by taking the field with his troops; Uroš was captured, imprisoned, and deposed by the Sabor, and within a few weeks died a mysterious death; whether the act was that of the young Dušan himself or of the wild nobles who wished to see a warlike prince on the throne remains uncertain.

Dušan now entered on a reign of twenty-four years (1331–55), in the course of which he doubled the area of his realm and raised it to the rank of an imperial power. The imperial idea was no new one; the decaying Byzantine Empire offered at once a model and a field. But Dušan was the first ruler of a genius to form a definite plan and pursue it undistracted. From first to last his eyes were fixed on Constantinople. It was in pursuance of this policy that he made no effort to reconquer Zahumlje, while to Ragusa he ceded Stagno,¹ the only port to the north which remained in Serbian hands. He thus established with the wealthy and independent city the permanent good understanding so important to Serbian commerce, and enjoyed her support in the wars which more than once broke out with Bosnia and Hungary; and he maintained friendly relations with Venice, who protected his trade in the Adriatic, as well as with Bulgaria and Walachia.

The chaos into which the Byzantine Empire fell on the death of Andronicus in 1341 afforded fresh opportunities to Stefan, who now turned his attention to the south and east. Fortress after fortress fell, thanks no doubt largely to his foreign mercenaries, for the Serbs were inexperienced in siege operations; but the spirit that directed and inspired the systematic

¹ On Sabbioncello.

advance was Dušan's. Albania, Macedonia with its great fortress of Okhrida, and finally Seres, beyond the Struma, fell successively into his hands.

On Easter Sunday, 1346, Stefan Dušan was proclaimed Emperor of Serbia and Greece in presence of a Sabor in which Greek, Albanian, and Serbian nobles met, while Greece and Bulgaria sent ecclesiastics of rank and Bulgaria her Patriarch to assist at the coronation ceremony. Stefan had before him ten years of life and of mainly successful warfare. Epirus and Greece as far south as the Gulfs of Arta and Volo were added to his dominions, but in 1350, while he was engaged with the Bosnians on his western frontier, the Byzantine Cantacuzenus (co-Emperor with John Palæologus) invaded his territories on the east with a large body of Turks, and only the prompt generalship of Dušan was able to hurl back the invasion from Thessaly. War broke out between the Byzantine rulers, and John sought and obtained help from Dušan; but their mixed forces suffered an ominous defeat at the hands of their opponent's Turkish cavalry. Cantacuzenus was powerless to control the spirits he had evoked: and in 1354 the Turks secured a permanent footing on European soil by seizing and fortifying the peninsula of Gallipoli. Meantime Stefan's plans for the conquest of Constantinople were ripening. Already in 1350 he had proposed, through his ambassador at Venice, an offensive alliance for this purpose, hoping to secure the co-operation of the Venetian fleet; but the Republic was cautious, and Dušan could rely on nothing more than the benevolent neutrality which had always been extended to him. Whether without a fleet he could have achieved his ambition is doubtful, and the question was not put to the proof. In the autumn of 1355 he was in the south of his dominions preparing the great campaign which was to open to him the gates of the imperial city, when death struck him down at the age of forty-eight, and the last hope, not merely of Serbian expansion, but of resistance to the rising power of the Turk, was extinguished. Like Stefan the First-Crowned, Dušan had entertained the idea of reconciliation with Rome; and had he had time to carry out this project and strengthen the Empire of the East by effective alliances in the West, the course of history might have been altered. As it was, the fabric of the Serbian Empire collapsed even more rapidly than it had arisen: but its glories had profoundly impressed the national imagination.

Serbian society had undergone a remarkable development since the days of Nemanja. Comparatively settled government

had made it possible for the first time to exploit the internal resources of the country, and the nationalisation of the Church had enabled a series of enlightened sovereigns to use it as a powerful instrument for the spread of civilisation and learning. Uroš II and Uroš III built magnificent monasteries, bringing their architects from afar; and in these institutions works covering the whole range of Byzantine erudition were translated into Serbian, while independent Serbian literature took its rise in the form of biographies of the Nemanjid kings and Serbian saints. The development of material prosperity is most marked under Uroš II. Flocks and herds, particularly swine, were then, as in modern times, the principal wealth of the country. Serbian pork victualled the ships of the Adriatic; corn and furs were exported in various directions; and the copper, iron, silver and gold mines, left idle since Roman days, were worked by foreigners imported for the purpose.¹ The wealth thus acquired enabled the monarch to equip himself with an army of mercenaries,² and so opened the way to conquest and expansion.

Expansion brought with it the need for further organisation, and thus led to the first codification of Serbian law. The code (*zakonik*), drawn up and passed by the monarch and national Sabor in 1349, embodies in the main old Serbian law and custom and the enactments of earlier kings and Sabors. It is restricted almost entirely to the domain of public law, where the structure of Serbian society rendered the Byzantine code inapplicable, and to criminal law; in practically the whole field of private law the Byzantine code, manuals of which exist in contemporary Serbian translations, was in force.

The new civilisation was doomed to destruction before it had well struck root. In spite of the economic development of the land, the Serb himself remained a hunter, a herdsman, and in a less degree an agriculturist. The population of the towns was almost entirely foreign, consisting of Ragusans and Venetians engaged in trade, and of the miners already mentioned, and it is partly for this reason that they never attained the development of the mediæval cities of the West. Yet the elements of an advanced civilisation were present: and the development of Ragusa under Western influences shows what mediæval Serbia might have become had she escaped her doom.

¹ Mainly by Germans from Hungary, who have left traces of their name (Sasi = Saxons) in more than one mountain village.

² Uroš II employed mainly Turks from Asia Minor, Tatars from South Russia, and Ossetes from the Caucasus. Uroš III had Spaniards and Aragonese; Dušan had Germans.

But once the strong hand of Dušan was withdrawn, this could not long be deferred. Throughout Stefan's dominions the subordinate rulers hastened to assert their independence of Uroš IV, his feeble successor. Meanwhile the Turks were pursuing their advance, and in 1361 drove a wedge into Byzantine territory by the victory of Lule Burgas, which before long delivered Philippopolis and Adrianople into their hands. A league was now formed between the chief Serbian rulers, Vukašin of Prilep, Knez Lazar, who governed the Rudnik district in the north, and Uroš, and some Bulgarian and Hungarian help was secured. But the allied forces sustained a bloody defeat on the Marica in 1371, of which the immediate result was the loss of Macedonia. The Serbian princes of that region became in fact, though not always in name, subject to the Turk, among them Vukašin's son and successor, Marko Kraljević of Prilep, the greatest hero of Serbian legend and song. How he attained this pre-eminence is obscure, for he perished in battle fighting for the Turk against his own countrymen, and not improbably fought against them also on the field of Kosovo. But there is doubtless more in the matter than a caprice of popular fancy. He is represented in legend as influential with the Sultan, and able to protect his countrymen from the arbitrary violence of individual Turks, a state of affairs by no means impossible in the early, cautious days of Ottoman supremacy. A tributary prince who could defend his subjects against alien oppression was at least as true a friend of his race as the independent chiefs who wore out their strength in internal quarrels farther north.

The Turkish conquest gradually proceeded till Niš, a place of the highest strategic importance, fell, and only Lazar was left to head the resistance of the chiefs of the north. He secured the aid of Tvrtko of Bosnia, and the allied forces won a victory at Pločnik on the Toplica in 1388, but the advantage was merely temporary. In June 1389 the Sultan Amurath led a great host to the plain of Kosovo, where he was met by Knez Lazar at the head of a mixed force which included Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, and Croats. If tradition may be trusted, disunion prevailed in the Serb camp. Miloš Obilić penetrated by a ruse to the Sultan's tent, and there slew him, but it was Lazar's accusation of treachery that goaded him to the useless if heroic act. Popular imagination fixed on Vuk Branković, a son-in-law of Knez Lazar, as a scapegoat, and credits him with traducing Miloš as well as transferring his own forces to the Turks at the crisis of the battle.

Be that as it may, the Serbian defeat was complete. Lazar and nearly all his nobles fell on the field or were captured and executed, and Serbian resistance in any large sense was broken. The Turkish conquest, however, proceeded in the same cautious and leisurely manner as before; one chief after another was subdued, and their followings went to form a fresh contingent in the conquering army. The last independent ruler of Serbian territory was the Despot George Branković,¹ who held sway in North Serbia from 1427 to 1458, and, as Belgrade was now occupied by the Hungarians, fortified Smederevo as his chief stronghold, and formed an alliance with the Hungarian leader, John Hunyadi, to prevent the further advance of the Ottomans. But their efforts were unavailing, and a year after George's death Smederevo fell into Turkish hands. The conquest of Serbia was now complete; but one Serbian land remained for ever free, or at least unvanquished. Montenegro with her mountain fastnesses, whither many of the higher-class Serbs retreated, defied the Crescent and kept alive in her enslaved neighbours the memory of the past and the hope of the future. The Roman conqueror of Britain meditated the subjugation of Ireland, deeming that the Britons of the larger island would be more tractable if "liberty were removed out of their sight." Liberty was never wholly removed out of Serbia's sight, and the fact counts for much in her later history.

Other portions of the Serbian stock escaped enslavement for a while. Under George Branković large numbers of Serbs migrated to South Hungary, where the Despot had great estates and where probably they found a considerable population of their own blood already settled, and large tracts of Slavonia were subsequently peopled in the same way by refugees; but all alike were submerged as the wave of Turkish invasion flowed on to Buda. Had the Serbs possessed a leader like Dušan, the Turkish attack might have led to the development of that organic unity for lack of which the Serbian Empire had perished. But in the absence of great leadership, the loose fabric of their society, with its characteristically Aryan sentiment of local independence, could not stand before a glowing fanaticism disciplined by military science and inspired by the single idea of conquest.

¹ George Branković was the son of Vuk and grandson of Knez Lazar on the mother's side. He ruled with a strong hand, and it has been suggested that his consequent unpopularity first gave rise to the story of his father's treachery at Kosovo.

CHAPTER II

TURKISH SUPREMACY

THE history of Serbia under the Turk lends itself to abbreviation. Time is measured only by what happens in it, and in the stagnation of Turkish rule nothing happens but the monotonous visits of the tax-collector, while aggravated misrule brings revolts extinguished with a no less monotonous brutality. If in the eyes of the Balkan states the quarrels, the ambitions, and the claims of a thousand years ago have all the freshness of yesterday, it is because the intervening period is so largely a blank.

Turkish supremacy was not at first the unmitigated evil which it afterwards became. The Christian was definitely regarded as inferior to the Moslem and excluded from high office in the Turkish Empire, but he was permitted to practise his own faith, a concession which no Latin conqueror would have allowed him. Islam made no headway in Serbia. In Bosnia the nobles apostasised in large numbers, thus securing the continued tenure of their privileges and estates; but in Serbia the greater nobles had been almost exterminated in the course of the wars. In the early days of Turkish rule, however, a considerable number of small districts were under the authority of native Christian rulers known as *bashi-knezes*. They were responsible for the collection of the Turkish tribute, but were not otherwise interfered with, and administered their districts in accordance with Serbian usage. Contrary to their practice elsewhere, which forbade the bearing of arms by Christians, the Turks continued to draw large contingents for their armies from the Serbs, whose fine fighting qualities were thus maintained. The tribute was at first not oppressive, and their other burdens were comparatively few. It is true that the Turkish army was maintained entirely at the expense of the subject Christian populations of the Empire. The *spahis*, who were bound to service as cavalry when need arose, were granted the

revenues from lands tilled by the *rayah*,¹ and the pay of the *janissaries*, who formed the standing infantry force, was provided by the land in which they were stationed. But originally spahis were few in Serbia and the janissaries fewer still, or entirely absent.

The status of the Church was unfavourably affected. The Turk, finding in the Patriarch of Constantinople a supple instrument of despotism, desired to extend his authority and placed the Serbian Church once more under the Greek Archbishops of Okhrida. These dignitaries however had no great love for the Patriarch, and much less harm was done than when in the eighteenth century the Patriarch once more secured supremacy over the Serbian Church. Nor was the new arrangement long lived, for in 1557 the Grand Vizier Sokolović, a Serb who if a renegade to his faith was true to his race, restored the Patriarchate of Ipek. But the Church did increasingly suffer from impoverishment, being entirely dependent for support on the voluntary offerings of the *rayah*, the miseries of whose lot increased as the abuses of Turkish rule became more pronounced. The ruin of a large number of monasteries involved the almost total extinction of education. Still a few foundations remained, faithfully copying the sacred texts and preventing the knowledge of letters from wholly perishing out of the land. Twice the Patriarch of Ipek appeared in the character of a national leader. Jovan II encouraged the widespread "Insurrection of St. Sava," which broke out in 1593 and smouldered on till 1609; and some eighty years later Arsenius III embarked on a more momentous policy.

The repulse of the Turks from Vienna in 1683 was followed up by an Austrian advance. Most of Hungary was reconquered, the Serbs of the south rising in support of the Austrians, who in 1688 captured the great fortress of Belgrade and for a time held all Serbia as far south as Skoplje. The Serbs were summoned by the Emperor Leopold to rise in support of his invasion, and at first responded with enthusiasm; but the Jesuits followed in the train of the army, and the usual efforts to force the Latin rite on the Orthodox ensued. Arsenius began to negotiate with Russia, who was also engaged in war with the Turk, and the Serbs fell away from the Austrian cause. This fact counted for much in the rapid triumph of the Turkish Grand Vizier, Kiuprili, who advanced through Serbia, recapturing Vidin, Niš, and Belgrade itself, and in 1691 carried the Turkish arms once more into Hungary.

¹ *Rayah* (herd) was the name given by the Turks to their Christian subjects.

The position of Arsenius was now dangerous, and he began to consider an offer which Leopold, on finding the tide turn against him, had appended to his first offer to the Serbs. All Serbs migrating to Austrian territory were to receive land in return for military service, and were to enjoy full religious autonomy and certain ill-defined national privileges. Arsenius decided that acceptance was the least dangerous of the courses open to him, and he headed a great exodus of some 30,000 or 40,000 families, who settled mainly in the district west of the Theiss known as Bačka, and formed an important part of Austria's defences against the Turk. The promise of religious freedom was respected,¹ though the others were broken, and though Serbian opinion is generally hostile to Arsenius, there can be little doubt that his decision was wise. The emigrants were gainers at the time, for the brief rising in Serbia was terribly visited on those who remained; and they contributed materially to the victory of Austria over the Turk, which was the indispensable preliminary to any improvement in the condition of Eastern Europe. In 1697 Prince Eugène of Savoy took command of the Austrian forces, and in the battle of Zenta, where the Serbian contingent greatly distinguished itself, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Turk. Two years later, by the Peace of Karlowitz, the Porte resigned to Austria the whole of Hungary except the Banat, and most of Slavonia and Croatia. The Peace of Karlowitz (1699) marks the first turn of the tide in Ottoman fortunes and the opening of a new era. Henceforth the Austro-Turkish frontier was to divide Serbs of the Orthodox faith, a fact second in importance only to the independence of Montenegro.

The frontier which divides a high-spirited race is apt to be insecure; but if all the Yugoslav subjects of the Habsburgs had been Catholics, the estranging force of religious differences might have prevailed over the sentiment of racial unity with their Orthodox kinsmen. As it was, the double tie which united the Serbs of the Habsburg Monarchy with their brethren was never broken. In the eyes of the state whose frontiers they protected they were barbarians and schismatics with a disloyal inclination towards Orthodox Russia. Hence arose that avowed contempt and unavowed terror of the Orthodox Yugoslav which determined so much of Austria's internal and external policy, and made her for a century before the European War the frightened and blustering gaoler of Serbia.

The lot of the Austrian Serbs was not always better than

¹ The office of Patriarch, however, was suppressed.

that of the subjects of the Turk, and in Hungary they were the objects of severe religious persecution. But they were in touch with civilisation, and attained a degree of education and culture denied to the rayah of Serbia; while the treatment they received was not such as to make them forget the land of their origin. When the day of Serbia's freedom came, the Hungarian Serbs supported her cause with men and money, and when the cause was won, rendered her a service no less important by supplying the best of her teachers, preachers, and administrators for the next half-century.

Turkey, though humiliated, was not crushed. In 1711 the Porte won a signal victory over the Russians on the Pruth, and secured peace in that quarter for nearly a quarter of a century. She next proceeded to expel the Venetians from the Morea and the Greek islands, which they had held since 1687, but this brought Austria into the field, her forces once more under the command of Prince Eugène. The last remnant of Turkish Hungary, the Banat of Temešvar, fell immediately into his hands (1716), and the great fortress of Belgrade surrendered after a siege of two months (August 1717). In 1718 the Peace of Passarowitz¹ confirmed Turkey in the possession of the Morea and Archipelago, but transferred to Austria the Banat of Temešvar, Slavonia, the greater part of Serbia, with the frontier fortresses, part of Bosnia and Little Walachia, all except the last being regions inhabited mainly or solely by Serbian populations.

These new possessions were retained by Austria till 1739, but the Serbs found that they had not gained much by their change of master. They were ruthlessly taxed and also subjected to military levies; the more systematic character of the exactions was not an advantage from their point of view, and to their other sufferings was now added for the first time religious persecution. It is significant that in 1739 the Serbs showed no disposition to help the Austrians, and in the long-run it was well for them that they did not. Had Austrian rule been maintained, it might have crushed the Serbian spirit of independence more effectually than that of the Turk. But it was short-lived. War broke out between Russia and the Porte in 1735, and Austria, the ally of the former, in 1738 sent an army across the Danube and captured Niš. But her troops were no longer led by Eugène, and those of the Porte, carefully drilled by French officers, were not to be despised. Urged on by the French Ambassador Villeneuve, the Turks

¹ Strictly speaking, Požarevac.

proceeded to a vigorous offensive. Marching down the Morava, they laid siege to Belgrade, where the incapable Austrian general Neipperg was presently persuaded by Villeneuve to negotiate. On September 1, 1739, the Treaty of Belgrade was signed, whereby Austria withdrew from Serbia, Bosnia, and Little Walachia, and restored to the Porte the fortresses including Belgrade. This amazing surrender threw away a possession of incalculable value. Belgrade was the key of the route to the Ægean, and control of this important highway was certainly one of the objects of Austrian policy in 1718. The dream was to recur: but with Belgrade the means of realising it were gone.

CHAPTER III

SERBIA AND AUSTRIA

THESE advances and retreats of half a century were merely phases of a struggle which came to a halt, though not to an end, in 1739, and it has been convenient to pursue them to that point. But a new epoch had opened with the Austrian advance of 1688. The relations of the European states to the Turkish Empire began to exercise a much more direct influence on the course of events in Serbia.

The rise of Russia under Peter the Great and her entry into the European state system was a new, and for Turkey a most disquieting, factor. Herself in a state of rapid decay, she was confronted along the greater part of her northern boundaries by a rising and ambitious Power, which regarded itself not only as the legitimate heir to the Byzantine Empire, but also as destined to find an outlet to the sea by way of Constantinople. In religion, moreover, it was Orthodox, and therefore much more likely than any of the Catholic states to take an inconvenient interest in the welfare of fellow-believers under the Turkish yoke. The dealings of the Patriarch Arsenius with Russia in 1689 were symptomatic. Austria shared the interest of Russia in forcing back the frontiers of the decaying Ottoman power, and consequently acted more or less in concert with her. From 1726 onwards these two Powers were united in an alliance which with a few interruptions subsisted for over a century, but naturally became less and less solid as the advance of Russia brought the rival Empires into contacts which were apt to be collisions.

France, on the other hand, commercially supreme in the Levant, had a special interest not only in preserving good relations with the Porte, but in the stability and good behaviour of that Power. Her policy, therefore, especially after the Austrian advance of 1718, was "to maintain the integrity of

the Ottoman Empire," and in pursuance of this aim to assist the Porte to develop an efficient army, and to strengthen the central government against the disorderly Moslem elements which as the century advanced threatened complete disruption. This policy was never more ably represented than by Villeneuve, who virtually directed Ottoman policy in 1738 and 1739. In the nineteenth century French influence waned, and the consequence for Serbia was that she became more and more a pawn in the long duel between Austria and Russia which was closed only by the European War.

The assaults on the Turkish Empire had the immediate effect of altering the internal conditions of Serbia very much for the worse. The support given by the Serbs to the Austrian invasion of 1688 filled the Turks with rage and suspicion. The districts hitherto ruled by Christian *bashi-knezes* responsible only to the pasha fell almost without exception under direct Turkish administration. The country was placed under a pasha with two horse-tails, and divided into four subordinate pashaliks with headquarters at Belgrade, Vidin, Niš and Leskovac. Each pashalik was subdivided into *nahis*, and in each of these a *kadi* resided, charged with the administration of justice between Moslems or between Moslems and Christians, and responsible to the pasha of his pashalik. All "political" offences came within his purview, and the term could be given a wide application. Yet some elements of independent community life remained. The taxes of each village were collected by the headman, or *knez*, and probably even at that date there was for each nahi an *oborknez*, responsible for collecting the sum due from the district. The oborknez, in the later period about which definite information is forthcoming, was sometimes elected, and administered justice in his village according to Serbian law and custom. The existence of a body of men accustomed to exercise a certain authority over their compatriots proved to be of great importance when the day of revolt came. The number of spahis, or Turkish cavalry, resident in the land and maintained by it, was greatly increased. They were for the most part Moslemised Serbs of Bosnian origin and therefore of one blood and speech with the people whom they oppressed, a not infrequent phenomenon in the Turkish Empire. The spahi was entitled to a tithe of the produce of the lands assigned for his maintenance and to certain other dues; but he did not own the land nor reside on it, nor did his caste in any sense constitute a native Moslem nobility such as existed in Bosnia.

The weakness, or rather anarchy, which with a few interludes prevailed at Constantinople was reflected in almost incredible misrule and oppression in the provinces. As the multitude of corrupt and dishonest functionaries grew in the capital, and as the treasury was more and more systematically plundered, the demands on the provinces increased and also the exactions of the local officials. Their salaries, always inadequate and always in arrears, were frequently not paid at all; to supply the lack, a grinding system of organised extortion was applied to the hapless Christian, who had no redress whatever against his oppressors. Besides the *harač*, or poll-tax, levied on all infidels and sent to Constantinople, he had to bear the cost of local administration, maintain the spahis and pay the janissaries quartered in his district, and in addition to satisfy the private greed of the pasha, his underlings, and any Moslem with whom he came in contact. He could hardly perform a single action without the payment of a fee: permission for a marriage, a funeral, the erection or even the repair of a building had to be purchased from the spahis or the Turkish authorities; and it need hardly be added that the Christian was powerless to protect his womenfolk from the insatiable demands of the Turkish harīm.

The obligation to entertain and, if need be, furnish transport to all Turks travelling on official business was so onerous that the neighbourhood of the main roads was almost deserted. The wilder spirits among the rayah turned *haiduk* (i.e. brigand), fled to the forests and formed organised bands which maintained themselves by plunder, thus adding still further to the misery of their fellow-countrymen; for every looted caravan had to be made good by the district in which the outrage occurred. Some lively sketches of the conditions prevalent are preserved in the letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, who in 1717 travelled across Serbia with a guard of 500 janissaries. Her testimony is of peculiar interest, for this route to Constantinople was very rarely followed by European travellers, who generally went by boat down the Danube.

"We crossed the deserts of Serbia," she writes from Adrianople to the Princess of Wales, "almost quite overgrown with wood, through a country naturally fertile. The inhabitants are industrious, but the oppression of the peasants is so great, they are forced to abandon their houses and neglect their tillage, all they have being a prey to the janissaries, whenever they please to seize upon it. We had a guard of 500 of them, and I was almost in tears every day to see their insolencies in the

poor villages through which we passed. After seven days' travelling through thick woods, we came to Nissa, once the capital of Serbia, situated in a fine plain on the river Nissava, in a very good air, and so fruitful a soil that the great plenty is hardly credible. . . . The happiness of this plenty is scarce perceived by the oppressed people. I saw here a new occasion for my compassion, the wretches that had provided twenty wagons for our baggage from Belgrade hither for a certain hire being all sent back without payment, some of their horses lamed and others killed, without any satisfaction made for them. The poor fellows came round the house weeping and tearing their hair and beards in a most pitiful manner, without getting anything but drubs from the insolent soldiers. I cannot express to your Royal Highness how much I was moved at this scene. I would have paid them the money out of my own pocket with all my heart, but it would have been only giving so much to the Aga,¹ who would have taken it from them without any remorse."

The Treaty of Karlowitz had greatly altered the position of Serbia by making her a frontier province of the Turkish Empire, in contact, moreover, with the lately victorious foe. The Danube became a frontier of critical importance, and a garrison of janissaries was posted, apparently for the first time, in Belgrade.

This famous corps, which formed the professional infantry of the Turkish army, had greatly changed since the days when it was maintained by a regular tribute of children from the conquered Christian lands. The tribute, gradually diminished, had finally ceased in 1676, and the janissaries had become a close, mainly hereditary corporation, subject to no authority in the State and only doubtfully submissive to their own officers.

Their return in 1739 was the prelude to many troubles. They inaugurated a new abuse, equally menacing to Turkish authority and to the rayah, by forcibly establishing themselves as landed proprietors in the Pashalik of Belgrade. Seizing the principal inhabitants of the village, they would force them to go through the form of selling their land, and professed to advance the harač, recovering it afterwards from the community; while the ousted spahi tried to wring his dues also from the same wretched victims.

While Turkish misrule was thus intensifying social misery in Serbia, the liberty of her Church was attacked from another

¹ I.e. officer of the janissaries.

quarter. Its independence was obnoxious to the Phanar,¹ the body of Greek officials who, though excluded from the highest posts, had acquired virtual control of the administrative machine at Constantinople. This body, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, had begun to work for the forcible Hellenisation of the Orthodox Church throughout the Turkish dominions. The Bulgarians and Romanians were the first to suffer, and it was not until 1766 that the Byzantine Patriarch secured the abolition of the Patriarchate of Ipek, thereby extinguishing the national Church of Serbia, and bringing the whole religious organisation under Greek control. All the Serbian bishops were deposed and many of the inferior clergy driven from their charges; vacant places were put up to auction with the proviso that bidders must be able to speak Greek. The new clergy, Greek by blood and often unable to speak any Slavonic tongue, oppressed alike their flocks and their Serbian colleagues. They destroyed the manuscripts preserved in the monasteries, especially the Slavonic liturgies, for which they substituted the Greek form. The exactions of the Greek Metropolitan, necessary not only to support his own dignity but to pay the large sums which he owed to the Byzantine Patriarchate for his elevation, were enforced by the authority of the Turk, and it is not surprising that the Serbs regarded the principal dignitary of their Church as that which in fact he was—an alien oppressor leagued with their infidel tyrants.

The next European war in which Turkey engaged, though it did not directly affect Serbian territory, brought about a new relation between Russia and the Christian subjects of the Porte, and made her a factor in every subsequent movement for liberation. In 1770 Catherine II, moved partly by rumours of discontent among the subject populations of the Balkans, and especially the Greeks, sent a naval expedition to the Mediterranean. Humiliating reverses were sustained, but these were more than cancelled by the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Chios. Constantinople was menaced and by a more energetic commander might have been seized, and a thrill of expectation ran through the subject lands. The jealous watchfulness of Austria was at once aroused, and the golden moment passed. Catherine was invited to compensate herself in Poland for renunciation on the Pruth and the Danube, and when the war was terminated in 1774 by the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji, the territorial acquisitions of Russia, though not unimportant, were limited to the regions north of the Black Sea. But she asserted

¹ So called from the suburb of Constantinople in which they lived.

her position as the great Orthodox Power by claiming a sort of informal protectorate over all Christians of the Greek rite who were subjects of the Porte—a position which she meant to use as France used her right of protecting the small number of Latin Christians who were in the same position. It will be remembered that practically all the Slav populations of the Balkans were now included in the definition.

Maria Theresia was profoundly alarmed by the new developments and, till her death in 1780, was studious to preserve the *status quo* on the Danube and allow her rival no pretext for aggression. But Joseph II, finding his ambitions in the West thwarted, conceived the idea of satisfying them in another quarter. He came to an understanding with Catherine, and a comprehensive scheme was formulated for the dismemberment of Turkey and the partition of her European dominions. Humanity would thus, as Joseph put it, be avenged on the barbarian, while Austria, whose share alone concerns us, would annex Little Walachia, as much of Serbia as she held by the Treaty of Passarowitz, Bosnia, the Hercegovina, Dalmatia, and Montenegro. An active Austrian propaganda was maintained in Serbian lands through Austrian officers and other agents, cautiously until the outbreak of the war, and thereafter quite openly. All Serbs of standing were invited to take an oath of allegiance to the Austrian Emperor, and readily complied; for incorporation in the Empire was regarded as a certainty. Hostilities broke out between Turkey and Russia in 1787, and in the following year Joseph took the field. The war opened favourably for the Austrians, who seized Belgrade and entered Bosnia. But Europe could not contemplate with equanimity the vast prospective extension of Russian and Austrian territory and influence; and when Joseph died in 1790 his more prudent successor bowed to the storm. Chiefly owing to pressure from England and Prussia, Austria in 1791 concluded the Peace of Sistova, whereby she relinquished her conquests, and once more withdrew beyond the Sava.

Her transitory occupation of Serbian lands would not in itself have produced permanent results; Austrians had been seen before to come—and go. Far more important was the fact that Joseph had invited the inhabitants of the invaded regions to join his forces. They had responded in large numbers and were enrolled in a Volunteer Corps commanded by officers of their own race; and in this force several of the subsequent leaders of the revolt, including Kara George himself, served their military apprenticeship. The effect on the national conscious-

ness can hardly be overestimated. Under the later phases of Turkish rule the rayah had almost everywhere been jealously excluded from military service ; now they fought victoriously side by side with the soldiers of a great Christian Power. Not only did they render excellent service at the siege of Belgrade but, following routes never before traversed by an army, they penetrated to the heart of the country and captured Kruševac, the old capital of Knez Lazar. The churches built by the royal saint had been turned by the Turks into stables ; they were cleaned and reconsecrated, and the victors met in them to celebrate services of thanksgiving. The men who took part in these deeds were not likely to relapse into their former servitude. The story goes that, when the peace was signed, the Turkish commissioners who came to receive one of the surrendered fortresses were startled and dismayed to see a Serbian contingent march out, fully armed and perfect in the Austrian drill. " Neighbours," cried one of them, " what have you made of our rayah ? " Time was soon to show.

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE PEACE OF SISTOVA TO THE FIRST REVOLT

THE Peace of Sistova secured an amnesty for all Christian subjects of the Sultan who had served in the Volunteer Corps, and the promise was honourably observed by the new Sultan, Selim III, who had ascended to the throne in 1789. None the less, the dismay and indignation of the Serbs when the terms became known were unbounded. Unaware of the international compulsion under which Austria acted, they only saw that the land which had been won almost entirely by Serbian troops, under Serbian leadership, was restored to the tyrant with no conditions as to its future government; while their pleadings for some foreign guarantee of improved treatment were disregarded. One protest, though it failed to reach its destination, deserves note. A petition signed by oborknezes and knezes, secular priests, and heads of religious houses was addressed to the Sabor of the Serbian Church in Austria, then in session at Temešvar, in the hope that their brethren beyond the Danube might be able to bring it to the notice of the Emperor. The document protested against the retransfer of the Serbs to Turkey, asked for arms and ammunition if no other help was accorded, and explicitly stated that, if they were completely disregarded, they must apply for protection to "another Power." The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji was bearing fruit.

Austria probably did not foresee the degree to which her refusal was to shake her prestige in Serbia. To all remonstrances she replied only with the offer of a favourable reception to any Serbs who should immigrate to Habsburg territories; and this immigration she took some pains to promote. But little response was made, for indignation against Austria was too strong, and the conciliatory attitude enforced by Selim on the returning Turks gave hopes of a better future. The new

Sultan was a ruler of exceptional vigour, ability, and enlightenment, and the extremity in which he found himself might prove to be the rayah's opportunity. The financial situation was desperate; the army was inefficient and mutinous; pashas were trying in various quarters to establish themselves as independent rulers, and the discontent of the suffering Christian populations had reached such a point that they could no longer be safely oppressed as in the past. The crux of the situation was that no improvement could be effected without drastic reforms, which must include the concession of something like an equal status to the rayah; but the Turkish conception of Empire was based on the inferiority of the infidel, who had no rights and existed merely on sufferance. Hence the reform of the Turkish Empire has never been anything but a contradiction in terms; reform could only mean extinction. This was less obvious at the time than it subsequently became; and to the task of reform Selim vigorously addressed himself.

Ibn Beshir, the new Pasha of Belgrade, was despatched with instructions to allow a large measure of local autonomy and to expel the janissaries from the pashalik. This last task was an alarming one, but the pasha achieved it by inviting their formidable leader, Deli Ahmet, to a friendly conference and having him assassinated; after which he ventured to produce the firman decreeing the expulsion (autumn 1791). In this measure the pasha naturally had the support of the spahis, with whom Deli Ahmet had dealt almost as oppressively as with the rayah, and for the time being the janissaries withdrew, chiefly to Vidin.

The promise of local autonomy was fulfilled. The oborknez of each nahi was regarded as the representative of its Christian population, and the kadi and the pasha dealt with them through him alone. He was made responsible for the administration of justice in his district, and, though an appeal lay to the kadi, it was seldom to the interest of either party to exercise the right. Both Beshir and his almost immediate successor, Hajji Mustafa, kept in close touch with the oborknezes. The now moderate harač was collected entirely by the native authorities, and this and the dues of the reinstated spahis were the only burdens of the rayah. The export trade in pigs, always lively when relations between Austria and Serbia are permitted to be natural, began to flourish. In one corner of the Turkish dominions reform was a reality.

It was not to be supposed however that the janissaries would let themselves be so easily disposed of. The majority of them, reinforced by the *krđžalis*, or mercenary soldiers disbanded by

the Porte at the end of the Austrian war, had attached themselves to Pasvan-oglu, a Mohammedan adventurer who had established himself in Vidin at the head of a force of krdžalis, and was endeavouring to extort from the Porte his recognition as pasha. The troops sent against him by the Sultan effected nothing, and, on the removal of Beshir from Belgrade, he began to threaten the pashalik itself. Beshir's immediate successor was probably depending on Pasvan-oglu's support when he announced to the Serbian oborknezes that the Sultan had pardoned the janissaries and permitted their return to the pashalik. None could doubt that this meant the immediate revival of the worst abuses of the past half-century. The oborknezes protested, and Hajji Mustafa, a Turkish military officer, proceeded with the aid of a Serbian force to put Belgrade in a state of defence. On his advice the Serbs sent a petition to the Sultan, with the result that the pasha was deposed and Mustafa appointed in his place. The years of his tenure marked a halcyon period. Able, humane, and upright, he became the champion of the rayah to a degree that won him the title of "Serbian Mother."¹

Selim's position however was precarious in the extreme. Moslem feeling was naturally strongly opposed to the reforms. Pasvan-oglu's pose was that of a loyal Turk only anxious to recall the Sultan from the dangerous and irreligious courses into which his ministers sought to lead him, and even the restored spahis, irritated by taxation which the reforming Sultan had recently imposed on Moslems, inclined to the rebels' side. Napoleon, put in possession of the Ionian Islands by the Treaty of Campo Formio, had just decided that "it is useless to try to maintain the Turkish Empire ; we shall see its downfall in our life-time," and was in communication with the rebel pashas of Yannina, Scutari, and Bosnia. Turkey's position was presently much eased by the second coalition against France, which she joined (1798), and by the withdrawal of France from the islands. Nevertheless all attempts to reduce Vidin failed, and, as it was absolutely necessary to come to terms with Pasvan-oglu, in 1799 he was acknowledged Pasha of Vidin, and the janissaries were permitted to return to Belgrade. This had been one of Pasvan-oglu's terms ; but its adoption is a proof less of the weakness of the Sultan than of the inherent absurdity of attempting to reform the Turkish State. The comparatively enlightened Selim was shocked that his loyal Christian subjects should have

¹ Himself a Freemason, he was in touch with Freemasons among the more educated Serbs. The tiny lodge which he built still stands within the wall of the fortress of Belgrade.

borne arms against rebellious Moslems, and meant to prevent a recurrence of the outrage.

At first, by the strong hand of Mustafa, the janissaries were kept in order and prevented from reoccupying the lands they had usurped, but this state of affairs could not last. Moslem feeling was against Mustafa, and when in 1801 he was ordered by the Sultan to renew operations against Pasvan-oglu he was obliged once more to fall back on Serbian assistance in order to make up an adequate force. Hardly was it despatched when the janissaries seized the lower town of Belgrade and besieged Mustafa in the upper citadel. They were treacherously admitted, captured and slew Mustafa, and sent word to the Sultan that "he was a false Turk, who had sided with the rayah and had received his reward." A new pasha was appointed, but was a mere shadow. The janissaries, under four chiefs of their number, who assumed the title of Dahi, instituted a reign of terror. Reinforced by wild bands of Bosnians and Albanians, they reoccupied the country, expelling or murdering the spahis, paralysing the authority of kadis and knezes, and subjecting the Christian population to the most violent and bloody tyranny that they had yet known. Selim would fain have restored order, but he only precipitated the crisis. By an incredible blunder he announced to the janissaries his intention to send against them an army, "but not an army of believers." The janissaries naturally and probably correctly concluded that this could only point to the employment of the Serbian rayah and decided to forestall their master. Deprived of their natural leaders the peasants, it was supposed, would not be formidable. Accordingly ten oborknezes and several leading ecclesiastics were first seized and executed, some with cruel tortures. The knezes were the next victims, and there was no indication that the Dahis meant to stay their hand; there is, in fact, a fair amount of evidence that the Serbian apprehension of a general massacre was only too well founded. In the pashalik of Belgrade the peasantry began to forsake the villages and seek refuge in the woods and mountains. The area at first affected falls naturally into three divisions, the country enclosed between the Morava and the Kolubara, and that to the east and west of it. In these the standard of revolt was raised, and first of all in the central region, the Šumadija, where a leader was found in George Petrović, the famous Kara George, just escaped from the janissaries who had sought to arrest him.

This extraordinary man had in 1787 transferred himself and his family to Austria, slaying his father with his own hand,

according to the well-known and probably authentic tradition, when the old man grew faint-hearted and would have turned back to remain under the tyranny of the Turk. He had served with distinction as a sergeant in the Volunteer Corps, but on the withdrawal of the Austrians had returned to Serbia, and had for some time led the life of a haiduk, but had finally established himself as a peaceful pig-dealer, and prospered greatly. He was in the act of collecting his herd to drive to the Austrian market when he learned the janissaries' designs on him and fled with his herdsmen to the forest. Here haiduks and peasants gathered rapidly round him, and in February 1804 the revolt actually broke out. The region beyond the Kolubara promptly followed suit under Jakov Nenadović, whose brother the arch-priest Aleksa has just fallen a victim to the Dahis, and almost simultaneously there was a rising east of the Morava under Milenko. In all three districts the Turks were instantly driven from the villages; the small towns, or *palankas*, were next attacked and burned, and only the fortresses remained, in which all the Turks who had escaped had taken refuge.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST REVOLT. KARA GEORGE

THE question of the command now became serious. In the Šumadija it was offered first to a haiduk, who refused it on the ground that the nation would not have confidence in a man who had nothing to lose; then to a knez, who had too much; "for a haiduk the knezes may obtain a pardon, but who is to take care of the knezes if the Turks come back?" Kara George combined the qualifications essential for the post. His prosperous business career reassured the knezes and the hitherto peaceful peasants; his previous activities as a haiduk gave him authority with the wilder elements. His military talents were of the highest order, as was soon to be shown, and he had some experience of regular warfare. Finally, his commanding personal qualities enabled him to secure a far higher degree of co-operation from the independent chiefs beyond the Morava and the Kolubara than would have been possible for any other.

The insurgents now devoted themselves to the reduction of the fortresses. Šabac on one side, Požarevac on the other, speedily fell; and the entire Serbian force was presently concentrated before Belgrade. Here they were joined by a somewhat unexpected ally, who was no other than their old acquaintance Beshir, now pasha of Bosnia, at the head of 3,000 men. The situation was peculiar. The Serbs were fighting to restore the authority of the Sultan over his rebellious subjects, and had at this time no thoughts of national independence. Beshir had no hope of subduing the janissaries without their aid, but was filled with angry dismay by the numbers, the equipment, and the martial spirit of the rayah. Their alliance could not be permanent, but the momentary combination was sufficient to seal the fate of the Dahis. Gušanac Ali, the krdžali commandant of Belgrade, entered into negotiations

with the enemy and surrendered the town, though still retaining control of the fortresses. He had first suffered the Dahis to escape down the Danube to New Orsova ; but Beshir insisted on their surrender, hoping that this would be sufficient to pacify the Serbs. A small force under Milenko was admitted into the fortress by night, shot down the Dahis, and brought their heads back to the Serbian camp (July 1804). Beshir now represented to the Serbs that their ends were achieved and ordered them to disperse to their homes, but they were little inclined to obey while Užice, Karanovac, and the southern district generally were still in the hands of the janissaries. It was a serious matter, however, to defy their legitimate sovereign ; and the leaders determined, while continuing to prosecute the war with the janissaries in the name of the Sultan, to invoke the intervention of some Christian Power.

They had the choice of two only—Russia and Austria, and very little knowledge of the former. Private overtures had been made to Austria by Kara George and Nenadović in the preceding spring. Austria refused to entertain them, but her tone was friendly ; she allowed the insurgents to buy ammunition and winked at the passage of the Graničari ¹ to Serbia in large numbers. As late as July the local chiefs before Belgrade were still in favour of Austria, but the Austrian Serbs had a better understanding of the new position of Russia, who was rapidly altering the balance of power in the Balkans, and explained to them that the “ Moskovi ” were of one blood and faith with themselves, while the Hungarian Serbs warned them against any arrangement that could bring them under the sway of Hungary. Under their influence a deputation was despatched to St. Petersburg in September 1804, and returned in the following February with a large sum of money and the promise of diplomatic support at Constantinople. But neither Russia nor Austria could venture to give any effective assistance. Both were preparing for the supreme struggle with Napoleon, and were nervously anxious to avoid any entanglement with the Porte.

In April 1805 a Skupština summoned by Kara George formulated the Serbian requests, of which the chief were, firstly, that the Pasha of Belgrade should be replaced by a Muhasil, who should be the Sultan’s only representative, and whose only function should be to transmit his orders to the Serbian authority ; and, secondly, that the territory should be governed by an elected Veliki Knez (Great Knez) who should reside at Belgrade.

¹ I.e. the Serbs settled on the Military Frontier of Austria.

The amount of the tribute should be fixed ; it should be collected by the native authorities and transmitted by the Veliki Knez to the Treasury in one lump sum. The Veliki Knez should have an armed guard to maintain peace, a proposal directed towards the removal of the Turkish garrisons from the fortresses. In fact, the petition demanded the completest possible local autonomy, tempered only by the recognition of Turkish suzerainty.

Selim rejected these proposals, and the struggle with the Dahis was converted into a war for independence. During that autumn and the following year (1806) the Serbs maintained a struggle in which the national heroism and the genius of their leader were equally displayed. The frontiers to east and west were successfully held, and the main Turkish army advancing down the Morava was annihilated by a Serbian force barely a third of its size. Turkey was brought so low that she offered to negotiate on a basis more favourable to the Serbs than even their own petition, for it included expulsion of the spahis and the evacuation of the fortresses. She soon drew back, but her original offer became the model for all subsequent demands on the part of the Serbs. Kara George's successes reached high-water mark in this year, which saw the fall of Belgrade and Šabac, followed in 1807 by that of Užice.

But the insurgents could not continue indefinitely to face such odds, and their appeals for help both to Austria and Russia were renewed. The outbreak of war between Russia and the Porte in December 1806 naturally led them to place their chief hopes in the Slav Power. Russia occupied Walachia and Moldavia, her General Michelson called on the Serbs for a common effort against the Turk, making large promises of protection and money and holding out the prospect of complete independence of the Porte, and in June 1807 a Russian division crossed the Danube. A Russian representative was appointed, and practically undertook the direction of Serbia's foreign policy. Meanwhile Selim was deposed, and the year of chaos which ensued allowed the Serbs a breathing-space. This ended with the advent of Mahmud II, and in 1809 a Russian diversion alone saved their army from annihilation, while their losses were terrible.

Fighting dragged on for two years more, during which Kara George resisted all the inducements of the Porte to desert Russia ; but the latter, under the menace of Napoleon's invasion, was forced to conclude the Treaty of Bucharest (May 1812). She did something to secure the position of her small ally, but

the terms seemed a cruel mockery to the men who had been encouraged by the promises, however unauthorised, of her agents. According to Article VIII the Serbs were to lay down their arms, hand over the fortresses, and destroy all fortifications erected by themselves. They were promised local autonomy and the "same advantages as those enjoyed by the islanders of the Archipelago." The phrase was happily conceived if the object were to enable the Turk to evade his obligations, for the advantages in question, differing in kind and degree in the different islands, defied definition and opened the way to those interminable diplomatic disputes in which Turkey had for long found her chief strength. Such as the terms were, the Porte broke them in the following year, thinking finally to crush the Serbian revolt while Russia was occupied elsewhere. The Serbs were now hemmed in by numbers double their own, and disaster could probably in no case have been averted. It was rendered certain by the collapse of their great leader, who suddenly deserted his forces, fell back on Belgrade, and presently fled to Austrian soil. This failure of nerve in the hero of a hundred fights is surprising but not inexplicable. For the last six years he had supported a struggle against ever-increasing odds and had seen the extinction of one hope after another, and his lonely and brooding temperament finally gave way under the strain of desertion by Russia, for whose sake he had rejected all the overtures of the Turk. At first interned by Austria, in the following year he was allowed to remove to Bessarabia, where he was joined by some hundreds of the insurgents.

[The melancholy end of his career may be anticipated here. In 1817 he returned secretly to Serbia, with the design of raising a fresh revolt in conjunction with the Greeks. He summoned Miloš Obrenović, then ruling the country as its first prince under Turkish suzerainty, to join him. Miloš was convinced, and rightly, of the futility of the scheme; discontent, moreover, was rife, and the reappearance of this rival likely to be as disastrous to himself as the conspiracy to his country. After three days of hesitation, he denounced the Liberator to the Turkish authorities, and on their instructions had him assassinated. Kara George's widow was pensioned by the Tsar, and the future prince, Alexander Karageorgević, was brought up in his dominions.]

Under Kara George the first foundations of a national government and a national education had been laid. At first the civil administration of the knezes was virtually superseded by that

of the self-constituted military chiefs, or *voivods*, who arose in every district and formed the kind of society which is apt to arise in any heroic age. Like the Homeric king, or the German *princeps*, they surrounded themselves with a band of armed followers (*momci*, "lads") drawn from the wealthier families of the neighbourhood, who took no pay, but ate at their chief's table and received from him their horses and other presents and a share in the spoils of war. Their formidable influence enabled him to overawe the local administration of justice. An annual Skupština (assembly) was held which theoretically could be attended by any Serb, and in fact was mainly composed of voivods and their momci. This body had the final decision in everything relative to finance and the conduct of operations, and even had certain judicial powers.

The need of some further organisation was obvious. Nenadović, supported by Kara George, proposed the creation of a Savet ¹ (council or senate). A Hungarian Serb, Filipović, a Doctor of Law and a man of high personal character, drew up a scheme which was passed by the Skupština of 1805. The new body, which was composed of twelve members elected one by each nahi, did some most valuable work, especially during the life, too soon cut short, of Filipović, its first secretary. Primarily a judicial body, it replaced the jurisdiction of the kadis in the districts and formed a Supreme Court of Appeal. It also dealt with the educational question, and founded a school in the chief town of each nahi, and at Belgrade a High School which ultimately developed into the University of that city.

The Senate became the theatre of violent struggles between Kara George and the voivods, who resisted his authority. In 1811, however, he succeeded in packing both Senate and Skupština, and a resolution was passed conferring on the Commander-in-Chief and the Senate complete control over the other leaders, and Kara George thus received for the first time *de jure* authority outside the Šumadija. The Senate now transferred its judicial functions to a new body called the Supreme Court of Justice, and became the chief administrative and executive authority, with ministries for war, foreign affairs, justice, finance, and religion. The dangerous power of the voivods was thus broken for the moment, and when the menace revived under Miloš, it was again effectively dealt with.

¹ The word is that now familiar in its Russian form, Soviet.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND REVOLT. MILOŠ OBRENOVIĆ AND ALEXANDER KARAGEORGEVIĆ

AFTER the flight of Kara George, Miloš Obrenović, whom personal enmity to Kara George had hitherto kept in the background, was one of the few Serb leaders who remained to face the storm. This signal proof of courage and his local influence led the new pasha to conceive the idea of using him to pacify the country. He was made Veliki Knez of almost the whole Šumadija, and for some months did his best to induce his fellow-countrymen to disarm.

What his original intentions were cannot be certainly known. The Turkish reoccupation was attended by horrible barbarities; plundering, tortures, and wholesale executions were the order of the day, and garrisons of janissaries and Albanians were planted, not merely in the fortresses, but all over the countryside. As in the days of the Dahis, a general massacre was expected; revolt was imminent, and Miloš could only choose whether he would crush or lead it. In spite of apparent hesitation, his mind was probably made up before the fateful Sabor held on Palm Sunday 1815 outside the church at Takovo. Surrounded as he came from divine service by an anxious crowd, Miloš mounted a stone beneath an oak-tree and spoke at first in a strain of discouragement; but, as the people protested that no fate could be worse than their present sufferings, he changed his tone. "Here am I, there stand you; so be it. War to the Turk! With us is God and His right."

The military operations which followed were a triumph of strategy. Miloš opened with a success in the capture of Paleš, a small town in the angle between the Kolubara and the Sava. It was enough to bring Hungarian Serbs, refugees in Austria, haiduks and veterans of Kara George flocking to the standard, and to rouse the district west of the Kolubara. With

his numbers thus augmented, he routed a Turkish force at Ljubić and captured its ammunition and artillery, a victory which gave him command of the Šumadija. With extraordinary rapidity he took Požarevac, wheeled westward, and totally defeated the vanguard of a force from Bosnia advancing by way of the Mačva. The Turks held out only in some of the fortresses ; but no more than Kara George could Miloš permanently sustain so unequal a struggle. His only hope was to secure tolerable terms by negotiation, and he promptly addressed himself to Marashli Ali Pasha, commander of the Turkish force advancing from Vidin, who had full powers to treat. Marashli fortunately took the line that, if the Serbs would acknowledge the supremacy of the Sultan, disarmament would not be insisted upon. Miloš at once conceded the first point and entered on further deliberations with a strong card in his hand, viz. the possession of a country very difficult from the military point of view and held by an armed and indomitable peasantry. His object was to get Article VIII of the Treaty of Bucharest accepted as the basis of agreement, for, with all its vagueness, it stipulated that the Serbs should be responsible for internal administration and the collection of taxes, and that the regulation giving effect to these proposals should be made by direct negotiation between the Porte and the Serbian nation. The Porte regarded the article as cancelled by the second Serbian revolt, and all that Miloš could at first obtain was the creation of a national Court of Chancery¹ to consist of the twelve oborknezes, and the concession that no Christian should be punished by a Turkish judge without the consent of his oborknez.

Over his own countrymen Miloš enforced his authority with great cruelty, and more than once had recourse to assassination or judicial murder. After the death of Kara George he obtained from the Skupština his recognition as Supreme Knez, and the office was declared hereditary in his family. But his position was no easy one. On the one side the Turk was jealously watchful over such rights as remained to him ; on the other, he had to contend against the turbulent vojvods, now transformed into knezes, who never responded to his summons except with their armed following at their backs, and finally a small Serbian *intelligencija* was arising which wanted complete independence by the shortest possible methods. His own character did not entirely fit him to make the best of the situation. Autocratic and unscrupulous, he refused to revive

¹ It was, in effect, Kara George's Supreme Court of Justice revived.

the Senate, concentrated all administrative and executive authority in his own hands, and exasperated the knezes by unwarrantable interference in local affairs.

None the less, his supreme object was the complete liberation of his country, and it was pursued with unremitting tenacity. The international situation developed in his favour. The Greek revolt and the victories of Russia inclined the Porte to concession. Russia proved herself an active champion, and one of the articles of the Convention of Akkerman (1826) provided that the Porte should put in force Article VIII of the Treaty of Bucharest and should reunite to Serbia the six southern districts which had been under the jurisdiction of Kara George but had not taken part in the second revolt. As usual, fulfilment tarried, and only by the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) was the Porte finally compelled to action. Complete internal autonomy was granted, and all Turks except the garrisons were to withdraw from the land. The amount of the tribute was fixed, and its collection entrusted to the Serbs themselves. The Serbian Church recovered the right to elect its own bishops, subject only to the approval of the Œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople, and thus the demoralising supremacy of the Phanar was brought to an end. Miloš was entrusted with the internal administration of the country jointly with the Senate—a body which he had succeeded in suppressing—and the hereditary rights of his family were recognised.

For all that Serbia gained Miloš deserves the fullest possible credit; but, while his arbitrary internal government had been to some extent justified by the difficulties of his diplomatic position, it had already produced much discontent. In the early years of his rule he had had to deal with a revolt of the knezes, and in 1824–5 with a much more serious and wide-spread revolt of peasants. So long as Serbia's position under the Porte remained uncertain Miloš was felt to be indispensable; but his despotic tendencies naturally strengthened with exercise, and his best combined with his worst actions to render his authority unpopular. One of his greatest services to his country was hardly realised at the time. By refusing to grant fiefs to the knezes he prevented the development of a mediæval aristocracy at the very moment of Serbia's entry into the modern world, and created the sturdy, independent, intelligent body of peasant holders which has been the strength of modern Serbia. His object was, of course, to secure his own authority against rivals, and he inevitably alienated his principal adherents. At the same time he failed to secure the support of

the peasantry, who had supposed taxation to be a peculiarity incidental to Turkish government, and had expected to see it disappear from the liberated State.

Once the separated districts had been secured,¹ the general discontent could no longer be restrained, and took the form of an agitation to procure a constitution. The disorders of the land were beginning to attract foreign attention. Nicholas I of Russia favoured the agitation for reasons which are not easy to fathom, but can hardly have included a predilection for constitutional government. Probably he thought that it would afford him more opportunities of interference, and that his influence would be greater if there were an Opposition to be played off against the somewhat intractable Prince. France and England, whose influence at Constantinople had been entirely superseded by that of Russia, wished to see Serbia emancipated from the tutelage of the Tsar, thinking that they might create something of a counterpoise to Russian aggression by encouraging an independent spirit in the Balkans. At the moment this meant encouraging Miloš in his despotic pretensions, and this was the line taken by French and British diplomacy, the latter under the direction of Lord Palmerston. But Serbian discontent, backed by Russian influence, carried the day; and in 1837 the Porte called upon Miloš to constitute the still non-existent Senate. An Organic Statute, framed under Russian influence and promulgated in 1838, provided for the creation of a Senate of seventeen members, appointed by the Prince, but responsible to the Sultan and removable by him alone, and only if they could be shown to have violated the laws. The executive was handed over to four Ministers, members of the Senate and responsible for the direction of home and foreign affairs, finance and justice.

The party opposed to Miloš now forced him to accept their list of nominations to the Senate, suppressed with great adroitness an incipient rising in his favour and, with the support of the Russian Consul, compelled him to abdicate in favour of his elder son (June 1839).

Miloš was destined, long after, to make a brief reappearance as ruler of Serbia; but he was a man of the period which was just closing, representing much the same traditions and the same degree of culture as his rival, Kara George. Neither was in the least fitted to govern a civilised state; but Miloš, by his consummate diplomatic ability as well as his military skill, had put his country in the way of becoming one. His

¹ Their actual transfer was delayed till 1833.

services to her are best measured by the difference between the Serbia of 1912 and the Macedonia of the same year, which is no less than that between civilisation and barbarism.

Milan Obrenović, a lad of twenty and a helpless invalid, survived his accession only by a few weeks. A provisional Government was therefore formed by the leaders of the Opposition, and in 1840 the second son of Miloš, Michael, then seventeen years of age, succeeded to his father's position.

The Porte took advantage of the internal situation to declare that Michael's position was not hereditary nor even necessarily life-long, and to force on him as advisers its special adherents, Vučić and Petronjević. It also insisted on his granting an amnesty to a large number of his opponents, including the exiled partisans of the Karageorgević family, who now returned to add a fresh element of discontent and disorder. Vučić began to work for the return of the Karageorgević line, and in 1842 carried out a *coup d'état*, which, after a certain amount of friction with the Powers, especially Russia, resulted in the election of Alexander Karageorgević, second son of Kara George, to the throne.

The new Prince, a man of respectable life and weak character, was not one to fish successfully in the troubled waters which surrounded him. Since the Napoleonic era the opposition between Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans had grown ever sharper, and Austrian influence had steadily declined. The Treaty of Adrianople, by establishing a Russian protectorate over the Turkish provinces of Walachia and Moldavia, had brought Austria's formidable ally to her very frontiers. All national movements within the Turkish Empire enhanced Russia's influence as the protectress of the Orthodox communion and were naturally favoured by her, for the Tsar Alexander's legitimist scruples could be overcome where the subjects of an infidel potentate were concerned. Austria inevitably preferred the *status quo*. The measure of independence achieved by Serbia had excited her Yugoslav subjects and stimulated the Illyrian movement, and she was haunted by the fear that Yugoslav disturbances arising in the Balkan lands might spread to her own territory. The Panslav movement contributed to her anxieties. Any fresh humiliation of the Porte meant the further advance of Russia as a protecting if not a conquering Power, and an increase of her already disquieting prestige in the eyes of Austria's Yugoslav subjects. The maintenance of the Ottoman Empire thus became for the former champion of Christian Europe an object of the first

importance; in the words of Metternich, Turkey was for Austria a frontier safer than the sea.

Unable to oust Russian influence from Serbia, Austria aimed at keeping her inactive and negligible; Russia, though at times she would have liked to use her active support, did not wish her to give any pretext for Austrian aggression. When, in 1848, the Yugoslavs of the Monarchy threw in their lot with the Imperial Government, and their forces, led by Jelačić, invaded Hungary, they sent urgent appeals to Serbia for armed support, and Alexander Karageorgević was not disinclined to respond. But Russia feared that Austria might reward assistance by combining Serbia with South Hungary and Croatia in a single Yugoslav State under her protection, and exerted her influence to keep Alexander neutral. It is improbable that Austria would have welcomed his intervention, for her suspicion of her Yugoslav subjects was not allayed by the zeal with which they demonstrated that in the hour of danger she could not dispense with their support. His abstention, however, stamped him as a man who need not be reckoned with, and wounded the susceptibilities of his own subjects, who thought that their brothers in South Hungary had been shamefully betrayed.

In the next few years Austria worked hard to recover lost ground in Serbia. The young Francis Joseph made personal overtures to Alexander, with such success that Austrian influence became paramount, and patriotic Serbs complained that the Austrian Consul-General might as well have been a minister without portfolio in the Serbian Cabinet.

Serbia's attitude in the Crimean War indicates the extent of Habsburg influence over Alexander. Russia, mindful of her services to Austria in 1848, confidently expected her military support in the new adventure against the infidel. She assured her that she had no intention of stirring up revolt among the Yugoslavs of the Balkans, hoping thus to set a haunting pre-occupation at rest; and it was on her admonition that Alexander declared for strict neutrality. She did not, however, bid high enough to secure her object. Her best offer was the erection in the Balkans of small protectorates under herself and Austria, and the latter justly felt that if Russia's control of Walachia and Moldavia were to be extended to Serbia and Bulgaria, an Austrian protectorate of Orthodox Slavs in Bosnia and the Heregovina was not an object for which to barter the frontier "safer than the sea." She decided, not without heart-searchings, on strict neutrality, and, by moving strong forces to

South Hungary and the Sava, rendered any pro-Russian outbreak impossible in Bosnia and Serbia, leaving Turkey free to concentrate her defences farther east. The Porte issued a firman declaring Walachia, Moldavia, and Serbia to be effective parts of her dominions, thus virtually denying Russia's treaty-rights over the first two; and Russia began to work for the active participation on her side of Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. The Tsar's agents held out prospects of a "Greater Serbia," which strongly appealed to the Serbian ministry and people; but Austria's military precautions had made action impossible, and Serbia maintained her new mentor's policy to the end.

In the Treaty of Paris Serbia did not fare badly. Her liberties were guaranteed by the Great Powers collectively, which emancipated her from the exclusive protection of one, and she received a seat on the newly founded Danube Commission. The Turks, however, retained all the powers of interference which they had secured in 1838, besides the right of maintaining the Turkish garrisons in the fortresses. But national feeling, which was strongly Russophil, had been offended by the deference paid to Austria; and the country was equally weary of Alexander and of the little knot of oligarchs who opposed him. A Skupština, summoned to decide between them, and noteworthy as the first assembly elected by the tax-payers, therefore cut the knot by deposing Alexander and recalling Miloš.

Vienna and the Porte were disturbed by the fall of their protégé, and the latter took the line that the Skupština had no power to dethrone or elect a prince. But Russia intervened sharply. She had not forgiven Alexander for his neutrality in the Crimean War, and the arbitrary government of Miloš suited her, for he was strong enough to repress liberal tendencies within and had shown himself far better able than Alexander to resist the encroachments of the Turk. Thus supported, the Skupština insisted; and Alexander closed by withdrawal an inglorious reign whose whole tendency had been retrograde. Internal dissensions had enabled the Porte to increase its interference, and the weakness of the Prince had permitted that domination of a foreign influence which, by whomsoever exercised, has been the curse of the Balkan States since the hour of their liberation.

CHAPTER VII

MILOŠ AND MICHAEL OBRENOVIĆ

EARLY in 1859 Miloš returned, amid transports of enthusiasm. In his seventy-ninth year he retained all his old vigour, resolution, and subtlety, and took command of the situation at once. He conciliated the Porte by refusing to accept his elevation until he had received the consent of the Sultan, and carefully avoided an open breach with Austria, who sullenly and tardily conceded the recognition which in that critical year she did not venture to withhold. But he tolerated no foreign influence, and soon showed that his deference towards the Sultan was merely formal.

Two stipulations of the agreement of 1829 were still unfulfilled: the Turks in Serbia were not confined to the fortresses, and the Porte refused to recognise the princely dignity as hereditary in the Obrenović family. In May 1860 a Serbian deputation went to Constantinople to request the fulfilment of these provisions, but returned with nothing but a grudging recognition of Michael as next heir, the right of election to rest with the Skupština in case the direct line became extinct in him. Miloš thereupon summoned the Skupština and announced that in these two matters the Serbian people could not be bound by the will of the Porte; and the Skupština hastened to confer on both proposals the force of law. Within a few weeks of this *coup* Miloš died and was succeeded by his son Michael. The restored ruler was a man of high character, great natural abilities, good education, and political insight. His twenty years of exile had been spent mainly in Vienna, but largely also in travel, and his outlook was modern and enlightened. The announcement in his first proclamation that the "law is the supreme authority in Serbia" struck the key-note of his reign.

Adherents of the Karageorgević dynasty were pardoned and admitted to office, the Francophil Garašanin, an able and

modern-minded though somewhat hot-headed man, being made Prime Minister. Having shown that reprisals formed no part of his policy, Michael proceeded to limit the oligarchic pretensions of the Senate, and transferred the supreme legislative power to the Skupština, which was to be elected by taxpayers and to meet at least every three years. The mischievous provision which gave senators complete immunity for their acts and made them responsible to the Sultan alone was abrogated. The old military arrangements were also remodelled. Hitherto the chiefs had called out their followings when emergency arose and withdrawn them when they pleased; discipline and regular training were unknown. A small regular army was now raised by conscription, and received a modern training under a French Chief of Staff. The whole nation formed a reserve; and the numbers of the regular force ultimately reached 100,000, to the scandal of our own Turcophil Government, which through its representative Bulwer tried hard but unsuccessfully to fix its limit at 12,000. The problem of the fortresses still awaited solution, and the provision which limited the Turks in Serbia to their confines was a dead letter. Semendria, Šabac, Užice, and Soko were not fortresses in any real sense, and could not have held out for a day against artillery fire; they were not occupied by troops, but simply abandoned to their Moslem inhabitants under a so-called commandant, and to a kadi who with a Mejlis of notables decided all cases between Moslems and Christians in favour of the former. Belgrade and Kladovo were occupied by troops of the line, but in the former, besides the legitimate garrison in the citadel, there was a whole Turkish quarter in the lower town. Michael reasonably claimed that all resident Turks other than actual soldiers must either become Serbian subjects and submit to the law of the land, which would grant them complete civil equality and religious freedom, or go elsewhere. But for Turkey, as well as Serbia, the question had more than sentimental importance. Not only would her prestige be lowered in the eyes of the Moslem world, but she had never abandoned the hope of reconquering Serbia, and every unauthorised Turk within the bounds of the Principality would be an asset when the day of attack should come.

The Prince's demands, formulated in 1861, evoked the utmost enthusiasm in Serbia, and greatly aided him in carrying out his military reforms; but the British Government threw all its weight into the Turkish scale, and nothing was done till 1862, when an outbreak in Belgrade such as competent observers

had often foretold rendered further delay impossible. On June 15 a scuffle arose in which two Serbs were killed by two Turks. The Serbian police arrested the Turks, and were conveying them to the Turkish police station, when fire was opened on them from that building with fatal effect. The Serbian populace rose, and looting of the Turkish quarter began. Prince Michael was absent, but the Prime Minister Garašanin, supported by the foreign consuls, succeeded in restoring at least temporary tranquillity, and the consuls were actually on their way to a conference with the pasha when the latter opened fire from the citadel on the town and bombarded it for five hours. The Turks had settled the question against themselves. A conference of the Powers met at Constantinople, and not even Austria, jealous as she was of any concession to Serbia, could support Turkey's request for the restoration of the *status quo*. Michael's demand for the complete withdrawal of the Turks, garrisons and all, found no support, for Austria was determined to prevent the transference of the fortresses to Serbian hands. Nevertheless, Serbia's gains were substantial. In Belgrade the Turks were confined to the citadel; Soko and Užice, the latter a place of strategic importance commanding the route to Montenegro, were dismantled and the troops withdrawn; and, though in the other fortresses the garrisons were maintained, it was settled that all Turks living outside them were to be deported and their property sold.

For another five years the futile privileges permitted to the Turks subsisted. Prince Michael used the interval skilfully in instructing British opinion through the agency of his wife, Princess Julia, and the publicist Hristić, who both visited London and secured the powerful support of Cobden. He also carried on active negotiations with Russia, Greece, and Montenegro, and formed a definite alliance with the last-named, while the arsenal at Kragujevac worked with feverish activity. When his plans for an attack were fully matured and the Porte was inconvenienced by the revolt of Crete, Michael sent a respectful message to the Sultan requesting permission to take over the guardianship of the fortresses. It was the hour of Austria's humiliation, and, as English opinion had undergone a change, the Sultan lost his previous supporters and at last yielded a reluctant assent. Michael visited Constantinople to receive the keys of the fortresses, subject only to the condition that the Turkish colours should fly side by side with the Serbian on the citadel of Belgrade.

How far Michael's ambitions extended is uncertain, but he

undoubtedly formed the conception of a Balkan federation which should secure the further liberation of the Slav provinces from the Turk. He formed an alliance with Charles of Romania, and entered into relations with the Bulgarian Committee at Bucharest, as well as with Bosnia, where the Mohammedan Serbs promised neutrality if their country should be invaded, in return for an engagement to respect their property and faith.

It is doubtful whether these plans would have been carried out even if longer life had been granted to Michael. The Tsar is stated to have definitely encouraged them, but the other Great Powers warned the Prince against a forward policy, and Austria, brought very low in 1866, was in 1868 once more in a position to make her opposition effective. Meanwhile, in spite of the enthusiasm created by the withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons, there was a definite movement of opposition to Michael, whose preoccupation with international politics had caused him to lose touch with the more liberal currents of feeling within the country. "First a great, and then a free, Serbia" was said to be his motto, and his methods had become autocratic. The censorship of the Press, partly necessitated by the delicate nature of Michael's foreign activities, was severe and much resented. The Prince seems to have realised the importance of pacifying legitimate discontents and to have had liberal measures in contemplation when the blow fell. In June 1868 he was assassinated while walking on the wooded hills which overlook Belgrade. The foul deed cost Serbia a man who might, in spite of the proverb, be truly called indispensable. The loss of the one ruler who had combined political genius, enlightenment, and personal integrity was instantly reflected in her fortunes, and its consequences were irreparable. Responsibility for the crime was never fixed. The Kara-georgević family, who were domiciled in Austria, naturally had the credit of it, and Alexander, acquitted by an Austrian court, was condemned in his absence by a Serbian one, both verdicts being foregone conclusions.

Whosoever the deed, the Kara-georgević family reaped no advantage. The Provisional Government promptly summoned the Grand Skupština, which elected the thirteen-year-old Milan Obrenović, the grand-nephew of Miloš and the last of the line, and appointed a Regency of three persons, of whom the leading spirit was Ristić, to hold office during his minority.

CHAPTER VIII

MILAN AND ALEXANDER OBRENOVIĆ

THE Regency at once proceeded to measures of internal reform. The Skupština was to consist of 120 members, of whom 90 were to be elected on an extremely liberal franchise. As no materials for a second chamber existed, the presence of a conservative element in the Skupština was ensured by reserving the remaining thirty places to be filled by nominees of the Prince. For these seats only men of over thirty who paid a minimum of 30 dinars (francs) in direct taxation were eligible. Officials and lawyers were excluded, but the small educated class found representation among the nominated thirty. The basis of election was liberal, but the powers of the Skupština were extremely limited; it could not initiate legislation, and, though the executive was in theory responsible to it, the exclusion of ministers from its ranks made it practically impossible to call them to account. The new Constitution was unpopular, and that it subsisted unchanged for twenty years was due partly to the fact that opposition to the Government was divided, partly to the preoccupation with foreign affairs which the troubled conditions of the Balkans rendered inevitable.

In 1872 Milan came of age, but his assumption of power marked no change for the better. He had a full share of the ability which had characterised his two Obrenović predecessors, but his parentage and upbringing were alike unfortunate. The scandals of his private life brought him into deserved disrepute, but were of less importance than the fact that, relying on Austria to keep him on the throne, he was always prepared to sacrifice his country's interests at her bidding.

Events were now imminent which engrossed the attention of Europe for several years and marked a fresh stage in the development of the Eastern Question. Moslem misrule and oppression had reached a climax in Bosnia and the Herce-

govina. A revolt which broke out in the latter (July 1, 1875) rapidly spread to Bosnia, and in the following year a similar movement in Bulgaria produced the reprisals which moved Gladstone to attack our Turcophil policy; while the murder of the French and German Consuls at Salonika by a Mohammedan mob emphasised the international importance of the Turkish disorders.

It was not to be expected that Serbia and Montenegro would remain spectators. Milan, when visiting Vienna in the summer of 1875, had been peremptorily warned by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Andrassy, to abstain from action and complied for a time, dismissing Ristić, who was for active measures. But the feeling in the country could not long be resisted. Nicholas of Montenegro was affording the insurgents scarcely disguised support, while his son-in-law, Peter Karageorgević, the late King of Serbia, was in close communication with him, and directed operations in the field. Both Montenegro and Serbia entered the war in July 1876. Prince Nicholas fought with unbroken success, but with Milan the case was far otherwise. His main force was sent eastward to co-operate with the Bulgars, who failed to render effective aid against the capable Turkish general. A series of Serbian defeats laid the road to Belgrade open to the Turks, and Serbia would have been completely crushed but for the intervention of Russia, who compelled the Porte to conclude on the basis of the *status quo* an armistice which in the following spring became a peace. Meanwhile a Conference of the Great Powers was sitting at Constantinople in the hope of imposing on the Porte a scheme of reform for the revolted provinces; but Abdul Hamid, who had entered on his sinister career as Sultan in the preceding year, could be moved to no practical steps. In May 1877 Russia, in alliance with Rumania, declared war on Turkey, and Montenegro and Serbia again followed suit. In spite of initial blunders the Russian arms were ultimately victorious; and Serbia achieved a very fair measure of success, capturing the important strategic site of Niš. Operations were terminated by an armistice concluded at Adrianople in January 1878, followed by the Treaty of San Stefano. This agreement, which was never carried into effect, has been fairly described as "a wholly Slavonic settlement of a question which concerns other races as well."¹ Its essential feature was the creation of a "big" and, as Russia hoped, a vassal, Bulgaria extending to the Ægean. Serbia and Montenegro were to receive acces-

¹ W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 384.

sions of territory, the latter from the Hercegovina; Bosnia and what remained of the Hercegovina were to enjoy local autonomy under a Christian Governor-General. A part of what had been Russia's programme in the Crimean War seemed on the point of realisation.

Austria-Hungary and Great Britain were alike determined that the treaty should be cancelled. The extension of Russian influence in the Balkans was as alarming to them as it had been in 1853, and Austria had a grievance to boot, for under the agreement of Reichstadt, secretly concluded with Russia in January 1877, she had expected to receive, in the case of Turkey's defeat, considerable portions of Bosnia and the Hercegovina. Nor was that all. In the *pourparlers* which had preceded the Reichstadt agreement Andrassy had expressly stipulated that Serbia should not be allowed to acquire Bosnia, on the ground that her presence there would constitute such a menace to Slavonia, Croatia, and above all to the Dalmatian littoral, as Austria could only meet by the annexation of Serbia, a step for which she was not prepared.¹ The erection of Bosnia into an autonomous province could hardly be anything but a prelude to its union with one or other of the Serbian principalities when Turkey next laid herself open to European interference. Russia was brought to agree to a revision of the Treaty, and in June 1878 the Powers met in Congress at Berlin. Ostensibly they were trying to solve the problem of ending Turkish misrule without permitting an undue aggrandisement of Russia. Incidentally they were trying to determine the future of the Yugoslav race in the Balkans, and for no part of their task were they more poorly equipped by knowledge or by sympathy. Even Greece, the Benjamin of the Balkan States, who wore the halo of the past and enjoyed a special measure of support from France and Great Britain, failed to secure direct representation at the Congress. It need hardly be said that neither Serbia nor Montenegro had any opportunity of stating their feelings or their desires. Nor was greater favour shown to an eminent Austrian Yugoslav, Strossmayer, Bishop of Djakovo (Slavonia), the greatest authority of the day on all Yugoslav questions, who vainly offered to give evidence before the Congress. In 1876, when the question of an Austrian occupation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina was first mooted, he had written to Gladstone urging that Bosnia should be placed under Serbian protection, and, when the question was decided, he uttered a prediction since fulfilled: "If Vienna, or rather Pest, means to govern

¹ Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrassy*, vol. ii, p. 323.

the new provinces by Hungarians and Germans, and for their profit, the Austrians will end by being more hated than the Turk." The Occupation offered on a superficial view many advantages, and might conceivably have been successful, if the internal conditions of Austria-Hungary had permitted of a disinterested administration. It was inevitably acceptable to the statesmanship of the day, fortified by a complete ignorance of the language, the history, the ideas, and the aspirations of the populations whose destiny it determined. Austria-Hungary might well think that a pressing anxiety was laid permanently to rest. The Occupation was the work of the Powers, but it settled the Bosnian question as she herself would have settled it. Whether the Ottoman Empire fell soon or late, Serbia could never succeed without dispute to the provinces which by considerations of race and religion seemed marked out for her.

The arrangements of the Congress directly affecting Serbia were not unfavourable; her complete independence of the Porte was recognised, and she received a considerable accession of territory which included Pirot, Vranja, and the important town of Niš. But by obtaining the right to a military, though not an administrative, occupation of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Austria drove a wedge between the two little Serb principalities which had hoped to join hands. Thus, cut off from such access to the sea as she might have obtained through Montenegro, and hemmed in on two frontiers by Austria-Hungary, Serbia was placed all the more completely at the mercy of her powerful neighbour by her new status of complete independence.¹ Even in such a situation Miloš or Michael Obrenović might have found means to save his own self-respect and secure some freedom of action for his country; but Milan was of a different mould. From the first there had been in the country a party which would have preferred the rule of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, whose popularity in Serbia was now greatly increased by his success in the war. Peter Karageorgević, the future king, had also won golden opinions, and strengthened his position by his marriage with a daughter of Prince Nicholas. Milan's throne was shaky indeed, and he turned for support to the Power whose chief aim was to hold his country in subjection. In 1880 Austria-Hungary showed her hand by framing commercial agreements which placed the Serbian export trade at her mercy and procuring the dismissal of the able and patriotic Ristić, who sought to modify them. In 1881 Milan concluded

¹ See map on p. 75.

with Austria-Hungary a secret agreement, whose existence was long suspected and long denied. In course of time its main provisions transpired, and its complete text has now been published.¹ By this instrument Milan bound himself to "tolerate no political, religious, or other intrigues [*menées*] which, taking [Serbian] territory as a point of departure, might be directed against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; including therein Bosnia, Hercegovina, and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar." In the case of Austria-Hungary finding herself at war with one or more Powers, Serbia was to observe a friendly neutrality towards her and towards the provinces specified above. Without a previous understanding with Austria-Hungary she was neither to negotiate nor conclude any political treaty with any Government nor to admit to her territory any foreign armed force, even as volunteers. Austria undertook to support and strengthen with all her influence the Obrenović dynasty, to recognise the title of the King of Serbia so soon as Milan should assume it with proper legal forms,² and in case Serbia should ever be in a position to make territorial acquisitions in the direction of her southern frontiers (with the exception of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar), to use her influence with the other Powers to secure their concurrence. To this instrument is appended a fulsome declaration of the Prince, expressive of his gratitude to Austria for enabling him "to keep in power the men whom I desired to maintain there," and of his intention to carry out the provisions of the treaty without reservation. Immediately after the abdication of Milan this treaty was renewed by the Regents, who obtained a promise that Austria would modify the existing commercial agreements in favour of Serbia. It finally expired in 1895.

It is not too much to say that the conclusion of such a treaty was what Milan's son is said to have called it, "an act of treason" which made Serbia merely a tributary of Austria. Its influence was hardly less fatal to internal than to external freedom. The men whom Milan desired to maintain in power were the so-called Liberals, whose absolutist tendencies suited his own; and their misgovernment, tyrannical and extravagant, provoked a rising to bring back the Karageorgević line. The Radical party, which opposed centralising tendencies and stood for that strongly developed local government which, whatever

¹ Pribram, *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, 1879-1914, English translation, pp. 50 ff. and 134 ff.

² He had already assumed it by proclamation, with singular inopportuneess, in the course of the disastrous operations of 1876.

its inconvenience, was in accordance with Serbian tradition, was implicated in the conspiracy, and many of its prominent members were executed. King Milan¹ was now an object of general hatred, and hastened into a military adventure, partly at the behest of Austria, partly to restore, if possible, his prestige.

When Russia's scheme for a "big Bulgaria" had been cancelled the territory south of the Balkans which had been destined for her was constituted as an autonomous province under the Porte with the name of Eastern Rumelia. In 1885 this highly artificial creation revolted, and proclaimed its union with the Bulgarian Principality. Great Britain supported the rebels; Russia, who had learned since 1878 that liberated Bulgars were not likely to accept a new master, opposed them, but with no intention of taking action; Austria-Hungary egged on Milan, whose demand for territorial compensation to balance the aggrandisement of his neighbour was refused, to seek to enforce it in Bulgaria by arms.² The expedition, led by Milan in person, was a complete failure, the Serbs sustaining a severe defeat at Slivnica; and Milan was saved by Austria-Hungary, as in 1876 he had been saved by Russia. Peace was ultimately concluded in March 1886, on the basis of the *status quo*.

Milan's position was now damaged beyond all retrieving. His quarrels with his wife were a public scandal, and moreover of serious political importance, for Queen Natalie, a Russian by birth, was naturally Russophil, and sought to counterwork Milan's pro-Austrian policy. The divorce which he obtained was illegal according to the view of the Orthodox Church and, if possible, injured his reputation still further. His last bid for popular favour was the granting of a "free Constitution," which he assisted a Commission drawn from all parties in the State to elaborate. The new provisions extended the franchise, promised freedom of the Press, and made all classes eligible for election to the Skupština; the King's right to nominate one-fourth of its members was, however, maintained. On January 2, 1889, the King insisted on the Skupština accepting the Constitution as it stood, without discussion or amendment, and two months later he resigned in favour of his son Alexander, then a boy of thirteen. Three Regents were appointed to govern during his minority, the chief of them being Ristić. Both Milan and his divorced wife continued to reside

¹ The title had been assumed and acknowledged in 1882.

² How far the war was supported by popular opinion in Serbia is doubtful.

in Serbia, and carried on their intrigues in a manner most detrimental to the interests of the country. At last they were induced to withdraw; but not long afterwards Alexander, in 1893, proclaimed himself of age, placed the Regents under arrest, and dissolved the Skupština. He next dealt a blow at the Russophil Radical party by abolishing the Constitution of 1889 and restoring that of 1869—a step which also enabled him to re-establish complete control of the Press. In 1897 his father returned and assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief. His abilities for the first time found useful employment in a serious reorganisation of the army; but he is at least partly responsible for what almost amounted to a proscription of the Radical party, a large number of whom lost their lives.

In 1900 Alexander committed the blunder of marrying Draga Mashin, a lady of dubious antecedents known to be incapable of giving the kingdom an heir. The sense of national humiliation was extreme, and Alexander's last expedient to regain popularity, some pretended constitutional concessions, failed alike to reconcile the people and to reassure the Radicals. No political opponent was secure of his life; and the plots of the Queen to determine the succession filled up the cup of popular disgust. On the night of June 10, 1903, the palace was entered by a gang of conspirators,¹ officers in the army who had gained the support of a portion of the troops, and the King and Queen were murdered in circumstances of unexampled brutality. The action was a hideous crime, and Serbia paid dearly for it in the discredit which it brought upon her. But the dead man was not only responsible for a series of judicial murders; he had overthrown constitutional government and rendered a healthy public life impossible. It is matter neither for surprise nor blame that the country was sensible mainly of relief at this final deliverance from the miasmatic influence of the later Obrenoviés.

The regicides formed a provisional government and summoned the Skupština, which unanimously offered the throne to Peter Karageorgević. His acceptance marked the opening of a happier age. His fine personal qualities and unblemished record augured well for his reign, and his promise to be a "true constitutional king" was scrupulously fulfilled. His people rightly divined beneath his unpretending exterior the loyalty

¹ The number of the conspirators was not great. It included, besides the actual assassins, a group of politicians. Scandal has never succeeded in fastening on the Karageorgević family any connection with the assassination of the last Obrenović.

that knew no interests but his country's and the heroic temper that would not desert them in the hour of danger and defeat. One circumstance assured his immediate popularity, and that far beyond the bounds of his own kingdom. The throne as a symbol has never counted for much with Serbs; but the fact that King Peter had fought in the revolt of the Hercegovina made him "our king" in lands beyond the Danube and the Drina. Many a Bosnian peasant made a pilgrimage to Belgrade merely to hang about the streets till he could catch a near view of the sovereign and return contented. Long before the Balkan wars the eyes of Bosnian and Hungarian Serbs were turned with a new affection to the Serbian capital.

CHAPTER IX

PETER KARAGEORGEVIĆ. THE TARIFF WAR AND THE ANNEXATION CRISIS

THE first years of the new reign were beset with difficulties. The Constitution of 1889 was revived with a few modifications democratic in tendency. The Skupština was now to meet annually and was to be elected by all male citizens who paid 15 dinars in direct taxation. Provision was made for a fixed minimum proportion of candidates who had enjoyed university, or at least secondary, education. A marked change in the character of the Skupština was the result, and the value which modern Serbia attaches to education in her politicians is indicated by the number of university professors who have held portfolios in the Cabinet. Men of this class have always studied in one of the great European Universities, generally Berlin, sometimes Munich or Paris, and thus political ideas of Central or Western Europe penetrated directly to the Serbian public. The working of the restored Constitution could not be felt immediately, and the regicides and their allies occupied all the positions of influence. They expected to make the King their tool, and not till 1906 was he sufficiently secure of his position to place them on the retired list. Austria and Russia recognised him immediately on his accession, but the ministers of the other Powers were withdrawn, and returned only after the disappearance of the regicides from public life.

The cordiality of both Austria and Russia is a circumstance deserving note. Alexander had by no means inherited his father's servility towards the former Power, as is shown by the fact that under him the secret treaty was suffered to expire. Austria hoped to re-establish her supremacy over the new sovereign, whose reign was opening so inauspiciously ; but King Peter, with whom the independence of his land was the first preoccupation, found a safer support in Russia, who was more remote and had no such direct interest in his subjugation.

The first endeavours of Serbia to free herself from the toils of Austria were in the economic field. As early as 1880 she had concluded a commercial treaty with England, but Milan's subjection had forbidden further developments in this direction; and in 1882 an agreement with the Habsburg Monarchy put commercial relations between the two neighbours on a special basis. Austrian imports into Serbia, which consisted chiefly of manufactured iron, glass, and paper, were admitted at half the tariff payable on the same goods from other countries, and the importation by Austria of Serbian live-stock and meat was also specially favoured. A second treaty in 1892 curtailed Austrian advantages while maintaining those of Serbia; and from this time onwards the hostility of the Agrarians in Austria, and still more in Hungary, whose object was the complete exclusion of Serbian live-stock, became more and more marked. Partly this fact and partly the first stirrings of the movement which issued in the Balkan League led King Peter's Government to seek to establish relations in another quarter.

In 1905 it came to the knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian Government that Serbia was negotiating a customs-union with Bulgaria. The symptom was significant and disquieting; for it was a main object of the Empire to keep the Balkan States weak and mutually hostile. Serbia on demand submitted a copy of the agreement and expressed herself willing to make reasonable modifications at the request of Austria; but the latter insisted on the right to make what modifications she pleased, and, as Serbia refused to submit to this, the scheme was dropped. The treaty of 1892 was due to expire on March 1, 1906, and, when negotiations for its renewal began, Austria put forward a demand incompatible with the independence of the country to which it was addressed, viz. that munitions orders should be placed only in the Habsburg dominions. Such a provision would obviously have placed Serbia completely at the mercy of her great neighbour, and had a special significance at a moment when Serbia was reorganising her army and placing munitions orders in France. While she conceded all other points, on this she was adamant. The treaty had already lapsed, and Austria now terminated the provisional arrangement which had succeeded it, placing a prohibitive duty on the importation of Serbian live-stock and meat; and this state of affairs prevailed, with short interludes of provisional agreements, till January 1911. The measure was expected to bring Serbia to her knees, but its actual effect

was very different. Serbia sought out new markets, and in 1907 made commercial arrangements with France, Italy, England, Switzerland, and Belgium, and what were virtually most-favoured-nation agreements with Montenegro, Romania, and Russia. Most important of all, Turkey, in return for a reduced impost on certain Turkish goods, granted duty-free transit of Serbian imports and exports via Salonika. Italy, Turkey, Bulgaria, Egypt, and Belgium absorbed large quantities of Serbian meat and corn, Serbian copper began to find its way to the United States, and Serbia began herself to develop industries in the form of primary processes of preparation applied to her own products of stock, corn, and wool. She had to some extent lost financially, but had profited by the discovery and development of her own resources, whereas Austria-Hungary had merely lost; for eager competitors, among whom Germany was first, had picked up a large proportion of her export trade to Serbia and she had not found compensating markets elsewhere. Yet it is noteworthy that on the conclusion of the new agreement, which lasted till the outbreak of war in 1914, Austria-Hungary recovered the lead as an importer, though not her former predominance.

The economic situation of these troubled years gave special importance to the question of railways through the Balkans. It was first raised by the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Aehrenthal,¹ who in 1906 succeeded Goluchowski at the Foreign Office. In January 1908 he unexpectedly announced his intention to obtain from the Porte leave to construct through the Sanjak of Novi Pazar a railway to connect the Bosnian line from Sarajevo to Uvac with the Turkish line to Salonika. This step was presumably taken in accordance with the view prevalent in military circles in 1878 that the road to Salonika lay through the Sanjak. Serbia made a counter-proposal, supported both by Russia and Italy, for a railway from Radujevac on the Danube to the Adriatic, which it was to reach either at Antivari or at San Giovanni di Medua. The Austrian scheme involved enormous engineering difficulties; but it was probably not so much this consideration which induced Aehrenthal to drop it as the outbreak of the Turkish Revolution, which threw Turkish affairs into the melting-pot, and the view rightly taken by the Military Staff that the strategic road to Salonika lay not through the Sanjak, a veritable death-trap for an army, but through Belgrade and up the valley of the Morava.

The turn of affairs in Turkey, far from arresting Aehrenthal

¹ Then Baron, afterwards Count.

in his forward policy, merely gave it a new direction ; and on October 6 he startled Europe by announcing the annexation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina. By this move, the logical outcome of the Occupation policy, Aehrenthal hoped to end a strained situation. The restlessness of Bosnia increased the permanent tension in the relations of the Empire with Serbia on the one hand, and her own Yugoslav subjects on the other. The term "Occupation" suggested a temporary arrangement ; it was supposed that by the *fait accompli* of annexation all hopes of future union would be extinguished alike in Serbia and Bosnia, and the situation stabilised. It may be doubted if at any period this result would have been achieved save by the inclusion under a single authority of all Orthodox Yugoslavs from the Timok to the Adriatic ; the time was long past when a solution could be reasonably attempted by a Catholic State in which the dominant elements were anti-Slav. So far as the immediate situation was concerned, Aehrenthal had little to fear. He was backed by Germany, and the opposition of Russia, which alone was to be apprehended, would not be carried to the point of armed intervention against this combination.

The indignation of Serbia and Montenegro was as bitter as it was fruitless. They had confidently expected that on the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, which they believed imminent, these severed portions of their race would be added to them, and, if they naively overlooked Austria's vested interests in the matter, Austria overlooked factors as potent. But, as Aehrenthal had foreseen, Russia, to whom Serbia appealed, was not prepared to push matters to a war ; the threats of Serbian politicians, unbacked by material force, were extravagant and ludicrous, and their reasonable suggestion that the question should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal passed unheeded.

The indignation of Europe and the resistance of Turkey were greater than Aehrenthal had foreseen ; the Porte was able (January 1909) to extort the price of T. £2,500,000, and still the Turkish Parliament withheld ratification of the agreement. Meanwhile, Austria and Serbia were arming feverishly, and a war which could only have ended in the annihilation of the smaller State seemed imminent. In response to a German ultimatum presented at St. Petersburg, Russian pressure was exerted to force submission on Serbia, whose representative ultimately agreed to a note drawn up by Aehrenthal and the British Ambassador at Vienna. In this she recognised that

her rights had not been infringed and, "confident in the pacific intentions of Austria-Hungary,"¹ undertook to reduce her army to a peace-footing. The note was handed to the Austro-Hungarian Government on March 31, and the Turkish Parliament accepted the agreement on April 5. The European crisis was over; but Serbia held herself warned, and proceeded to a complete reorganisation of her military resources.

¹ According to M. Martchenko, *La Catastrophe Austro-Hongroise*, the insertion of this clause was due entirely to the insistence of the British Ambassador. Aehrenthal would have preferred to keep a free hand.

CHAPTER X

MACEDONIA AND THE BALKAN WARS

THE Turkish Revolution which had given Austria-Hungary her chance in Bosnia ultimately precipitated a crisis in Macedonia, and so led to the First Balkan War. This debatable land had been contested in the Middle Ages by Greek, Bulgar, and Serb ; and, as the liberated States found their feet and began to look round them and anticipate the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the secular conflict revived. Each of the races interested was substantially represented in the motley population. The Greeks have never been ousted from the coastal region, and the bulk of the inland population, though containing large Albanian and Kutzo-Vlach¹ elements, has always been predominantly Slav. But the nature of this Slav race is the subject of the bitterest controversy.

That Serb and Bulgar elements are present is undeniable ; but, according to a probable view, the main population is itself neither Bulgar nor Serb, but is descended from a Slav tribe, akin to both, but identical with neither.² This would account for the fact that, given favourable conditions, the Macedonian Slav can be assimilated to either nationality and passionately embrace it as his own ; while the fictitious character of the adoption is betrayed by the fact that brothers of one house, according to the influences under which they have fallen, are found ranged on opposite sides. Never was an unfortunate land better fitted to become the theatre of propaganda ; and in the Protean forms of religion, education, arson, rape, and murder, propaganda has unceasingly raged.

In the field of religion and education the Greeks, through their control of the Orthodox Church, long enjoyed a monopoly of influence in the contested regions. But in the years 1870-72

¹ A nomadic race akin to the Romanian.

² Another opinion is that it represents the stock which forms the Slav element in the mixed Bulgarian race.

the situation was completely altered by the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, which conferred virtual independence on the Bulgarian Church. The new Exarch was indeed to receive the holy oil from Constantinople, and to mention the name of the Patriarch in his prayers, but was to exercise supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction not merely in specified districts now for the most part included in the Kingdom of Bulgaria, but wherever in Thrace and Macedonia two-thirds of the Christian population desired to acknowledge his authority. The new creation owed its existence to a firman of the Sultan, and was designed to repress Greek influence. The Patriarch naturally resisted to the uttermost, and excommunicated the Exarch (who was thereby relieved of the obligation to pray for him) and all his clergy without at all damping the ardour of Bulgarian propaganda. Greek influence suffered a serious set-back, but the case of Serbia was worse. In 1878, as a result of the Russo-Turkish War, the Porte closed all Serbian schools in Macedonia, thus leaving her without any legitimate means of propaganda; and large numbers of Serbs, exasperated by Greek ecclesiastical tyranny and seeing no prospect of union with free Serbia, lent their support to the Slav Exarchate. Bulgaria, disappointed by the cancelling of the Treaty of San Stefano, made the Bulgarisation of Macedonia her first object. Unfortunately, none of the prospective claimants to the Turkish estate confined themselves to such comparatively legitimate methods as bribery and corruption. The country was terrorised and plundered by bands of Komitajis—Greek, Serbian, Albanian, Bulgarian—by whom whole villages were frequently wiped out. Turkish misrule at its worst was added to the afflictions of the unhappy country, whose discontent found vent in local risings and in 1903 in a general insurrection. Russia and Austria-Hungary, who had already endeavoured to arrest disorder, met again in consultation, and produced the Mürzsteg Programme, whose policy was the enforcement of reforms under the supervision of Austria-Hungary and Russia represented each by a Civil Agent.

The Programme was put in operation; but what results might have followed from its provisions for reform, had they stood alone, it is impossible to say. Their whole operation was warped by a fatal clause which provided that, when the country had been pacified, the Porte should be requested to modify the existing boundaries of the administrative districts in order to secure "a more regular grouping of the various Macedonian races." This incentive to a renewed racial propaganda—for each race naturally hoped to secure modifications in its own

favour—led at once to a renewal in an aggravated form of the very disorders which had produced the Programme. The Komitajis spread a reign of terror over the country, and the bishops of the contending Churches promoted massacres which exterminated the flock of a rival. The execution of the other clauses of the Programme was ultimately entrusted to the Great Powers, who, with the exception of Germany, accepted each a sphere of control. In 1907 the nationality clause was abrogated; somewhat better order was maintained, and under an International Finance Commission a real reform of Macedonian finance was carried through. But this internationalisation was distasteful to Austria-Hungary, and Germany opposed the exercise of any real pressure on the Turk. The views of the two Powers were not at this date identical; in fact, Aehrenthal's historian, Sosnosky, attributes his Balkan policy to his determination to show that Austria was not the amiable moon shining by the borrowed light of Germany's sun, and from 1906 onwards Aehrenthal was responsible for Austria's foreign policy. But their interests so far coincided that neither could tolerate the creation of an international authority which might hamper Berlin's access to Constantinople or Vienna's to Salonika; and the Turkish Revolution of July 1908 and the fair promises of the Young Turks afforded an opportunity for dropping the reform schemes. The wretched districts were therefore abandoned to the mercies of the Young Turks, from whose policy of forcible Turkification the now disarmed population suffered the worst things it had yet known.

Feeling in the Balkans rose to fever heat. The common hatred of the Turk and the general disgust at the results of European interference gave their chance to a group of able Balkan politicians, among whom the most outstanding personality was that of the Greek Premier, Venizelos. The course of events outside the Balkans favoured them, and in the autumn of 1911, when Turkey was distracted by the war with Italy, the first steps were taken towards the formation of a Balkan League. Russia was privy to the conclusion of the agreements, and it is almost certain that, in spite of all efforts to maintain secrecy, Vienna and Berlin—probably through Ferdinand of Bulgaria—had early intelligence of them. On March 13, 1912, a Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of alliance was concluded, supplemented in May by a Military Convention. The first instrument provided for the military assistance of each State by the other in case of attack by one or more States unspecified or of the annexation by any Great Power of any part of Turkey's Balkan

dominions. Possible conquests of Turkish territory were to be allotted as follows : Everything north of the Šar Planina¹ was to go to Serbia, and to Bulgaria everything east of the Rhodope Mountains and the river Struma. Bulgaria desired that the intervening region should become an autonomous Macedonia ; but, if this were impossible, a line was to be drawn from a point just north of Egri Palanka to the north-east shore of Lake Okhrida. Serbia was to make no claim south-east of this line, thus resigning to Bulgaria Kratovo, Veles, and Monastir. Bulgaria, on her side, agreed to accept this frontier if the Tsar of Russia pronounced in its favour. By the Military Convention Bulgaria was to furnish not less than 200,000, and Serbia not less than 150,000 combatants. If Romania or Turkey attacked Bulgaria, Serbia was to furnish at least 100,000 combatants, while, if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, Bulgaria was to declare war against her and furnish at least 200,000 men. A Greco-Bulgarian treaty followed, and in September a Serbo-Montenegrin treaty provided for separate military action by Montenegro. Austria-Hungary and Russia informed the Balkan States that, whatever the issue of the impending conflict, they would allow no alteration in the territorial *status quo*, and were told that their claim to interfere was not admitted. An Identic Note of October 13 conveyed the Balkan ultimatum to the Porte, to Austria, and to Russia. It demanded for the European provinces of Turkey administrative autonomy under Swiss or Belgian governors, provincial elective assemblies, and the introduction of various other reforms. The work was to be directed by a Council consisting of an equal number of Christians and Moslems under the supervision of the representatives of the Great Powers and of the ministers of the Balkan States at Constantinople.

Turkey withdrew her representatives from Belgrade and Sofia, and on October 17 declared war on Serbia and Bulgaria. The struggle which ensued belied the forecasts of most of the best authorities. The Serbs utterly routed the Turks at Kumanovo and captured Üsküb, the old capital of Stefan Dušan, thenceforward to be known again by the Serbian name of Skoplje. Priština and Prizren also fell to their arms, and finally Monastir, while the Montenegrins took Ipek. The Bulgarians flung back the Turkish forces on Chatalja, and the triumph of the allies was completed by the capitulation of Salonika to the Greeks (November 8).

The *status quo* position had to be abandoned, and Mr. Asquith

¹ Between Prizren and Üsküb.

expressed the view of justice and common sense when he stated on November 9 that "the map of Eastern Europe has to be recast, and the victors are not to be robbed of the fruit that has cost them so dear." But Austria-Hungary, profoundly chagrined by seeing the Sanjak fall into Serbian hands, intimated at once, with the support of Italy and Russia,¹ that she would not tolerate the retention by Serbia of any Albanian port. The Serbs, however, entered Durazzo. In December an armistice was signed by Turkey and the three Slav States; and shortly afterwards representatives of the five belligerents met in London, while simultaneously a conference of the ambassadors of the Great Powers sat under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey. But a revolution in Turkey, in which the war-party got the upper hand, put an end to the negotiations, and operations were renewed early in February 1913. The Bulgarians resumed the siege of Adrianople, and, with the aid of Serbian artillery and a Serbian contingent of 50,000, succeeded in taking it on March 26. Meanwhile, the Greeks had captured Yannina, while the Montenegrins were besieging Scutari. Turkey was now ready to accept mediation, to which the Balkan allies agreed, stipulating, however, for the cession of Scutari and the Ægean Islands, together with the payment of an indemnity.

The question of Scutari was of supreme importance to Serbia and Montenegro, for by its possession the Serb States, now rendered contiguous by the conquest of the Sanjak, would find their sorely needed outlet on the Adriatic, through a region which, geographically speaking, formed part of their natural territory.² But this very fact involved the opposition of Austria-Hungary, who, already cut off from all advance to Salonika, would now lose the control which she could exercise with considerable effect over a land-locked Serbia. Italy, who expected one day to round off *Italia Redenta* by all the possessions of the Venetian Republic, meant to see no rival on the Adriatic. Scutari surrendered to the Montenegrin forces on April 22, but the Powers paid no heed to the plea of King Nicholas that the matter lay wholly between himself and the Porte, and compelled him to hand over the town to an international force landed from warships. The Triple Alliance brought all its influence to bear, and though by the Treaty of London (May 30) all the other European territories of the

¹ Russia's action seems to have been due to her desire to support Italy as an Adriatic Power capable of counterbalancing the Habsburg Monarchy in those waters.

² Montenegro possessed about thirty miles of coast-line, but no port of any economic utility.

THE EXPANSION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO



Austro-Turkish frontier 1718-1739.....	Treaty of San Stefano 1878	oooooooo
Treaty of Akkerman (1826) carried out 1833.....	" " Berlin 1878.....	++++++
Montenegro before 1878.....	" " London & Bucharest 1913.....	-----
Treaty of Neuilly 1919.....		

Turkish Empire west of the Enos-Midia line were ceded to the Balkan Allies, Albania was made an autonomous State under a German prince, Wilhelm of Wied. Despite the presence of large Serb and Greek elements in Northern and Southern Albania, it is improbable that its partition between those States would have been a proper solution of the Adriatic question. But the sudden conversion of Italy and Austria-Hungary to the principle of nationality was anything but disinterested. For the latter, the advantages were far-reaching indeed. Serbia, thrown back from the Adriatic, must seek her compensation in the south and east, and in so doing would inevitably embroil herself with one, and perhaps two, of her allies. It is not to be supposed that these advantages escaped the calculations of the statesmen at Vienna and Berlin, whose policy had been brought into complete harmony by the unexpected formation of the Balkan League. An event which promised to terminate the most pernicious of all influences in the Balkans—the interference of Europe—necessarily filled with dismay those whose ambitions required that these countries should remain for ever poor, backward, disunited and weak. Germany's *Drang nach Osten* and Austria-Hungary's to Salonika were thwarted if from the Adriatic to the Black Sea there stretched a line of federated States strong enough in their mutual support to develop their own policy and follow the line of their national interests unperturbed by the threats of their powerful neighbours. Whether foreseen or not, the natural consequences of the embargo on Serbia's aspirations in the west promptly ensued.

Serbia demanded that the partition treaty of March 1912 should be modified in her favour. Cut off from a port on the Adriatic, one of her chief objects in going to war, she now asked for Monastir and Okhrida, which had been won by her arms and were now occupied by her troops, in order that she might at least reach the territory of Greece, whose retention of Salonika was obviously secured. The demand was not inequitable, for the partition as envisaged by the signatories of 1912 had been vitally altered by the intervention of Austria-Hungary backed by the weight of the Triple Alliance; and technical justifications were not wanting, for Bulgaria had not fulfilled the requirements of the military convention of 1912, while Serbia had gone beyond them in the assistance rendered to Bulgaria at the siege of Adrianople. On the other hand, the situation of Bulgaria, who had fought with signal valour and success, was peculiarly galling. Greece had secured the surrender of

Salonika to herself alone on the eve of the arrival of the Bulgarian troops, and access to the Ægean, though much less vital to Bulgaria with her Black Sea frontage than to Serbia, was eagerly coveted. The Tsar's mediation was offered, but was ineffective; and on June 29, 1913, the Second Balkan War opened by an attack of the Bulgars on the Serbs. Greece and Serbia, who had just concluded an offensive and defensive alliance for ten years against Bulgaria, took the field against her; and their co-operation, supported moreover by a renewed resistance on the part of the Turks and a raid by the Romanians, was more than she could face. She was beaten, and the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10) reflected the depth of her humiliation. The rigour of its terms, imposed by Greece and Romania no less than by Serbia, bore fruit in Bulgaria's choice of allies in the European War. Serbia's acquisitions consisted in the western half of the Sanjak and in Central Macedonia, including Monastir and Okhrida. To a considerable part of this territory she was entitled by the treaty of 1912, and to much of the rest her historic and sentimental claims were strong. But her demands, though by no means the most prejudicial to Bulgaria of those which the treaty enforced, were pushed beyond generosity and prudence alike, and Bulgaria would undoubtedly have fared better in this quarter under a Russian award.

Serbia, disappointed in the matter of most importance to her, had nevertheless gained largely in population and territory and incalculably in prestige. Her valour and her military efficiency had been displayed to the world, and that at a critical moment in the relations of Austria-Hungary with her Yugoslav subjects. The annexation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina, which was to have quenched all pro-Serbian inclinations in these provinces, had produced exactly the opposite effect, and to intense political irritation was added discontent arising from the acute social distress prevalent among the Christian population. The racial intolerance of the Magyars had neutralised the anti-Orthodox sentiments of Catholic Croats, and the scandals of the Agram and Friedjung trials had kindled the just indignation of Orthodox and Catholic alike. Belgrade was rapidly becoming the Mecca of Yugoslav sentiment, and when King Peter, on the conclusion of the war, made his triumphal entry into Belgrade the streets were thronged with Hungarian Serbs who crossed the Danube in defiance of official prohibition. Every Yugoslav province in the Empire was stirred, and the Government took alarm. For long it had ascribed every symptom of Yugoslav discontent within Austria-Hungary to

the subversive action of the Serbian Government, alleged to be plotting against the integrity of the Habsburg dominions, while behind Serbia loomed Russia, who was credited with aiming at the encirclement of Austria by an extension of Slav dominion from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. Facts to support the contention were lacking. Austria-Hungary's attempt by the Agram trial to fasten responsibility on the Serbian Government had been a discreditable failure, whilst Russia had induced Serbia to keep the peace over the annexation question in 1909, and had just supported the Triple Alliance in excluding her from the Albanian coast. But the substantial facts remained that Bosnia and the Hercegovina were sick of the Habsburg rule which had been forced on them, and that Serbia's acquiescence in the arrangement could in the nature of things only be compulsory. On August 9, 1913, the day before the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, the Italian Premier, Giolitti, received from his Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, a telegram stating that "Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action" (against Serbia), "and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance." San Giuliano and his chief took the view that the *casus fœderis* did not arise, "inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking Austria."

But the design, though deferred, was not abandoned. On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, was murdered in the streets of Sarajevo, the chief town of Bosnia, by Prinčip, a Bosnian Serb student and a subject of Austria-Hungary. Credited with Slav sympathies, the Archduke was hated in Hungary and in Pan-German circles in Austria. The most ordinary precautions for the safety of a royal personage had been omitted, and it is not surprising that the Austro-Hungarian Government has incurred the suspicion of having connived at the crime. Whatever its circumstances, it afforded an opportunity for fastening a quarrel on Serbia.

On July 23 the Austro-Hungarian Government addressed to her an ultimatum in which, without the production of any proof, it was stated that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, that Serbian officers and functionaries were implicated in it,¹ and that it was the work of a "subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of Austria-Hungary from the

¹ It was proved that the youthful assassin and a comrade had secretly visited Belgrade and received hand-grenades and revolvers from two Serbian Komitajis. For the complicity of the Serbian Government no evidence has ever been adduced, and it is in the highest degree improbable. See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, New Vols., xxxii, p. 404.

Monarchy " which " had its birth under the eye of the Serbian Government." ¹ To this preamble succeeded ten demands couched in the most peremptory terms, relating chiefly to the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda in Serbia. Eight were at once conceded. The remaining two—that the collaboration of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement should be accepted in Serbia, and that Austro-Hungarian delegates should take part in the proceedings against accessories to the plot alleged to be in Serbian territory—were justly felt to be incompatible with the sovereignty of the State to which they were addressed. Yet, even regarding these, the door was left open for discussion: and Serbia further offered to submit the whole question to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers. No step could have been more inconvenient to the Central Empires, whose object was to strike before Russia, on whose advice Serbia's answer had been framed, could intervene on behalf of the State whose annihilation had been decreed. Only forty-eight hours had been allowed for a reply to the ultimatum, which is now known to have been communicated to the German Government twelve hours before it was transmitted to that of Serbia.²

¹ For the English version of the text see *Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, Part I, No. 7, and, for that of the Serbian reply, loc. cit., No. 25.

² *Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, vol. iv, p. 171. Published 1919.

CHAPTER XI

THE AUSTRIAN INVASIONS

WHEN the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was presented at Belgrade on July 23, 1914, Serbia was in no condition to fight another war. The two Balkan Wars had strained the resources of the little State to their utmost, and many of her troops had been employed in the short interval since the conclusion of peace in quelling the insurrection of her new Albanian subjects. The supply of munitions was depleted ; and the arsenal at Kragujevac could not make good more than a small fraction of the losses, while the Great Powers were not likely, at such a moment, to have supplies to spare. Even had arms been plentiful, and had the new divisions created since the Balkan Wars existed in fact and not only on paper, it was obviously useless for the little kingdom to resist the power of the Dual Monarchy. Serbia, therefore, bowed her head to *force majeure*.

It is doubtful if any European State ever received in times of peace so humiliating a document as the Austro-Hungarian Note. Yet the Serbian Government accepted, as we have seen, all its clauses except two. Nor was this all ; for the Serbian reply suggested that, if the Monarchy was not satisfied, and to avoid an armed conflict, reference might be had to the International Tribunal at the Hague, or to the Great Powers, who had dictated Serbia's submission to Austria-Hungary over the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1909.

But the purpose of the Note was that it should not be accepted. The Italian Ambassador at Constantinople had been told by his German colleague already on July 15 that the Note was so worded that it would make war inevitable. The Serbian reply was such as to merit the most careful consideration, at the very least, from any Government not absolutely determined on war. But no sooner had the Austro-Hungarian Minister received that reply on the evening of July 25 than he left Serbia that night by special train with the whole staff of his

Legation, after informing M. Pašić that diplomatic relations were broken off. The formal declaration of war followed three days later.

Thus suddenly was Serbia plunged into her last and greatest war. So unexpected was the blow that some ministers, including M. Pašić, the Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been in the provinces engaged in political campaigning at the moment when the ultimatum was presented. But on July 25 everything was hurriedly prepared for war. Mobilisation was quickly ordered, and that night the Government, accompanied by the Diplomatic Corps and a crowd of officials, left the capital, which was within easy reach of the Austro-Hungarian guns, and went south to Niš in Central Serbia. For fifteen months that muddy, overgrown village became the seat of government and centre of the nation's life.

While all Europe was engaged in frantic efforts of diplomacy or mobilisation, Austria-Hungary slowly opened her attack upon Serbia. The campaign was intended to be no more than a punitive expedition against the barbarous little State that had made itself a nuisance to the Dual Monarchy. As the *Pesti Hirlap* wrote in June 1916, "We saw that we were obliged to finish once for all with the Serbian agitation, which after the Balkan Wars had become insupportable."

In view of the national consciousness among the Serbs and the fact that a good third of them (not to mention the other Yugoslavs) were subjects of the Monarchy, a clash between Serbian nationalism and Habsburg imperialism does seem to have been inevitable. Austria-Hungary thought that the moment had come at which the clash might be most profitably brought about. It seems probable that when the local quarrel began to spread and to develop into a European war, the diplomats of Vienna attempted to draw back, horrified at the gulf that was opening before them. But stronger wills and larger plans controlled them, and, before the Austro-Hungarian armies entered Serbia, their ally at Berlin was at grips with Russia, and the Western Powers were reluctantly entering the great struggle.

When the bombardment of Belgrade from across the Sava and Danube began on July 29 it was generally believed that, though the Serbians might offer a gallant resistance, they would be steadily forced back into the mountainous south of their own kingdom, even if they did not capitulate. Their military reputation was not yet entirely established. They had failed miserably in the disastrous war of 1885 against the

Bulgarians. They had made short work of the Turks, it is true, in 1912, and quickly settled accounts with the Bulgarians in 1913; but critics might point to the incorrigible mediævalism of Turkish organisation and to the assistance received from Greece and Rumania in the Second Balkan War. It was not yet certain how the Serbian Army would shape when opposed to that of a great European Power. That question was answered during the last five months of 1914 by the expulsion of three successive "punitive expeditions" and the capture of some 70,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners.

Belgrade itself was not considered by the Serbian staff to be capable of successful defence. Yet, despite the weakness of the forces left to hold the enemy at that point, they were enough to prevent him from crossing the rivers there. The main attack was made from Bosnia and Srem (Syrmlia), upon the north-western corner of Serbia, known as the Mačva. The invaders crossed the frontier on August 13, and advanced towards the important strategic point of Valjevo, their flanks covered by the rivers Sava and Drina. The main Serbian forces were concentrated in the centre of the country, and could not be wholly moved to the defence of the Mačva. Other vulnerable points of the northern frontier had to be watched, as had the Bulgarian bands, who made several attempts to destroy the railway to Salonika, Serbia's one line of communication with the outer world. Thus, in the battle that now followed the Serbian commander, Marshal Putnik, was able to employ only a half of his available forces against his numerous and well-equipped opponents.

By August 17 the two armies were engaged all along a 60-kilometre front, the Serbians being steadily pressed back on either flank. But they hurled themselves in a furious attack upon the enemy's centre, driving them off the ridges of the Cer hills. By the 20th the campaign had been decided, and the bulk of the Austro-Hungarian army was in rapid and confused flight towards the Drina. Šabac on the Sava was still held by the invaders for a few days, but when the Serbian artillery was brought up to bombard the town on the 24th it was found that the occupying force had slipped over the river and that Serbia had been cleared of her enemy.

Thus Serbia had registered the first victory of the Allies in the world-war. The enemy abandoned some 4,000 prisoners and much material of war in his precipitate flight, and—a more important result for Allied strategy as a whole—was obliged to retain on the Balkan front five Army Corps which the Central

Empires would have been glad to transfer to France or Poland. The Austrian Press Bureau gave as ingeniously optimistic a description of the campaign as was possible, in which it was declared that "the operation was limited to a short incursion into the enemy's territory, after the successful accomplishment of which it was necessary to return to an attitude of expectancy, in adjourning the offensive to a more favourable occasion." This was making the best of a bad business. Everyone knew that the "punitive expedition" had proved a fiasco.

But, as the Serbians recaptured their own villages and towns, they found that the invaders had been carrying on a veritable war of extermination. The civil population, exclusively old folk and children in a country where the young men are all soldiers, had been assured that this was a war with a civilised European Power, not a set of Balkan bandits, and that therefore they could go about their daily concerns without fear. In all wars there is an element of brutality towards the non-combatant population affected. Opportunities for cruelty and bestiality are offered to those baser natures who are to be found in all armies. But in this case it was the High Command which stimulated the invading troops to severity and to the instant execution of any person encountered on the countryside who might even appear suspicious. The troops probably knew little about the Serbians beyond the traditional view, long disseminated by the Austrian Press, that they were a race of cut-throats and blackguards, unrestrained by the laws of God or man. They now received such orders as that of the commander of the Ninth Corps: "I therefore order that during the entire course of the war an attitude of extreme severity, extreme harshness, and extreme distrust is to be observed towards everybody. In the first place, I will not allow persons armed, but wearing no uniform, whether encountered singly or in groups, to be taken prisoners. They must be executed without exception." Such orders amounted to direct incitement to massacre, while the real meaning of the second sentence quoted will be understood when it is remembered that the Serbians had not uniforms for a large part of their army, which took the field in the ordinary peasant's dress. Dr. Reiss, the Swiss criminologist, investigated the accusations brought by the Serbian population against the invaders, and published his results with photographs that sickened even readers accustomed by then to the more gruesome details of war. Three hundred and six women had been executed, and the list of victims contained persons of all ages from one to ninety-five;

sixty-eight with eyes put out and thirty-four with noses cut off, to mention but part of the indictment. Such were the traces left behind them in Serbia by the apostles of a superior civilisation.

But the wrath aroused by these wanton and senseless cruelties was quickly forgotten in the exhilaration of success. On the heels of the retreating Austro-Hungarian Army the Serbians crossed the rivers and invaded Bosnia and Syrmia. It was an intoxicating moment. They had defended their native soil and now they came as national deliverers to be welcomed by their brother-Serbs of the unredeemed territories. All was going well for the Allies. The Germans were held in France, the Russians pressing on from the East. The Serbians looked forward eagerly to an early and triumphant peace.

But the pride of the Dual Monarchy could not tolerate the insult of defeat at the hands of Serbian "swineherds." Despite the Russian pressure, a second invasion was launched in September, and penetrated almost to Valjevo before being thrown back again to the Drina, like its predecessor. A pause followed during October, while the enemy prepared a third invasion. This time, it was understood in Vienna, there was going to be no mistake. General Potiorek, at the head of his five Army Corps and two supplementary divisions, steadily advanced, despite all the difficulties of a country never well provided with roads, and now devastated by two campaigns. Valjevo fell. Potiorek was decorated with a new order specially inaugurated to commemorate his triumph. On December 2 Belgrade was evacuated, after a defence of four months, and the enemy columns pushed up the Morava Valley towards Niš to cut off the retreat of the Serbian army. The Austro-Hungarian forces were closing round Kragujevac, the old Serbian capital, the supply of ammunition was running out, the troops were discouraged by continued retreat before superior numbers, Serbia's fate seemed surely sealed—when the prayed-for munitions arrived by the railway from Salonika (having just escaped destruction by a Bulgarian band that blew up the bridge near Strumica) and the Serbian Staff gave the order to attack. Even before receiving the order, General Mišić had moved forward, confident that he could break the opposing line. Down from the heights of Rudnik and over the hills of the Šumadija the Serbians rushed on the astonished Austro-Hungarians. Masters of mountain warfare, they had only needed the shells and bullets, and now they moved rapidly, attacking the enemy from every side. The invaders fell back

at first slowly, but soon in confusion. Their columns were separated from their bases and from each other, by what Marshal Putnik called "the Serbian national mud." Soon the retreat became a rout helter-skelter towards the Drina. On December 15, after an absence of thirteen days, the Serbians were back again in Belgrade, and once more they had delivered their country from the presence of the invader.

But the very completeness of the victory brought new misfortune upon the Serbians. Nearly 70,000 prisoners had been captured in the last great victory, and amongst these were large numbers who had contracted diseases amid the hardships and filth of war. Typhus and cholera made their appearance in the districts most strewn with the wreckage of battle, and rapidly spread to the rest of the country. Serbia had never been well supplied with doctors or particularly devoted to modern ideas of hygiene. Many of her medical men and students were interned in Austria-Hungary, where they were accustomed to learn their profession. The Government, therefore, sent out urgent appeals to Allied and neutral countries for help. Hospital units were organised by private enterprise and hurried out, and all through the spring and early summer they gallantly fought the diseases till by July they had triumphed and Serbia was herself again—though only after the loss of many thousands of lives which she could ill afford to spare.

It was a common opinion in Belgrade in the late summer of 1915 that Serbia was now to enjoy a spell of rest from the labours of war. She had shown that she could not be lightly attacked. On the other hand, she could not alone venture on any serious attack on Austria-Hungary. Her part would be played by remaining under arms and pinning down enemy forces to her frontier. This hope was short-lived. The war-map of Europe had changed rapidly since the spring. The Germans had delivered crushing blows at their opponents in Galicia and Poland, and the Russians had withdrawn far to the east. The next German preoccupation was to come to the rescue of their Turkish Ally. Should the Entente break through the Dardanelles, the Central Empires would be ringed round, and Russia would receive the material of war, for lack of which she had had to give way in Poland. But the road to Turkey lay across Serbia and Bulgaria, since Romania showed no inclination to depart from her neutrality in favour of Germany. Accordingly, Serbia must be crushed and Bulgaria adequately bribed.

CHAPTER XII

THE CRUSHING OF SERBIA

It has been asserted that the Bulgarian Government was undecided until the very eve of its participation in the war as to which side it proposed to join, and that, had the Allies spoken more clearly and insisted on the immediate surrender to Bulgaria of Serbian territory in Macedonia, the former country would have joined her Serbian sister and marched against the Central Empires. But this view depends on two hypotheses. First, that the Bulgarian Government was open to conviction that the Allies might win the war. And, secondly, that this Government, as opposed to its people, would be content with a settlement of the Balkans on national lines (which was taken to mean the assignment to Bulgaria of portions of Serbian and Greek Macedonia, and that part of the Dobruja lost by Bulgaria to Romania in 1913). It is highly improbable that either of these hypotheses is correct. The Central Empires seemed on the road to victory, especially as the attack on the Dardanelles was seen to be unsuccessful, and it was the hegemony of the Balkan peninsula at which the Bulgarian Tsar and his ministers were aiming.

It is true that the Allied diplomacy was dilatory and uncertain in tone, offering only theoretic approval to the suggested concessions of territory by Greece and Romania, and unable to bring itself to insist upon the immediate surrender of Macedonia by Serbia. But the actions of the Bulgarian Government seem to indicate that it was already committed early in 1915 to the other side. Turkey had reluctantly (as was seen by her efforts to recover the lost territory in 1918) surrendered to Bulgaria the right bank of the Maritsa from Adrianople southwards ; and the Central Empires had provided Bulgaria with a large loan. It is incredible that these benefits should have been conferred in return for no engagement binding Bulgaria at least not to join the Entente. Popular as the cause of the Entente may have

been with large classes of the Bulgarian population, by nothing short of considerable military success could the Allies have persuaded the Bulgarian Government to support their cause.

The German plan required the elimination of Serbia. Its execution was not left to Germany's inefficient ally, since this time there must be no failure. A German army under Marshal von Mackensen, the victor of Galicia, was concentrated north of the Danube, and another, of which two-thirds were Austro-Hungarian, along the Sava. In infantry this force outnumbered the Serbian troops opposed to them in the proportion of roughly three to two; but in artillery, especially in guns of heavy calibre, the enemy's superiority was far more pronounced. The Germans proposed to blast their way through Serbia as they had done on the Polish front.

The German-Austrian bombardment along the rivers began on September 19, and four days later the Bulgarian mobilisation was ordered. The Serbian Government was under no illusions as to what that meant. Marshal Putnik indeed suggested attacking Bulgaria at once, as a defensive measure, before the mobilisation could be completed. The Serbian Army on the eastern frontier could have advanced rapidly on Sofia, and, by occupying several strategic points, could have safeguarded the railway to Salonika and communication with the Allies. But the Allies, duped to the end by Tsar Ferdinand's Government, assured the Serbians that the Bulgarian mobilisation was not directed against them and vetoed any attack upon Bulgaria. The Serbians accordingly withdrew a short distance from their frontier and awaited the deluge.

Every possible calamity now seemed to fall upon the devoted country. Awaiting attack from north, east, and west, the Serbians comforted themselves with hopes of help from the south. The Allies had promised to stand by them in case of need, and Greece was bound by the treaty of 1913 to come to their assistance if they were attacked by Bulgaria. But at the beginning of October the Allies had only some 20,000 troops at Salonika, and on the 5th King Constantine informed his Prime Minister, M. Venizelos, that he could not sanction any intervention in the war. M. Venizelos resigned, and a neutralist Cabinet succeeded his at Athens. Betrayed by the Greek Government, the Serbians prepared to hold up their enemies as long as possible until the Anglo-French expeditionary force was strong enough to come to their rescue.

They might have been better advised to have abandoned all Serbia proper in face of the overwhelming German attack

and to have made certain of holding Macedonia and their communication with the sea. But to relinquish their mother-country while there was still a hope of reinforcement would have been a hard choice to make, and one that would not have been understood by the Serbian peasant-soldiers, confident in their own fighting powers and unaccustomed to German artillery. Instead, the Serbians offered a desperate resistance along the rivers. But they were slowly forced back into the interior by terrific gun-fire. On October 11 the Germans were in Smederevo (Semendria), where the Morava flows into the Danube, and four days later Belgrade fell. Mackensen had thus achieved the first steps in the break-through to Turkey by gaining control of the rail-heads on the Danube.

Meanwhile, on the 13th the Bulgarians at last decided to act. Without declaration of war they fell upon the Serbian rear, attacking at various points along the whole of the Serbian eastern frontier. Even the exiguous forces that had been detached to guard against the enemy from the east had been necessarily further reduced in order to reinforce the defence in the north. But in the Bulgarians the Serbian troops saw an enemy whose methods they understood and whom they had defeated two years before. Although outnumbered by more than two to one, the Serbians held their own round Pirot, and farther north, for nearly a fortnight. At the end of that time they found themselves in a position of extreme danger. The German thrust up the Morava had forced the Serbian left in Western Serbia to fall back to the south-east and had made the defence of the north-eastern frontier impossible. All the Serbian forces were obliged to retire towards the centre of their country to avoid being taken in the rear. With the troops also came masses of the civil population, urging their ox-wagons along the congested and impossible roads, and increasing the congestion in the central towns of Kruševac and Kraljevo.

As long as the road to the south lay open hope burned bright. The great Western Powers could surely never leave Serbia to her fate. They could not be so blind to their own interests as to let the German stride across a subject Serbia towards his Baghdad railway. Day after day Niš was decorated with Allied flags in honour of the Anglo-French force whose arrival was announced. But the news from Macedonia was of the worst. The Allies had not been able to send adequate forces to Salonika in time to prevent the Bulgarians from pouring into the Vardar Valley and cutting the railway. By October 2

the Bulgarians were in Skoplje (Üsküb) and pressing northwards towards Serbia proper, while they held off the weak Allied divisions on the Serbo-Greek frontier. Once again, as elsewhere, the Allies were too late. Serbia was now cut off, caught in a ring of steel. Her downfall was now assured. The only question was whether the army, with the mob of civilians that followed it, could hack its way out of the trap to join the increased forces which the Allies would soon have at Salonika.

Early in November the Serbians set out upon their way of sorrows. Through the mountains of Central Serbia by narrow and muddy tracks, under a pitiless rain, army and people pressed southwards towards the plain of Kosovo, where their nation and empire had gone down before the Turk five centuries before. It was a race against their pursuers, in which again and again the Serbian army just broke away in time to escape the closing grasp of the Austrian, German, and Bulgarian pincers. By November 15 the army was concentrated on the plain of Kosovo, the only corner of the country, except Monastir, that still remained unconquered. It now gathered itself for one last attack upon the enemy. The weary and starving troops flung themselves upon the Bulgarians who held the pass leading to Macedonia and the south. They had some success, and pressed the enemy back. But speed was essential. If they could not effect a break-through immediately they would be caught by the advancing Germans and Austrians behind them. When it was clear that time would be needed to make the opening southwards, and that the Allies had fallen back towards the sea, the attempt was abandoned.

Serbia was now at an end of her resistance. But if her army could fight no more, it could also refuse to surrender. One way of escape still lay open, a retreat across the wild and rocky mountains of Montenegro and Northern Albania, the most savage corner of Europe, sparsely inhabited by the hostile Geg tribes. The decision was taken, and the army set out on its ghastly retreat in the intense cold of early December. The civilians were bidden to return and make their way as best they could to their homes again, a task rendered the more difficult since the invaders had armed the Albanian inhabitants of the plain of Kosovo, and the latter were now eager to repay old scores to their late masters. Yet a small proportion of the peasants and many of the educated class preferred to follow the army, and swelled the wretched columns that staggered over the mountains towards Scutari, where the Allies were to meet them with food and the protection of

war-ships. With the army came also a large number of young lads, whom it was not thought safe to leave behind in view of the excesses committed in the first Austrian invasion. Few of these lads, who had set off from their homes with nothing but a fistful of money, ever reached the sea. Many died within sight of Valona waiting for a chance of transshipment. A few thousand of the hardiest survived and went off to schools and colleges in Western Europe; but the fate of their companions is one of the most distressing features of the national Calvary.

The retreating army became a herd of starving, despairing fugitives. Guns and wagons had to be abandoned. The men ate the corpses of their horses, their boots, their paper money. Around them at night could be heard the wolves waiting for those who should fall by the way. Stragglers were attacked by the Albanians. Overhead flew the enemy's aeroplanes, dropping their bombs on the crawling columns. Thousands died by the wayside of cold, hunger, and exposure. Again and again hope of safety and relief was deferred. The Allies' Adriatic Mission was unable to transport supplies up to Scutari and Podgórica, and the Serbs had to trudge on to the coast. When they reached the tumbledown little port of San Giovanni di Medua they found that the Austrian submarines had been busy and that the harbour was blocked with the wrecks of the vessels that should have carried them away. On they had to go across the marshes of Central Albania—the worst part of the whole retreat according to many—till at last the British and French navies took them on board at Valona and transported them to Corfu.

Now began the three years of exile from December 1915 to November 1918, during which it might be said of Serbia that she existed in the camp of Marshal Mišić, who now took the place of the aged and dying Putnik. By wonderful endurance no less than 150,000 men had survived the retreat, and, although some thousands died at Corfu before they could be restored to health, more than 120,000 were ready by May to be shipped round to Salonika and once more to resume the fight for their fatherland. The Serbs are seen at their best as soldiers on active service; and it was during the long-sustained campaign in Macedonia that they first became known to a considerable number of their French and British allies, upon whom they certainly left the impression of being a very gallant and sporting race, taking light-heartedly their monotonous life among the barren mountains, their poverty and homelessness, and their separation from parents, wives, and children. Serbia, though

erased from the map of Europe, and officially unrecognised by the Central Empires, lived on in the huts and round the campfires of the army, which carefully kept up the many celebrations and traditional customs that enliven the Serbian peasant's winter.

The Serbians, six divisions and a cavalry division, began to move up from Salonika to become the left wing of the Allied forces in July 1916. Their guns and their rifles were French. Their rations, uniforms, ammunition, animals, transport and hospital equipment were jointly supplied by Great Britain and France. Their position was ticklish. In front the Bulgarians held a precipitous mountain range and a very strong line of defences drawn up across the plain of Monastir by von Mackensen. Behind was the uncertain quantity of Constantinist Greece. In August it became clear that these two elements were in collusion ; for the Bulgarians advanced across the right wing of the Allies in Eastern Macedonia, where the Greek troops surrendered the port of Kavalla without resistance. At the same time the Bulgarian right attacked the Serbians and seemed likely to establish their connection with Old Greece, and so pin down the Allies in Salonika. But the rest of the Serbians, some French, and a brigade of Russian troops were brought up. The Bulgarians were repulsed, and a long and fiercely contested series of actions ended in the capture of the highest mountain summits by the Serbians, who then advanced and turned the defences on the plain. This enabled the Allies to capture Monastir on November 19.

CHAPTER XIII

WAITING FOR THE TURN

For the moment the hopes of the Serbians ran high. They had secured a foothold in their own country once more, and talked of a rapid advance towards their homes. But the enemy held very strong positions, and the Serbian army had lost so heavily that it could not afford to be reckless of lives which could not be replaced. For nearly two years the Serbians and their Allies, though constantly fighting minor engagements, suffering from malaria and dysentery, and in each spring making elaborate offensives which were bloodily repulsed, on the whole led a monotonous and stationary existence along the Greek frontier. The Serbian generals knew the ground and the nature of Balkan warfare as no one else, but their voices did not yet carry much weight in the Allied councils at Salonika, where General Sarrail was in the chief command.

Besides the army there were other *foci* of national life. The poorer refugees were given an asylum in Corsica by the French Government, their clothing and medical care being provided by the Serbian Relief Fund. Others were at Bizerta, in Algiers, which was also a hospital base for military invalids and convalescents. Several thousands of boys who came through the retreat were taken into the schools of France and Switzerland, and a few hundreds got as far as England and Scotland, where a small number remained long enough to proceed to the British Universities. Specially noticeable is the fact that during these years of exile the preparation of students for the priesthood of the Serbian Church was entirely carried out in English theological colleges, though under Serbian professors, owing to the collapse of civilisation in Russia. Yet other centres were Geneva, where the journal *La Serbie* gave Europe week by week the official views of M. Pašić's Ministry, and Nice, where the Skupština (Parliament) was gathered before its removal to Corfu in 1917.

The Government, with the diplomatic corps and a number of officials and elderly officers with their families, remained at Corfu, and led a very tolerable existence in that earthly paradise. The peasant-soldiers had not loved the heat and the strange flora of the sub-tropical island; but the black-coated crowd of officials managed to "do" themselves pretty well in the city with its cafés and cinema, while the storms of political life raged as soon as the Skupština was reopened and adversity was seen to have stimulated the vigour of parliamentary opposition.

Serbian politics before the war were entirely dominated by the patriarchal figure of M. Pašić, the leader of the Old Radical Party. He had devoted many years and much money to the creation of a parliamentary majority, consisting largely of unlettered peasants, amongst whom his long white beard gave him a semi-pontifical authority. They appreciated a Premier who did not bother them with "progress" or education, but who was lavish with favours at election time, and only asked to be left in uninterrupted enjoyment of office along with the clan of his relatives and dependents, who filled the diplomatic and civil services. His foreign policy had always consisted of an unquestioning trust in Russia, shared by the peasants of Serbia, who were vastly impressed every time that Nikola Pašić was received by the Tsar and looked upon him as on one who had beheld the beatific vision of the Lord of the Earth.

If to the Premier might be given much of the credit for keeping Serbia in a contented state of barbaric simplicity, in which Turkish dilatoriness prevailed and public life consisted of personal intrigue, yet, when the war and the period of exile shook the nation out of its lethargy, many Serbian Radicals began to question the omniscience of their leader. Without a peasant electorate to manipulate, and brought into constant and intimate relations with the Governments of Western Europe, Nikola Pašić and his gang were not so impressive as they had been. The deputies who got away in the retreat were largely of the more educated class, and capable of criticism directed at the Government's masterly inactivity. The Prime Minister remained the only Serbian public man known to Western Europe, where he alone represented the nation; but behind that solid figure there grew up an increasing opposition amongst the deputies at Corfu, impatient of the personal régime which seemed firmly established by the Allies' knowledge of the Premier and their ignorance of all other Serbian political leaders.

Soon after the war broke out and the seat of Government

had been transferred to Niš, a Coalition Cabinet had been formed. The leading parties in the Skupština agreed to sink their differences in the face of the national crisis. This Coalition remained in office until June 1917, but at the end of 1916 the bonds that held it together were being worn away by constant friction. After the retreat not only Marshal Putnik but most of his staff were superseded, and the Premier's opponents accused him of trying to lay the blame for the national disaster upon the military chiefs. In the autumn of 1916 there followed a long conspiracy trial, which enabled embittered critics to accuse the Premier and his friends of trying to eliminate men of talent from public life ; for the accused were some of the ablest officers of the army. Late in August someone had fired a shot at the car in which the Prince Regent and General Sarraill were seated. The French authorities instituted an enquiry, and arrested a Greek suspect. The Serbian Government then placed under arrest Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, a well-known staff officer, nicknamed "Apis," whose abilities and patriotism were proverbial, and ten others, most of whom were well-known senior officers.

The military tribunal before which the accused were brought virtually tried the case *in camera*, for admission was only granted to those who had Government permits to attend. When it was found impossible to establish any connection between the prisoners and the attempt on the Prince Regent, a new charge was brought forward. "Apis" and his friends were now accused of being the leaders of the secret society "Union or Death," which was often called the "Black Hand." This society had been started some years before the Balkan wars for the purpose of stimulating nationalism in Serbia and linking it up with Yugoslav activities in Austria-Hungary. These objects were entirely laudable from the Serbian point of view, and Dimitrijević had been the intimate friend of Dr. Milovanović, the brilliant statesman whose death in 1912 was a catastrophe for his country. But this army clique had threatened to become a power in the State, especially after the Balkan wars had greatly heightened the reputation of its leaders. Disputes between the officers and the Pašić Cabinet broke out in the following year, but were allayed by the outbreak of the war and the feverish activities of its first two years. M. Pašić evidently felt in 1916 that the time had come to finish with his military critics. The trial resulted in the condemnation to death of seven of the accused, the other four being sentenced to imprisonment ; but nearly sixty other officers were despatched to Bizerta in disgrace, and many other

suspects were relieved of their posts or kept under observation. Meanwhile, a severe censorship prevented the full facts from being generally known, and sought to discredit the condemned officers by representing them as Austrophiles who had schemed for a separate peace.

This Salonika conspiracy trial brought to a head the dissensions in the Coalition at Corfu. The condemned men had far-reaching connections of blood or friendship in Serbian society, and no one really suspected them of disloyalty to their nation and dynasty, whatever might be the general opinion of military interference in politics. The Young Radical and Progressive parties, led by MM. Davidović, Drašković, and others, demanded a revision of the trial, and, when that was refused, at last decided to withdraw from the Government in June 1917.

Unfortunate as this political party feud was, it did not represent any differences of opinion on the cause for which the nation had so gallantly given its all. It was just at the moment of the Coalition's disruption that Dr. Trumbić arrived in Corfu on behalf of the Yugoslav Committee to negotiate the terms of a manifesto of Serbo-Yugoslav solidarity and war-aims. When the Coalition had been formed one of its first acts had been to appeal to all the Yugoslavs for whose liberation and unification it declared that Serbia was fighting. Since then Russian official distrust of the Catholic Croats had rendered difficult any whole-hearted and active propaganda for the integral union of the race. But the Russian Revolution had changed the situation. While destroying the mainstay of the Old Radicals' foreign policy, it also freed their hands to clasp those of their Croatian brothers. In this the other political parties were more zealous than M. Pašić and his friends, who were suspected of clinging to narrowly Serbian ideals. Actually the drafting of the Manifesto of Corfu was the joint work of all the political parties, and represented the resolve of the whole nation to accomplish union with the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of the Dual Monarchy.

As soon as that bold announcement of racial aspiration had been promulgated (July 20, 1917), the opposition parties resumed their attack on M. Pašić and the Old Radicals. M. Pašić replied by refusing to convoke the Skupština, in which he had a majority of only two votes. A direct appeal from the President of the Skupština to the Crown at last secured the resumption of parliamentary life in February 1918. But when the budget was introduced in April the opposition retired from

the house and left the Government without the quorum necessary for legislation.

The official Press Bureau merely informed the Allied public that the Serbian war credits had been refused, and the opposition leaders were falsely represented as being defeatists, or even Austrophiles, while the Government proceeded to raise the unvoted credits. In view of the urgent necessities of the war, M. Pašić's Government was justified in this unconstitutional act, but the resentment against the Old Radical régime was considerably increased.

While the politicians squabbled at Corfu and the army tenaciously clung to its strip of regained territory in Macedonia, Serbia had been divided between her conquerors, and the population was suffering the miseries of government by foreign Powers, themselves in dire straits owing to the Allied blockade. The Entente continued to insist that they were fighting for the restoration of Serbia and, after January 1917, for the emancipation from foreign domination of the other Yugoslavs. But the friends of Serbia began to have uneasy doubts whether there would be any reasonable number of Serbians left if deliverance were long delayed, so terrible was the mortality in the country and among the prisoners in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, as well as in the ever-dwindling army.

In the division of Serbia, the lion's share of territory fell to Bulgaria. To her was accorded everything east of the lower Morava and all south-east of a line roughly from Niš to the Albanian frontier. To the remainder, which included Belgrade and Šumadija, the heart of Serbia, Austria-Hungary could put forward no claim except conquest, satisfaction for Serbian nationalist agitation, and the rights of a superior civilisation. But Bulgaria seized Serbian Macedonia, a portion of "Old Serbia," and nearly half of Serbia proper in the name of nationality, representing her annexation even of the latter district as a reunion of long-lost children to their mother-country. The Serbian peasants of the eastern Morava Valley showed their view of this claim by a desperate revolt in the early months of 1917. Disturbances occurred in December 1916, to which the Bulgarian authorities replied by interning all males over the age of seventeen and conscribing all those capable of bearing arms. The Serbian peasants were thus forced to fight against their own exiled fellow-countrymen. The result was a formidable revolt of some 20,000 insurgents, who hoped to co-operate with the Allied armies in the south. Three Bulgarian divisions had to be employed to deal with the situation, and, after a

fortnight's fierce fighting, they succeeded in suppressing the insurrection. Some 2,000 of the rebels were executed, the rest being deported along with many of the rural population into Bulgaria, some being even sent on to Asia Minor.

Occupation by a victorious enemy is usually hateful for the population concerned, whose pride is likely to be outraged and their interests affected. What made the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian occupation peculiarly unbearable was that it was based on the assumption that it was definitive and final. By the agreement and usage of civilised nations a Power occupying the territory of its opponent should continue that opponent's system of administration, levying for this purpose the usual taxation, and only issuing such ordinances as may be necessary for the safety of its army. The Austro-Hungarian Government, indeed, followed this principle to some extent. Native municipal bodies continued to discharge their functions, although their members were nominated by the conquerors. Civil justice remained as before. The authorities made real efforts, at any rate in the early days of the occupation, to relieve the hunger and want of the destitute population. But they were driven into violations of the rights of the people by their own fears, by their desire to justify the original attack on Serbia in 1914, and by the economic needs of their own country. The ardent nationalism of which the Serbians had given proof made the Austro-Hungarians nervous and suspicious of everything that could be construed as possible agitation against themselves. For this reason they deported large numbers of civilians, especially those of the educated class, into internment camps in Hungary, where unhygienic conditions caused terrible mortality amongst them. The Serbian criminal code was suspended and its place taken by the military penal code of Austria-Hungary administered by military tribunals. Strenuous efforts were also made to eliminate anything which could keep alive national feeling. The Cyrillic alphabet and the Orthodox calendar were both prohibited, while first German and then Magyar were made compulsory in the schools. The desire to lay the blame for the war on Serbia caused the Archduke Frederick, military governor of Serbia, to issue an ordinance announcing the confiscation of the property of all persons who should be found guilty of complicity in the murder at Sarajevo or in any other way of having provoked the war. The document was so vaguely worded that it would have been possible on the strength of it to inculcate most of the population. Further, it violated the Serbian Constitution, which forbids the seizure

of the means of livelihood of any Serbian subject, as well as the principle that war does not justify a Power in trying foreign individuals for acts committed in time of peace, and therefore in no way connected with the safety of the forces of occupation.

Lastly, the needs of Austria-Hungary, if they caused the conquerors to introduce improved methods of agriculture and to exploit as much as possible the fertile fields of Serbia, did not lessen the sufferings of the Serbian people. In August 1916 the population were put on rations, so that the fruits of their labour might be exported to the Monarchy. In addition, there was much sporadic pilfering of cattle, furniture, and whatever else the country possessed. Belgrade itself, immediately after its capture, was looted in the fashion of mediæval warfare, the invaders taking peculiar pains to clear out the contents of the new royal palace.

But Austro-Hungarian officials are proverbially easy-going. There seems to have been in practice much alleviation of this harsh régime. No such mitigation obtained where the Bulgarians ruled. Here the population looked anxiously to the rare German and Austro-Hungarian troops to protect them against their new masters. In Macedonia a systematic attempt was made to wipe out by massacre those elements of the population who would not declare themselves of Bulgarian race. Throughout the Bulgarian occupied area the conquerors tried to denationalise their victims. Nearly all Serbian surnames end in -ić. The termination was forbidden, and the people ordered to change it into the Bulgarian -ov. Education east of the Morava was exclusively Bulgarian. All Serbian books were seized and either destroyed or forwarded to Sofia to be pulped. Everything of value was officially pilfered from the monastery of Dečani, one of the chief centres of pilgrimage and devotion of the Serbs. A usual feature of Balkan conquest appeared when the Serbian Church was suppressed in favour of the Bulgarian Exarchate, Bulgarian priests being introduced in place of the native parochial clergy, whilst the courageous and saintly Bishop of Niš was carried into captivity near Sofia in the first deportations in November 1915.

In a number of ways the population was impoverished. Serbian paper-money was declared to be worthless and the silver currency called in at 50 per cent. of its value. The property of Serbians who had fled in anticipation of Bulgarian brutality, as of those who were with the army and had had no relatives to put in charge of it, was declared to be ownerless. This character was also applied to land whose owners had been

deported by the Bulgarians. The "ownerless" property was then offered by the State to the highest bidder. The Bulgarian newspapers frequently reported the arrival at Sofia of trainloads of confiscated goods for sale, the seizure of cattle, or the felling of forests. The list of misdeeds could be prolonged, but enough has been said to show that under Bulgarian rule the Serbian people suffered three years of mental and physical martyrdom.

CHAPTER XIV

VICTORY

BUT the end came at last. To the people who had suffered the most it was most appropriately given to take the lead in the military movement which inaugurated the downfall of the Central Empires. During the summer of 1918 the plans of Marshal Mišić were adopted by the Allied Command at Salonika. It was felt that there were good reasons to be hopeful of success. Most of the German troops had been withdrawn from the Balkan front. The Allies were now supported by Greece and had a reinforcement of nine Greek divisions. Germany was fully occupied in the Western theatre of war. Bulgarian *moral* was known to be lowered by the long duration of the war and discontent with Bulgaria's Allies. The plan was that, while the Greeks and British pinned the Bulgarian left to its defences and the French kept the right occupied in Albania, a powerful force of Serbians and French should pierce the Bulgarian centre and then push forward across the trackless mountain country till it controlled the middle Vardar Valley. It would thus cut off the Bulgarian right from its line of retreat and out-flank the Bulgarian left in its overwhelmingly strong fortified line opposite the British.

The Bulgarian centre occupied a position on the precipitous crest of the Moglenica Mountains that might well have been thought impregnable. And indeed the defenders probably so considered it. But on the sector selected for the break-through all that remained of the Serbian army (a rifle-strength of some 36,000, which included a division of Yugoslav volunteers) and two French divisions were concentrated. This force outnumbered the Bulgarians opposed to them by more than three to one, with a corresponding superiority in artillery and machine-guns. On September 15 the attack was opened all along the Allied line. Everything happened according to plan. The British and Greeks were held up and suffered very heavy

casualties. But in the centre the breach was effected. The Serbians immediately poured through the gap, and, hurrying on without their transport, which could not follow across the difficult country, they swept aside the reinforcements that the enemy rapidly brought up, and within a week they had won through to the Vardar and broken the Bulgarian communications. The enemy began to fall back at every point. While the British at last were able to advance into Bulgaria, the Serbians pursued their advantage, and again, as in 1913, drove the Bulgarians up the Bregalnica. In fourteen days from the opening of the offensive they reached the Bulgarian frontier and were preparing to invade their enemy's country, when they were chagrined to hear that the Allies had granted an armistice and that they were forbidden to enter Bulgarian territory.

The Serbians turned at once to the task of recovering their own country from the Austro-Hungarian troops and the German divisions that had been hurried to the Balkans to save the situation. Despite the ravages of an epidemic of influenza and the destruction of railroads and bridges, they pressed rapidly forward, the peasants everywhere supporting them. The Germans offered a stiff resistance for two days at Niš; but the Serbians were now not to be stopped. For a month they fought their way across their own devastated country until on November 1 their cavalry rode into Belgrade.

The comparatively small number of troops employed in this Balkan triumph and its distance from the Western front may have prevented a recognition of its importance. Yet it was the Bulgarian collapse and the Serbian advance to the frontier of Hungary that precipitated the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian army and so left Germany alone to face her inevitable surrender.

But the Serbians did not stop to enjoy a return to their homes. By this time Habsburg authority had ceased in the Yugoslav provinces and was followed by a temporary anarchy, increased by the return of thousands of disorganised troops from the Italian front. Deputations began immediately to arrive from the Banat, from Syrmia, and then from the Yugoslav National Council at Zagreb, asking for Serbian troops to preserve order. So the Serbian army crossed the rivers Sava, Drina, and Danube amid the enthusiasm of a race which saw itself united for the first time in history.

On December 4 the Prince Regent proclaimed the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and consequently the story of the Serbians becomes henceforth

merged in that of all the Yugoslavs. As regards Serbia herself, the main business of the next year after the return was to reconstruct the material basis of life. The country had been bled white by its late necessitous masters. In many districts the people did not know what to do for clothes. It was many months before the few railway lines of the country could be got into working order. Until the harvest of 1919 there was a food shortage in many districts. The lack of cattle, the very large number of orphaned children, and the prevalence of disease due to the hardships of the war all made a return to normal life difficult. The fantastic rise also of prices in Belgrade, which now found itself the capital of 12,000,000 of people, and the drop in the exchange value of Serbian money caused much suffering and discontent. But the admirable regulation of the river traffic and the labours of the foreign relief agencies in distributing goods and medical aid, joined to the efforts of the Serbians themselves and the natural fertility of their land, have brought the people through the bad times. If speed in reconstruction has been retarded by the Serbian unwillingness to allow foreigners to gain economic power in the country, it is easy to sympathise with such independence of feeling. After centuries of foreign domination or indirect control, culminating in the three years of conquest and exile, the Serbians have won through not only to liberty but to the leadership of the Yugoslavs. They have shown an unequalled tenacity in adversity. It remains for them now to cast aside whatever of their mediæval and oriental traditions retards their true development and in the arts of peace to exploit their new position to the advantage of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes alike.¹

¹ For recent history of Yugoslavia, vide pp. 245 to 250.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

SERBIA

- 610 (*circ.*). The Serbs enter the Balkan Peninsula.
12th century. Foundation of the Serbian Monarchy by Stefan Nemanja.
1331-55. Reign of Stefan Dušan.
1346. Dušan proclaimed Emperor at Skoplje.
1389. Battle of Kosovo.
1459. Completion of the Turkish conquest of Serbia.
1688-90. Austrian occupation of Belgrade.
1691. Serbian migration to Austria under the Patriarch of Ipek.
1718-39. Austrian occupation of Serbia.
1804. First Serbian rising under Kara George.
1812. (First) Treaty of Bucharest.
1815. Second Serbian Rising under Miloš Obrenović.
1817. Miloš declared hereditary chief.
1826. Convention of Akkerman.
1829. Treaty of Adrianople.
1830. Miloš invested by the Sultan as hereditary Prince.
1839. Abdication of Miloš.
1840-2. First reign of Michael Obrenović.
1842. Accession of Alexander Karageorgević.
1856. Treaty of Paris.
1859. Deposition of Alexander and return of Miloš.
1860-68. Second reign of Michael.
1867. Withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons from Serbia.
1868. Assassination of Michael and accession of Milan Obrenović.
1876. First Serbo-Turkish War.
1877. Second Serbo-Turkish War.
1878. Congress of Berlin.
1885. Serbo-Bulgarian War.
1889. Abdication of Milan and accession of Alexander.
1903. Assassination of Alexander and Draga.
Peter Karageorgević elected King.
1908. Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia and the Hercegovina.
1912. First Balkan War.

1913. Treaty of London ; Second Balkan War ; (Third) Treaty of Bucharest.
1914. Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand ; Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia.
First Austrian Invasion (July 30—August 25).
Second Austrian Invasion (September 7—17).
Third Austrian Invasion (November 8—December 15).
1915. Austro-German invasion of Serbia, September 19 ; Belgrade occupied, October 9 ; Bulgaria attacks Serbia from N.E. and S.E., October 14 ; Serbia appeals in vain to Greece, November 6 ; after gallant fighting, Serbian armies retreat to Macedonia and Albania, November 14 to December 20 ; Fall of Monastir, December 5.
1916. Serbian armies reorganise at Corfu (Government sets up there, February 9) and join Allies on Salonika front, January to July ; Skupština meets at Corfu September 10 ; Serbs attack, September 9, and take Monastir, November 19.
1917. Spring campaign in Macedonia, March 11 to May 11. Pact of Corfu, July 20.
1918. Conference of Yugoslav nationalities in Rome, April 8 ; Battle of the Vardar, September 15 to 25 ; Bulgaria surrenders, September 30 ; Serbs take Nis, October 12 ; re-enter Belgrade, November 1 ; Yugoslav State proclaimed, December 4.

PART II

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MONTENEGRO

GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

It would be difficult to find a more concrete case of the importance which a country's geography exerts upon its history than that of Montenegro. Situated as the little State is amongst a wild tangle of rocky hills and forests, with practically no communications (up till quite lately) except those of footpaths, and with a very short sea-coast without a harbour of any value, it was only to be foreseen that its inhabitants would remain for centuries cut off from the civilising influences of European development.

"When God finished making the world," runs the Montenegrin legend, "He found that He had a great many rocks left in His bag : so He tumbled the whole lot on to a wild and desolate bit of country—and that is how Montenegro was formed." But the Slav people who came to inhabit this country were tough and hardy, and as unyielding as the rocks themselves. Time after time they beat back the hordes of Turkish warriors who were sent against them, and in their mountain fastnesses upheld the flag of Christianity for centuries against the all-invading Moslems. Skilled in all manner of guerrilla warfare, and aided to a very large extent by the impenetrability of their hilly labyrinths, they held out against the Ottoman armies who had succeeded in reducing so many of their brethren in more open country to slavery. They were a nation of warriors, and warriors only ; their inhospitable country produced no goods with which to traffic by sea or land, and their paucity of communications and general trend of living prevented them from taking part in the Renaissance which was developing within a comparatively short distance of their sea-coast.

And so it has been down to the present time. Sturdy independence has been their motto throughout ; and even now, when the liberation of Yugoslavia is an accomplished fact, it is by no means certain whether the Montenegrins will acknowledge the sway of Belgrade, or whether they will prefer to work out their own salvation within the rocky barriers of their own country.

CHAPTER I

EARLY HISTORY: TO THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

THE Montenegro of to-day answers, roughly speaking, to the old Serbian province of Zeta, which formerly also included Northern Albania with Scutari. During the chaos that followed upon the death of Dušan in 1355 Zeta, like other Serbian provinces, became more or less independent, and was ruled by the family of the Balšići, who, according to tradition, were descendants of Vuk Nemanja, the hero of Serbia in the late twelfth century. They were connected by marriage with some of the great Serbian families of the day, notably with the Mrnjačevići, of whom the most important members were Vukašin and Marko, and were at feud with others. George Balšić II, who was married to a daughter of Lazar, Prince of Serbia, was called upon to meet the Turks at Kosovo in 1389, but he was too late for the battle. He soon began to feel the effects of that great defeat, and in 1392 was driven from his capital Skadar (Scutari). He won it back later, but thought it best to cede it to Venice, hoping that in alliance with that powerful Republic he might make a better stand against the Turks; and Ulcinj (Dulcigno) became his temporary capital. Skadar, however, objected to Venetian rule, and after the temporary weakening of the Turks after the battle of Angora, Balšić III, who became ruler in 1404, and who apparently had less political wisdom than his father, contested its possession with Venice.

In 1410 Balšić III won a great victory over the Turks under Evrenos Pasha. He died without issue about 1421—according to some while on a visit to his uncle, Despot Stefan of Serbia. During the following years there was a *rapprochement* with Serbia; Stefan apparently had been designated as heir to the last of the Balšići, but he and George Branković, who became Governor of Zeta, failed to consolidate their power. Zeta, as yet unconquered, disliked the implication of the connection

with Serbia, a vassal State of Turkey, and two parties formed themselves, one for Branković, the other for one Stefan Crnojević, who seems to have been some relation of the Balšići. As early as 1423 we hear of Crnojević building a fortress at Žabljak, near the mouth of the Morača, and by the year 1427, when Despot Stefan died, he had become the independent ruler of the country.

During the years that followed, the repeated attacks by the Turks caused the province of Zeta to disappear from the map of Europe, and in its stead grew up the small State of Crnagora (Black Mountain), generally known as Montenegro, at first confined to the fastnesses of the gloomy mountain region that gave it its name, but later on absorbing other districts. Here, in a country hitherto uninhabited except by cowherds and shepherds, foregathered the indomitable spirits of various lands of the Southern Slav, and notably Serbs of the upper classes who refused to live under Turkish rule.

The chief feature in the struggle that eventually ended so disastrously for Zeta was the magnificent twenty-four years' defence of Albania by George Kastriotes (Skanderbeg), supported by the Crnojevići, more particularly by Ivan, popularly known as Ivanbeg, Stefan's famous son, who seems to have become ruler only in 1471, though his father died some years earlier.

Skanderbeg died in 1468, and the subjugation of Albania quickly followed. Then the whole weight of the Turkish onslaught fell upon Zeta. The Venetians were in possession of Skadar, and there endured a long siege; but though supported by Ivan, the city fell in 1479. For previous help in the defence of Skadar Ivan's name had been inscribed in the Golden Book of Venice. The whole of Zeta appears at this time to have been under the protection of the Republic.

The fall of Skadar was followed by a struggle with the Turks for the possession of Žabljak. Ivan came to the conclusion that it was impossible to hold it, and burnt and abandoned it in 1482. This implied the abandonment of the Morača and Zeta valleys.

The inhabitants now confined themselves to the defence of the little valley of the Rjeka, running into the N.W. end of Lake Scutari, and Obod became a temporary capital. Two years later the fortification of Cetinje was begun—on a plateau above the source of the Rjeka, known as the "cowshed district" (Kunska Nahia). Ivan, despairing of success, went to Italy in search of support from States other than Venice; but his quest was in vain. On his return he called his people

together, and told them that they had only God and their own right arm to depend on, and they swore that the Black Mountain should be the temple of their national freedom or their graveyard. The country was now reduced to the Katunska, Crmnička, Rječka, and Lješanska *nahias* (districts).

In 1490 Ivan died. He is one of the heroic figures of Montenegrin legend. According to tradition he sleeps on the bosom of the *vile* (fairies) in a mysterious cave at Obod, watching till the day shall come when "God shall have resolved to restore Cattaro and the blue sea to his dear Montenegrins."

Ivan left two sons, George and Stephen (Staniša). George, who succeeded him, married a Venetian lady in the year that his father died. Staniša, on the other hand, embraced Islam, became Beg of Skadar, and, helped by the Turks, tried to wrest Montenegro from his brother. According to tradition he was defeated at Lješkopolje. Some of his renegade followers returned to Montenegro with their new religion, causing much difficulty in later years, while Staniša settled down in the district of Skadar. The ill-feeling existing to-day between Montenegro and Skadar is said to be partly inherited from this family and religious feud.

The desire for education among the Serbs of Montenegro found expression in the introduction into Obod of a printing-press in 1493. It may be noted parenthetically that Caxton printed his first books at Westminster only six years earlier. Religious works continued to be printed in Montenegro till 1566. They comprise the earliest known specimens in the Cyrillic characters, excepting some at Cracow dating from 1491.

In 1496 George Crnojević was persuaded by his wife, who pined for Venice, to leave the country. Tradition mentions three other Crnojevići, who reigned in turn till about 1516. In that year the Government of the country was certainly in the hands of Bishop Vavil, the first of the bishop-princes who ruled the land for three hundred years; but for the next two centuries little is known of Montenegrin history.

In spite of the triumphs of the Turks, who were at the height of their power in the early seventeenth century, hope died hard in the Balkans. In 1614 there met together in the district of Kući, east of the Black Mountain, representatives of Upper Albania, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Dalmatia, to consider a tax imposed upon the Orthodox Church by the Turks. Here it was proposed to smuggle arms into the Balkans by way of Montenegro and the unconquered mountains of the Cimeriots, with the help of Charles, Duke of

Nevers, who proposed, as a descendant of the Palæologi, to claim the Byzantine Empire. The ramifications of the conspiracy implicated Spain, France, Germany, Genoa, the Pope, Poland, and the Princes of Walachia and Moldavia.

Plans were made to take various points of vantage and advance on Constantinople. The Balkans were agog with excitement, but in 1619 the transport ships built by the Duke were burnt, and activities came to an abrupt end. This plot brought home to the Turks the importance of Montenegro in case of a concerted rising. But how to subjugate the country was a problem that exercised the mind of Sultan after Sultan. A small Turkish army was no match for the Montenegrins in the fastnesses of their own mountains; a large army was soon starved out. Montenegro was, as Medaković expresses it, a bone which stuck in the Turkish throat.

The defeat of the Turks before Vienna (1683) and at Mohacs (1687) again roused hope in the Balkans. Venice thought the moment opportune for declaring war against the Turks, and she was ably helped by the Montenegrins under Bogdanović in the Castel Nuovo and Grahovo districts. The heroism of the mountaineers on this occasion attracted the attention of Europe, and their help was solicited in 1689 by Leopold of Austria, who had hopes of adding Serbia to his Empire. The anger of the Turks against Montenegro was such that they sent Suleiman Pasha in 1690 with a large army to overpower Cetinje. The Montenegrins made a desperate stand near Mount Vrtjelka, but in spite of this the Turks succeeded in penetrating to Cetinje, probably for the first time. The Cetinje monastery (monasteries in the Black Mountain were fortified arsenals as well as religious houses) was blown up by a monk when the Turks arrived; but the church and the palace built by Ivanbeg were destroyed by the Turks. When Suleiman withdrew he left garrisons which levied *harač* (poll-tax) for a few years, and he rewarded the Mohammedan Montenegrins who had helped him by handing over to them the town of Obod, which controlled the Montenegrin markets. Suleiman's march home was, however, not without incident: for he was waylaid by the Klementi, Kući, and Piperi tribes near Podgórica, and sustained a crushing defeat. But the Austro-Turkish Peace of Karlowitz, in 1699, contained no reference to the Montenegrins—a silence that seemed to them a great betrayal on the part of the Austrians. In the course of the next century, however, they had repeated experiences of the ingratitude of great Powers.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST BISHOPS OF THE PETROVIĆ-NJEGUŠ DYNASTY

IN 1697 Danilo Petrović-Njegoš, aged twenty, was elected ruler, and founded the dynasty of Petrović-Njegoš. His election marked an epoch in the history of Montenegro. The office of ruler, combined with the headship of the Church, became hereditary, descending generally from uncle to nephew, and the family gradually became endowed with powers which the first elected bishop-princes did not possess.

In 1702 Danilo, relying on the safe-conduct of Demir Pasha, went into Turkish territory to consecrate a church; but he was seized, imprisoned, and tortured. Preparations were actually made for impaling him, but in the end the pasha accepted a large ransom for his release. On his return to Montenegro Danilo unfolded to the assembled chiefs the sinister project of massacring all Mohammedans in Montenegro, as the only means of acquiring national security. The chiefs, after some hesitation, consented, and on Christmas Eve some of them went round on their bloody work, sparing only women and children and those who consented to baptism. Christmas Day was observed with great rejoicing, and the cry, "Crnagora is free!" Probably in the days of prolonged torture Danilo had come to understand the suffering of his nation for the last three centuries, and the meaning of subjugation to the Turk. Gopčević,¹ commenting on this incident, says: "If ever a nation in the interests of general civilisation deserved to be wiped out, it is the Turkish nation; were it not for her six hundred years of misrule, all South-Eastern Europe would presumably stand on a level with the culture of the West and North."

The church and monastery of Cetinje were rebuilt in 1704, and in the years that followed the liberation of the adjoining territory was begun. The Brda, as the hilly and more fertile

¹ An historian of authority.

country to the east was called, soon became for all practical purposes united with Montenegro, though it was not formally incorporated till the close of the eighteenth century.

In 1711 an event occurred which thrilled Montenegro, and shaped the whole course of her future politics. There arrived at Cetinje delegates from no less a personage than Peter the Great of Russia, who had in 1710 declared war against Turkey, and sought the help of Montenegro, assuming rather than negotiating a protectorate over her. Vladika Danilo assembled the people, and interpreted the situation briefly: "We have always heard," he said, "that somewhere—God knows where—in a distant Eastern land, there was an Orthodox Empire of which we always wanted to know more. But as we are shut up here in our mountains, remote from all the world, we have not hitherto been able to learn anything more." Then he called upon the Montenegrins to support Russia against the Turks in return for arms and her protection. The effect was electric. Not only Montenegro but neighbouring territories rose against the Turks, who shut themselves up in the forts of Nikšić, Spuž, Podgórica, and Žabljak. These the mountaineers could not take, for they had not a single gun. In the midst of the military operations Peter the Great was forced to make peace, and he did not even so much as mention the Montenegrins in the Peace Treaty that followed.

The Turks determined therefore to wreak their vengeance on the Black Mountain, and demanded harač and three hostages. The chiefs decided that the fire of their muskets should be their only tribute. "Oh," sings their national bard, "it is no shadow, the Crnagorski freedom. No other than God can quell it, and who knows but what God Himself would tire of such an enterprise?" Ahmed Pasha was now sent against them with a force of about 60,000 men,¹ but he met with a staggering defeat at the battle of Karev Laz. In 1713 the Turks determined on crushing the country once and for all, and the Grand Vizier Damad Ali appeared with an army of 120,000 men. He started operations by enticing thirty-seven chiefs of Montenegro into his camp, ostensibly with the object of negotiating an honourable peace. Lulled into a sense of security, the Montenegrin army disbanded. Then the Grand Vizier had the chiefs hanged, and marched to Cetinje, ravaging the country so that not a single altar or house was left standing where he passed. The monastery of Cetinje was burnt for the second time. Women and girls were carried away into slavery. Male children were

¹ The population of Montenegro at the time was perhaps 30,000.

slaughtered. Refugees were pursued into Venetian territory, and six hundred of these were delivered up by the Venetians.

In the following year the Montenegrins avenged this defeat at Raganova Kula. Meanwhile, as they had not the wherewithal to restore the buildings of the country, and as they had been led into their terrible adventure by Russia, Vladika Danilo travelled to St. Petersburg to ask for help (1715). His mission was successful, and he returned with money and the promise of a yearly subsidy. In 1716 the Turks again met with a crushing defeat. Over seventy prisoners, including the two Turkish leaders, the pashas of Bosnia and Hercegovina, were put to death to avenge the thirty-seven chiefs. In the following years, when the military successes of Prince Eugène again roused hopes in the Balkans, the Montenegrins again assisted Austria and Venice in their war against Turkey, participating in the Dulcigno and Antivari campaigns. They were again not mentioned in the Treaty of Požarevac (Passarowitz) (1718).

The aged Danilo was succeeded by Bishop Sava in 1735. In 1736 Austria and Russia declared war against Turkey, and Montenegro again rendered assistance to them. After the defeat of the Austrians the Turks made another effort to subjugate Montenegro (1739), but in vain. After desperate fighting the Turks attempted, during seven years, to blockade the country, but the effort was never completely successful.

Meanwhile Sava, a man of gentle instincts, proved himself unequal to the task of governing his turbulent people. The very qualities that had preserved their independence led to a state of anarchy under a weak ruler. Blood-feuds became the curse of the country, and Sava at last made his cousin Vasilije virtual ruler. Vasilije had great hopes of improving the condition of the people by closer bonds with Russia; and on his visit to that country (1752-5) he arranged to send Montenegrin boys to be educated there. Unfortunately nearly all of them died. The Turks meanwhile took advantage of the state of the country to try and detach from Montenegro the Piperi and other tribes. Internal affairs reached such a condition of chaos that certain chiefs proceeded to Constantinople to offer their submission in return for the satisfaction of their petty quarrels.

On his return from Russia, Vasilije impressed on his people the meaning of treachery to their country, and encouraged by him, they defeated, in the following year, the Turks in the Zeta Valley. On a subsequent visit to St. Petersburg Vasilije died (1766), and again the rule reverted to Sava. Then occurred

one of the most romantic episodes in the history of Montenegro. A stranger, probably a Croat, appeared on the scene and declared himself to be Peter III of Russia, commonly supposed to have been murdered by his wife's lover. Stefan Mali, as the stranger was called, was at once hailed by the Montenegrins as their ruler. The idea of an Emperor coming to live with them fired their imagination. His influence over them was extraordinary. Blood-feuds practically ceased, property became more secure, roads were built.

These events however were looked upon coldly by Russia, Venice, and the Porte. Catherine II naturally objected to this resuscitation of her dead husband, and neither Venice nor Turkey cared to see such enthusiasm for even a spurious Russian Emperor. They feared that the imagination of Bosnia and Hercegovina might be affected by it, and that they might throw in their lot with Montenegro. Consequently in 1768 the Porte sent three armies, the largest force ever sent against Montenegro, under the Beglerbegs of Bosnia and Rumelia and the Pasha of Albania. Venice assisted the Turks by blockading the frontier from Spizza to Grahovo, and thus prevented the importation of powder.

The Turkish armies of 1768 advanced, one from Nikšić, another from Podgorica, while the third tried to penetrate the Crmnica, the country that borders the Lake of Scutari. Never before had the position of Montenegro been more critical. The Montenegrins succeeded in getting powder, their most urgent want, by attacking and seizing a Turkish convoy. They then met the two Turkish armies that had joined forces at Čevo, and inflicted upon them perhaps the greatest defeat in all Montenegrin history. After this they marched against the third army. Even the elements seemed to fight in their favour. Some stores of gunpowder that were being pushed up by the Turks were struck by lightning, and the explosion that followed caused a panic and a precipitate retreat. A similar catastrophe overtook the Venetians in the plain of Budua, and caused them to withdraw to their coast towns.

Stefan Mali does not seem to have distinguished himself in the fighting; but, in spite of temporary eclipse, he held his own when Dolgoruki came the following year on a mission from Russia, with quantities of ammunition, soliciting Montenegro's help in a war against the Porte, but at the same time denouncing Stefan Mali as an impostor. Montenegro took no active part in the war that followed, but the situation in the Black Mountain so perplexed the Turks that they did not dare to withdraw

troops from the frontiers, especially as Stefan caused a rumour to be spread that the Russians were coming round to help the Montenegrins—a possibility not altogether remote, since Russia about this time startled Europe by sending a fleet into the Mediterranean.

Stefan Mali, meanwhile, proceeded with his work of organisation. In 1771 a central court of justice was set up and judges were appointed to tour the country. But in 1774 he was assassinated by a Greek servant at the instigation of the Pasha of Skadar, and was succeeded by Peter I. Sava died in 1782.

CHAPTER III

THE LAST BISHOP-PRINCES

DURING Peter's prolonged absence in Austria and Russia after the death of Sava internal dissensions became acute in Montenegro, whilst the Turks under Kara Mahmud, with the help of disaffected Montenegrins, managed to penetrate for the third time to Cetinje, and again destroyed the monastery (1785). Peter returned in the following year. He had not achieved much diplomatic success in Russia, but he brought back with him the potato, which eventually proved to be of more value than a subsidy would have been. The Montenegrins participated in the war against Turkey upon which Austria and Russia embarked in 1788, but in the Treaty of Sistova (1791) between Austria and Turkey they figured as rebels against their rightful overlord, while the Peace of Jassy (1792) between Russia and Turkey did not mention them at all. Consequently, the Turks thought the moment opportune for dealing with Montenegro and the rebellious districts around her. In 1795 they aimed an abortive blow at the piratical Uskoks who, driven from the seas, had become troublesome inhabitants of the Piva and Morača watersheds, and in 1792 and 1796 they attempted to subjugate the Brdians,¹ whom the Montenegrins, in response to an appeal by Vladika Peter, defended as their own brethren. The Turks met with a crushing defeat in the district of Spuž (1796), and later in the same year at Kruse, where the Turkish leader, Kara Mahmud Bušatlija, supposed to have been a descendant of Staniša Crnojević, lost his life. As a result of the fighting the Montenegrins came to be regarded in the Balkans as emancipators. To appease the Montenegrins Sultan Selim in 1799 solemnly recognised their independence with the words: "The Montenegrins have never been subjects of our Sublime Porte."

The military talents of Peter, which had become conspicuous

¹ The Brda is the mountainous country some 40 miles N. of Lake Scutari.

in the fighting, increased his hold over his people, and he felt himself strong enough to take severe measures against blood-feuds. In 1796 he promulgated a code of thirty-three articles, which was revised in 1803, when a tax for the upkeep of the State was also proposed. The chiefs were extremely indignant at the latter suggestion, and protested that they might as well be under the Turks—better, in fact, for if they paid harač they would have peace.

Peace with the Turks there was for many years except for border forays. Life in the mountains did not tend however to become monotonous. The French Revolution brought storms from the West. In 1797 the Venetian Republic was wiped officially from the map of Europe, and Cattaro, with its coveted natural harbour, was bandied about between Austria and France, much to its own indignation. After the Treaty of Pressburg (1805), when it became French, the town made a definitive move to throw in its lot with Montenegro, its natural hinterland. This fact was significant of the growing feeling of solidarity among the Southern Slavs. In earlier history the barriers between Cattaro and Montenegro, erected chiefly by difference of religion as between Croats and Serbs, had been formidable. In the tangled politics of the following years it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the union of Montenegro and Cattaro was a contingency dreaded by the Powers. They feared that a Russia in alliance with Montenegro reinforced by a naval base might expand to the shores of the Adriatic.

In 1806 the Russian fleet entered the Bocche di Cattaro, and Russians and Montenegrins, with Vladika Peter commanding the allied land forces, co-operated to prevent the occupation of Cattaro by the French. Desperate fighting followed in the districts of Cattaro and Ragusa, and everywhere the Montenegrins struck terror into the hearts of the French soldiery, partly through their practice, borrowed from the Turks, of cutting off the heads of their enemies. Local military events, however, had but little bearing upon the course of diplomacy. Russia made peace with France at Tilsit (1807), and Cattaro was abandoned.

Marmont was now left in charge of the French forces in Dalmatia, and was advised by Napoleon to quell the Montenegrins. The Turks, on the contrary, counselled him to leave them alone. Finally Marmont invited the Vladika to an interview. According to Andrić, he wished to win him over, the friendship of Montenegro being necessary for the success of his military schemes; Gopčević, on the other hand, says

that he intended to arrest the Vladika, but thought better of the matter when several Montenegrins insisted upon standing outside the door during the interview, and shouted to Peter, a man of great stature, to throw Marmont out of the window if he noticed anything suspicious. In the course of conversation Marmont represented the Russians as enemies of the Montenegrins; but Peter replied that they were brothers by race and creed, and that, if the Russians went under, so would all Slavs. Marmont then asked why Peter ruled the country instead of confining his interests to spiritual affairs. The Vladika answered that he did not know what was done in France, but in Montenegro the people made the laws, and as long as they wished him to rule he would do so. The French general then complained of the barbarity of cutting off heads in warfare; but the Vladika retorted that he was surprised that the French should be shocked, seeing that they had cut off the heads of their own King and of their countrymen. Marmont, enraged at this, declared that the French would soon turn the Black Mountain into a red one—red with blood.

It is interesting to compare Marmont's own account of the interview with the above. He described the Vladika as an *homme superbe*, of remarkable intelligence and great dignity, whose legal authority in his country was small, but whose influence was unlimited and who, without pledging himself to anything, implied a desire to be one day under the protection of France.

Meanwhile the insurrection in Serbia was exciting the mountaineers, and co-operation with Kara George was attempted in 1809 and 1811; but it bore little fruit, partly because the Montenegrins were hampered by lack of powder and shot. Moreover, their attention was engaged by developments on the coast. In 1813 they co-operated with a British naval force under Hoste against the French in Cattaro. The town capitulated in 1814, but had to be given up to the Austrians in the same year by the terms of the Treaty of Paris, although the inhabitants had thrashed out terms of union with Montenegro. The substitution of the powerful Austrian Empire for the decaying Republic of Venice as a neighbour was a political factor of the first importance, though its danger to Montenegro was not at first realised. Montenegro gained nothing by the war; poverty and famine stalked the land, and many inhabitants migrated to Russia and Serbia. The Turks showed themselves determined to check the tendency of Montenegro to expand, and diplomatic Russia was impervious to requests

for help. In 1820 the Vizier of Bosnia launched an attack, but was defeated at Dragovičkopolje, and subsequently committed suicide in very shame at his failure. In 1835 the Russians renewed their subsidy.

Vladika Peter died in 1830 at the age of eighty-one, and four years later was canonised as a saint. As in the case of Stefan Nemanja, his dying thoughts were for his country, and in his will he enjoined his people to swear on his corpse a truce from blood-feuds. The new ruler, Peter II, who was only seventeen when his uncle died, and who had been educated in Russia, soon became remarkable both as a statesman and a poet, and piloted his country through a difficult period of transition. Early in his reign the Turks offered Peter an hereditary title, such as was enjoyed by the Prince of Serbia, if he would consent to recognise the suzerainty of the Porte. The Vladika's answer was characteristic: "As long as my subjects are willing to defend me, no *berat*¹ is necessary; on the other hand, if they were not willing, it would be useless."

Peter II reorganised the country. He founded schools where there had been no school for 300 years. He introduced a printing-press where there had been none for about the same period (its type had to be melted down for bullets in 1857), and published the ballads in which the history of the country is recorded. He also improved the roads, built powder-mills, and bought guns. In order to centralise authority and break the power of unruly chiefs he formed a senate (1831), and linked to it an organisation which, supported by a kind of gendarmerie, administered justice throughout the country. He produced Montenegro's first budget, and even built a prison.

So long as Russian money paid the cost of reforms the people were satisfied; but when they were called upon to supply funds there was not unnaturally trouble, for with a growing population, which now numbered over 100,000 souls, it was becoming more and more difficult to supply even the bare necessities of life; and cattle-lifting across the frontier, once a lucrative source of revenue, was becoming increasingly difficult. Forays against Christian neighbours were forbidden under pain of excommunication. Even expeditions against the Turks came to be looked upon with disfavour, since they invited reprisals, and also called forth the condemnation of the Powers, who regarded this method of earning a living as uncivilised. The frontiers were at this time in a more than ordinary state of ferment. The tribes beyond the border

¹ Certificate of appointment.

refused to pay harač to the Turk, and were helped in their resistance by marauding bands of Montenegrins, who seized Turkish forts, e.g. Žabljak, which they were not able to hold. The Turks, appreciating the discontent within Montenegro, added to the confusion by holding out fair promises to some of the almost starving people, who ended by negotiating with them, so that civil war broke out. Conciliation followed, but the possibility of expansion offered by the discontent beyond the frontier was frustrated by the instability within. Between 1842 and 1844 an international commission fixed the frontiers between Turkey and Montenegro, and some years later free trade was permitted across them. The frontiers that marched with Austria were delimited between 1832 and 1840, not without desperate fighting in the territories concerned. These delimitations were diplomatic events of the first importance, since they brought Montenegro into the international community of Europe.

The poverty of Montenegro had other ill effects. The little country became dependent on the subsidies of some great Power, generally Russia, and sometimes Austria, and the consequence was, as we have already seen, that she was continually being embroiled in international intrigues. These also had their repercussions within the State, one of the most serious being trouble with a party led by Radonjić, the Civil Governor, who desired political orientation in the direction of Austria. This was contrary to the cherished traditions of the Montenegrin people, and Radonjić and others were banished, and the office of Civil Governor suppressed. But this elimination of an opposition, however desirable at the time, prepared the way, as did also the centralising of power, for the despotism of King Nicholas.

Peter II died of lung-trouble in 1851. One of his dying wishes was that Montenegro should remain on friendly terms with the inhabitants of the Bocche di Cattaro. He saw that his country was cut off from economic prosperity, almost from civilisation, by not having a port, and the union of his country with Cattaro could only be achieved by friendly dealings with its inhabitants. But his vision penetrated further, and he contemplated the possibility of the union of Southern Slavs on a much larger scale. In his *Gorski Vjenac*, a poetic drama which has placed him at the head of Serbian poets, he crystallised the traditions of his race and gave coherence to its aspirations. The poem expresses the solidarity of the Serbs of Serbia and of Montenegro. In it he voiced the feeling of his

people. Sir John Wilkinson, who travelled in the land during his reign, says that feelings of attachment to Serbia seem never to have been forgotten. Peter also preached religious tolerance, a somewhat newer idea. "Our brother is dear to us, no matter what his religion," is one of his most quoted sayings.

CHAPTER IV

MONTENEGRO UNDER SECULAR PRINCES

PETER II was the last of the bishop-princes. His successor, Danilo, had become enamoured of a lady of Trieste—whom he afterwards married—and he persuaded his people to consent to the breaking of the ecclesiastical tradition. The politics of the following years are intricate, owing chiefly to the fact that the aspirations of the rulers and those of the people tended to become divergent. The rulers' point of view became increasingly dynastic, and was sometimes in conflict with the national aims of the people. But the necessity of dissimulating any anti-national feeling made the policy of the former difficult of execution.

As soon as Danilo became ruler the celebrated Omar Pasha, a Croat renegade, tried to provoke internal strife by telling the Piperi clans that, if they came under Turkey, they would not be taxed. Fighting ensued, during which the Montenegrins, helped by torrential rain, forced the Turks to abandon the Zeta Valley. Diplomatic intervention followed, and in 1853 peace was signed on the basis of the *status quo*. Shortly afterwards the Crimean War broke out, and Danilo promised Austria that he would remain neutral—a fact that caused much discontent, as did also his effort to prevent his subjects from disappearing over the frontier to fight against the Turks. So great was the feeling against Danilo that the Piperi, Kući, and Bjelopavlići rose in rebellion, reproaching the Prince for his pro-Austrian feelings. They seized the reserve ammunition at Ostrog, and declared the autonomy of the Brda. They were, however, forced to submit.

During the peace negotiations in Paris in 1856–7 advantageous offers were made to Danilo if he would recognise the authority of the Porte. He was apparently inclined, after some protest, to do so; but his indignant people preferred war.

Prince Mirko, Danilo's brother, won a great victory over the Turks at Grahovo (1858), which settled, once for all, the question of independence; and an international commission proceeded to fix the frontiers much to the advantage of the Montenegrins. The victory also had a great effect upon the rebellious portions of the Turkish Empire, and if it had been followed up might have resulted in the liberation of large territories from Ottoman suzerainty.

The Prince, who was unpopular with his people, not only because of his international policy but because of his ruthless efforts to ensure internal order, was assassinated in Austrian territory by an exiled Montenegrin (1860). According to some accounts he had seduced the assassin's wife—a monstrous crime in Montenegro.

Danilo had no son. The succession passed to his nephew Nicholas, the son of Mirko.

During the reign of Peter II and Danilo many strangers visited Montenegro and wrote accounts of their experiences. They described the men of the country as brave and honest, but wily and vain, with one chief topic of conversation: liberty. They showed the greatest hospitality—a virtue often noticed in the South Slavs; Sir John Wilkinson, indeed, said that he had nowhere met with greater kindness. Kindness to refugees in particular seems to have been a tradition upheld in their poetry, and finally embodied in the code of laws promulgated by Danilo in 1855. All visitors to Montenegro were, however, shocked at the position of women. "Women are our mules" was a saying of the country. Wilkinson reported that they were the drudges of the community, the "men imagining that they maintain the dignity of their sex by reducing women to the condition of slaves." On the other hand, a woman could travel respected and unmolested, and immorality was ruthlessly punished in the man as in the woman. Darinka, Prince Danilo's wife, a cultured woman, brought to Montenegro the first feminine influence in high quarters since the days of the Crnojevići. She did much towards the cultural development of Montenegro, not only during Danilo's reign but during that of Nicholas as well.

The reign of Prince Nicholas, like most Montenegrin reigns, began with hostilities with the Turks, owing to the fact that individual Montenegrins crossed the frontier to help insurgents in Hercegovina. The Turks in 1862 invaded the country with a powerful army, according to some authorities numbering 196,000 men, who advanced as usual from Nikšić and Spuž.

Mirko distinguished himself by the defence, with twenty-six men, of the upper monastery-arsenal of Ostrog, which is built into the rock under an overhanging precipice near the spot where the Zeta, lost to view for some miles, emerges from the ridge that joins Montenegro to the Brda.¹ The Turks, in spite of the heroism of the Montenegrins, succeeded in ravaging the Zeta Valley, and Cetinje was threatened before Nicholas asked for terms. By the convention of Scutari the Montenegrins were confirmed in the possession of Grahovo and Gornji Vasojevići according to the frontier delimitation of 1859, trading rights were explicitly defined, and the Montenegrins remained in much the same position as they were in before, the two clauses referring to the banishment of Mirko and to the occupation by the Turks of the road between Nikšić and Spuž remaining a dead letter.

The young Prince started his reign with the idea of (1) gaining access to the sea; (2) raising the standard of civilisation among his people; (3) liberating Southern Slav lands still in servitude. He proceeded at once with the organisation of his army. An arsenal was established in Obod, and a gun-factory near Cetinje. By 1877 he had about 35,000 men under arms. Meanwhile, helped by Southern Slavs from other countries, he started schools in rapid succession, and education became compulsory. A girls' school opened at Cetinje under the auspices of the Empress of Russia became renowned beyond the frontier. A newspaper was started, laws were amended. In 1868 the Prince electrified the people by granting a so-called "Constitution" and by renouncing all control over public money; but he retained the direction of military and foreign affairs.

The Prince's foreign policy at the beginning of his reign was in accord with the wishes of his people, and he and Michael of Serbia concluded a pact that in the event of the liberation of the lands that separated their respective States, one single State should be formed of all three territories,² Michael ruling over them, and, as he was childless, Nicholas succeeding him. But the assassination of Michael in 1868 upset these plans. Afterwards Nicholas seems to have dreaded the possible liberation of the sanjak from the Turks, for the hoped-for union might mean the extinction of his dynasty. Montenegro, which had for nearly five centuries maintained the political continuity

¹ It is related that the defenders, having come to an end of their ammunition, repulsed the final Turkish assault by means of volleys of empty bottles from the well-furnished monasterial cellars, the contents of which they had themselves previously absorbed.

² I.e. Serbia, Montenegro, and the *sanjak* of Novi Pazar.

of the Serbian race, and seemed predestined during most of that period to be the future Piedmont of Yugoslavia, had in recent years found her place taken by Serbia as the natural leader of unliberated Serbs. It does not appear that the Montenegrin people resented the fact; but the dynasty did.

When Hercegovina and Bosnia broke into revolt against the Turks in 1875, followed by Bulgaria, both Milan of Serbia and Nicholas, each influenced by Austria, hesitated to support the rebels. They were pushed into action by their people, each fearing that he would lose his throne if he did not declare war. Much is still obscure about the history of the events that followed. According to Gopčević¹ Nicholas had been intriguing with the Turks, who were so sure of his good-will that they left Hercegovina almost devoid of troops. That province, he goes on to say, might have been occupied without drawing sword. The Montenegrins might have joined forces with the Serbian Ibar army, and Bosnia might have been cut off from Turkey. Instead of this the Prince, who was himself in command of the northern army, took twenty days advancing ten miles, and afterwards ordered a retreat without sufficient reason. The victory of Vrbica Vučidol against Mukhtar Pasha was won by the Montenegrin soldiery in spite of their leaders, to whose orders they paid little attention. The southern army meanwhile defeated the Turks at Medun (near Podgórica), the key to the Kući district. After further indecisive fighting came the signing of the armistice.

When hostilities were resumed in the following year the Turks sent about 82,000 men against Montenegro. One army, under Suleiman Pasha, was to advance from Mostar and join hands with a second army under Ali Said marching up the Zeta, whilst a third one operated from Kolašin. The northern army succeeded in reaching the lower Zeta by reason of what Coquelle calls the "strategic" retreat of the Montenegrin army. Meanwhile the Turks advancing from Spuž had been defeated by the southern Montenegrin army, and Suleiman had to cut his way out to the south again because his retreat northward was barred. Nikšić remained some time longer in the hands of the Turks owing to the determination of the Prince to delay assault. Sir A. Evans, at that time war correspondent in Montenegro, was much perplexed at what he called the "masterly inactivity" of the northern Montenegrin army, which contrasted so strangely with traditions which, according to Gladstone, "exceeded in

¹ *Montenegro und die Montenegriner*, published in 1877, and sent to press before the war was over.

glory those of Marathon and Thermopylæ and all the war traditions of the world." He attributed it alternately to a desire on the part of the Prince to spare his troops, to a feeling that he would get just as much from the Powers without disturbing himself, and to a fear that Austrian susceptibilities might be affected by a march northwards. Considerations that prevented activity in the north did not seem to hold good in the south, where the Montenegrins marched from victory to victory, occupying Plava, Gusinje, Skadar nahia, Dulcigno, Antivari, and Spizza, until diplomacy intervened. By the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which curtailed the territory apportioned to Montenegro by the Treaty of San Stefano, Dulcigno was returned to Turkey, while Spizza went to Austria. Later, by the "Corti Compromise," Montenegro relinquished Plava and Gusinje, where difficulties were arising with the Mohammedan population, and received in exchange the districts of Podgórica with Žabljak and Spuž. Still later she acquired Dulcigno.¹

By this war one chief aim of the people and of the Prince was gained: they now had a port—in fact, two. Meanwhile, internal organisation had made rapid strides, and in 1888 an elaborated Code of Laws was promulgated, the work of Professor Bogošić. Education was, however, having serious effects not altogether appreciated by the Prince. It had aroused opposition to his despotic rule, and this opposition was inflamed by ideas imported into the country by Montenegrin emigrants returning from America. Moreover, it was becoming evident to the people that union with other Southern Slav countries was imperative for economic reasons, quite apart from any question of sentiment. Montenegro had mines and forests that could not be exploited without capital. Capital derived from one of the Powers meant subservience, especially if that Power were a near neighbour. The subsidies received during the reign of Prince Nicholas from both Russia and Austria had demoralising effects.

In 1905 Nicholas granted another Constitution, partly, it is said, because he wished to impress foreign States. A Parliament was called (1906), but it soon became evident that the divergence of opinion between Prince and people was fundamental: for the Skupština demanded that Montenegrin politics should be directed towards union with Serbia. It was therefore dissolved in the following year, and persecutions and arrests became the order of the day.

¹ V. map, p. 75.

CHAPTER V

NICHOLAS AND THE CONSTITUTION

SINCE 1906 the history of Montenegro has been largely that of its ruler. The little country, barren, rocky, with next to no resources, and inhabited by a race of warlike mountaineers with no leanings towards international commerce and no ports to speak of,¹ has remained curiously cut off from the rest of Europe. In these circumstances the dominant personality of Nicholas had full scope, and his restless mind, full of ambitions and schemes for himself rather than for his country, swayed the fortunes of Montenegro to a much greater extent than would have been possible in the case of a more constitutional monarch.

It is safe to presume that many of the casual foreigners who found themselves in Cetinje during 1906 were much more interested in the ruined tower, hard by the little Orthodox monastery, which scarcely fifty years ago had been always decorated with Turkish heads, than they were in the brand-new Constitution and the Skupština. Nor did they, for the most part, enquire as to what passed through the far-seeing head of Montenegro's autocrat, Prince Nicholas, when he decided to confer these institutions on his people. He very probably did not intend to make this small, isolated realm a democracy, for, while he was going to nominate only 14 out of the 76 members of the Skupština, or Parliament, he knew very well that the general inexperience and the local rivalries would prevent the deputies from working in harmony; he knew also that a person distasteful to himself would find it hard to be elected, and finally he knew that he could always veto the Skupština's decisions.

Why then did he trouble to present his people with this futile gift? It was a semblance of modernity which he con-

¹ Even the sea up to the very coast-line was claimed by Austria as her own.

sidered opportune, for the Serbian royal house of Kara-georgević, after having been the outlaws of Europe on account of the circumstances which surrounded their accession in 1903, had succeeded in winning for themselves a general esteem, and Prince Nicholas was much afraid that the prospective leadership of the Greater Serbia, which had been his life-long aim, would not be his unless he could manage to put his son-in-law King Peter in the shade. Now Peter had from the first been a thoroughly constitutional monarch; he differed radically from his predecessors, Milan and Alexander, in that the Skupština was not flouted; he refrained from leaning, like Milan, upon the minority of the House; and he never thought of governing, like Alexander, by midnight *coups d'état*. In fact, the Skupština became a real force in the State; Serbia was regarded as a country that was emerging from the darkness, while Montenegro was still wrapt in mediævalism. And Nicholas Petrović was not going to let himself be outstripped, if he could help it. The Montenegrins might not have reached that stage of progress when a Parliament is something more than a strange imported toy which the people stare at; but it was highly necessary that the cultured world should not compare the Serbs of Montenegro and those of Serbia to the disadvantage of the former. The heroism and fidelity with which they were credited would not cause their Gospodar to be given the headship of the united Southern Slavs unless he and they had shown themselves to be possessed of the civic virtues. Therefore in 1906 not only did the Skupština meet in October—which Skupština was ostensibly, in conjunction with the Crown, to exercise the legislative power, while the ministers were to be responsible to it as well as to the Crown—but a new criminal code was promulgated.

The differences which separate one political party from another in a Balkan State and separate them into hostile camps are often most minute as to the tenets held by the competing parties, for it is merely a question as to whether you are a devotee of this or of that politician. When Montenegro had her Skupština, it was necessary that she should have some parties: two out of the three which existed down to the time of the Great War were both grouped round the Crown Prince, and the sole difference between the Radović and the Miuškević party seemed to lie in the fact that no member of the Miuškević Cabinet had been in prison. The third one, that of Brigadier-General Mita Martinović, had as its principal plank its opposition to the other two parties. Martinović himself

was not much of a politician ; but he was a sturdy friend of Russia.

On account, then, of the introduction of the Skupština and the new code Nicholas was full of hope that he, and not his Serbian son-in-law, would be regarded by the Powers as the rightful leader of the Yugoslavs. And his untravelled people never for a moment doubted but that Montenegro was the grandest and noblest of all the Serbian lands. Hour after hour they spent, disdaining to do any work more arduous than smoking cigarettes and drinking rakia ; they would relate to one another what their ancestors had done by way of slaughtering the Turk, and what pure blood of heroes they possessed. The Serbs of the kingdom, on the other hand, were a lower class of people, who occupied themselves with manual and other toil.

But the younger generation, of whom a good many had gone for their schooling to Belgrade, had very different ideas. They saw that Montenegro was nothing but a stagnant backwater, and they made no secret of it that, in their opinion, Nicholas Petrović was greatly to blame for it, for he had always looked askance on those who went abroad for education : for only the sons of a few favoured families were given passports ; other young men were obliged to leave the land by stealth. Prince Nicholas was, of course, aware of the growing discontent among his younger subjects, but he felt assured that he would prove quite equal to the situation. He had always considered himself one of the chief diplomats of Europe, and even when his star, so long in the ascendant, had paled, and when everybody knew what his own poor subjects had known for years, namely, that his romantic appearance and his joviality concealed a base and petty nature, he preserved the same pious opinion of himself and the same confidence that he would easily outwit his opponents. For a very long time his diplomatic talents gave him everything he wanted. True, he did not greatly increase the area of his little kingdom, but his own personal fortunes flourished. "Ich bin," said he, "ein alter Fechter" (and this word signifies both "fighter" and "borrower"). His exploits on the battle-field had been for many years thrown into the shade by his financial achievements. Russia, Austria, Turkey, and Italy—they almost fell over each other in their eagerness to fill his exchequer. Some of them wanted to benefit his country, but in the eyes of Nicholas the country was his own estate, and he considered himself quite justified in appropriating some of the donations. This principle he applied even to the gifts in kind—it was in Montenegro a matter of common knowledge that the wheat

which Russia sent in large quantities for the famine-stricken people was not given, but was sold to them by their Prince, the proceeds being to a large extent shared by himself and other privileged families.

In 1906, when Nicholas thought it timely to give his land a modern veneer, so that Serbia should not win the race, he also determined to make Austria instead of Russia his patron. The Russians were very openly looking to Belgrade, and it was the Karageorgević dynasty which in their programme was to have the leadership of the Southern Slavs. It would have been far more difficult for Nicholas to counter this by stretching out his hands to Austria if the Russians in the war against Japan had not suffered such disaster. The Black Mountain had always thought of Holy Russia as all-powerful; her defeat, after they could bring themselves to realise it, was to them as if the foundations of the world were rocking, and in their dazed condition they agreed that it was well to have recourse to Austria. When the two heirs, Franz Ferdinand and Danilo, met at Ragusa in the summer of 1906 this friendship may be said to have been formally inaugurated.

A very notorious Austrian who in the course of the following year, 1907, placed his services at the disposal of Nicholas was the police-spy Nastić, a person who was also implicated in the Zagreb High Treason Trial; according to Professor Friedjung, the eminent Austrian historian, whom on that occasion he furnished with forged evidence, his character was such that one could only touch him with a pair of tongs. A great deal of mystery surrounded and still surrounds the Cetinje Bomb Conspiracy. It was to Austria's interest that Serbia and Montenegro should not be on amicable terms; and Nastić assured the Prince that it was the Serbs who had intended to blow him up, his grandson, Prince George of Serbia, being one of the chief conspirators. Even if Nastić were a less discreditable witness one would be inclined to brush away this charge, for at that time the Princess Helen, George's only sister, was staying at the palace in Cetinje with her grandparents. Much more probable is it that the Austrians were at work to demonstrate that Belgrade was a nest of vipers, so that Europe would not hearken to their protest when the time came for the Habsburgs to annex Bosnia and Hercegovina. Anyhow, the bombs arrived at Cattaro, in ordinary portmanteaux, while others arrived at Gusinje; and a number of persons were shot or imprisoned. Among the later was Radović, who was lured back from Paris and given a four years' sentence, not because he was in any way

guilty, but on the grounds that he knew what was going to happen and should have handed on the information. The real reason was that constitutional government, even as it was applied in Montenegro, was already proving irksome to Nicholas, and it was necessary to remove the chief of the reforming party. At all events it was necessary to reduce him to obedience, and Nicholas used to try, without success, to compel the innocent prisoner to beg for pardon. Since he declined to do so, he remained incarcerated with a large cannon-ball chained to his left leg. It may assist in the reading of Balkan psychology if we mention that throughout his imprisonment Radović was in correspondence with the Crown Prince Danilo, and when he was finally released Prince Nicholas himself wept upon his shoulder. In any case, the Skupština was dissolved in 1907.

Achrenthal's blow fell in 1908 when Bosnia was annexed, so that foreign sway was definitely extended over the central portion and over ethnically the purest of the Serbian people, the latter already being divided into seven different administrations or States. Russia was still reeling from the effects of the Japanese War, and although she and Great Britain protested against the annexation, Baron von Aehrenthal was able to gather this booty. It would, however, be an exaggeration to say that Russia—apart from the ultra-patriotic Press—was violently excited. As Monsieur Nekludov, the able diplomat, points out,¹ his country was annoyed not so much at the Bosnian annexation as because there was for it no *quid pro quo*, no free passage through the Dardanelles. Serbia was advised by the Great Powers to accept the *fait accompli*. She constrained herself to do so, while preparing for the inevitable. As for Prince Nicholas, he issued a flamboyant proclamation, calling on all the Serbs to unite and to denounce the breaking of the Berlin Treaty; and he laid much emphasis on the fact that in the Hercegovina which the Austrians had appropriated lay the mortal remains of his ancestors.

But, while Nicholas called on the Serbs to unite, he persisted very strenuously in his own candidature for the leadership. From the mighty castle that looks down upon the tortuous vine-roofed streets of Prizren he would rule over all the Southern Slavs. Prizren, as also Peć, the ancient town of the Patriarchate, and the gloomy Djakovica were for the moment in the Turkish Empire, and in the possession of the dour Albanians; but by some means or other Nicholas intended to reign in glory from the famous legendary land of Old Serbia. One essential was

¹ Cf. *Diplomatic Reminiscences*. London, 1920.

that he should be a king; and in the year 1910, with the consent of the Powers, he assumed this title. He began in 1911 by stirring up the Malsors, or mountain dwellers, against the Turks. It seemed as if Montenegro, assisted by an arrangement with Ferdinand of Bulgaria, would shortly be fighting the Turk; but after a good deal of noise and excitement nothing came of it, and the Malsors were abandoned to the mercy of Constantinople.¹

In 1912, however, after an alliance, previously thought impossible, but engineered by Ferdinand, had been effected between Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, the first Balkan War was entered upon, and Montenegro struck the first blow. In this action the part which Montenegro played was less efficient than those mountaineers had expected. A dash was made to Prizren. But Nicholas had no cavalry—in old Montenegro they would have been of little use—and thus he had the mortification of hearing that the Serbs, who came from a greater distance, were in that famous town of Dušan while his own warriors were several hours away from it. This disappointment made the Montenegrins long more fiercely for Scutari. With Scutari in their hands, said Nicholas, they would have their natural outlet to the Adriatic, and Montenegro would be prosperous indeed. So during many months the army, camped upon these dreary hills, endeavoured to break through. Down there in the fertile plain at the end of the lake they could see the glittering white town, and if they could have seen themselves and their own inadequate resources as clearly, they would have abandoned an attempt which cost them the flower of their nation, some twenty thousand fighting men. The minarets of Scutari, raised like so many warning fingers, failed to warn them. Serbia offered to assist with her artillery, and Nicholas reluctantly accepted the offer. So primitive was the equipment of the whole Montenegrin force that the supplies and munitions were carried to the lines by their devoted women.

Scutari was ultimately taken, but not by arms. In February 1913 the Turkish commander, Hussein Riza Bey, was murdered by two men disguised as women, just outside the house of Essad Pasha the Albanian, with whom he had been dining. Essad succeeded him, and was soon in active communication with the Montenegrins. He accepted the proposal that, in return for being allowed to leave with all honours, and with a large supply of arms and provisions, he should hand over the

¹ Cf. *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle*. London, 1920.

town to the Montenegrins. But their occupation of it was very brief. An international force arrived under Admiral Sir Cecil Burney and took it over. Elsewhere, though, a considerable territory was added to Montenegro, including the towns of Peć and Djakovica in Old Serbia and part of the sanjak of Novi Pazar; so that the Serbs of Serbia and of Montenegro were no longer separated from one another.¹ But the policy pursued in these districts by the Montenegrin authorities seemed to make it clear that King Nicholas possessed as yet an insufficient number of subjects who were capable of filling such positions. So that when, after the Great War, these lands reverted to the Serbs and Montenegrins, who were then realising their ancient dream of a united realm, it was thought advisable to have the territories administered by the more experienced Serbs from Serbia.

¹ V. map, p. 75.

CHAPTER VI

THE GREAT WAR

By observing what occurred at the outbreak of the European War one sees to what extent the personal desires of Nicholas informed the policy of Montenegro. He sent a theatrical telegram to Belgrade, promising that he and his Montenegrins would stand by their Serbian brothers and be loyal unto death. And there can be not the least doubt but that the vast majority of Montenegrins would have acted in this fashion. To some degree they had deteriorated under the example of Nicholas—"A fish stinks from its head," says a Turkish proverb; but when their brother Serbs were in deadly peril all else was forgotten. And they were bewildered and suspicious when the Skupština was summoned, seeing that the Constitution laid it down that the declaring of war was a royal prerogative. As practically every man was thirsting for battle—after all, they were Serbs and incapable of committing high treason against their brothers—they marvelled at the King's delay. But to the politicians his manœuvre explained itself; they recognised that Nicholas had some secret arrangement with the Austrians¹ and that he wanted to tell Francis Joseph that the war had

¹ An illuminating document was found, after the Great War, in the Austrian archives. It is a lengthy report sent from Cetinje on November 1, 1911, by Baron Giesl, the Austrian Minister, to Count Aehrenthal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Giesl puts down very vividly a conversation he had had with Nicholas, who suggested that the minister should go forthwith to Vienna with the purpose of preparing for a secret treaty between Austria-Hungary and Montenegro. "I will do all that Austria desires," the King is reported to have said; "for instance, I will place under her protection the kingdom of Montenegro. . . . For years I have aimed at this, and in spite of all that has happened [the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina] I was preparing my people for this, and putting Austria in a sympathetic light." The King promised that his army (whose numbers, says Giesl, he multiplied by two in this conversation) should act in perfect harmony with Austria's troops—they would, if need arose, assist each other. Baron Giesl appears to have irritated Nicholas by his lack of enthusiasm for the scheme. "With Austria-Hungary," the King had said, "I must be frank and honest." But the minister characterised his efforts as the throwing of dust in Austria's eyes.

been forced upon him. From that moment he was playing a double rôle. He secured a Serbian officer as chief of the Montenegrin Staff: "They have even placed my army under Serbian command," he told the Austrians. "So faithful was I," he said to the Entente, "that I even took a Serbian commander." And his financial transactions took on the same hue.

In the course of 1914 and 1915 the Serbian army struggled with varying fortunes against the Austro-Hungarians, who, needless to say, far outnumbered them. On August 24, 1914, the Imperial troops were dislodged from Šabac and flung across to the northern bank of the Sava. One of the first results of this victory was the invasion, by Serbs and Montenegrins, of Bosnia. They succeeded in penetrating to within a few miles of Sarajevo, and there they were held up not only by the encircling forts, but by the scarcity of their ammunition, for the Russian supplies had not yet come through. And just before the grand attack on Sarajevo was expected the whole army was thrown into confusion by an order from the Montenegrin King, who, without vouchsafing any reason, called his army back. The Serbian troops had no other course but to retreat as well. The co-operation between Serbs and Montenegrins for the Bosnian campaign was also the occasion for some of Nicholas's usual devious diplomacy. While his ill-equipped warriors pushed on to Budua, arrived before Cattaro, seized Foča, Rogatica, and other towns, the royal family, jealous as ever of Belgrade, were plunging deeper, and always deeper, into treachery. The Serbian officers, General Janković and Colonel (now General) Pešić, who had come to reorganise the Montenegrin army, saw themselves hampered at every turn by the court clique at Cetinje. Janković, finding that orders were given without his knowledge, returned to Niš; and later on, after the fall of Lovčen, Nicholas tried to foist upon Pešić the odium of a surrender which his own machinations had brought about.

In the winter of 1915-16 the Serbs were at last compelled by the simultaneous assaults of Austro-Hungarians, Germans, and Bulgars to abandon their country and to undertake that *via dolorosa* across the dreadful mountains of northern Albania. Yet a royal order was issued to the Montenegrin military and police authorities commanding them to prevent the population from giving or selling any provisions to the Serbian army. "Ne Bogami, svetoga mi Vassilija ne!" [Goodness gracious, no! And by Saint Basil, no!] was the phrase which everywhere greeted the Serbs, and when they remonstrated with the

natives for demanding eleven Serbian silver dinars for ten Montenegrin perpers—the exchange was at par, but the people were acting under orders—"If I had ten sons I would give them all to King Peter," was the usual reply, "but money is money." Yet were the Austrians not as grateful as they might have been. It looked as though Nicholas intended, after the annihilation of the Serbs, to conclude a separate peace with Austria and to rule, as an Austrian satrap, over an enlarged territory. But they ignored his aspirations, they swarmed over his country—and this time he was not play-acting when he showed his indignation; the deceived deceiver had to fly.

On January 10, 1916, Lovčen had fallen. That Adriatic Gibraltar, which rises gaunt and sheer to some 6,000 feet, was entrusted by Nicholas to his youngest son, Prince Peter, a youth of some vanity. He used to deny, after the surrender of Lovčen, that he had consorted at Budua with Lieutenant-Colonel Hupka, the former Austro-Hungarian military attaché at Cetinje whom his superiors had brought specially from the Italian front for this purpose. The well-known patriot, Dr. Maciedo of Zadar, who happened to be confined during the summer of 1915 by the Austrians in the fortress of Goražda, which lies in Bosnia, read in the telephone book certain messages from Prince Peter, asking for an interview with Hupka; and these messages were carried by a patrol to the lines and thence telephoned to Goražda. When the Prince at last acknowledged that he had been meeting Hupka—which he naturally had done at his father's command—he stated that it was with the object of preventing the bombardment of open towns by Austrian aeroplanes. Between him and Hupka the arrangements were made; many of the Austrians exchanged their military boots for the Serbian national sandals, so that they could more easily scale the rocks; and Peter sent verbal orders to his two outlying brigadiers that they must not resist. General Pejanović demanded, however, that this should be put in writing, and the document is extant. Thirteen Austrians lie buried in a little graveyard on the slopes of Lovčen, mostly men who missed their footing; and this was the price which Austria paid for the tremendous mountain she had coveted for years; she had been willing, more than once, to let the Montenegrins, in lieu of it, have Scutari.

The great picture of "The Storming of Lovčen," which Gabriel Jurkić, the Sarajevo artist, was commissioned by the Austrians to paint, was never painted; and when Nicholas motored out from Cetinje to meet the men who were retiring from Lovčen

he had the hardihood to rebuke them as traitors. "It is not we who are traitors," shouted a colonel, "it is you and your sons!" "Oh! that I must hear such words!" groaned the King. "I want to die." But he did not die; on the contrary, he went to Paris. . . . Before he left Montenegro he found another opportunity for a grandiose attitude. He appeared at Podgórica, where he made an eloquent speech, exhorting his people to march on the morrow against the hated Austrian and assuring them that their old King would fire the first shot—and then decamped in the night for Scutari, which lies in the opposite direction. He and the Queen, Prince Peter and Miuškević, the Premier, fled the country; while Prince Mirko, the remainder of the Cabinet, the National Assembly, and, above all, the army, had instructions to remain behind. How much easier it would have been for his army than for the Serbs to reach Corfu! But this terrible old man delivered 50,000 of the best Yugoslav soldiers to the enemy. On January 21 he sailed away.

Before his departure Nicholas had attempted to put the whole blame on the shoulders of Colonel Pešić. He sent—in order to make more certain the success of the Austrian army—a telegraphic command to the Voivoda Djuro Petrović, the chief of the Hercegovinian detachment, in which he required him to destroy his cannon and machine-guns and then (although the enemy was exerting no pressure upon him) to withdraw towards Nikšić. This order was issued in the name of Colonel Pešić. There is every reason to believe that the signature was forged; for there exists a letter in which the colonel wrote that, in order to avoid capitulation, a supreme effort would be necessary at certain positions which he indicated; and, anyhow, the army should be withdrawn to Scutari and the defence of the town organised.

The fall of Montenegro had been brought about the more swiftly by the Austrian submarines, which in the Gulf of San Giovanni di Medua torpedoed practically every ship that carried food or munitions, while other boats were not molested. This gave rise to some comment. One of the King's final acts was to summon the Skupština, as he did not wish to be saddled with the responsibility of making peace. But the war was continued by those Montenegrin troops between Kolašin and Bielo Polje who, even after the fall of Lovćen and the flowing of the Austrian army towards Scutari, were ordered to make a counter-offensive, during which they had over 1,500 dead and wounded. The reason for this was said to be that Nicholas

wished to prevent his army escaping to Scutari ; he was afraid lest, if they escaped with the Serbs, they would dethrone him forthwith. Afterwards he gave out as an explanation that he had ordered the Chief of Staff, Yanko Vukotić, to rescue the army, which order he alleged that he had wirelessly from Brindisi. Vukotić, together with Prince Mirko and the ministers who stayed behind, declared in the *Pester Lloyd* that this was untrue. They added that he could have sent no wireless from Brindisi, because there was at that time no receiving station in Montenegro, the French one at Podgórica having been destroyed by the order of the British Minister, Count de Salis, the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps.

The King, by the way, had endeavoured for some time to rid himself of the diplomats, who were inconvenient witnesses of what was in progress. On December 31, 1915, a telegram was sent to their Governments by the ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, in which they said that "Apparently our presence is displeasing to the King, and he is trying to disengage himself from us. He has begged us on several occasions to depart, and last night he insisted, with the asseveration that in forty-eight hours it would be too late. We suspect that His Majesty is playing a very ambiguous game. . . ." And on January 9 the French minister telegraphed, among other things, that "My Russian and English colleagues are of opinion that the King is merely performing a comedy with us, and that this comedy will end in a tragedy for the belligerents."

CHAPTER VII

AFTER THE FLIGHT OF NICHOLAS

WHEN Nicholas arrived in France he proposed to settle down at Lyons, but the French authorities did not care for him to be so close to Switzerland, which was one of his intriguing centres. So they placed at his disposal a château near Bordeaux; and it was not until he had made repeated requests that they permitted him to come to Neuilly, a suburb of Paris. He replaced Miuškević as Premier by Radović, hoping by this move towards the left to silence his critics. But in August 1916 Radović presented a memorandum in favour of the formal union between Montenegro and Serbia, under Prince Alexander of Serbia, the son of King Peter and grandson of King Nicholas. The Montenegrin monarch was enraged at this; but, after Radović had resigned, one after another all the Montenegrins of any standing withdrew from Nicholas, who was openly working against the Serbs; and the King was left to carry on a nominal Government with his own nominees. Many efforts were made by the Court at Neuilly to counteract the accusations of treachery which were openly levelled against the King: but in vain. The evidence was too strong, and no one believed his asseverations except his own creatures and those who were quite ignorant of the true state of affairs.

Occasionally a French review or newspaper referred to him. "The official courtesies extended by the French Government to Nicholas I and his family should not deceive the public," said the eminent publicist, M. Gauvain, in the *Revue de Paris* (March 1917). M. Gauvain showed that the Petrović dynasty constituted the sole obstacle to a union of Montenegro with Serbia and the rest of the Yugoslav lands.

Meanwhile, with Montenegro occupied by the Austrians, most of the Allies consented that it should be revictualled on the same lines as Belgium. Even Austria offered no objections.

One State and only one man were hostile to the scheme, and that man actually the King of Montenegro. "Let them wait," argued Nicholas, "and when the moment comes for my return, I will go back with large supplies and be most popular." Even when his ministers realised that there must be no more delay in asking for the King of Spain's good offices, and drafted a letter to the King of Spain, it produced another one from Nicholas to his ministers written by Nicholas but signed by an aide-de-camp. "The King," he said, "considers that the letter to the King of Spain should stand over, so long as one cannot be sure that Italy will permit the transit of food-stuffs." He desired no mediation between himself and the Italians, and when Great Britain and France at length ceased to pay their annual subsidies for the expenses of the Neuilly Court, he was given an increased allowance by Rome.

Can one be astonished if, at the end of the war, very few Montenegrins had kindly thoughts for Nicholas? About 200 Yugoslav troops from Macedonia had arrived in Montenegro when the Great National Skupština met on November 24, 1918, at Podgórica and unanimously deposed the King on the 26th; and at the same time the meeting voted for union with Serbia. It is argued by some foolish persons that the Montenegrins were acting under duress—as if 200 men could intimidate an armed population of 150,000. The deputies were chosen by the people indirectly—that is to say, ten men elected a representative and these, in their turn, elected the deputies. No one will pretend that in the excitement of those days the voting was conducted in a calm and methodical fashion. Here and there a dead man was elected; the proceedings—though they were not faked, as in Nicholas's time—were rough and ready. But if the deputies had been chosen in a more haphazard manner, say according to the first letters of their surnames, the result would have been identical. The metropolitan of Cetinje, the bishops and five of the six ex-premiers gave their unreserved support to the new régime; and among these was the ex-Queen's brother, the Voivoda Stefan Vukotić, a man much beloved in Cetinje—all his life he has remained a poor man. Being questioned by General Franchet d'Esperey as to whether he voted against his brother-in-law, "If I had seven heads and on each of them a crown," he answered, "I would give them all for the union of the Southern Slavs."

King Nicholas died, regretted by few, in March 1921. Though matters are still in a state of flux in Montenegro, it is now accepted that the little country forms part of the "Kingdom

of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," and will, to the best of its ability, proceed with the consolidation and development of its own portion of Yugoslavia. For the present, however, it is in a terribly poverty-stricken condition, and large numbers of its inhabitants have taken to the hills, whence they make sudden descents on their more fortunate brethren below.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

MONTENEGRO

- 1355-85. Rise to power of the Balšići.
1385. George Balšić II.
1389. Battle of Kosovo.
1392. Turks seize Scutari (Skadar) for the first time.
1392-1479. Struggle between Turks, Serbs, and Venetians for Scutari:
1404. Balšić III.
1421. Extinction of the Balšić line.
1421-7. *Rapprochement* with Serbia.
1427. Stefan Crnojević becomes ruler.
1471. Ivan Crnojević.
1479. Venetians in Scutari capitulate to Turks.
1482. Zabljak burnt and abandoned by Ivan.
1490. George Crnojević.
1493. Printing-press brought to Obod.
1516. Government by Bishop-Princes begins.
1614-19. Duke of Nevers' Conspiracy.
1683. Turks defeated before Vienna.
1687-9. Montenegrins co-operate with Venice against Turks.
1690. Turks sack Cetinje for the first time.
1697. Danilo Petrović-Njegoš becomes Bishop. The beginning of the Petrović-Njegoš line.
1699. Treaty of Karlowitz.
1702. Massacre of Mohammedans in Montenegro.
1711. Beginning of Russian influence; Montenegro supports the Russians against the Turks.
1712. Turks defeated at the battle of Kurev Laz.
1714. Cetinje sacked for the second time.
1717-18. Montenegrins support Venice against the Turks.
1735. Bishop Sava.
1766. Vasilije (Sava's deputy) dies in Russia.
1767-74. Stefan Mali.
1768. Battle of Čevo.
1782. Death of Sava. Peter I.
1785. Turks sack Cetinje for the third time.
1788-91. Austria and Russia allied against Turks; Montenegro in support.

- 1796. Defeat of Turks at Spuž and Kruse.
- 1796. Code of Laws promulgated.
- 1797. The Republic of Venice ceases to exist. Cattaro becomes Austrian.
- 1805. Treaty of Pressburg. Cattaro becomes French.
- 1806. Russia and Montenegro co-operate against the French in Cattaro.
- 1807. Peace of Tilsit. Cattaro abandoned to the French.
- 1813. Montenegro co-operates with the British against the French in Cattaro.
- 1814. Treaty of Paris. Cattaro goes to Austria.
- 1830. Peter II.
- 1831-3. State reorganised. Senate formed.
- 1832-40. Frontiers with Austria delimited.
- 1842-4. Frontiers with Turkey delimited.
- 1851. Danilo II becomes ruler and breaks the ecclesiastical tradition.
- 1852. Omar Pasha invades Montenegro.
- 1855. Fresh Code of Laws promulgated.
- 1858. Turks defeated at Grahovo.
- 1860. Assassination of Danilo II. Nicholas succeeds.
- 1862. Cetinje threatened by Turks. Convention of Scutari.
- 1868. Constitutional changes.
- 1876. Declaration of war against Turkey.
Victories of Vrbica Vučidol and Medun.
- 1877. Montenegrins occupy Nikšić, Dulcigno, Antivari, Spizza, etc.
- 1878. Treaty of Berlin.
- 1888. New Code of Laws.
- 1905. Constitution granted.
- 1906. Parliament elected; overtures to Austria.
- 1908. Bosnia-Hercegovina annexed by Austria.
- 1912. First Balkan War.
- 1913. Scutari occupied and evacuated; Montenegro enlarged.
- 1914. Outbreak of Great War.
- 1916. Austrians occupy Mount Lovčen; Flight of Nicholas.
- 1918. Deposition of King Nicholas; union with Serbia voted.

**PART III. . THE FORMER
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN LANDS**

GENERAL CHARACTERS

THE new Yugoslav State consists essentially of a union between the Balkan kingdom of Serbia and a wide tract of territory to the north-west, formerly included within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The basis of this union was definitely ethnic, a recognition of the fact that various branches of the South Slavs extend from the Morava Valley, in an almost solid block, westwards to the Adriatic and north-westwards at least to the line of the Drava. The Austro-Hungarian lands included in the new State do not, however, form a unit, either geographically or politically, and it is thus necessary to consider the history of their separate parts. This task is rendered more difficult by the fact that while some of them were provinces, crown lands, etc., within the old Empire, and, in more or less precise form, had existed as political or administrative units for a long period of time, others are mere sections of provinces, or groups of counties, with but little definite history apart from that of the unit to which they formerly belonged. One may put the matter in another way by saying that, while certain Austro-Hungarian South Slav groups have been able, within more or less clearly defined territories, to preserve at least a measure of individuality, or even autonomy, for a prolonged period, other groups have been pressed upon by adjacent peoples and more or less merged with them.

These facts are best shown by setting forth, in tabular form, the position which the various lands now attached to Yugoslavia occupied in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In this table, it should be noted, we have omitted all reference to those areas in South Hungary (Banat, Bačka, Baranya), and the small part of South-West Hungary which are included in Yugoslavia.

In the present Yugoslavia the following were formerly Austro-Hungarian lands :

- I. Provinces attached to Empire as whole.
Bosnia and Hercegovina.

II. Areas attached to Austria :

- (a) The Crown Land of Dalmatia.
- (b) A very small part of the County of Istria, which included the Quarnero Islands, and was formerly part of the Küstenland, or Littoral, Province.
- (c) Part of the Province of Carniola.
- (d) The southern part of the Province of Styria.
- (e) A very small strip in the south-east of the Province of Carinthia.

Note.—The name Slovenia is now applied to areas (c), (d), and (e), because their population is predominantly Slovene, but the Slovenes have used the word in the past to include the whole Coastland Province in addition. They form the majority of the population in Gorizia-Gradisca, one of the Coastland counties, but are in a minority to Serbo-Croats and Italians in Istria, and to Italians in Trieste, the third county. Slovenia was never a definite Austrian Province under that name.

III. Areas attached to Hungary :

Croatia-Slavonia, including the two territories formerly known as Croatia and Slavonia, together with a part of the former military marches of the Empire.

The most obvious fact which emerges from this table is that while the lands in which the Slovenes occur were divided out by Austria among various provinces, on the other hand, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina formed, within the old Empire, administrative units. The breaking up of the Slovene lands was facilitated by the fact that for centuries the Slovenes have been exposed to a double pressure, from the west and the north. On the west, as has been suggested above, they have been pressed upon by the Italians, who predominate in the towns of Trieste and Gorizia as well as in the plain country round Gradisca. In the north they have been pressed upon by the Germans, who are in a large majority in Styria and Carinthia when these two provinces are considered as a whole. In all this region, indeed, until comparatively recently, the Slovenes tended to be limited to the hill country, being ousted by Italians or Germans alike in the plains and the towns.

That the Serbo-Croats of the former Austro-Hungarian lands dwelt in provinces or crown lands whose boundaries have been more or less permanent is due to a combination of geographical and historical conditions. Among the latter the coming of

the Turk is undoubtedly the most important, and it is for this reason that we begin our detailed survey with the fourteenth century. An earlier date, such as the sixth or seventh century, would have shown us the inwandering of the Serbs into this part of Europe owing to pressure from the east, followed by a reaction on the part of the Central European peoples, and an approach to a condition of equilibrium. That developing equilibrium was disturbed by the Turkish invasion, which resulted in the Balkan Slavs reverting to a large extent to the state at which their barbarian ancestors stood when they entered Europe. Some fled to the mountains and reverted to the primitive patriarchal life of their forefathers; others were reduced to slavery; many reacquired that migratory instinct which had brought the first hordes from the banks of the Dniester and the Bug to the Middle Danube. Because movement in and out of the Balkan Peninsula was easy across the Danube-Sava line; because also that peninsula, in its western mountain-chain, afforded in its rocky fastnesses shelter to small groups of warriors who, on the flank of the Turk as he marched northwards, could preserve a measure of independence, nourished by the memory of past greatness,—because of these facts the process of assimilating the Slav, which had been taking place in the Danube-Sava basin, was checked. The history of the centuries which we have to follow in detail is the story of the triple conflict between Central Europe on the one hand and Turk and Slav on the other. To the States of Europe it seemed that the conflict was only between western civilisation and the barbarian Turk, the Slavs being merely instruments which might be used in the conflict. But when the Slavs of the peninsula succeeded in founding independent States as against the Turk, the effect of the constant migrations in and out of the peninsula became increasingly apparent in Austro-Hungarian territory. Neither Austria nor Hungary had wisdom enough to respond to the changed conditions; and the founding of Yugoslavia is an assertion of the South Slav's belief that the day of assimilation and absorption is over, and that the time has come when the refugees can descend from their mountains, and hold plain and river-valley, coast-line and the great highways, against all comers.

To understand the complex history of the conflicts here, it is necessary to look first at the main facts of geography. The essential feature is the presence, from the Coastland province north of Trieste, through Western Carniola, South-Western Croatia, the western border of Bosnia and Hercegovina down

to Montenegro, of a great belt of elevated land of very peculiar character. As compared with the Alps proper, the heights are not great, for no peak greatly exceeds 8,000 feet. The striking effect on human life is due rather to the presence of massive limestones, stretching over wide areas. In the region near Trieste the name Karst (Italian *Carso*) is given locally to the lands underlain by these limestones, and the name has been applied by extension to the area throughout which they occur. Owing to the way in which the limestone is dissolved by acidulated water, the streams throughout the Karst tend to run underground. No river, for example, enters the sea throughout Croatia's ninety miles of coast-line, and those of Dalmatia are few. This has a double effect: it makes the problem of water-supply a serious one, and it increases very greatly the difficulty of communication, for in mountainous areas generally river-valleys afford the easiest mode of access. The Karst belt is therefore a great barrier between the interior and the Adriatic coast; and the difficulty is heightened by the fact that on the Adriatic side the slopes are generally steep, sometimes precipitous, so that roads can be constructed only at great expense.

Another feature of the Karst country is its inhospitable nature. In places, where the rainfall permits, forests may occur; this is notably the case in Carniola. The higher areas, however, and those most remote from rain-bearing winds, are bare and bleak in the extreme, and the surface soil is generally exceedingly scanty. Thus, at first sight it might seem as if the land would be useless for purposes of cultivation. This is, in point of fact, true for wide tracts, but two locally developed land features make this possible in places. These are the *dolines* and *polyes*, which occur throughout the Karst belt. Dolines are closed depressions, more or less funnel-shaped, generally arranged in rows, and rarely exceeding some fifty yards in diameter. They are quite comparable to the small "sinks" common in the Pennines in our own country, and are sometimes flat and marshy at the bottom, and sometimes lead into a rock-cavity where water can be seen or heard. Such dolines are not infrequently capable of some amount of cultivation, or give pasturage, and on a small scale attract population. Much more important are the polyes, which are great depressions, always with a flat floor, sometimes attaining a length of nearly forty miles, with a width of from five to ten. Their special feature is that they contain, for a part at least of their extent, permanent streams, often turning into lakes during the wet season, but

ending in limestone sinks instead of reaching the sea. The flat floor of the polye is covered with alluvial soil, so that the basins attract not only on account of their water but because of their fertility. One polye may, however, be cut off from the next by a wide, waterless belt; their presence thus favours the existence of small groups of people, separated by a desert tract from other similar groups.

To the north-west the Karst belt is succeeded by the Alps proper, containing valleys with perennial streams of normal type. These valleys contain the headwaters of two great converging rivers, the Drava and the Sava, of which the Drava, in the Alpine belt at least, marks approximately the northern limit of the South Slavs, who are here Slovenes.

Between the two rivers the mountains are continued by more or less isolated hill-groups, diminishing in size and number as one approaches the Danube. Thus Eastern Croatia and Slavonia consist of a mingling of upland and plains, the plains increasing in size and extent in Slavonia, which is formed by the mesopotamian belt proper. Here also extensive marshes occur.

The Sava, which once formed the northern boundary of Turkey, is distinguished by the great number of its right-bank tributaries, which drain from the hill country of Bosnia. The reason is, that while Western Croatia, Dalmatia, and Hercegovina all belong to the Karst type, other rocks, older and more resistant, appear farther to the east. These rocks form the mountains of Bosnia, which are cut up by innumerable valleys, carrying streams which flow to the Sava. Though one of these, the river Drina, formed the political boundary between Serbia and Bosnia, there is no real change in the character of the land here. Bosnia, like much of Serbia, is a green, well-watered, forested country of hills and valleys, offering a sharp contrast to the inhospitable Karst.

This summary description enables us to individualise the separate areas whose history we have to consider here, and also to explain the essential facts of that history.

It is clear that Slovene Styria and Slovene Carinthia—that is, in both cases, the areas south of the Drava, together with Northern Carniola, consist of the last slopes of the Alps towards the plains and hill country which form the south-western continuation of the Danubian plain. Their activities centre round the Sava and Drava Rivers, and, till at least the nineteenth century, germanisation was proceeding apace. Western Carniola, the peninsula of Istria, with parts of Gorizia-Gradisca,


belong to the Karst area, as does also Western Croatia. But Western Carniola and North-Western Croatia both exhibit a relation to lines of communication which has strongly influenced their history. A glance at the map of Europe will show that Trieste marks the termination of the shortest line from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and thus to the Mediterranean. Now the contrast in products between Europe north and south of the Alps is so great that exchange has tended to take place since the dawn of history, and this despite the existence of the great Alpine barrier. Not only is Trieste at the end of the shortest line between Baltic and Mediterranean, it is also at the end of the shortest line between the west-to-east section of the Upper Danube and the Adriatic. It is true that even for the moderns, despite their power of tunnelling the mountains, the shortest line cannot be followed. But the fact remains that Trieste is at the end of routes leading through the Alps, and is a natural port for Alpine and transalpine areas, which are connected with it by lines of communication across the Karst. Here, therefore, the Karst belt is not a region of separation, as it is farther south. But the predominance of Italians in Trieste reminds us that, despite the lines of communication across it, the Karst does tend, even here, to act as a barrier to human migration. The combination of the conditions, and especially the presence of a solid block of Germans in the Eastern Alps, and the easy access of Italians by the coastal plain, together with the fact that the Karst area, which might have served as a place of refuge for the Slovenes, is on the main road to Trieste, explains why the Slovenes practically disappeared from history for centuries, and why the lands inhabited by them were divided out among different Austrian provinces.

The conditions in Croatia offer certain resemblances, with well-marked differences, which again make clear the reason why the country preserved, until the war, a large measure of theoretical autonomy, with practical dependence upon Hungary.

In recent times the Croatian centre has been Agram (Zagreb) on the Sava. But Agram originally formed part of Slavonia, and, for the explanation of the persistence of Croatian national feeling, no less than of Hungarian interference, we have to look farther west, to the Karst country, where the earlier centres of Croatian life are to be found. Just as Trieste marks the north-western notch of the peninsula of Istria, so Fiume marks the south-eastern, and just as Trieste stands at the end of the shortest line between Upper Danube and Adriatic, so Fiume

ADRIATIC COAST OF YUGOSLAVIA—1.





stands at the end of the shortest one between the Sava and the same sea. In other words, Fiume is the natural outlet for the rich plains of the Middle Danube. Hungary's interest in it was thus inevitable, and the conditions so far are comparable to those existing in Trieste, even to the extent that half the population of the town is Italian. But farther to the south, between the coastal chain of the Velebit and the inland Kapela chains, there is a wide belt of Karst, containing the great polye of Lika, which formed a natural place of refuge for the Slavs, whether from Turk or Magyar. It is a natural "borderland" also, as was realised by the Austrians when they laid down the Military Borderland Province as a defence against the Turk.

As contrasted with Croatia, with its reservoirs of warlike, untamed tribes, Slavonia, lying just north of the Sava, along a natural line of invasion, was on the one hand more easily subdued, whether by Turk or Magyar; but, on the other hand, like the south of Hungary proper, it received constant migrants from the Balkans, and was more definitely under Balkan influence.

Croatia, as already explained, has an inhospitable coast-line. But, as we travel onwards into Dalmatia, ports become frequent, and a new tendency manifests itself. An ordinary political map shows Dalmatia as a long, narrowing strip, separating Bosnia and Hercegovina from the Adriatic, a condition which appears singularly anomalous. In speaking of the Karst belt we have already dwelt upon the reason for the apparent anomaly. It may be sufficient to add that, historically, there has always been a sharp contrast between the Dalmatian littoral, depending upon trade and fishing, with a certain amount of cultivation, and the barren Karst zone above. The history of the republic of Ragusa is emblematic of the whole. This had a strong Serb element, and carried on in the days of its prosperity a great trade with Serbia proper; but politically it was never Serbian. Venice was for a time the suzerain, and Venetian influence was paramount throughout. The Balkan Slavs could, and did, find refuge in the Karst country. They have descended to the littoral and established there a maritime type of Slav, with many differences from those of the interior. But the task of uniting the whole of Dalmatia with an interior State has not hitherto proved possible.

Bosnia, as we have already hinted, is most easily invaded along the valley lines—that is, up from the Sava. This was the line the Turk took; it was the line followed by Austria on his

retreat. Even in the days of her greatness mediæval Serbia never succeeded in grasping the whole of the country, and nowhere, in the regions considered here, has the influence exerted by the Turk during his long occupation been more marked.

Hercegovina, whose history, save for rare intervals, has been closely bound up with that of Bosnia, is predominantly a Karst country, which is, however, exceptional in possessing in the Narenta a perennial stream of some importance. The fact that the river runs between steep walls of limestone is of some interest, for it diminishes the usefulness of its valley as a line of communication. But the Narenta does give Hercegovina a measure of geographical unity.

CHAPTER I

BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA

THE early history of these provinces is obscure, but the conditions existing at the time of the Turkish Conquest, and the events of the period immediately preceding, may be summarised briefly.

In the twelfth century Bosnia was conquered by the Hungarians, some forty years after their absorption of Croatia, and its *bans*, or rulers, became vassals of the Hungarian Crown. But the country was remote and backward, and the native rulers made not wholly unsuccessful efforts to preserve a measure of independence. Hercegovina, then known as Hom, or Hum, was attached to Serbia till 1325, when it was conquered by the Ban of Bosnia. A later ruler, Ban Stefan Tvrtko, proclaimed himself King in *circa* 1377, his overlord being much absorbed by troubles in Poland and elsewhere. Tvrtko's reign was Bosnia's period of greatness, for, after having humbled Serbia or Raška, he advanced to attack Croatia and Dalmatia. In the last years of his reign his success was such that he ruled over practically the whole of Dalmatia, interior and towns, only the town of Zara and the territory of Ragusa standing out against him.

Dalmatia and Croatia slipped almost at once from his successor's grasp, but the kingdom of Bosnia lasted, in name at least, till the time of the Turkish Conquest. It was, however, continuously torn by strife, partly religious in nature. There was not only the rivalry between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, Bosnia being the meeting-ground of the two Churches, but from the twelfth century onwards the Bogomil heresy became very important.

The tenets of the Bogomils¹ are chiefly known from the writings of their enemies, who accuse them of every crime,

¹ Their creed was strongly influenced by the much earlier Manichæism, and was based upon dualism, that is the co-existence of a spiritual universe and a world of matter, created by Satan. They rejected the sacraments and despised images.

actual and doctrinal. The real significance of the heresy may perhaps be best appreciated by considering the position of Bosnia, and the part which religion has always played in Eastern Europe as a political weapon. Hercegovina, as we have seen, together with, at intervals, parts of Bosnia, had come within the orbit of Serbia. Now Serbia was Orthodox, the ruler, Stefan Nemanja, putting down the Bogomil heresy with a strong hand within his lands. For the Bosnians and Hercegovinians to declare for the Orthodox Church was therefore to play into the hands of the Serbs. But Serbia as a mediæval State had but a precarious existence, and the real permanent menace both to Bosnia and Hercegovina came from Hungary. Now the power of the Catholic Church was a redoubtable weapon in Hungary's hand. The Bogomil heresy, on the other hand, which arose in Bulgaria, in contrast to the two historic creeds, seemed to have a definite nationalist basis; it was a Slav creed, and therefore a useful weapon in the hands of a small State striving to maintain independence against powerful enemies.

The position may be realised by noting the causes which led to the new separation of Hercegovina from Bosnia in the fifteenth century. Stefan Thomas reigned in Bosnia from 1444 to 1461, at a time when the Turkish menace was fully apparent. He was a Bogomil, but desired to obtain the support of the Catholic King of Hungary and of the Pope against the Turks. He therefore renounced his heresy, declared his conversion to Catholicism, and began to show his zeal in the fashion expected at that time by persecuting the heretics. Some of his subjects rose in revolt against him on this account, fled to the Karst country on the borders of Montenegro, and there found shelter in the lands of a lord called Stefan. Stefan's territory included the burial-place and monastery of St. Sava, the patron saint of Serbia, and he took the name of *Herzog* (Serbian *Herceg*) or Duke of St. Sava, whence the name Hercegovina (1448). In this case the association of Bogomilism and nationalism seems fairly clear. Curiously enough also, that Bosnian Ban who first conquered Hom (Hercegovina) in 1325 was also a Bogomil, but adopted Catholicism in order to obtain help from the King of Hungary because of the difficulty of holding his conquest against Stefan Dušan of Serbia. The conversion did not prevent him losing territory temporarily to Serbia, and Stefan Thomas similarly alienated his subjects, without obtaining the aid which was to have been the price of his conversion.

That conversion and its consequences probably, indeed, accelerated the Turkish conquest of Bosnia, for the Bogomils seem to have felt that the contemptuous toleration of the Turks was to be preferred to the bitter persecution of Christians, Catholic or Orthodox. The Turks, at least by 1463, had completed their capture of Bosnia, while Hercegovina more or less held out till 1482. Large numbers of the Bogomils, especially of the land-owning class, then became Moslems, and in this way retained their lands, while many of the Christians fled from the conquerors, northwards into Hungarian lands, westwards into Dalmatia, or southwards into the hills of Montenegro.

These fifteenth-century conversions have influenced profoundly the later history of Bosnia. The landowners were granted special privileges by the conquerors, with the result that the Christian peasants became even more deeply enslaved and oppressed than in other parts of Balkan Turkey. The Islamised Slavs also lost almost all sense of unity with the other South Slavs, and reconciled themselves entirely to Turkish rule. Right down to the nineteenth century therefore—that is, for a period of some four hundred years—Bosnia and Hercegovina remained under Turkish rule. It is important also to note that events have hitherto falsified the prediction of those who asserted that, as Moslem rule had brought extensive conversions to the faith of the rulers, so a Christian overlord would bring reversion.

The majority of the conversions to Islam took place either soon after the Turkish Conquest or during the following century. But the number of Moslems was increased not only by later conversions, on a smaller scale, but by the settlement of a certain number of Turks by race, and, after Turkey's expulsion from Hungary, by Moslem migrants from former Turkish lands there. Even so late as the Balkan Wars, Turkey's retreat from Macedonia was followed by an increase in the Moslems of Bosnia, for some of the peoples of that region migrated to the country. Further, while the beys or land-owners form the most important Moslem element, there are also Moslem peasants, including both small-holders, and *kmets*, or landless peasants, formerly serfs working for the beys.

It should be explained also that in Bosnia it is customary to call all Moslems "Turks," the inhabitants thus showing an appreciation of the fact that religion still counts for more than "race" or nationality. Most of the Bosnian "Turks" are of course Slavs by race, but there seems to have been, in addition, a considerable amount of assimilation of true Osmanlis, who

have forgotten their own language, and are not easily distinguished from the Moslem Slavs. Some only of the latter display in their customs and traditions traces of their earlier condition.

Since Bosnia and Hercegovina have practically no history between the Turkish Conquest and the nineteenth century, it seems clear that their inhabitants were either content, or unable to make their discontent felt. The one statement appears applicable to the Moslems, and the other to the Christians. The beys had accepted Islam as a means of retaining lands and power, and the central Turkish Government prudently refrained from provoking the fiery mountaineers. Far-seeing Turks doubtless perceived that "European" interference was unlikely so long as the most vocal section was Moslem and lip-loyal to the Porte, and were careful not to strain that loyalty too much. Thus the Bosnian lords enjoyed a large measure of independence, and pursued their private feuds with but little attention to the wider interests of the Empire to which they belonged. They were "neither Serbs nor Turks, neither water nor wine," and stood largely aloof from the life of the rest of the peninsula.

That the nineteenth century brought change was due in the first place to the general European situation, and to the "reforms" by which Mahmud II of Turkey (1809) sought to counter that situation. Those reforms menaced the privileged position of the semi-independent beys and shook their somewhat precarious loyalty; thus they were the first to rebel. Later, the rising tide of nationalism among the Slavs of the peninsula awakened echoes among the oppressed Christian peasantry, who revolted in their turn, and the turmoil made the interference of the Powers inevitable.

The Moslems rose in 1832, and again in 1859. The latter revolt, although suppressed by the Turkish Government, was important in that it led to the abolition of the feudal system and the establishment of *métayage*,¹ which, so far from satisfying the Christian peasants, only brought added resentment of their position. The peasant risings, which were frequent between 1853 and the Austrian occupation of 1878, not infrequently started in Hercegovina, and were stimulated by the proximity of that province to the free State of Montenegro, with its Orthodox population. In North Bosnia, again, the proximity of the Austro-Hungarian Slavs on the one hand, and the growing power of Serbia on the other, both exerted influence.

¹ A system by which the owner divided the fruits of the soil with the cultivator.

Thus, a rising in North Bosnia in 1858 resulted in a promise of reform from the Turks, without producing much effect in practice. The Montenegrin victory over the Turks in 1858, at Grahovo, led to a rising in Hercegovina in 1861. A few years later Prince Michael of Serbia was planning with Nicholas of Montenegro combined action against the Turk, the plans including risings in Bosnia; but the assassination of Michael in 1868 put an end to this "first Balkan League," as it has been called. Conditions were, however, steadily growing worse, and in 1873 extensive migration took place from both Bosnia and Hercegovina into Austria-Hungary. In 1874 Hercegovina, under local leaders, but with assistance from Montenegro, revolted, Bosnia following the next year.

It was this final revolt which brought Austria into the field. From a military point of view, she took steps both to prevent her own South Slav subjects from entering into the fray and to help Turkey to put down the insurgents. At the same time, in combination with the German and Russian Governments, she demanded from Turkey such reforms as were likely to prevent fresh outbreaks. From the Bosnian point of view the Diplomatic Note presented to Turkey, like many other similar ones, suffered from the grave defect that no machinery was suggested which might ensure that the reforms proposed would be carried out, and the revolting peasants showed no gratitude to their would-be protectors. The general European situation postponed the settlement till the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Austria was permitted to occupy both Bosnia and Hercegovina, both provinces remaining in name Turkish territory. The meaning of the Occupation is perhaps rendered sufficiently clear by the remark with which Andrassy, the Austrian Foreign Minister, is said to have greeted the Emperor on his return from Berlin: "Your Majesty, the Gate of the Balkans is open to you."

Andrassy's "gate" probably referred less to the Occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina themselves, than to the clause in the settlement which permitted Austria to place garrisons and to make commercial and military roads in the sanjak of Novi Pazar. Novi Pazar consists essentially of a defile in the mountainous belt which then separated Serbia from Montenegro, and its appearance in the settlement terms marks a very important historical stage, for it shows that the Bosnian question was entirely altering in character. For centuries it had been, in fact if not in name, a Turkish "mark," the equivalent on the south side of the Sava of the Austrian Military

Borderland on the north of the same river. Now it was beginning to play a part in European politics.

Previous history showed that, so long as Bosnia formed a definite entity, apart from the other areas of the peninsula, it could not be held by an outside Power without the consent of the most vocal section of the inhabitants; for the geographical difficulties were too great. Hungarian rule was largely nominal, and the acquiescence of the King of Hungary in Tvrtko's Declaration of Independence was an indication that the area, from the Hungarian point of view, was not worth the trouble of holding. Similarly, the Turk at Constantinople was too far off, and the difficulties of communication too great to make much interference possible. So long as Bosnia was feudal, therefore, and the Christian peasants unable to menace their lords, there was no Bosnian question. The successive risings indicated that the peasants were being influenced by the emotions which were sweeping over the Slavs of the peninsula and of the Austro-Hungarian borderlands. Turkey was therefore compelled either to show that she was able to put down those risings, or to abandon her position as ruling Power. But the military problem proved so serious that Austria-Hungary was obliged to place at the disposal of the Turkish Government her own Dalmatian port of Klek, at the mouth of the Narenta, for the landing of troops and supplies. Even had this given immediate and complete success, which it did not, it would have been an admission that Turkey could not control her own subjects without foreign assistance—an obviously impossible position. The acceptance of the use of the port was a virtual admission of defeat. Turkey had originally conquered Bosnia from the north; she could not hold it from the south, except with the consent of its inhabitants, and her whole policy made it impossible for her to hope to pacify the peasants, even if with Austrian help she succeeded first of all in subduing them. The country was too near "Europe" also for primitive methods, such as the wholesale massacre of the recalcitrants, to be possible.

That Austria should succeed Turkey as overlord was, all things considered, inevitable, for union with Serbia at this time was not practical politics. But that, in addition to occupying Bosnia and Hercegovina, Austria claimed the right to garrison the sanjak was a clear indication of a new orientation of her policy. It can scarcely be doubted that this claim indicated an intention on her part to advance as the Turk retreated, at least as far as the Vardar Valley and Salonika. She believed,

erroneously as she discovered later, that the road through the sanjak was a possible line of advance.

In the Berlin Treaty, as a result of Turkish representations, a clause was inserted stating that the Occupation was temporary only, and was to continue until the provinces had been pacified and their condition ameliorated. But the separate Austro-Turkish Convention, signed in April 1879, contained no such clause, though the Sultan's sovereign rights were affirmed, and it was quite clear as time went on that Austria intended to stay.

Considerable opposition was manifested by the Moslems of Bosnia to the Occupation, and the introduction of conscription for the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1882 provoked a revolt in the just-pacified province. Broadly speaking, however, it may be said that the years of the Occupation, 1878-1908, were years of considerable progress on the surface, and of gathering unrest below. An indication of the general policy of the Government is given by the fact that Baron von Kállay, who was Governor from 1882 to 1903, prohibited the circulation in the province of his own *History of the Serbs*, in which he admitted that the Bosnians were identical in race with the Serbs.

The fact is significant, for it was an essential part of Austria's policy to prevent, as far as possible, the rise of a community of feeling between the inhabitants of the province and Serbia. This influenced her attitude alike to the religious and the agrarian question; the two are in point of fact related, for Moslem ascendancy meant a retrograde attitude in regard to the land, and to the Orthodox peasants Serbia's appeal came primarily rather from the fact that the peasants there were freeholders than from the call of race.

The first census held by the occupying Power (1879) gave the following figures for the three main creeds: Orthodox, 496,485; Moslems, 448,613; Catholics, 209,391. The census of 1910 showed that the relative proportions had altered, as witness the following figures: Orthodox, 825,418; Moslems, 612,137; Catholics, 434,061. In addition there were nearly 12,000 Jews, over 8,000 Uniats, and over 6,000 Evangelicals. It is clear from these figures that the Catholics had increased more rapidly than either of the other two groups, while Moslems had increased more slowly than the Orthodox.

The figures may be said to sum up both what Austria strove to do by conscious effort and the factors which limited her efforts. In the first place, despite their early resistance to the Occupation, she intended to favour the Moslems as a conser-

vative, non-national element, with limited and localised ideals. This meant that no sudden, radical change could be introduced into the system of land tenure. But the acute land-hunger of the Slav is here, as we have already seen, complicated by the fact that the kmets are mostly Christian and the beys mostly Moslem, which greatly increases the bitterness of the peasants. Very varied opinions have been expressed by different authorities as to the facilities which the Austrian authorities have given for land purchase. It is perhaps sufficient here to say that between 1879 and 1909 only 26,000 kmets became freeholders, while in the latter year about 80,000 kmets remained. A calculation made by Prof. Grünberg of Vienna that the last kmet would not have redeemed his holding till the year 2025 has been widely quoted. It is quite certain that the Austrian treatment of the whole agrarian problem has been a profound disappointment to the peasants, and greatly assisted Yugoslav propaganda.

If the official attitude to the land question was, as the South Slavs believe, influenced by the desire to attach the Moslems to the occupying Power, we have still to remember that passive acquiescence was the most that could be hoped for from them. Since they are profoundly attached to their faith, their tendency, most especially while the province remained nominally Turkish, must always have been to look south rather than north. Active support, therefore, had to be sought for elsewhere, and it was natural that it should be looked for among the Catholics rather than among the Orthodox. In this connection it is essential to remember that till at least the early years of the present century the antagonism between Catholic Croat and Orthodox Serb seemed greater than the call of race. Or, it would perhaps be more accurate to say, the religious difference was a convenient label by which a contrast which the Croats regarded as fundamental could be recognised. To them the Serbs seemed uncouth peasants, just emerging from barbarism; the use by the latter of the Cyrillic alphabet, while the Croats employed the Latin one, masked the essential identity of language; the two calendars made a striking difference in daily life. Finally, and not least important, the Europeanised Croats obtained from their communion with the Catholic Church and their attachment to Austria, the heir of the Holy Roman Empire, a consciousness of a long tradition of civilisation which affected their whole attitude to the Balkan Slavs.

Austria's policy, therefore, was to attempt to increase the numbers and influence of the Catholics, and to keep the Orthodox

in a suppressed and dependent position. The increase in the relative number of Catholics, shown by the census figures quoted, is stated to be largely due to immigration. This immigration was of two types. In the first place, especially in the early years of the Occupation, a belt of land in North Bosnia—that is, on the right bank of the Sava—was colonised chiefly by Catholics brought from other parts of the Empire, such as Poles, Czechs, Germans, as well as Ruthenians. This colonising process was a traditional part of Austrian policy.

In the second place, the Catholic element was increased by the army of officials introduced to carry on the administration. These officials were predominantly Croats, but Poles, Germans, and Magyars were also introduced, and German became the official language. Italian culture, which had penetrated into Hercegovina by the Narenta valley, largely disappeared, and the encouragement of tourist traffic helped to favour the use of German, and was an agent in germanisation.

Apart from the land question, and the small share in the administration granted to them, the Orthodox section had other causes of dissatisfaction. Taxation naturally increased with road-making and other improvements; but the peasants complained that they were taxed for improvements which did not actually benefit them. Railway construction, the postal arrangements, and so forth were such as to hinder easy communication with Serbia, while it is stated that the economic development of the province was deliberately checked, partly owing to the rivalry between Austria and Hungary, and partly lest increased wealth should bring restlessness to the Orthodox majority. Commerce and trade were largely in the hands of the Jews.

By the beginning of the present century, however, changes outside Bosnia, both in Austro-Hungarian lands and in Serbia, began to affect the country. Serbian propaganda was exceedingly active between 1903 and 1908, and the foundation in Austria-Hungary about 1906 of the Serbo-Croat coalition party showed that religious antagonism was dying down.

The annexation of 1908 was a profound disappointment to Serbia. It was due in the first instance to the Austrian fear that the Young Turk Revolution might lead to a claim for the return of the province to its nominal possessor. Turkey's protest was got over by the payment of an indemnity and by evacuating the sanjak of Novi Pazar. The evacuation has been regarded by some as an indication of a desire on Austria's part to compromise and to maintain peace; it seems more

probable that it was due to the fact that the Austrian military authorities had declared that, as a line of advance into Macedonia, the sanjak was entirely unsuitable for a modern army. It is probable also that even in 1908 Austrian politicians had come to the conclusion that a successful southern advance must involve first of all the crushing of Serbia.

The annexation was followed (in 1910) by the grant of a Constitution, but this gave no satisfaction to the people, who at once protested against its terms.

During the Balkan Wars a considerable number of Bosnians fought on the Serbian side, an indication of the trend of feeling there, and the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, at Sarajevo, while on a visit to Bosnia, brings us to the outbreak of war. The circumstances of that murder still remain obscure, but the anti-Serb riots which occurred in the town afterwards, without interference by the police or the troops, together with the inadequate precautions taken for the protection of the Archduke, show at least that the intention was to make the Serbs and the Government of Serbia responsible.

CHAPTER II

CROATIA AND SLAVONIA

FROM our point of view the history of Croatia and Slavonia may be said to begin with the battle of Mohacs in 1526, when the Turks defeated Louis II of Hungary and Bohemia, who was killed on the field. This disastrous defeat opened the way for the Turkish advance into Central Europe, and led to the temporary disappearance of Hungary as an important Power.

It is, however, necessary to say a word about much earlier events, owing to the bearing of these upon subsequent political history.

The early Croatian State appears to have been founded on the shores of the Adriatic, and to have centred round Nona, north of Zara, and Trau and Clissa in the Channel of Spalato, all within modern Dalmatia, with which Croatia was closely connected (cf. p. 177). By the ninth century it had become enlarged, and included the western half of the peninsula of Istria. It extended only to the Kulpa-Sava line, thus excluding part of modern Croatia, but eastward reached the Urbas—that is, embraced a part of Bosnia. Later more of Bosnia and nominally at least the Narenta Valley were appropriated, and the period of greatness was the latter part of the eleventh century. As that century drew to a close, however, a connection with Hungary took place. In 1091 Vladislav of Hungary intervened in Croatian affairs, and in 1102 Koloman of Hungary was crowned King of Croatia and Dalmatia. It is a fiercely debated question between Magyar and Croat historians whether this was a mere union of crowns, or whether Croatia then became a conquered, subject province, retaining only a measure of autonomy. The period between 1102 and 1526 was turbulent enough, but included nothing of prime importance in connection with recent history.

Slavonia, like Croatia, is a name which has been used in

different senses at various times. According to the Magyars, the plains between the Drava and the Sava, corresponding to the Hungarian counties of Pozsega, Verocze, and Szerem (Syrmia), were Magyar territories from the first, and the term Slavonia was only applicable to the country farther to the north-west. It was this Slavonia, according to them, which was attached to Hungary by King Vladislav, during the period of his intervention in Croatia, when it lost what autonomous status it had previously possessed. But after Mohacs not only Syrmia, Verocze, and Pozsega, and part of Slavonia proper, but also South-Eastern Croatia fell to the Turks. The last became Turkish Croatia (Krajina). Part of this territory was freed from the Turk at the peace of Karlowitz in 1699; a small remnant remained under Turkish rule till the peace of Passarowitz in 1718. But the greater part of Hungary was also Turkish till 1699, and during the Hungarian eclipse changes were taking place in Croatia.

In realising their significance, it is important to bear in mind that, once across the Sava-Danube line, the Turks found no real obstacle to an advance through the wide plains of the Middle Danube. On the other hand Austria, which lay on the left flank of the Turk, was more or less protected by her mountains, the Alps and their continuations (see p. 151). Thus the Habsburgs steadily increased in importance, and since a large number of South Slavs found shelter from the Turks in the hill country, they came more or less definitely under Austrian influence. After Mohacs, indeed, the Croatian Assembly appealed for protection to Ferdinand of Habsburg, electing and recognising him as their king, and the Estates of Slavonia also made submission to him. But while parts of Croatia, as just indicated, were never conquered by the Turk, Slavonia was largely submerged by the flood, and its remaining portion was united by Austria to what was left of Croatia. The latter thus acquired the districts of Varasdin on the Drava, Zagreb on the Sava and Kreuz between the two, and in consequence extended across the Sava to the Drava, at the expense of the original Slavonia. As the Turk retreated, the name Slavonia was, according to the Magyar account, extended unwarrantably to include the three Hungarian counties. Croatia, however, retained her enlarged boundaries. But nominally Croatia and Slavonia remained Hungarian territory, and, since Croatia was admitted to possess more autonomous rights than Slavonia, Magyar historians claim that the change in the significance of the names had no constitutional justification. The use of the

compound form Croatia-Slavonia from 1868 onwards was intended to meet this difficulty.

The actual relation between the two areas was also influenced by the laying down by Austria, from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards, of the Military Frontier Province, which, till its final abolition in 1881, separated Croatia and Slavonia in fact, despite their union in theory in 1868.

During the sixteenth century the Military Province had two main centres, one at Varasdin, in territory previously Slavonian, and one at Karlstadt, on the Kulpa, in Croatia. With the progressive liberation of extra-Balkan lands from the Turk the province was extended eastwards, and a curious northern loop intervened between Croatia and Slavonia. All the male inhabitants of the Province were theoretically soldiers, liable to be called upon at any moment to turn out against the Turks. In return they received various privileges, among them full liberty of creed to members of the Orthodox Church. This provision resulted in the numbers of the inhabitants being greatly increased by Orthodox immigrants from the areas under Turkish rule, and as time went on the characteristics of the people of the Frontier Province, especially in the Karst country between the Velebit and Kapela mountains, were profoundly modified by the military régime. The men acquired many of the peculiarities of their Russian analogues the Cossacks, and became strongly attached to the Habsburgs, earning, like the Cossacks, a reputation for fierce brutality combined with the most devoted affection for the person of the Kaiser. Some of the hatred and contempt which Hungarians and Italians alike have manifested towards the South Slavs is due to memories of the savagery of the Croatian soldiery, who lived under an aristocratic and military social policy, and were themselves subjected to a brutalising discipline.

In detail the history of Croatia and Slavonia between the battle of Mohacs and the peace of Passarowitz is that of Austria and Hungary, so that this brief summary of the chief points of interest may suffice. The period between 1718 and August 1914 may conveniently be considered under three headings :

1. The years between 1718 and 1848 saw the beginnings of the revival of Hungary after the Turkish night. During this period, broadly speaking, the Croats were but pawns in the game being played by Austria and Hungary, the two great antagonists. Not till nearly the end of the period can there be said to be any considerable display of national feeling among them.

2. In 1848 occurred the Hungarian upheaval, in response to

the emotions aroused everywhere by the year of revolution. The widespread enthusiasm at first affected the Croats also, but when reaction came they threw their weight into the scale against Hungary and in support of Austria. In the Compromises of 1867 and 1868 they were sacrificed in the interests of peace between the two major antagonists. The result was that Croat loyalty to the Habsburgs was shaken, while the Magyars were unable to forget what they regarded as a betrayal.

3. Between 1868 and the outbreak of the Great War a national movement among the Austro-Hungarian Slavs became increasingly evident. It was due not only to difficulties alike with Austria and with Hungary on the part of the different groups, and a growing feeling of community of interest among those respectively under the two Powers, but also to the rise of modern Serbia, and the decay of the Turkish Empire in Europe. Till the outbreak of war, however, it appeared more probable that Croatia would take the lead within the Dual Monarchy than that union with Serbia would occur.

1. It is not necessary to consider the history of the years between 1718 and 1848 in any detail. Not only, as already stated, were the Croats largely passive, but the fact that a new nobility, with strong Magyar sympathies, entered the lands recently freed from the Turk for long checked any marked development of independent Croat feeling. Two points only are of considerable importance.

The first was the existence, between 1809 and 1814, of the Illyrian Provinces, erected by Napoleon. They included the Slovene lands, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia-Gradisca, as well as the whole of Istria, also Dalmatia with the former republic of Ragusa, and Western Croatia, both military and civil. The Croatian area included Karlstadt but not Agram, and the capital of the Provinces was Laibach. The French administration was enlightened and progressive, and, though the provinces disappeared in 1814, and the Croatian element was reattached to Hungary at the Congress of Vienna in the following year, the memory of this limited union of Austro-Hungarian South Slavs was abiding.

It had a considerable bearing upon the second event, the political and literary activities of the Croat Ljudevit Gaj, who founded an anti-Magyar paper at Agram in 1835, and proposed that the names Serb, Croat, and Slovene should be dropped, and that the South Slavs should adopt the common name of Illyrians. Magyar historians declare that he was in the pay of Russia, and that his anti-Magyar tendencies were secretly

encouraged by Austria, who wished to make of his party catspaws in the struggle with Hungary. But Gaj's work was not only political, for, stimulated by the writings of Vuk Karadžić, the Serb linguist, he advocated the abandonment, in writing, of the various local dialects in use among the "Illyrians," and the acceptance of the Serbian literary language. The Magyar view of this campaign may be indicated by a quotation: "The difficulty presented by the absence of a medium of communication between all Southern Slavs was more or less got over by the adoption of the Ragusan dialect, which, under Italian influence, had developed into something resembling a modern language, which could not be said of the Croatian and Servian dialects to which it was allied."¹ The same author speaks (vol. ii, p. 305) of "inferior types, whose sole claim to political differentiation lies in the fact that they speak a bastard variety of the languages of more important races"; a similar phrase is repeated on p. 333, where the words are "the bastard idioms of inferior races." The phrases are of some interest, in that they show that the literary movement was definitely regarded by both parties as an integral part of a political one, a fact which explains the Magyar attempts to force their own language upon the Croats, and the resistance of the latter.

The language question, about which we shall have something to say later, took many curious forms. One of the most peculiar is perhaps the fierce fights which went on until 1844 over the substitution of Magyar for Latin in debates in the Hungarian Diet. The replacement was at first opposed by Austria, and, when the King's consent was finally obtained, the Croat deputies persisted in using the discarded tongue. The House refused to permit them to speak, and resolved to ignore speeches delivered in Latin in the official journal of proceedings. After the King-Emperor had made a vain effort to induce the Diet to allow Croat deputies to speak Latin, a law was passed in 1844, by which, as so often happened, under cover of an apparent concession to the Croats, the dominance of the Magyar language and people was further strengthened.

2. At the outset of the year of revolution, the relations between Hungary and Croatia were bad; yet under the influence of the emotions aroused it seemed for a moment as if a reconciliation might be possible. Kossuth's historic Address was moved in the Hungarian Diet on March 3, 1848. On March 25

¹ Knatchbull-Hugessen, *The Political Evolution of the Hungarian Nation*, 1908, vol. i, p. 321, quoted from the Hungarian Pulszky.

a National Assembly was summoned at Agram, when an Address to the King, drawn up by Gaj, demanded that Baron Jellačić—who is said to have been previously nominated by Austria as one likely to be able to control the Croatian frontier guards—should be appointed Ban, or Governor; that a Diet should be summoned representing the three frontier kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia and the Military Frontier Province; that separation from Hungary should take place; that the national language should be officially recognised, and so forth. This Address was presented on April 2, when Ferdinand gave a conciliatory answer, but pointed out the necessity of maintaining the connection with Hungary. A deputation to the Hungarian Diet on April 8 made no public reference to territorial separation, but in a private interview between Kossuth and one of its members the question was raised, accompanied, it is asserted, by a threat that if the Hungarians proved recalcitrant, application would be made “elsewhere.” Kossuth replied, “In that case the sword must decide between us.”

The sword did indeed come into play very speedily, for, after some complicated cross-manceuvring between the Austrian Court, Jellačić, and the Hungarians, Jellačić crossed the Drava in September 1848, at the head of an army of 40,000 men. The following year the Russians entered the fray, and the war ended in September 1849 with the defeat of the Hungarians.

In the subsequent settlement Croatia and Slavonia became Austrian Crown Lands, and the port of Fiume was attached to Croatia. This port, which plays a very important part in the relations between Croatia and Hungary later, had had a very chequered history. In 1779 it was united by Maria Theresia to Hungary, and was subsequently declared to be a *corpus separatum* of the Hungarian Crown. In 1809 it was included by Napoleon in the Illyrian Provinces, but was recovered by Britain for Austria in 1814. Hungary received it back in 1822, but lost it, as stated, in 1849.

The next ten years were a period of reaction, under which Croatia and Slavonia suffered as well as Hungary, if to a less extent. The year 1860 saw the beginning of the protracted negotiations between Austria and Hungary, which resulted in the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867. Croatia and Slavonia fell back into their old position of pawns in the struggle, and the final decision to sacrifice them came from the Austrian realisation that, in view of the numbers of Slavs within the boundaries of the Empire, the dominant position of the Germans in Austria

could be maintained only by the adoption of the dualistic principle, which made the Magyars predominant in Hungary and divided the different groups of Slavs between the two countries. The Compromise between Austria and Hungary was supplemented by the *Nagoda* of the following year between Hungary and Croatia, which regulated the relations of the two till the outbreak of the War.

Over the exposition of the terms of this agreement much ink has been expended; but most authors have been concerned rather with the attempt to define the precise significance of the legal terms used than with broad principles. That all that has been written has left many points in obscurity merely indicates that the phrases employed were not meant to be clear. The essential point indeed is that the Croats and the Hungarians approached the settlement from diametrically opposite points of view.

For the Magyars, the reconciliation with Austria meant the wiping out of the events of the previous twenty years, and the restoration intact of the *status quo ante*. If this premise was granted they were willing, at any rate in the early days, to show liberality towards the "subject nationalities." But to the Croats it seemed impossible that the part which they had played in 1848-9 could be forgotten, and they felt also that if Hungary maintained her own position in relation to Austria on a purely racial basis, then she could not prevent the Croats from using the racial argument in their discussions with them. This was, however, precisely what Hungary did, for it is unfortunately true that an emphasis on race as the foundation of a State is apt to bring with it acute racial intolerance. The different standpoints of the two contracting parties meant that the *Nagoda* was less a Compromise than an agreement which could be interpreted in more than one way.

Paragraph 1 states that Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia form with Hungary a single political entity, *vis-à-vis*, alike with the other dominions of the King-Emperor and with foreign countries, and that the King of Hungary, as such, rules over these territories. Croatia-Slavonia is, however, recognised as a political nation possessing a special territory of its own, and Hungary not only recognises Croatia's territorial integrity, but promises help in restoring the Military Frontier Province and Dalmatia.

The Military Frontier Province, as we have seen, was under Austria, and was established on account of the Turkish menace. This menace had long since passed away, but the attachment

of the frontier guards to the Habsburgs made Austria very unwilling that the province should be abolished, and the final stage did not take place till 1881, though the perpetual military service of the guards was done away with in 1871.

Dalmatia proved a more difficult matter. Hungary promised to demand its reincorporation with Croatia, on the ground that it had been so united in early times. Further, the title of King of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia appears on the Hungarian coinage. In point of fact, however, it was never given up by Austria, and until the outbreak of war was attached to that country, while in theory it was Hungarian territory. Austria's motive was undoubtedly that, as a naval and seafaring Power, she had urgent need of the maritime Slavs of the Adriatic seaboard, and wished to limit the Hungarian coast-line so far as possible.

Finally, under the territorial heading we come to the delicate question of Fiume. The attachment of this port to Croatia, as we have seen, was part of the meagre reward for the help given by the Croats to Austria against the Magyars. In the text of the Nagoda, as usually accepted, there is a clause creating the town, harbour, and district of Fiume a special body (*corpus separatum*) connected with the Hungarian Crown, i.e. the condition laid down by Maria Theresia was restored. It is stated, however, that the appearance of this paragraph is due to fraud, and that the Croatian Diet never consented to the separation of Fiume. We have already seen (p. 152) that the fundamental importance of Croatia to Hungary lay in the fact that the road to Fiume crossed it; without Fiume and the road thither Hungary becomes an inland State.

It is not possible here to consider in detail the whole of the terms of the Compromise, but to understand later history it is necessary to say a few words about the position of the Ban. Theoretically the arrangement granted Croatia-Slavonia a large measure of autonomy, the Diet being in control of Administration, Education, and Justice. But executive authority, and the power of appointment to all offices of importance, rested with the Ban, who was appointed by the King on the nomination of the Hungarian Prime Minister, and could only communicate with the King through the Minister for Croatian Affairs in the Hungarian Cabinet. This meant that the Ban was a Hungarian nominee, and could be—and in the sequel was—used as an agent of Magyarisation in Croatia.

3. The Nagoda was forced through the Croatian Diet by more than doubtful methods, and after 1868 opposition to its

provisions, especially to the nomination of the Ban by the Hungarian Premier, continued. In 1873 certain modifications were introduced, without however meeting Croatian feeling on this or some other points regarded by the Croats as vital. The following year, 1874, was remarkable for the foundation, owing to the efforts of the Catholic Bishop Strossmayer, of the University of Agram. Bishop Strossmayer had already, in 1867, founded the Southern Slav Academy of Science and Art in this town, and his great aim was to make Croatia a centre of South Slav civilisation, and to bridge over the differences between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs by means of higher education. His endeavours were, however, slow in bearing fruit, and various causes, notably a law in regard to religious education in the schools, passed by the Croatian Diet in 1875, increased the bitterness with which the members of the two communions regarded one another.

The troubles in Bosnia (cf. p. 159) found an echo in Croatia, where the Serbs sympathised strongly with the struggles of their kinsfolk against the Turk. In 1878 an appeal was made for the ultimate union of Bosnia and Hercegovina with Croatia—which was strongly resented by the Magyars. In 1883 riots broke out in Agram as a result of what the Croats regarded as an infringement of the Compromise, and, after the Constitution had been suspended, Count Charles Khuen-Héderváry was appointed Ban. His rule lasted for twenty years, till 1903, and from the Hungarian standpoint was remarkably successful, while the Croats describe the Ban as the corrupter of a whole generation.

Khuen-Héderváry's policy was fairly simple, and was carried out with great skill. His object was to make Croatia-Slavonia harmless from the Magyar standpoint. The whole of his power of appointment to offices and his influence were therefore exercised in favour of those willing to submit to Magyar leading; careers of all kinds were closed as far as possible to others. Second, he played off, with remarkable success, the Catholic Croats against the Serbs; though it must be admitted that the two parties required little encouragement to fratricidal combat. Finally, all the usual devices of arbitrary government, electoral corruption, suspension in certain cases of trial by jury, press laws and so forth were adopted.

By 1903 signs of a change were apparent, due especially to movements in Dalmatia, and to the beginnings of combination between Serbs and Croats—that is, between Catholic and Orthodox South Slavs. But, though Khuen-Héderváry re-

signed it was only to become Hungarian Prime Minister, so that there was no immediate improvement in the conditions in Croatia.

On the other hand the period of stagnation was obviously over, and Croatian problems took on a wider aspect. The conditions in the kingdom under the late Ban had aroused much feeling in Dalmatia and Istria, and deputies from the two Diets endeavoured to interview the Emperor, with a view to making a direct appeal to him. They were rebuffed, apparently under Hungarian influence, and, by one of those curious inconsistencies of which the history of Austria-Hungary affords so many examples, their sympathies were turned from Austria towards Hungary. Meantime, one of the frequent crises between Austria and Hungary took place, Khuen-Héderváry resigned his new post as Hungarian Premier, and a period of parliamentary chaos ensued in Hungary. To some of the Slavs, alike of Croatia-Slavonia, of Dalmatia, and of Istria, it appeared that the opportunity might be taken to approach the Hungarian Opposition, and offer help against Austria in return for concessions.

On Oct. 2, 1905, forty Croatian deputies, representing the three territories, met at Fiume and passed the famous Resolution. This asserted the right of every nation to decide its own fate, interpreted the strife between Austria and Hungary as due to an attempt on Hungary's part to carry this principle into effect, and claimed the reincorporation of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia, and certain specified reforms in Croatian administration. On Oct. 15 twenty-six Serb deputies met at Zara, expressed agreement with the Fiume Resolution, and declared for joint political action between the Serbs and Croats of the Monarchy.

The two resolutions were enthusiastically received by the Hungarian Opposition, but, not unnaturally, aroused much distrust at Vienna.

This attempt to launch the frail Yugoslav bark on the stormy sea of Austro-Hungarian politics met with speedy disaster. In the spring of 1906 a reconciliation was effected between the Hungarian Opposition and the Crown, and the Serbo-Croats, having served their purpose, were as usual thrown overboard. In the following year a new railway bill was introduced into the Hungarian Parliament, which declared Magyar to be the official language on the railway passing through Croatia to Fiume. This was regarded by the Croats as a deliberate violation of the provisions of the Nagoda, and was

defended by the Magyars as a practical necessity. Much as in the case of the earlier fight over the substitution of Magyar for Latin in the debates, the Magyars had the best of the argument from the common-sense point of view, but made no attempt to deal in a statesmanlike fashion with the intense national feeling aroused among the Croats. Nor were the Magyars' subsequent actions calculated to modify the Croats' conviction that the practical argument was merely a device to justify in the eyes of the world a far-reaching attack upon their constitutional rights. The passage of the bill was continuously obstructed by the Croatian delegates, and it was put into force without full parliamentary sanction.

The effect in Croatia was great, and the opposition there was countered by the appointment, in 1908, of Baron Paul Rauch as Ban. The appointment increased the storm, and the new Ban ruled for two years by suspending the Constitution. During his period of office there occurred the famous Agram trial, when fifty-three Croatian Serbs were indicted for taking part in a revolutionary conspiracy, directed from Belgrade and having Pan-Serb aims. The conduct of the trial and the nature of the evidence allowed aroused great scandal (v. p. 214). After the proceedings had dragged on for nearly six months, thirty-one of the accused were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, the other twenty-two being acquitted.

While the Agram trial was going on two other important events took place. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina, which aroused much emotion in Serbia as well as in Europe generally, and the historian Prof. Friedjung published an article in the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, in which he roundly accused the leaders of the Croato-Serb Coalition party of receiving bribes from the Government of Serbia to promote a conspiracy against the Empire. The documents upon which Friedjung relied were proved to be forgeries at the trial of the action for libel brought by the Deputies slandered, and the trial itself ended in a compromise (v. p. 214). Some months afterwards the verdicts in the Agram trial were quashed and the prisoners liberated. The details of the two trials belong to Austro-Hungarian history, but their effect upon public feeling in Croatia was undoubtedly great.

Some attempt was made to conciliate the Croats and Serbs by the replacement, in 1910, of Baron Rauch by a new Ban, who, however, only remained for two years; after this the Constitution was again suspended, and a dictator was appointed. The year 1913 saw the repeal of the Railway Regulations Act,

which removed one constant source of bitterness, though it may be doubted whether the concession did not come too late. By this time the Trialist Solution was becoming increasingly popular, and the fact that in July 1914, immediately before the outbreak of the war, the Serbian Government arrived at a Concordat with the Vatican is of great interest. This Concordat was meant to smooth away the last difficulties in the co-operation between Serb and Croat, which had been promoted rather than, as was the Austro-Hungarian intention, hindered by the Agram and Friedjung trials.

CHAPTER III

DALMATIA

By the agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy of November 1920 the peninsula of Istria has been assigned to the latter Power. The former Austrian county of Istria (p. 148) included, in addition to the peninsula, the Quarnero Islands. Of these the largest, the island of Veglia, becomes Yugoslav, under the name of Krk, the remainder falling to Italy. But since historically the islands have always been closely bound up with Dalmatia, it seems needless to add anything to what has been already said incidentally in regard to Istria.

In discussing the history of Dalmatia, the first point to notice is that we cannot in this case take the coming of the Turks as the starting-point of a new era, in the sense that this is true for the other South Slav territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. In point of fact, the essentials of the Dalmatian problem, as it exists to-day, were in existence at a much earlier period, and the advent of the Turks, though it introduced a new factor, did not affect the main issue.

For our purpose here we may begin with the advent of the Slavs in the seventh century. At the time when the Eastern Empire was menaced by the Avars, the Emperor Heraclius invited a tribe of Croats to enter Roman Illyria to drive them out (A.D. 634). These Croats seem only to have extended southwards in Dalmatia as far as the river Cetina, which enters the sea at Almissa, some twelve miles south-east of Spalato. About the same time Southern Dalmatia was occupied by Serbs, and, after both groups had been converted to Christianity, the river Cetina for a long period marked the dividing line between Catholic and Orthodox. Subsequent movements and political changes did away with any sharp distinction which may have existed between the two groups, but it remains still true that, while Northern Dalmatia is predominantly Catholic,

in parts of Southern Dalmatia members of the Orthodox Church are in a majority.

As a result of the struggles of the barbarians, Avar and Slav, the Latin civilisation, which had been concentrated in a comparatively small number of coastal towns, suffered a temporary eclipse; the towns were destroyed and the inhabitants scattered. But a reaction soon took place, and some seven towns at least rose again from the general ruin, and carried on the ancient tradition. The most important of these were Zara, an old Roman colony; Ragusa, which replaced the older Epidaurus (Ragusa Vecchia), originally a Greek colony; and Spalato, which arose on the site of Diocletian's villa, to replace ruined Salona, formerly the capital of the Roman Province.

Apart from the towns the country was scantily peopled by loosely organised Slavs, and the result is often described, in Freeman's much-quoted phrase, as making Dalmatia "a Slavonic land with an Italian fringe." But the phrase is apt, from two points of view, to give rise to a wrong impression. In the first place, the word "fringe" suggests a continuity which never existed, and in the second the use of the word "Italian," for a period long antecedent to Italian unity, is not without its dangers to-day. It is, in point of fact, undesirable to employ terms indicating nationality in Dalmatian history, at any rate before the end of the nineteenth century, for till then the region was one of undeveloped nationality. Even the use of such words as indicating race is to be deprecated, for there has been a Slav element in the "Italian" towns for a prolonged period. Down at least till the time of the formation of the Illyrian provinces by Napoleon, it may be said indeed that the special feature of Dalmatia was the co-existence of a relatively small number of coastal towns, with a continuous Latin, or perhaps it is better called Mediterranean, tradition, and a scattered, poverty-stricken rural population, for long notably backward as compared with the townsfolk, and regarded by them as mere barbarians. The rural population was not, however, confined to the interior, for coastal sites unsuitable for considerable towns could be occupied by its members without interference, so long as they did not encroach upon the territory of the quasi-autonomous towns. Such settlers, time and again, found in piracy a method of eking out the scanty yield of their lands or their fishing, and when such piracy was carried on on a large scale it became a factor in Dalmatian history.

But successful piracy obviously implies the pre-existence of

maritime trade, so that it is necessary to say something about the coastal towns. Of these the most interesting is certainly Ragusa, which affords some curious contrasts to Zara, a town so long under Venetian influence and control that it has been assigned to Italy by the recent agreement.

As already stated, the town now known as Ragusa replaced the older city of Epidaurus as an important centre after the Slav settlements. Owing to its position, which made it, in consequence of the south-easterly trend of the coast-line, relatively remote from Venice—as distances went in early days—while it was at the same time within easy reach of Serb lands, it was able to maintain a large measure of independence by the device of playing its enemies off against each other. Thus, throughout the long history of the republic, till Napoleon declared that it had “ceased to exist” in 1808, though it often changed one suzerain for another, most of its overlords exercised little more than nominal power.

The town lies at the extremity of routes leading into the interior, and by the thirteenth century colonies of Ragusan traders were established within the Balkan Peninsula, while consuls were placed in various Adriatic ports, including Venice. The republic was purely aristocratic in constitution, office and power being limited to certain noble families. The nobles were, however, as in Venice, merchants, for the simple reason that wealth and power came from trade, not from the possession of wide tracts of land; for much of the land was barren. Since the interior of the peninsula was chiefly pastoral, and had considerable mineral wealth, Ragusa exported live-stock, skins, cheese, beeswax, and silver, while she imported salt, wine, oil, and cloth from Italy. The great dangers to which the republic was exposed were, first of all, sea piracy, and, secondly, earthquake shocks. Her acceptance of Venetian supremacy, as in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was due to the fact that the more powerful republic could police the seas.

As contrasted with Ragusa we may note that Zara, despite the routes which lead from it, was less favourably placed for trade with the interior. Its constant appearance in Dalmatian history, however, is due to the fact that the island chain opposite to it was indispensable to Venetian control of the Adriatic, and that the town formed a convenient stage and stopping-place for Venetian galleys. Its importance to Venice was one of the reasons why it never obtained virtual independence like Ragusa, while the willingness which it, in common with the other Dalmatian towns, displayed to change allegiance from

Venice to Hungary, according as the land power or the sea power seemed to have most to offer, is proof enough that for at least a prolonged period its sympathies were determined by economic interest, and not either by race or nationality.

But the essential point to bear in mind is that the cities of Dalmatia, no less than many of those of Italy, were examples of a type of "state" which is characteristically Mediterranean. It is a common belief—apparently confirmed by the characters of the regions most frequently visited by travellers—that the Mediterranean seaboard is an area of great natural fertility. But this is largely illusion. The regions in which fertile lands occur, and in which the characteristic Mediterranean fruit-trees can be grown with ease, are almost always of very limited extent. More especially where limestone rocks approach the sea—and this is very marked in Dalmatia—there are very few areas capable of supporting a dense population on local produce alone. In consequence, considerable towns could only arise, in the general case, where there is on the one hand easy access to an interior region producing commodities not obtainable near the town, and on the other facilities for sea trade. Where these conditions are satisfied a prosperous community could arise, able to accumulate wealth, and to express itself in art, especially architecture. But such city States were necessarily isolated one from the other, and as inevitably rivals.

The relations of Venice to the Dalmatian towns have been subjected to severe criticism, much of which is justifiable, especially in the later stages of the republic's existence. But when such criticism is used in political argument we have to reply that it is largely irrelevant. Venice was, it is true, always jealous of Zara, and, so far as may be, opposed her trade and prosperity. But to say that Venice oppressed "Dalmatia" is to forget that Zara, Spalato, Ragusa, and so forth were also rivals and enemies.

Again, not only were the cities rivals each of the other, but the geographical conditions made them opposed—not essentially by race or nationality—but by economic interest, sympathy, and mode of administration—to the rural population around. They were not the centres to which that population naturally looked; their own interests lay farther afield. When William of Tyre, in describing the march of Raymond of Toulouse through Dalmatia in 1095–6, contrasts the ferocious Croats, accustomed to robbery and murder, clad like barbarians, living by their flocks and herds, little given to agriculture, and loose in their religion and government, with the civilised peoples of

Zara, Spalato, Antivari, and Ragusa, he was certainly expressing the opinion of the townsfolk.

It should be noted also that the backward condition of the country people is to be ascribed not only to the poverty of the land and the difficulty of combination and communication, but certainly also to malaria, which has always ravaged Dalmatia. It is important not only from the resultant high death-rate, but perhaps even more from the slow sapping of vitality due to early infection. Among the factors which determined town sites in the Mediterranean area generally, it should be noted that freedom from malaria was always important.

It was this double discord, between town and town, and town and country, which made Dalmatia as a whole for long centuries merely a pawn used in the struggle between a land power and a sea power. If within very recent years it has taken on a different aspect, and has displayed a measure of unity, the cause must be ascribed first to the Turkish invasion, which brought new and often vigorous stocks which had fled from the interior, and secondly, and more definitely, to the rise of new centres of culture in the interior, as at Agram and Belgrade, which in attracting both town and country folk alike helped to reconcile old differences. But whether the new Yugoslav State has capital, administrative ability, and scientific knowledge and skill enough to attach Dalmatia permanently to the interior, both by bonds of sympathy and by modern lines of communication, remains to be proved.

To this general account of the country we may add a very brief summary of those points in its history which illustrate the facts upon which stress has been laid above.

Venetian interest in the region dates from the ninth century. Soon after the Slavs had established themselves there arose in the Narenta region what is variously regarded as an incipient State and as a nest of pirates. The Narentines were pagans, and occupied the valley of the Narenta River and the sea-coast, with its islands, from the mouth of the river to Almissa. They attacked Venetian commerce, and were more or less supported by the Dukes of Croatia and the Ragusans. An unsuccessful attempt was made by the Venetians to crush them towards the end of the century, and for a prolonged period Venetian commerce was carried on only by the payment of blackmail. But by the end of the tenth century the growing Dalmatian towns found the attacks of the Croats on land and the Narentines by sea unbearable, and offered allegiance to the Doge as the price of protection. Pietro Orseolo II accepted

the offer, and in 998 conquered the Narentines and assumed the title of Duke of Dalmatia.

During the next hundred years, however, the attention of Venice was largely absorbed elsewhere, and the title of Duke soon lapsed. Towards the end of the eleventh century (cf. p. 165) the Hungarians intervened in Croatia. King Koloman, though crowned King of Croatia and Dalmatia in 1102, did not advance into the latter region till a few years later, when he seized Zara and the other cities, promising, however, to maintain their ancient privileges. This may be regarded as the beginning of a period which lasted more than 300 years—till 1420—during which Venice and Hungary were engaged in an almost continuous struggle for domination in Dalmatia. Zara, especially, was constantly changing rulers, being retaken by the Venetians after its loss in 1105, lost again, and retaken, all within the space of less than a hundred years. It should, however, be noted that Croatian Dalmatia, over which the Hungarians claimed to rule, did not extend beyond the Cetina Valley. Between this river and the territory of Ragusa, much farther to the south, was the area peopled by Serbs, nominally Orthodox but often, as in Bosnia (p. 155), Bogomils, and always inclined to piracy.

In the first half of the thirteenth century the inhabitants of Almissa came again into notice, on account alike of their acts of piracy and of their heresy. Like the Narentines before them the Almissans, partly on account of the encouragement of the enemies of Venice—in this case the Hungarians—continued their activities for more than a hundred years. The point of special interest in this case, however, is that they were finally put down, in 1240, by the armed forces of Spalato, the nearest town. The fact is important because it shows that the Dalmatian towns were growing strong. Their willingness to be attached to Hungary was indeed largely due to the fact that Hungarian rule, if it bore hardly on the rural Croats, interfered but little with the liberties of the cities. Thus, while the art and culture of these cities was strongly under the influence of Venice, they showed generally at this time a preference for the rule of the more distant Hungarian as against the powerful rival across the sea.

The acquiescence of the maritime cities in Venetian rule, from 1420 onwards, on the other hand, is to be ascribed to the Turkish invasion and the resultant Hungarian collapse. By 1540 the Turks had made themselves masters of the whole of the interior of Dalmatia; only the maritime cities remained

to Venice, and formed an important part of the barrier which kept the Moslem from Italy. From this time dates apparently the presence in the cities, even in those which seem most markedly Latin in appearance, of great numbers of Slavs, who had fled from the Turks. Many of these Slavs are now bilingual, but the women generally speak only Croat, and in most of the towns Italian became the domestic language only of the educated classes. In other words, from the fifteenth century onwards, urban life gradually ceased to involve necessarily the loss of Slav speech and customs.

But not all the fugitives found a refuge in the towns. The garrison of the town of Clissa, which fell to the Pasha of Bosnia in 1536, was permitted to settle at Segna (Zengg), on the coast of Croatia, opposite the island of Veglia. It consisted chiefly of Uskoks, or refugees from the interior, and its members speedily acquired the habit of piracy, outrivalling the Narentines and Almissans of earlier days. They attacked the shipping alike of Venetians and Turks, but, since the former were responsible for the safety of the Adriatic, the Turks blamed them for the depredations of the Uskoks. There was, therefore, a fresh outbreak of war between the two Powers, and even after the peace of 1573 the activities of the Uskoks, who were more or less openly encouraged by the Emperor Ferdinand and had their numbers increased by refugees and outlaws of all nations, continued to be a menace to peace. Eventually war broke out between Venice and Austria over the question, which was settled at the peace of Madrid in 1617, when the Uskoks were removed into the interior of Croatia.

But if this particular problem was thus settled, piracy was not exterminated, and the Turks declared war against Venice again in 1714, partly on account of the alleged failure of the republic to put it down.

By the peace of Passarowitz, however, in 1718, the republic of Venice was confirmed in the possession of the whole of Dalmatia, except for the territory of the republic of Ragusa, which now extended to Klek on the Canal of Narenta.

Venetian it remained till the fall of the republic in 1797, when it was ceded to Austria, and, after a brief interval, was temporarily included in Napoleon's short-lived kingdom of Italy. Of its subsequent inclusion in the Illyrian Provinces we have already spoken. One minor incident of these years of conflict is, however, worth a passing mention. In 1808 the British fleet established a station at Lissa, and this island was regularly occupied in 1812, that of Curzola in 1813, and later

that of Lagosta. All three islands were handed over to Austria in 1815, but Lissa became temporarily an important centre of trade. The goods of the rapidly growing factories of Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham were stored here, smuggled across the Dalmatian frontier into Bosnia and so into Central Europe. In three years the population of Lissa increased threefold, and the enormous profits obtained offer some support to the views of those who hold that Spalato is destined, with proper railway communication, to become a great centre of trade through which goods may reach the interior.

Of the history of Dalmatia since 1815 nothing need be added to what has been said under Croatia. Austrian rule has done little for the country; fear of the South Slavs has prevented even the most necessary railway lines from being constructed, and the country as a whole is poor and backward.

CHAPTER IV

THE SLOVENE LANDS

WE have already seen (p. 148) that the name Slovenia is sometimes applied to the whole or parts of the area inhabited predominantly by Slovenes. But it is important to bear in mind that historically there has never yet been a Slovenia, and till at least the early part of the nineteenth century we can scarcely say that the Slovenes, as a political grouping, appear in the pages of history—certainly not within the period we have to consider here.

In the seventh century there was a Czecho-Slovene kingdom under Samo; for in their first origin the Slovenes are more nearly related to the Czechs than to the South Slavs proper. But Samo's kingdom was short-lived, and the continuity between Czech and Slovene was thus soon broken. In 952 there was created the Great Duchy of Carantania, which served as a march to protect the German lands from the Magyars. This Duchy underwent many complicated changes, and though at its inception it included most of the Slovenes, and was thus in a sense a "Slovenia," by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Slovene lands had fallen under the rule of the Habsburgs, who remained in power until the Armistice. During this period of some 600 years germanisation made great progress, and had it not been for the Turkish invasion of Europe and the resultant movements of South Slav peoples, with, later, the rise of South Slav States in the Balkans, it seems probable that the Germans of the Alpine districts would have absorbed the Slovenes without great difficulty.

In early times the Catholic Church was a great germanising agent. The Slovenes, who with rare exceptions are Catholics, were converted to Christianity by German clergy. The original Slovene aristocracy was absorbed or ousted by the Germans in the early Middle Ages, and for long the Slovenes were only poor and depressed peasants, using a more or less

corrupt and germanised idiom, and without a written language or a literature.

During the course of their dark ages, however, there were some signs that a spirit of independence was not wholly extinct. One of these, upon which Slovene writers lay some stress, is the curious ceremony, which persisted down to the fifteenth century, whereby the Duke of Carinthia (Kärnthen) at his investiture received his authority from the hands of a free-born peasant. Carinthia was formed out of a part of the Duchy of Carantania, and the ceremony took place near Klagenfurt, the Coronation Stone being said to exist still. The chosen peasant took his seat upon this stone, and to him the Duke-elect advanced, being clad in peasant's costume, and having a staff in one hand, while leading a horse and an ox with the other. He was questioned by the peasant, and was required to promise to maintain the Slovene language and institutions, as well as to rule justly, before being permitted to take his seat on the stone in his turn. It would appear, however, that the Slovene language had lost its legal status before this ceremony was abolished.

Of more real importance were the effects of the Reformation, for the sixteenth century saw both the rise of a definite national feeling among the Slovenes, and at least a dawn of community of interest with the South Slavs. It was only natural, considering the contiguity with German-speaking peoples, that the Reformed doctrines should obtain a considerable measure of popularity among the Slovenes, and their spread was accompanied by a national literary movement. Primož Trubar (1508-86), a native of Carniola (Krain), preached the new doctrine in Slovene, and, after being exiled to Germany for his heresy, translated the New Testament into that language, and also published various religious works. This led to a general study of the language, and the publication of a grammar and a dictionary. The movement was not confined to the Slovenes, for Croats and Serbs from Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria, and Serbia gathered round Trubar, and the Reform made a certain amount of progress in Croatia. As in Germany, the movement soon took on a political and economic character, and in 1573 Slovene and Croat peasants rose against their lords under the leadership of the peasant "king" Matija Gubac. Their demands included both a share in administration and an improvement of their position as regards their relations to the landowners. The insurrection was suppressed with much severity, but the memory of it persists to this day. According to the peasant tradition Matija Gubac and his army were not annihilated; they lie

buried beneath two mountains which closed around them. Here the chiefs, with the "king" at their head, sit round a massive stone table. The king's long beard is slowly growing round the table, and when it shall have enveloped it for the ninth time the mountains will burst asunder, he and his army will awake, and the reign of liberty will dawn for the peasants.

The dawn was long delayed, however, for the Catholic Church, as in Bohemia, triumphed completely at the Counter-Reformation. The Protestant books in Slovene were burnt, and the use of the language was discouraged. It did not revive till the very end of the eighteenth century, when the first Slovene newspaper was founded at Laibach in 1797. This was due, indirectly at least, to French influence, for it was part of the Romantic movement, which was strongly stimulated by the doctrines of the French Revolution. The leader of the movement was Cojz, or Zojs, a wealthy mine-owner and mineralogist, who was in constant communication with French scientists. Cojz gathered round him a group of enthusiasts, including Vodnik (1758-1819), a priest from Carniola, who was editor of the paper just mentioned, and later organised public instruction under the French régime in the Illyrian provinces.

The establishment of these provinces (cf. p. 168), which included all the Slovene lands except South Styria and Slovene Hungary, was of importance from two points of view. In the first place the union of most of the Slovenes under an enlightened and progressive administration promoted national feeling. Again, in that Slovenes and Serbo-Croats were combined, the way was prepared for South Slav unity. After the restoration of the provinces to Austria in 1815 there existed, in theory at least, an Austrian kingdom of Illyria which did not finally disappear till 1849. Long before this, however, the restoration of the Provincial Diets meant that the Slovenes were distributed among different provinces, in such a fashion as to render combined action practically impossible.

Between 1815 and 1848, indeed, such history as the Slovenes as a unit may be said to have had was literary and linguistic rather than political. Further, it interested the small, though rising, intellectual class rather than the bulk of the people, and the intellectuals themselves were divided in their aims. One group, with some vague perception that the future centre of gravity of the South Slavs must lie to the south-east rather than to the north, wished to adopt the new Serbo-Croat literary language, and, consciously or not, to work for a union of the South Slavs. The other group felt that the immediate need

was to preserve a sense of national unity as against German and Italian pressure, and feared that the neglect of the Slovene idiom might lead to an increasing divorce between the mass of the people and those who aspired to be their leaders. The fact that the peasants, who formed the great mass of the people, were much more concerned with economic than with political problems must not be forgotten. Their apathy, which lasted probably till the end of the nineteenth century, helps to explain the fact that the Slovene claims put forward in the year 1848 were formulated in Vienna, and not in the Slovene lands at all.

In that year the Slav Committee of the Congress of Prague put forward a claim for the foundation of a Kingdom of Slovenia, on the basis of a demand formulated by "Slovenija," a Slovene society founded at Vienna. This seems to be the first appearance, in modern times at least, of the word Slovenia. So little also did "Slovenija" represent the mass of the Slovenes that various other conflicting demands were put forward by Slovene representatives during this year of trouble. In point of fact the Slovenes gained no political advantage from 1848, though the emancipation of the peasants brought marked economic improvement, and a middle class began to grow important.

There is little to record in Slovene history between 1848 and the time of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which was exceedingly unpopular with the Slovenes, who perceived that it meant handing them over to the Germans. In 1868-9 there were fresh demands for the establishment of a Kingdom of Slovenia, which, as might be expected, led to nothing.

Thereafter there began the period of acute germanisation, for after 1871 the Pan-German movement became powerful, and the Pan-Germans saw in the Slovene lands an obstacle to the German advance to the Adriatic.

Within the Slovene lands the resistance to germanisation took forms quite similar to those adopted in Bohemia, the Czechs having always exerted a considerable amount of influence over the Slovenes. Thus, Slovene schools were founded in opposition to the German schools, and associations for furnishing cheap loans or credits were started in opposition to similar German organisations. As to the ultimate political aims at this time there is much uncertainty, though it is generally admitted that widespread enthusiasm for the idea of a great South Slav State is of very recent growth among the Slovenes. Till the war open support of this conception was

of course impossible, and even the acceptance of the Trialist solution by a majority of the Slovenes was perhaps doubtful till just before the war. The powerful clerical party, which dreaded association with the Orthodox Serbs, was strongly opposed to a union of South Slavs, whether within the Monarchy or on a broader basis. But the Balkan wars and the resultant enlargement of Serbia, combined with the Concordat of 1914, led to an acceptance of the idea of South Slav unity on the part of the majority.

CHAPTER V

THE YUGOSLAV LANDS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM 1914 TO THE PACT OF CORFU (1917)

THE history of the Yugoslavs during the war may be said to fall into two main divisions, the period prior to the year 1917, and that between this year of change and Austria's acceptance of the Allies' armistice terms on November 3, 1918. The two great events of the year 1917, from this point of view, were the Russian revolutions, with the resultant collapse of that Empire as a military and political Power, and the entry of the United States into the war. Of minor and yet considerable importance are two other incidents of the year, the Italian disaster at Caporetto, which led to a marked, even if not wholly permanent, change in the Italian attitude towards Adriatic problems, and the meeting of the Austrian Parliament after a lapse of nearly three years. The latter event, which made it possible for the first time since 1914 for the Serbo-Croats within the Monarchy to express themselves openly, was associated with a certain relaxation of the régime to which they had been subjected since the Sarajevo tragedy, and was due partly to the changes in Russia and partly to the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph, which occurred at the end of 1916; for his successor naturally wished to ingratiate himself with his subjects.

Speaking quite broadly, we may say that the great contrast between the two periods was that before 1917 Britain and France, whether judged by the mass of public opinion—and this despite a very energetic minority—or by the statements of their elected representatives, tended to regard the future settlement of South-Eastern Europe as primarily a Russian problem. After 1917 it became increasingly clear that the problem would have to be faced by the Western Powers. We may put the matter in another way by saying that before 1917 the Western nations were by no means certain that the disrupt-

tion of Austria-Hungary, as a result of the war, was either inevitable or even desirable. After 1917 the inevitability of the break-up became steadily clearer.

It will be noted that in both the statements made above stress is laid rather upon the attitude of the Powers than upon that of the South Slavs themselves. At first sight this may seem to be a very anomalous position to take up in dealing with the history of this people. In point of fact, however, it can hardly be too much emphasised that the political conditions within the Monarchy were such that the South Slavs were unable, till nearly the end of the war, to make their desires felt. Further, it is not wholly clear that, at least in the early days of the war, the desire to be united with Serbia in a great South Slav State was widespread. We have already indicated that in some parts certainly of the territories concerned the conception, even as an ideal, had only obtained popularity, and then limited popularity, from the time of the Balkan wars, and the interval between these wars and the assassinations at Sarajevo was short.

That the dominant party in Austria-Hungary was well aware of the psychological effect on the Slavs of the Monarchy of the proof which those wars afforded that Serbia had become a Power to be reckoned with, even from the military standpoint, is clear. There is no doubt therefore that that party entered the war with the intention, firstly, of crushing Serbia as the representative of the South Slavs outside the Monarchy, and, secondly, of subduing the rising tide of national feeling among the Slavs within. It was inevitable, therefore, that the military party should signalise the entry of the Monarchy into the war by ruthless oppression of all South Slavs suspected of cherishing, or of being likely to cherish, feelings of sympathy for Serbia. This meant that the weight of their displeasure fell most heavily first upon all political leaders who had before the war expressed in various forms South Slav sympathies, and secondly upon all "Serbs," i.e. South Slavs belonging to the Orthodox Church, in general. To the dispassionate historian it may well seem that this policy had many elements of danger and that its only chance of success lay in an immediate crushing of Serbia, without hope of resurrection, followed by a speedy and complete reversal of home policy. Even so, the fact, brought out by experience, that it is much easier to begin a régime of oppression than to bring it to a close made the policy a risky one. In point of fact, it would seem that the immediate result of the official policy was to strengthen very greatly the

Yugoslav movement. Too much blood was shed to render a reconciliation within the Monarchy possible, and the repression convinced the Western Powers—slowly and unwillingly—that the position of the South Slavs within it was not a domestic problem, but an international one. Thus, the half-hearted and tentative efforts made both within and without to find an internal solution during the later part of the war came to nothing.

In appreciating the first effects of the policy of repression one has to bear in mind the nature of the Austro-Hungarian land frontiers, and the political conditions of the time. Bosnia-Hercegovina marched with Serbia and Montenegro, and within the province Serbs (i.e. Orthodox Slavs) were in a majority. Southern Dalmatia, in which many Orthodox Slavs occur, marched with Montenegro, and Montenegro had a short stretch of coast-line, with ports of her own. The Coastland Province, with its mingling of Italians and Slovenes, had a land frontier with Italy, and Italy was at first neutral. Orthodox South Slavs could therefore either escape into Serbia and Montenegro and take a direct part in the fighting against Austria-Hungary, or, in common with Catholic Croats and Slovenes, could escape from the country westwards, if their political opinions rendered such a course advisable. The refugees, Catholic and Orthodox alike, played a very important part later in the struggle for South Slav unity.

Again, from the Austro-Hungarian point of view, rigorous oppression was at once easiest and most necessary in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which in point of fact was subjected to an absolutist régime practically for the whole period. But the fury of the oppression tended to strengthen Serbian sympathies, which, as we have seen, were before the war probably rather lukewarm. That the military officers and men who committed the worst cruelties were German-speaking, and that during the war efforts were made to impose the German speech upon the people, made the official policy especially dangerous and short-sighted.

No good purpose would be served by detailing the various acts of cruelty committed in Bosnia, more especially since there has not yet been time for the reports of these to be subjected to a detailed and impartial analysis. But a brief summary of official acts, with notes on the popular response to these, is necessary to show the trend of events.

In the first place, it has to be borne in mind that the ostensible cause of the war was the assassinations of Sarajevo, and that

the Austro-Hungarian position was that those crimes were due to the instigation of the Serbian Government, and that many of the Bosnian Serbs were in sympathy or direct communication with that Government. Since the Bosnian Serbs formed the majority of the population, the tendency was to regard the inhabitants generally as actual or potential rebels. Thus the Diet was dissolved, and the Military Governor was empowered to appoint an Administrative Council to take its place. Wholesale executions, arrests, and internments occurred. The families of males who had fled into Serbia or Montenegro, after being rendered destitute by the confiscation of the family effects, were deported into Serbia or Montenegro. Requisitions, both of men and material, were carried out with such rigour that the country was rapidly reduced to a condition of widespread poverty, soon becoming starvation. Such actions were not likely to arouse enthusiasm for the Austro-Hungarian cause among the levies. Surrenders and desertions indeed became so frequent that the Austro-Hungarian authorities announced that all those caught in the act would be hanged without trial, while the relatives of those not caught, especially their wives and children, would pay the penalty. Long after this decree, however, in September 1917, we find that an entire Bosnian regiment, with all its officers at its head, surrendered to the Russians at Jassy, and desired to be incorporated in the Yugoslav Volunteer Corps formed in Russia. This regiment had twice previously deserted, and had been twice reconstituted.

It is obvious that even the Emperor Charles's much-advertised amnesty of 1917—which, so far as the inhabitants of Bosnia were concerned, was of very limited extent—could not wipe out such a past as this brief account suggests. We find, indeed, that even those who were most reluctant to contemplate a complete disruption of Austria-Hungary were fain to admit that a union at least of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia was bound to come if that country rose again after her defeat.

It is not possible to consider in detail here the history of Austro-Hungarian relations to all the areas inhabited by South Slavs during the war period. But to this account of Bosnia-Herzegovina we may add a few words in regard to Slovene lands where, by a curious decree of fate, a less arbitrary and oppressive policy had a quite similar effect in stimulating anti-Austrian feeling.

That the Austrians could not adopt towards the Slovenes the attitude taken by the Monarchy as a whole in Bosnia-Herce-

govina, and, to a somewhat less marked extent, that adopted by the Magyars in Croatia, becomes obvious when one looks at the political conditions. In Austria, as we have seen, Slovenes were represented in six Diets, three in the Coastland Province, together with those of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. Only in the last and in Gorizia-Gradisca in the Coastland were they in a majority; in Styria and Carinthia they were outnumbered by Germans, in the Diet of Trieste by Italians, while in the Diet of Istria the Italians held half the seats, the Slovenes and Serbo-Croats holding the other half. This division of the Slovenes, among separate administrative units, which was a marked disadvantage to them in the pre-war period, was useful during the war; for no general repressive measures could be put in force in either Styria or Carinthia without risk to the German majority, while even in Carniola the small German minority had to be considered. After the entry of Italy into the war Istria, it is true, came off badly, the three chief elements in its population, Slovenes, Italians and Serbo-Croats, being alike regarded with distrust by the authorities.

Again, apart altogether from the presence of Germans, the Italian element on the western front of Austria made it necessary to handle the Slovenes cautiously. The passionate Italian desire for Trieste was well known. Austria's great hope of maintaining the *status quo* lay in inflaming the feelings of Austrian Slavs on the one hand and Austrian Italians on the other to such an extent as to appear to make a readjustment of territory impossible. Rigorous oppression of the Slovenes as a whole was thus against her interest.

Let us note next what actually happened. Before the outbreak of the war there was, as we have seen, a growing, but not yet large, Slovene professional class, largely restless and dissatisfied, and holding more or less definite forms of the Yugoslav creed. Austro-Hungarian apologists assert, probably with a measure of truth, that the restlessness of this class was due to the fact that its members had just arisen from the ranks of the peasants, and were unable, under the existing régime, to find opportunities and openings. Such apologists state that the desire of these to see the foundation, in one form or another, of a South Slav State was due to the hope of obtaining position and advancement within it. Unfortunately, however, the dominant party was devoid of that practical political sense which is expressed in the familiar statement that the only way of treating a confirmed and skilful poacher is to make him a gamekeeper. In other words, they failed to recognise that

the attitude of the Slovene intellectuals was inevitable and had to be allowed for by a prudent administration.

In consequence, at the outbreak of war, such of the Slovene suspected leaders as were unable to make their escape were arrested, even when no charge could be formulated against them, and detained in prison for months. There had been hitherto, as we have already suggested, an element of doubt as to the extent to which these leaders represented the mass of the people. But the fact that they were thus chosen to suffer vicariously, in expiation of the possible sins of their fellows, seems to have produced a marked reaction in their favour, and to have led to an increased spread of the doctrines they were supposed to hold. Further, since, for the reasons already given, the censorship of the Press and of free speech was less rigorous than in the other South Slav areas, the feelings aroused by the régime of oppression, arbitrarily suppressed there, found an outlet in the Slovene journals.

The net result was that by 1917 the German-Austrian press admitted that Yugoslav propaganda had "penetrated to every peasant's hut," while even more dangerous, from the official point of view, was the admission by a pan-German deputy in the Reichsrat, in October of that year, "that the Slovene clergy, both high and low, is taking part with Orthodox Serbdom and against the Germans, who are of the same faith as themselves." In other words, the Slovene clericals, previously uncompromising opponents of Yugoslav ideals, had been converted under the stress of war conditions.

Of Croatia it may be sufficient to say that the treatment meted out to the inhabitants was such as to inflame the fear and distrust of Magyar aims which had been in existence long before, and thus to propagate the desire to unite with other South Slavs, within or without the Monarchy, as the only means of escape from Magyar oppression. From the early part of the war the lands of those who had fled the country or been executed for high treason were confiscated, and advantage was also taken of the necessitous conditions of the families of soldiers sent to the front to induce them to mortgage or sell their farms and property. The general belief was that these measures were intended to promote Magyar colonisation on a large scale after the war, and they tended to exasperate further wounded national feeling.

Turning next to the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs outside the Monarchy, and their activities during the period under consideration, we find that they fall into two groups. In the first

place, owing in part to the natural poverty of some of the South Slav lands, and in part to the deliberate economic policy of the Germans and Magyars, some of these lands had before the war been areas of intensive emigration. There were thus large South Slav communities in the Americas, in Australia, and elsewhere. These communities furnished volunteers both for actual fighting in the field and for the making of munitions in neutral and allied countries, and also supplied the second group, that of the war refugees, with extensive funds for propagandist purposes. These refugees established themselves first in Rome and later in London, and founded a Southern Slav Committee which carried on a very energetic, though it must be admitted not always judicious, campaign, with powerful support from British sympathisers.

The position of this Committee was a difficult one. Its members, who included Serbo-Croats from Dalmatia, Croatia, and Bosnia, as well as Slovenes, were technically enemy aliens. In so far as their propagandist work was likely, through their relations with their fellow-nationals left within Austrian territory, to be a source of weakness to that country, it was to the interest of the British Government to allow it to go on. It was, however, quite impossible, under the given conditions, that the views of its members could be accepted as those of the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs; in other words, there was no proof that they were the representatives of these. Thus, no official notice could be taken of the Committee's activities, and no direct communication could be carried on with them. Since the Committee thus consisted, from the Government point of view, merely of a group of political refugees permitted to reside in this country, their publications and manifestos were statements of individual opinion only, binding no one but themselves. They tended, like many similar bands of refugees before, to take individual expressions of sympathy with their cause more seriously than the facts warranted, and were not infrequently guilty of indiscretions which could not have been tolerated if they had been recognised as official representatives.

This was especially the case in regard to their demands upon areas to which it was known that Italy made a claim. During the early part of the war, indeed, their demands in this respect aroused a considerable amount of feeling, both among Italians and Italian sympathisers. Since at this time the terms of the Treaty of London, signed April 26, 1915, by France, Britain, and Russia, were not known generally, Italian official tolerance of their vigorous propaganda gave rise to some surprise. It

was obvious afterwards that with this document in its pocket the Italian Government could afford to take no notice of the activities of the Committee. But there can be no doubt that they helped to make a reasonable settlement later more difficult.

In the negotiations which preceded the Treaty of London, Russia, in her capacity as protector of the extra-Russian Slavs, would appear to have taken the predominant part. It is significant that not only was Serbia apparently not consulted, but that the terms of the Treaty were not, it would seem, communicated either to her or to Montenegro.

In regard to the Russian standpoint it is to be noted that, in the first weeks of the war, there appeared in the *Contemporary Review* of Petrograd, an article by M. Alexandre Bashmakov, under the title of "What we want," which was believed to represent more or less precisely the Russian view then. In this article the author claimed that Bosnia and Slavonia, together with the Banat and Bačka in Hungary, should be incorporated with Serbia. To Montenegro should go, he said, Hercegovina, the Bocche di Cattaro, and part of Southern Dalmatia, e.g. as far as Stagno, on the peninsula of Sabbioncello. Croatia, with both Agram and Fiume, should form a separate State, unless its people, in a Constituent Assembly, should declare for union with the Kingdom of Serbia. Finally, Carniola, with the southern part of Carinthia, should form a Slovene State, with its capital at Laibach, unless its people preferred to be united with Croatia.

Since this scheme (as summarised by Vellay, see below) says nothing of Istria, the presumption is that Italy's claims to the peninsula were either recognised or that it was supposed that both Trieste and Istria would remain Austrian. From the Italian point of view, apart from any other, the scheme had the obvious disadvantage that it envisaged the existence of four small South Slav States, all of which would be more or less definitely under Russian protection. While leaving the fate of the greater part of Dalmatia vague also, it gave to Croatia and Montenegro excellent ports in Fiume and the Bocche. If these ports were to be open to Russian ships of war, there was an obvious menace to Italy.

The next stage is the actual negotiations between Russia and Italy, believed to have continued from October 1914 to April 1915. Italy had in the meantime occupied Valona (Oct. 25, 1914) as a measure of precaution. The final stage in the negotiations, as published at the time,¹ was Russia's proposals

¹ See *La Question de l'Adriatique*, par Charles Vellay, Paris, 1915.

that Italy should receive, in addition to Gorizia-Gradisca and Trieste, the western half of Istria (including Pola), extending to the mouth of the Arsa River. On the other hand, a new independent Croatia, formed of Croatia-Slavonia, the greater part of Carniola, the Slovene areas of Styria and Carinthia, was to have attached to it Eastern Istria, the port of Fiume, and the Dalmatian coast-line as far as the mouth of the Narenta. The coast-line south-east of the mouth of the Narenta, in addition to Bosnia-Hercegovina, was to go to Serbia, on the assumption, apparently, that Serbia and Montenegro would unite.

These proposals were followed by an outcry in Italy, on the ground, suggested above, that the two small Slav States contemplated would mean in point of fact the appearance of Russia on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. The Italian reply, which may not have been meant altogether seriously, was a demand for Fiume in addition to Trieste and Pola, for the Dalmatian coast-line from the mouth of the Zermagna (due east of Zara) to the Narenta Valley—that is, for all the important Dalmatian ports except those of the south, as well as all the Dalmatian islands, in regard to which Russia had suggested a compromise.

The Secret Treaty, published by the Bolsheviki after the second Russian Revolution in the autumn of 1917, showed that the actual arrangement made was somewhat less extreme on the Italian side. It assigned to Italy the whole of Istria, east as well as west, and the outer row of the Quarnero Islands, i.e. Cherso, Lussin, and the small islands; but Fiume, also Veglia and Arbe, with the smaller islands between, were left to Croatia. The claim to Dalmatia was so far modified as to make the southern limit of Italian territory a line starting from Cape Planka, between Trau and Sebenico, which left Salona and Spalato, as well as the southern ports, to Serbia and Montenegro. A long series of Dalmatian islands was claimed, and there were other provisions in regard to neutralisation which would have been very burdensome.

From our point of view here, the interest of this Treaty of London is that it shows that in 1915 Imperial Russia, as the most interested party, was by no means sure that the war would bring in its train the foundation of a new great Yugoslav State. Neither in Britain nor in France did general public opinion regard Austro-Hungarian problems at this time as of prime importance, nor was the feeling against the Monarchy very strong. Naturally, therefore, more especially since it was clear that it was impossible that Italy could remain permanently neutral, neither Government was prepared to enlarge its war

aims to an extent which made the adhesion of that country to their cause doubtful. No one of the three Powers, therefore, objected to Italy taking out what was virtually an almost unlimited insurance policy against a wholly uncertain future.

During all the early years of the war active propaganda was carried on in Italy to popularise the Italian claim to Dalmatia. On the other hand the Yugoslav Committee, in the course of its propaganda, distributed widely a map showing, *inter alia*, a line described as the "northern boundary of Yugoslav territory," which included in this territory not only the whole of Istria, Trieste, and Gorizia-Gradisca, but actually projected westwards over the pre-war Italian boundary, apparently implying a claim to Italian territory. When one remembers that Italy was by this time fighting desperately against Austria-Hungary, of which Monarchy the Yugoslavs of the Committee were subjects, it has to be admitted that its members were displaying an imperfect realisation of facts.

Again, while for long it seemed as if the most vocal section in Italy was also making extravagant claims, there were not wanting, even in early days, signs that a moderate party existed. Thus, Prezzolini's *Dalmazia* (v. p. 283) was published in its Italian version in June 1915, and in it the author disclaims with much vigour any demand for Dalmatia, except for Zara, on account of sentimental reasons, and a few islands, including Lissa, for strategic reasons. A very similar standpoint was adopted by Prof. Salvemini in an article published in an English review in the early part of 1918, when the question was becoming urgent practical politics; and since, with minor differences, it was also the basis of the 1920 settlement, we may assume that a moderate party always existed in Italy, even if the extremists on both sides were most in evidence.

This summary account shows that, up till the year 1917, no Great Power in the Allied Group had manifested any particular desire to assist in the founding of a Yugoslavia which should include both the South Slavs within and without the Monarchy. The fact that Russia, the party most interested, had appeared to prefer to work for two or more Yugoslav States, rather than one large one, also prevented any close co-operation between the Yugoslav Committee, the only body able to speak for the Austro-Hungarian group, and the Serbian Government, as representing Serbia.

This situation was however shortly to be changed. For in the eventful year 1917 we find that the immediate consequence of the Russian Revolution, from our standpoint here, was that

closer co-operation for the first time became possible. This was shown by the drafting of the Pact of Corfu, which was signed there on July 20, 1917, by M. Pašić, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the exiled Government of Serbia, and by Dr. Trumbić, formerly deputy for Zara in the Reichsrat, and now president of the Yugoslav Committee, on behalf of that body.

The Pact was a somewhat lengthy document, and need not be recorded in full here.¹ It may be sufficient to state that, in the words of the Handbook, it "provided for the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in a single free and independent kingdom, on a constitutional and democratic basis, under the Karageorgević dynasty. Local autonomy, the free exercise of religions, and the maintenance of the two alphabets were guaranteed" (p. 28). We may add that the two alphabets named were of course the Latin and the Cyrillic, and that the Pact also provided for the unification of the calendar. In regard to the territorial question the document contained generalities only, but it stated that the Yugoslav nation "consciously and firmly refuses every partial solution of the problems of its national liberation and unification." Montenegro was not officially represented at the Conference, but article 9 of the Pact put forward as an aim the union of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Yugoslav lands of Austria-Hungary "in a single State forming an indivisible whole."

This Pact was the first clear and definite statement of a desire to form a combined kingdom of the three peoples which gave an indication of the basis of union. Since, however, at the time when it was signed the Serbian people had still to be restored to their own lands, and the Yugoslav Committee could scarcely be legitimately recognised as representing the 7,000,000 South Slavs of Austria-Hungary, it was then rather of importance in its reflex effect on other parties than in itself.

Here we may break off the story of the "Former Austro-Hungarian Lands." The remainder of their history is merged in the following pages describing the Yugoslav Movement and its development up to date.

¹ It will be found in the Appendix to No. 14 of the Handbooks published under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office (*The Yugoslav Movement*).

PART IV . THE
YUGOSLAV MOVEMENT

[In dealing with the Yugoslav Movement as a whole, a certain amount of recapitulation of portions of the histories of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Former Austro-Hungarian Lands, already recounted in previous pages, has been inevitable. The following chapters, however, give a concise account of the movement and its development to the present day, without trenching more than is absolutely necessary on material already presented.—ED.]

CHAPTER I

THE YUGOSLAV RACE

THE name "Yugoslav" (Southern Slav), which has come into common usage during the European War, denotes collectively those branches of the Slavonic race which are separated from the remainder by a broad belt of Germans, Magyars, and Romanians. In the full sense of the word it covers not only the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who to-day form almost the whole population of Yugoslavia, but also the Bulgars, whose language is of Slavonic origin, and who are bound to the Slavonic world by ties of race and religion. The Bulgars, however, possess a considerable admixture of Finno-Ugrian blood, and the events of the past forty years have emphasised their differences from, rather than their solidarity with, the rest of the Yugoslavs. If, therefore, it must still be borne in mind that a complete union of the Yugoslavs would include the Bulgars, it will here be assumed that the Yugoslavs are the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

These three peoples inhabit a continuous block of territory bounded, roughly speaking, by the Adriatic on the west, the rivers Drava and Danube on the north, and the frontier of Bulgaria on the east. To the south the race shades off among the Albanians, Bulgars, and Greeks in the centre of the Balkan peninsula. Along the borders of this territory there are almost everywhere areas of mixed population, where the drawing of an ethnically just boundary is extremely difficult, particularly in the north, where the Yugoslavs extend beyond the Danube and Drava, and to the north-west, where their claims conflict with those of the Italians and the Germans. But within the limits mentioned the Yugoslavs form a population united by language and to some extent by a common tradition and folklore.

The Yugoslavs are an instance of the immense strength of language in the formation of modern States; for they are divided into three religious confessions and have always, until

1919, been subjected to a number of different political governments. Thus, at the opening of the sixteenth century nearly the whole of the Serbs were engulfed in the Turkish Empire, Croatia was united to Hungary by a personal bond in the common monarch of the two countries, the Serbo-Croats of the Dalmatian towns were either subjects of Venice or free citizens of the Republic of Ragusa, the Slovenes owed allegiance to the house of Habsburg, while the Serbs of Montenegro and other refugees from the Ottoman conquest maintained themselves in a precarious independence in the mountains and on the seas. Four centuries later, in the year 1910, although the majority of Yugoslavs owed allegiance to the Habsburg Emperor, they were almost as divided as ever. Serbia and Montenegro had grown into independent kingdoms. Croatia, though theoretically a sister-kingdom to Hungary, was in practice subjected to the government of Budapest, while the Serbs north of the Danube did not even enjoy Croatia's measure of Home Rule. The Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy contained the Slovenes, a few thousands of whom were to be found in Italy and in Hungary, and the Serbo-Croats of Istria and Dalmatia. In Bosnia-Hercegovina a solid Yugoslav population was under joint Austrian and Hungarian administration. Lastly, the Turkish Empire in Europe still contained the Serbs of "old Serbia" and Macedonia.

Further, in religion the Slovene lands are Catholic, while Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serbs north of the Danube are solidly Orthodox. Elsewhere the two Churches are intermingled and form the real difference between Croats and Serbs, the Croats being Catholic and the Serbs, with insignificant exceptions, Orthodox. In Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia the position is complicated by the presence of Moslems, who form about one-third of the population and retain a Turkish atmosphere of the past. The Serbo-Croat, Orthodox-Catholic line of demarcation is further emphasised by a difference of alphabets, the Serbs using the Cyrillic (a development of Greek) characters and the Croats the Latin with accents upon certain consonants. Both alphabets are, however, equally familiar to the educated Serb, and both are fairly generally taught in the primary schools of the Orthodox districts.¹

These differences of religious confession and political orientation have inevitably resulted in wide differences of social culture. The Slovenes have for a thousand years shared the fortunes of the Italo-Germanic civilisation of Central Europe, as subjects

¹ The tendency at present is to spread the Cyrillic alphabet over all Yugoslavia.

of the Holy Roman Empire and of its more restricted successor, the Habsburg Monarchy. Although their nationality was obscured from view by their subjection to German rulers, it was strong enough to preserve their Slavonic speech and their race consciousness intact to the present day. But, like the Czechs, they have learned from their German masters. Before the war all large industrial undertakings were in the hands of Germans. Yet the Slovenes were fighting their way towards economic freedom. Secure in the possession of most of the land, divided into small farms, they were building up a rapidly increasing number of small industries. In 1910 they had 1,267 co-operative societies with assets amounting to 365,000,000 kronen of invested capital. This co-operative movement was followed by a development of banking, with the assistance of Czech firms. Thus, the Slovene "Adriatic Bank" became the leading local bank of Trieste, in successful competition with the Italian houses. The educational advantages offered by Austria enabled the Slovenes to reduce their illiterates to 15 per cent. by 1910. Slovenes were forcing their way into the learned professions, and so forming a middle class in close touch with the peasants from whom it had originated. For political ends the little nation was well organised and returned a solid nationalist group of members to the Reichsrat under the leadership usually of a priest. Thus, the characteristic notes of the Slovenes are those of a western democratic people, middle-class, industrious, efficient, rather dour and hardened by economic warfare with the German and the Italian.

The Croats present a different appearance. Attached to the west by their religious dependence upon Rome, they have stood for centuries on the frontier of east and west, their preoccupation being resistance to the Turkish invaders. Proud of their mediæval independence, when Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia formed "the Triune Kingdom," they have never technically been subjected to an alien allegiance. But their nobles offered the crown in 1102 to the King of Hungary, and in practice the two crowns have been united ever since. The necessities of war with the Turks caused them, like the Magyars, to elect a Habsburg king in 1527, and countless campaigns in the Imperial service against the Moslem bred a devotion to their Catholic monarch at Vienna. It used to be said before the war that, amidst the welter of nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy, the only "true Austrians" were the Croats, a character largely earned by their preference for Vienna as against their immediate superiors at Budapest.

Socially the Croats enjoyed the same structure as any other conservative society of Central Europe. The upper class of landed gentry was rather international and Catholic than national in its sympathies. Most of the population were employed in agriculture. The industry and commerce of the towns were largely in the hands of Jews or Germans, the Croat, from prince to peasant, having the manners and prejudices of a *grand seigneur*. Yet even amongst the Croats and Slavonians the modern spirit of nationalism and economic progress had begun in the nineteenth century to weaken the feudal and military character of the people. The Parliament at Zagreb came to contain only members representing middle-class, nationalist parties. Industry was developing at Zagreb, Eszek, and a few other centres, while the years just before the war saw a large increase in the Croatian capital sunk in the commerce of Fiume.

Long subjection to the Turks and the oriental origin of their Christianity have severed the Serbs from Western civilisation. The extinction of their aristocracy (except in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where it largely turned Moslem and so retained its hold on the land) has made them ultra-democratic in social culture, and hostile to the class system of Central Europe. Their Orthodoxy has filled them with the traditions of Byzantinism and caused them to look to Russia for light and leading. They are a people of peasant proprietors in Serbia and Montenegro, and have become so since the war in the other Yugoslav lands by assuming ownership of the estates which they had worked for their landlords. Cereals, fruit, and, above all, pigs, were their chief articles of export. Like the Croats, they have always been magnificent soldiers. Successive groups of emigrants from the Turkish Empire obtained leave to settle in Slavonia and South Hungary on condition of forming a permanent military garrison cantoned along the frontier as the defence of Christendom. But they never developed any great affection for their Habsburg monarchs, still less for their immediate masters, the Magyars. Despite the preventive measures of the Austro-Hungarian Governments, they looked to Belgrade as the free centre of their national life. As in the case of the Croats, the standard of material civilisation was low among the Serbs, varying from extreme penury in parts of Bosnia to solid and comfortable squalor in the large, compact villages of the Danube plain. Life on the territory of a Great Power gave the enterprising Serb a chance of success in commerce. A considerable number of Serbs have taken advantage of this and built up flourishing businesses in various towns, showing

a truly Irish capacity for getting on in life in a country not their own.

One province ought to receive separate mention, for it presents features that distinguish its inhabitants from the rest of the race. Dalmatia is the land of the Latinised and seafaring Yugoslav. The peasants of the hills are not to be distinguished from their Croatian and Serbian brethren of the inland mountain districts, but in the towns of the coast there has long been a highly intelligent and cultivated society. Venetian rule made these towns appear to be but an extension of Italy across the Adriatic. But the nineteenth century saw Dalmatia become the chief centre of the purest doctrine of Yugoslav nationalism. As the poets and savants of the free republic of Ragusa kept alive the tradition of a common Yugoslav culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so the modern Dalmatian politicians have been the leaders of unionism, drawing Croat and Serb together. The civilising influence of the sea, bringing contact with other nations, the tradition of familiarity with the art and literature of Italy, the warm Mediterranean sun and the poignant beauty of the coast, with its ancient cities and its fringe of exquisite islands, have endowed the Dalmatians with gifts of grace and intelligence that make them singularly attractive to the foreigner. It is from this race of sailors, who supplied most of the personnel in the Austro-Hungarian Navy, that the Yugoslav merchant marine of the future will draw its recruits.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF THE YUGOSLAV MOVEMENT

THE revolt of Serbia against the Turks at the opening of the nineteenth century and Napoleon's creation of the short-lived "Illyrian Provinces" (1809-13) produced among the educated classes of Croats and Slovenes an enthusiasm for the Yugoslav national idea. The movement was chiefly expressed in the fields of literature and philology, and did not on the whole emerge into political agitation, nor had it a clear political aim. Its greatest exponent, the most venerated name in modern Yugoslav history, was neither a politician in the ordinary sense nor a soldier, but an ecclesiastic, Mgr. Strossmayer, Bishop of Djakovo (1849-1905). Although a Catholic Croat, with a deep devotion to the Habsburg Monarchy, the great prelate tirelessly laboured for the moral and intellectual progress of the whole of his race. His foundations of the Yugoslav Academy at Zagreb in 1867 and of Zagreb University in 1874 provided a centre from which ideas of national solidarity radiated outwards. Reunions of scholars, students, artists, brought the different branches of the race together at a time when politics only served to keep alive suspicion and dislike.

There were, however, occasions when the Yugoslavs actively demanded self-government. When, in 1848, Hungary rose in rebellion against the Austrian Emperor, the contemptuous attitude of the Magyars towards the claims of the Croats caused the latter to throw in their lot with the Habsburg Monarchy in its hour of need. The Croats, fighting in hopes of the revival of their "Triune Kingdom," were joined by the Serbs of South Hungary against the Magyar Liberals, who sympathised with no nationalism except their own. When Austria triumphed, both Serbs and Croats looked for their reward. Croatia was, indeed, separated from Hungary, received Fiume, and was promised a measure of local autonomy. On the plea of the general unrest this promise was not fulfilled. The Serbs of Hungary were similarly detached from Hungary

and their lands formed into the Vojvodina of Temešvar. But they were ruled by a military governor from Vienna, and the limits of the Vojvodina extended far beyond the Serbian districts, thereby destroying its solidarity. Also, in 1860 the Vojvodina was suppressed.

The disasters of Austria in the war of 1859 made reform of the Monarchy a question of urgency. The years 1860-68 were filled with discussions and bargainings and with the promulgation of one constitution after another. Three solutions of the Empire's difficulties were upheld—the unitary, the federal, and the dualist. The Germans, especially the Liberals of Vienna, supported the unitary idea as giving the leadership in the whole Monarchy to their own, the most progressive, nationality. The Slavs, with other, especially conservative, elements, stood for a federal union of the various nationalities who had historic claims to form separate kingdoms. In the end, when Austria had been defeated by Prussia in 1866, it was the Dualist or Magyar solution which triumphed.

It might well be maintained that the decision reached in 1867 made the future disruption of the Monarchy certain. Had a federal scheme been adopted, the Monarchy might have been in fact that League of Nations on a small scale which it claimed to be. Germans, Magyars, Poles, Czechs, and Croats might all have found adequate possibilities for their national development and, despite the inevitable friction of such an arrangement, might have reconciled the pursuit of their own interests with loyalty to the whole. But the Compromise of 1867 satisfied nobody except the Magyars, whom it elevated to a more complete supremacy in Hungary than that of the Germans in Austria.

The Yugoslavs thus found themselves divided between two masters. The Slovenes, with Istria and Dalmatia, went to Austria, the rest to Hungary, with whom Croatia was left to make what terms she could. The Hungaro-Croat Compromise of 1868 gave to Croatia a measure of Home Rule, but the Ban, or head of the Government, was to be appointed from Budapest, and was not responsible to the Parliament of Zagreb; only three departments of government were set up for separate Croatian affairs, the remainder (including commerce, railways, and finance) being directed from Budapest; and Fiume, the port of the Croatian littoral, was annexed to Hungary, though geographically separated from that country by two hundred kilometres of Croatian territory.

Croatian politics, the only Yugoslav politics that were then

vocal, consisted for the rest of the century mainly of efforts to secure the revision of the Compromise of 1868. Resenting the attempts of the Magyar officials to impose the Magyar language on Croatia, and finding their country's economic development strangled by Magyar commercial jealousy, the Croats agitated for separation from Hungary, and, learning nothing from past experience, looked to the monarch for the fulfilment of their hopes. But the "Triune Kingdom" of their programme was to be constituted on a purely Catholic basis. This drove the Orthodox Serbs, who form about one quarter of the population of Croatia, into the arms of the Government, which gladly made use of this opportunity to divide the Yugoslavs and to discredit the nationalist movement.

The Southern Slav question was enlarged and complicated by one other factor in the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. These two Turkish provinces rose in revolt in 1875, a large proportion of the inhabitants hoping for incorporation in the principality of Serbia. After the rising had grown into the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, the question of the two provinces was decided at the Congress of Berlin. Supported by Germany and Britain, who feared Russian aggression, Austria defeated all projects of annexation to Serbia, a State that did not then command much respect. On the other hand, continued disturbances and the sympathy of her own Yugoslavs for those of the two provinces made the continuation of Turkish rule there intolerable to Austria. She therefore easily persuaded the Congress to put the administration of the provinces temporarily into her hands as the agent of European civilisation. But the Monarchy had no intention of adding to her difficulties by permitting the Bosnians to be politically united with any of their fellow Yugoslavs. The Sultan's sovereignty over the provinces was maintained, the administration became a joint Austro-Hungarian affair, and careful measures were taken to isolate the inhabitants from contact with Serbia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. Austria-Hungary undoubtedly established order amongst an unruly population, and efforts were made to improve the material conditions of life. But the new governors could not demand loyalty from the consciences of the governed, who saw no sanction behind the new régime save that of force. Consequently the Government's efforts were not directed towards the intellectual progress of the people. "For my mission," said Kállay, the Governor, "one gendarme is worth five teachers." Nor was commerce, with its broadening

outlook, encouraged. The railways which were now constructed were planned primarily for strategic purposes. Inhabiting the centre of the Yugoslav territories, and, with their three religions, fitted to be a force for national unification, the Bosnians found themselves enclosed by a Chinese wall of official regulations. The only government which would have commanded their sympathies would have been either that of Serbia or that of a really autonomous Croatia. As Bishop Strossmayer prophetically warned the Monarchy, "If Vienna, or rather Pest, means to govern the new provinces by Hungarians and Germans, and for their profit, the Austrians will end by being more hated than the Turks." When Serbian prestige rose after 1903, and still more after 1912, and an Austro-Serbian conflict became increasingly probable, the more intelligent Bosnians realised that the circumstances of Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy made a disinterested administration of their country impossible.

At the opening of the twentieth century observers of political phenomena might have been excused if they had been unable to detect any Yugoslav movement. Habsburg policy kept the race divided into water-tight territorial compartments and endowed it with many names, Istrians, Dalmatians, Slavonians, Bosnians, and so on, which served to obscure their national unity from the Yugoslavs themselves. But the enthusiasm for spiritual and intellectual unity circumvented official restrictions. The greatest difficulties were placed in the way of Serbs of South Hungary, who wished to visit Belgrade. Yet many evaded the frontier control, and in 1903 they thronged to the coronation of King Peter. The Serbo-Bosnian frontier was so carefully watched that it used to be said that not even a bird crossed it without police permission. Yet educated Bosnians managed to visit Serbia in increasing numbers and to spread the idea of union with that kingdom. Slovene students intending to qualify for the profession of the Law or the Civil Service were obliged to attend a university in Austria, since Zagreb, where they could have heard lectures in their own tongue, was a Hungarian university, and its degrees not recognised in Austria. Yet both Croat and Slovene students went to the University of Prague, and, working there, especially at the feet of Dr. Masaryk, they learned to regard each other as brethren.

The year 1903 may be taken as marking the beginning of a new and more aggressive phase of the Yugoslav movement. In that year the Obrenović dynasty, with its policy of subservience to Austria, gave way to the nationalist house of Kara-georgević in Serbia. At the same time the twenty years'

administration of Croatia by Khuen-Héderváry, who had cleverly played on Serbo-Croat differences, came to an end. Very soon the more moderate elements amongst both Serbian and Croatian parties saw the advantages of co-operation and began to draw together. A conference of Croatian deputies representing Istria, Dalmatia, and Croatia met at Fiume in October 1905 and voted a resolution demanding national unity on grounds of self-determination. A few days later a meeting of Serbian deputies of Dalmatia was held at Zara and confirmed the Croatian resolution on condition that the principle of Serbo-Croatian equality was recognised. In the next month both sides met together at Zara and jointly declared that the Serbs and Croats formed one nation. These events in turn were followed by the formation of the Serbo-Croatian Coalition in the Parliament of Zagreb. The party at once dominated Croatian politics, and from 1908 never ceased to be in an absolute majority until the abolition of that Parliament in 1918.

In all this there was no hint of disloyalty to the Habsburg Monarchy, nor even to the connection with Hungary. The coalition leaders offered their support to those Magyar parties at Budapest who were striving to increase Hungary's independence and preparing to insist on a drastic revision of the Compromise with Austria in 1907. Francis Kossuth, the Magyar leader, welcomed his Croatian allies effusively; but, when he had attained office, he himself in 1907 brought in a Railway Bill making a knowledge of Magyar necessary to employees on the Croatian railways. The Croatian deputies in the Parliament of Budapest did their best to obstruct the measure, but it was forced through and remained a constant source of friction until its repeal was promised in 1913. Its immediate result was the withdrawal of the Croatian deputies from Budapest, and the dismissal of two successive Bans, considered not to be sufficiently docile; after which Baron Rauch was appointed Ban and charged with the task of subduing the Coalition. A general election was held in February 1908. Out of a population of nearly three millions, there were only 49,000 who enjoyed the parliamentary franchise in Croatia, and of these about one-half were employees of the Government. The new Ban used every means in his power to secure the return of deputies acceptable to Budapest. But the Coalition won a heavy majority of the seats, all the remainder being secured by the smaller nationalist parties, and not one official candidate being elected. This triumph was intolerable to the Hungarian Government, and Rauch prorogued the new Parliament indefinitely before it had met.

CHAPTER III

THE COALITION STRUGGLE

FOR the next few years a vigorous struggle was carried on between the Coalition, representing Yugoslav nationalism, and the central authorities of Vienna and Budapest, a struggle which served to embitter the relations between the two parties and to strengthen a growing doubt in the minds of many Yugoslavs of the possibility of their national development within the framework of the Dual Monarchy. The ambitions of the Coalition to secure a revision of the Hungaro-Croatian Compromise were denounced as disloyal and separatist. The idea of intrigue between Zagreb and Belgrade was encouraged by the accusations of the German and Magyar press that such was the practice of the Coalition. The common government of the monarchy, with the support of the Magyars, was then engaged in a forward policy in the Balkans. The Foreign Minister, von Aehrenthal, viewed with misgivings the rising self-confidence of Serbia and the ostensibly constitutionalist movement of the Young Turks in 1908. The Serbian Government was boldly defending its economic liberty against the attempt of the Monarchy to reduce Serbia to economic dependence, and was clearly getting the better of the struggle. There was a danger that the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina, whose nominal sovereign was still the Sultan of Turkey, would claim to participate in the privileges of the new era inaugurated at Constantinople. Should Bosnian members be returned to an Ottoman Parliament, an agitation to end the Austro-Hungarian administration of the two provinces would soon follow and would menace the Monarchy's plans of controlling (if not absorbing) Serbia, and eventually reaching out to seize Salonika.

The definitive annexation of the administered provinces would serve many purposes. As a violation of the Treaty of Berlin, it would display the determination of Austria-Hungary to follow her own interests despite treaty obligations, and serve

as a trial of strength between the Triple Alliance and the newly formed Triple Entente. It might easily provoke Serbia to some imprudent act of armed retaliation, when the Monarchy could settle accounts with the troublesome little kingdom, without fear of Russia, then restrained by her exhaustion after the Japanese War and by the "shining armour" threat of the Monarchy's ally, William II. In the event of any such conflict with Serbia, the abnormal circumstances of war would provide an excellent opportunity for removing the leaders of the Yugoslav movement in the Monarchy by judicial processes for high treason. Even if Serbia restrained her public opinion and behaved with diplomatic correctness, Aehrenthal believed that he could discredit both the Serbian Government and the Coalition by proving that a revolutionary movement in the Yugoslav lands was being engineered from Belgrade. This would serve to justify the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina before the opinion of Europe.

Accordingly, shortly before the annexation, which took place on October 7, 1908, a charge of conspiracy was brought by the Public Prosecutor at Zagreb against fifty-three members of the Coalition, of whom thirty-one were sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from five to twelve years. So scandalous was the procedure of the court that a general outcry induced the Foreign Office at Vienna to lay before Dr. Friedjung, an eminent historian, a number of the secret documents upon the existence of which the verdict of the court had been based. The distinguished scholar was convinced of the authenticity of these papers, which seemed to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government in the Yugoslav agitation, and he published a study of them in the *Neue Freie Presse*, repeating the charges which were then being rebutted in the Zagreb trial. This attack was serious, on account of the high reputation of the writer and of his assertion that he could support his allegations with irrefutable documentary evidence. Accordingly, the members of the Coalition brought an action for libel against Dr. Friedjung at Vienna. The much-vaunted documents were then shown to have been inaccurate on a number of points of fact; but, when Dr. Friedjung read a public apology for his mistake, the Government persuaded the plaintiffs to drop the prosecution. The mystery of the documents was not solved till the autumn of 1910, when the truth came out in the trial of a certain Vasić, arrested at Belgrade for espionage. It was shown that the documents had been forgeries concocted in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.

The exposure of these fraudulent methods of persecution covered the central Government with ridicule and intensified the unrest amongst the southern Slavs. After the Friedjung trial the Hungarian Government made an effort to retrieve the situation by withdrawing Rauch and appointing, as Ban of Croatia, Dr. Tomasić, a learned lawyer and historian, who had been leader of the "National" Party (friendly to the union with Hungary). The new Ban endeavoured to act as peace-maker between Budapest and Zagreb. His main points of policy were an agreement with the Coalition to secure the repeal of the detested Railway Act and to carry an extension of the parliamentary franchise. In the latter object he was successful, the electorate being increased in May 1910 to 190,000 voters and Government influence upon elections rendered more difficult. But over the railways he encountered the stolid resistance of the Magyars, who maintained that the Croatian railways were essential to Hungary's connection with the sea and for the mobilisation of troops for national defence, and that therefore employees must be able to work with the Magyar-speaking officials of the Ministry of Railways. Tomasić tendered his resignation, which was not accepted. Then, considering himself free from obligations to the Coalition, he attempted to reconstruct the National Party and so obtain a ministerialist majority. After two attempts, in the general elections of 1910 and 1911, had failed to break the power of the Coalition in Parliament, Tomasić was superseded by Cuvaj. The brief interlude of constitutional government was over. The submission to Parliament, shortly before Tomasić's resignation, of a resolution recommending the separation of Croatia from Hungary had aroused the resentment of the Magyars. The Constitution of Croatia was now suspended and the new Ban given the dictatorial powers of a Royal Commissioner (March 31, 1912).

Cuvaj settled down to a policy of repression. A rigorous press censorship was introduced and the right of public meeting suppressed. But the more the emissary of Budapest deprived his fellow-countrymen of legal and public means of self-expression, the stronger grew the nationalist movement. An attempt was made to assassinate the unpopular Ban. More satisfactory and creditable features of the Opposition were the co-operation of the Starčevist Party (Croatian exclusivist) with the Coalition and the extension of the agitation to the hitherto less demonstrative Slovenes. In October 1912 an Assembly at Ljubljana (Laibach) unanimously adopted a

resolution to work for the union of the Slovene lands with Croatia.

The Yugoslav provinces were thus in a condition of resentful but confused agitation, when the Balkan War broke out. The immediate and complete military success of Serbia, followed by her victory over Bulgaria in 1913, brought a new element into the struggle within the Monarchy. Hitherto, although Serbia had been the hearth of Yugoslav liberty, she had not shown herself as a State of which the Yugoslavs could be particularly proud. Now the quiet consolidation of the past nine years enabled Serbia to blossom out as a military Power, vigorous and self-confident. Enthusiasm for the free kingdom at once awoke amongst the Yugoslavs, amongst whom the idea gained ground that the solution of their problem might some day come from Serbia and not from the Habsburgs. Volunteers slipped over the frontier from Bosnia and Dalmatia to join the Serbian army. Many demonstrations and collections of funds testified to the sympathy of the Slovenes and Dalmatians. The danger that Austria might intervene in the war and attack Serbia from behind caused all the Serbo-Croat political leaders to meet at Zara and protest against the alleged "attempt of the Government to involve our people in a civil war." Even the Croats began to wonder if salvation was not to be found at Belgrade.

Again, as in 1908, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy took up the idea of removing Serbia from the map. The Government sounded the other members of the Triple Alliance with a view to concerted action if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, at that moment not yet free from the war with Bulgaria. But Italy refused to admit that such aggressive action could command her support, while it is possible that Germany counselled postponement of action until her preparations for war were complete.

Much wiser measures to combat Yugoslav separatism were taken by Count Tisza, who became Hungarian Premier in June 1913. In July he substituted Baron Skerlecz for the unpopular Cuvaj in Croatia. The new Ban promised the immediate restoration of the Constitution and free elections, and offered to further the repeal of the obnoxious Railway Act. He thus won the support of the Coalition, who went to the country as the ministerialist party and were returned once more as a majority. Government and Parliament were working together more amicably in the spring and summer of 1914 than at any time in the previous ten years. This did not mean that anti-Magyar feeling had been exorcised or plans of separation abandoned.

The smaller Croatian parties, Starčevists and Frankists, had drawn up at Abbazia in the spring of 1913 a programme which provided for a Croat kingdom under the Habsburg dynasty, comprising all the Yugoslav lands except those of the Serbs of South Hungary. These parties remained true to this ideal, but, since they were less numerous than the Coalition, by no means tainted with Panserbism and loyal to the Habsburg dynasty, they could be safely disregarded by the Magyars.

In 1914 the Government's secret agents informed the military authorities that opinion in Croatia-Slavonia was thoroughly loyal to the Monarchy. The provinces most obviously disaffected were Bosnia and Hercegovina. Here the Constitution, promised at the time of the annexation, had been inaugurated in 1910 with a franchise ingeniously based on confessional lines so as to make parties correspond to Catholic, Orthodox, Moslem, and Jewish differences. But provincial political activity was almost confined to the demand for reform of the new Constitution. The Diet of the provinces had a power of legislation that was practically negligible. All bills carried in the Diet required the confirmation of the Parliaments of Austria and Hungary, as well as the approval of the common Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Finance, before they could receive the assent of the Emperor-King. In the elections of 1911 those parties of all three religions, which demanded a Ministry responsible to the Diet and direct relations with the monarch, completely defeated their opponents. But if Bosnian feeling was generally anti-Austrian, it was not so generally pro-Serbian. Serbia was known to have hopes of acquiring a strip down the eastern frontier of the provinces which should bring her to the sea. That strip was inhabited mostly by enthusiastic Serbs. But elsewhere the Croats looked westwards, and the Moslems sighed for the good old times, the leisurely ways, the mud and the absence of railways—blessings that had departed with the Turk. Where a country is united in opposition to a foreign Government there is some chance of a peaceful nationalist movement. But when it is itself divided along confessional lines and the alien rulers habitually differentiate against one religion, the opposition of that religion's adherents is likely to become violent and bitter.

The heir to the Imperial throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was a devoted Catholic, an ardent believer in a Croatian solution of the Yugoslav problem, the man who had rattled the Austrian sabre at Serbia in 1908 and during the Balkan Wars. Thus, not only was he a hated Habsburg, but

he had earned the odium which attaches to the stranger who intervenes in a domestic quarrel. In the summer of 1914 the Archduke could hardly have undertaken any tour more likely to end in his death than a visit to the Serbs of Bosnia. Yet he came south for the grand manœuvres (ostentatiously carried out near the Serbian frontier) and drove through the streets of Sarajevo practically unguarded.

The problems connected with his murder on June 28 (the commemoration of the great battle of Kosovo (1389), on which day all Serbs feel rather beside themselves) have not been cleared up. Though the murderer, Princip, a young Bosnian student of apparently indifferent mental equilibrium, was pretty certainly in touch with individuals in Serbia, there appears to be no reason for inculcating the Serbian Government. On the other hand, there are features connected with the murder which suggest that there were official influences in the Monarchy, especially in Hungary, that were not sorry to see the pushful and anti-Magyar Crown-Prince removed, and that smoothed the way for the murderer. Yet the murder itself, in view of Princip's youth and character and the excited state of opinion, needs no explanation. It was a dastardly act, but such as might have been expected amongst a people who had known nothing but foreign rule based on violence for over 500 years. It cannot be called the cause of the outbreak of war, seeing that Austria-Hungary had suggested war to her allies less than a year before, but it provided the Monarchy with an excellent occasion.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM IN 1914

IT may be well to pause at the opening of the world-war and consider the possible solutions of the Yugoslav question as they then presented themselves. One solution was that which will always commend itself to some portion of a dominant race, namely forceful repression. Those methods were to be employed which had failed to do their work in 1908-9 owing to the preservation of peace at that time. But now, Serbia being forced into war, and, as official circles hoped, the Yugoslav movement being utterly discredited by a murderer's crime, it would be possible to stamp out all the sparks of the nationalist fire. All signs of Yugoslav feeling should be treated as high treason, and under cover of military necessity and a censored press the Yugoslavs could be herded into the front-line trenches or into internment camps or more directly executed till there would be none to carry on the agitation. Such a policy was not likely to effect its object. It is exceedingly difficult to exterminate a nationality. Also Austrian and Hungarian officials could not agree as to what was a treasonable attitude. The Croatian patriot, who looked to Vienna for support, was an excellent loyalist to Austrian eyes, a would-be rebel to the Magyars. Repression of Pan-Serbs was no answer to the demands of those Yugoslavs who were content to be subjects of Francis Joseph. Also the conquest of Serbia, unless the population were literally wiped out, would add an element more intransigent than all the rest to the Yugoslav opposition within the Habsburg Monarchy.

Very much more constructive were the various proposals which may be grouped together under the name of Trialism. However such plans might differ from each other in detail, their common basis was the creation of a third and Slav Habsburg State, which should convert the Dual into a Triple Monarchy. The weakness of the Austrian Slavs has always

been their division into seven more or less differentiated peoples, the northern group being also divided geographically from the southern. As the northern group contained one people, the Poles, who in their province were the ruling race, and as the differences of feeling and of language were considerable, the idea of this third, Slav, State has in recent years been applied only to the southern group. The idea encountered the opposition of the most powerful forces in the Monarchy. The proposal to include the Slovene lands in the Yugoslav State met with the absolute refusal of the German nationalists of Austria to surrender their high-road to the sea. Even if a reduced Yugoslavia, without the Slovenes, were proposed, such a State would be sprinkled with islands of German race and culture, which the Germans of Austria would be sorry to see swamped in a Slavonic sea. Although even the Croatian programme of Abbazia (1913) provided for the autonomy of Trieste and the Italian coast towns of the Austrian Küstenland, yet the Italians of that shore would resent the creation in their immediate rear of a semi-sovereign State representing a people whom they despised and hated. The most vigorous opposition, however, came from the Magyars, who would be cut off from the sea by any possible Yugoslav State created within the Monarchy. Far from permitting any such development, the Magyars looked forward to the increasing prosperity of their port of Fiume and to Hungary's future maritime greatness. But, besides such external opposition, Trialism encountered the sullen suspicions of the Serbs. The Serbians¹ naturally disliked any political arrangement that might defeat their hope of seeing their kingdom gather in all their race. The Serbs¹ of the Dual Monarchy saw that all Trialistic schemes assumed a Croatian Catholic basis for the new State.

The supporters of Trialistic ideas were to be found amongst the aristocratic and Catholic circles of Austrian society who had supported federalism in the years 1860-66, and in the exclusively Croatian opposition parties at Zagreb. It was a "loyalist" programme, intended to strengthen the dynasty by bringing it into direct touch with contented, because self-governing, nationalities. Its most prominent supporter was the heir to the throne himself, the murdered Archduke. To him was attributed a conception which should combine national autonomy with Imperial unity. The historic nations, especially the loyal Croats, should have their own political institutions

¹ The word "Serbians" has been used for subjects of the kingdom of Serbia; and "Serbs" taken to denote the whole nation, of whatever allegiance.

uncontrolled by any other single race, but at Vienna there should be a central government and legislature representing all the nationalities for common, imperial affairs whose nature and limits should be clearly defined. But such plans, even if they could have been carried out in the face of Magyar opposition, were but a partial satisfaction of Yugoslav aspirations. It was highly unlikely that the new State would be extended to include the Slovenes, while the Serbs of Croatia, Bosnia, etc., saw no advantage for themselves in Trialism, but merely subjection to a purely Croat régime, and the Serbs of South Hungary would have been unaffected by the proposed change.

As purely Croatian ideas were turning towards various forms of Trialism, so there was also a purely Serbian answer to Yugoslav unrest. The ideal of "Greater Serbia" meant the inclusion within the Serbian kingdom of all Serbs—that is, of all Yugoslavs who had the two necessary qualifications dear to the heart of Serbians, the use of the Cyrillic alphabet and profession of the Orthodox religion. Just as the conservative country gentry of Prussia in 1866–71 disliked the idea of merging the kingdom of which they were so proud in a Germanic Empire the southern portions of which they despised, so many a crusty old Serb (particularly of the "old Radical" party, consisting chiefly of conservative farmers) did not want his country to contain any but people exactly like himself. Had such views prevailed, Serbia would have expanded to include the extreme south of Dalmatia, most of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the eastern projection of Croatia (Syrmia), and the Serbian districts of South Hungary. That would have brought all but a few thousands of the Serbs into the kingdom and provided an indifferent but secure route to the sea at the Boke Kotor (Bocche di Cattaro). But, if such a solution was acceptable to the Serb peasant proprietor whose political vision did not extend beyond the market town where he sold his pigs and plum-brandy, it did not take into account the new nationalist movement that had grown up amongst the *intelligentsia*, Serb, Croat, and Slovene, during the decade preceding the war and that had expressed itself in the political action of the Coalition at Zagreb. Also such a "Greater Serbia" could only have been created after a successful war with Austria-Hungary, an event that seemed most improbable in the spring of 1914. But if the unlikely happened, another result seemed certain. A defeated Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces, and the Croats would denounce their union with Hungary. What would then be the attitude of the "Greater Serbians"? Would

they encourage advances from their Croatian brothers who would hold the vital port of Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, or would they, by an attitude of reserve, encourage the pro-Habsburg elements at Zagreb to keep the Croats loyal to Vienna? A purely Serbian basis was no solution of the sentimental or economic problems of the Yugoslavs. On the other hand, it was supposed, and rightly, to have the support of the Tsar's Government. Russia, in whom the Serbia of the Kara-georgević dynasty put her whole trust, was ardently anti-Catholic and anxious to identify the Slav cause with the Orthodox Church. While Russia was the patron of the Serbs, the latter could not flirt with Croatian Catholicism without serious danger of losing their protector's favour.

The fourth solution, that of Yugoslavia, the union of the whole race in one independent State, had not many supporters before the outbreak of war. Apart from the interests and prejudices opposed to such a union, the natural inertia of mankind would prevent any but a few dreamers from seriously considering a project that could only be carried out through the collapse of an apparently solid Great Power. Yet even before 1914 the idea was at work, especially amongst the Slovenes and Dalmatians, whose racial solidarity was quickened by fears of the lengths to which Italian claims on the Adriatic might be pushed. But, as Baron Burian said, the war acted as "a hot-house for forcing plants." The protagonists of the idea were the little group of exiles who fled from Austria-Hungary at the opening of the war or who found themselves by chance abroad at that moment. These men, led by Supilo¹ and Trumbić,² and representing all three branches of their race, united to form the "Yugoslav Committee" with its headquarters in London and its financial support derived chiefly from the Yugoslavs of North and South America. They were confronted with immense difficulties. Since their programme was Yugoslavia one and indivisible, with equal rights for the three nations and the three religions, they were distrustful of Tsarist Russia and preferred to lay their appeal before the Western Powers. But public opinion in England and France was almost entirely ignorant of the Yugoslav question and by no means hostile towards the Dual Monarchy. The governing classes of London and Paris were by long habit accustomed to

¹ A journalist of Fiume, and member of the Croatian and Hungarian Parliaments. The chief author of the Serbo-Croatian Coalition. Died in 1917.

² First Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 1919-20. Previously Mayor of Spljet (Spalato) and member of the Austrian Reichsrat.

regard Austria-Hungary with favour as being a conservative, unaggressive, non-colonial Power, governed by very pleasant gentlemen of irreproachable manners. Palacky's famous remark in 1848 that "if Austria did not exist, it would be necessary to create her," was still taken to hold good in the sense that the Habsburg Monarchy, whatever form it might meanwhile have assumed, was a European necessity, since it held together in a workable fashion so many conflicting nations and interests.

The Yugoslav Committee had a few supporters, especially in London, amongst writers who had lived in Austria-Hungary; and they could take comfort from the fact that in November 1914 the Prince-Regent of Serbia and his Ministry had addressed an appeal to all the Yugoslavs, declaring that Serbia was fighting for their freedom. In July 1914 the Serbian Government had given evidence of a desire to propitiate Croatian feeling and to undermine the chief stronghold of Vienna in Croatian hearts, by making a Concordat with the Vatican on terms perhaps the most favourable that any modern government has accorded to the Roman Catholic Church. But as yet this Concordat applied only to a handful of clergy and their small flock of Albanian Catholics in the south. It seemed certain that Russia would do her best to prevent a further influx of Catholics to the Serbian State.

Such was the state of opinion when the war began. "Trialism" for the moment was dead, along with the Archduke. "Greater Serbia" was the Russian plan. "Yugoslavia" was but the dream of a few exiles and their literary friends, though many in all the Yugoslav lands were feeling their way consciously or unconsciously towards the same solution. But meanwhile the policy of repression, pure and simple, held the field and was vigorously applied to the Monarchy's Slavonic south.

CHAPTER V

REPRESSION, GROWTH, AND CONSUMMATION

THE measures which the Austro-Hungarian Governments saw fit to take against their Yugoslav subjects show how widespread and dangerous the nationalist movement was considered to be. Under the cover of war-time censorship the authorities were able to pursue their policy with a high degree of secrecy. But a number of refugees brought their tales of suffering to the Entente Countries, and a certain amount of information appearing in the press of the Monarchy indicated that the Yugoslav Provinces were being severely treated. The full horror of that treatment was revealed by Dr. Trešić Pavičić in a memorable speech in the Austrian Reichsrat on October 19, 1917. The Dalmatian Croat deputy said: "In this war our people have been placed in the first line of fire, exposed to the hail of red-hot iron, to its complete destruction, while on its native soil it was being systematically exterminated by halter, bullet and bayonet, dungeon, deportation, imprisonment, and evacuation; by court-martial, by famine, by concentration camps, and by intentionally-induced disease." He went on to allude to the official policy at the outbreak of war of isolating the Serbs and stimulating Croatian feeling against them. "At that time [immediately after the murder at Sarajevo], and under the auspices of the authorities, *battues* began to be organised against the Serbs, whose shops were everywhere looted and destroyed. At that time already many Serbs were done to death. The Deputy, Ivan Frank, has made a statement in the Croatian Parliament to the effect that the Zagreb Chief of Police incited him to cause the Serb leaders to be murdered by the scum of an artificially infuriated population."¹

In certain districts the authorities might well claim that the utmost rigour was necessitated by the attitude of the Serb

¹ *Austria-Hungary's Effort to exterminate her Yugoslav Subjects*, published by the Yugoslav Committee, London, N.D., p. 32.

population. The Serbs are specially concentrated in the frontier areas of Eastern Bosnia and Syrmia. Their sentiments were soon put to the proof. Contrary to expectation, the campaign against Serbia did not take the form of a short and successful punitive expedition. On the contrary, the Serbians ejected the invading Austro-Hungarian army in the middle of August and themselves proceeded to enter their enemy's territory. Here they were welcomed by their co-nationals and given considerable assistance in their operations. Evidence of this is to be found in the records of the military command at Zagreb, published in 1919.¹ Thus, for example, the Commandant at Breko forwarded to the civil government on September 12 a complaint that "on the railway-line near Mitrovica the Serbian artillery has effected destruction which it is impossible to imagine could have been carried out unless the local population collaborated with signals. Between Ruma and Indjija—that is, on territory occupied by our troops—the rails have been blown up."² The general officer commanding at Zagreb on September 26 similarly complained that the population of Syrmia were damaging the railway-lines and telephones, firing on the Imperial and Royal troops, and denouncing loyalists to the Serbians. Also the Orthodox clergy were affixing the initials of King Peter to the towers of the churches. If that happened in Syrmia, which he had been assured was loyalist, what, the General asked, would have happened in districts stigmatized as serbophile and suspect?³

The Serbs certainly paid for this reception of the Serbian army. When the Dual Monarchy's territories were cleared of the invaders in October 1914 all suspected of working with the enemy were deprived of their citizenship, their property was confiscated and their families were rendered liable to deportation. This policy was thoroughly enforced, at any rate in Bosnia, where the provincial government was weakened by no sympathy with the suspects. By March 1915 the semi-official *Bosnische Post* announced the expulsion into Serbia and Montenegro of 5,260 families in a destitute condition, and 5,510 cases of confiscation of property. During 1915 the authorities systematically laid waste the frontier districts, destroying houses and churches and evacuating the inhabitants either over the border or into the interior. Those in the latter condi-

¹ Barac, *Les Croates et les Slovènes ont été les amis de l'Entente pendant la guerre*. Paris, 1919.

² *Ibid.*, Document II.

³ *Ibid.*, Document IV.

tion formed the nucleus of wandering bands of refugees, later increased by deserters and outlaws, and became, as the war went on, a danger to public security in the South Slav lands.

Dr. Trešić Pavičić, in his speech quoted above, gave the most horrifying details of the sufferings and the number of deaths amongst the interned. But it was by no means only upon the Serbs that the Monarchy's wrath fell. Dr. Trešić Pavičić was himself arrested at the outbreak of the war and, after three months' imprisonment in Styria, he was brought up before a judge who excused his ignorance of the charge against the prisoner on the ground that in Dalmatia, Istria, and Carniola alone more than 5,000 persons had been arrested.¹ In Trieste, too, the arrests numbered over a thousand. In Dalmatia all the councils of the municipalities (except in the one Italian city of Zara) were dissolved. Hostages were taken before the outbreak of war. Men of education were rounded up and disposed of in prison or the army. The promptness of the Austrian police in hunting out the most trivial offences did not, however, always prevent the population from showing their feelings. On All Saints' Day, 1914, on the wall of the cemetery at Spljet (Spalato) were found the words, "Arise, ye dead! Francis is making the fourth levy for his army." The authorities offered a thousand kronen for information as to the author of this outrage. Next day at the same place was found written, "Will it be in gold or paper?" The Slovene deputies also, in 1917, had much to say of the behaviour of the provincial governments of their lands, of how every demonstration of nationalist sympathy was treated as high treason, and of how official wrath fell especially upon the Slovene Catholic clergy. The whole may be summed up in the words of the Slovene leader, Father Korošec, who said in the Reichsrat on June 26, 1917, "The wounds of our nation are deep and cruel, a sea of blood and tears has flooded our Yugoslav lands."²

Only in Croatia, thanks to the national character of its government, was it possible to escape the Austro-Magyar severity. Here the Parliament of Zagreb was not at once dissolved. The G.O.C. at Zagreb in November wrote somewhat bitterly of this body. "I consider it is time to think seriously of dissolving the Diet," runs his despatch to the President of the Diet, "only so can one get rid of elements who might well be deputies in Serbia, but on no account in Austria-Hungary."³

¹ *Austria-Hungary's Effort to exterminate her Yugoslav Subjects*, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ Barac, Document IX.

Croatian was the official language in the kingdom, and, as very few other than Yugoslavs can speak it, it followed that a large proportion of the officials were Serbo-Croats. The complaints of the military commanders show that, while many Croats were enthusiastically loyal to the Habsburg dynasty, many officials were blind to nationalist demonstrations and even to what amounted to high treason. The military command disgustingly pointed out in September 1915 that the authorities at Zagreb had in their possession about 3,000 denunciations for crimes of high treason, *lèse-majesté*, and attacks on the public peace, none of which had been followed up, ostensibly from lack of evidence. Out of 1,751 trials for similar crimes, 849 had been dropped. Also the tribunals often inflicted most inadequate penalties.¹ There was much *sabotage* of the Monarchy's forces, economic, political, military. The censor allowed the press to publish the declarations of Yugoslav leaders or the news of desertions by Yugoslav troops to the Entente. Various other methods of defeatism were followed. Doctors refused to pass recruits as fit for service, the supplies necessary for the army were not forthcoming, appeals for investment in war loan fell upon deaf ears. In many ways, and without a definite idea of their common aim, many elements seized opportunities to undermine the Monarchy's strength, while the Serbo-Croatian Coalition remained the Ministerialist majority in the Parliament and kept up apparently friendly relations with the Government of Budapest.

Meanwhile the Yugoslav Committee in London set about its double task of drawing together all possible Yugoslav elements and of appealing to the Entente Powers. In May 1915 they published an appeal to the British Nation and Parliament, claiming "the deliverance of all Yugoslavs from the Austrian yoke and union with our free brothers in Serbia and Montenegro in one united State." They chose to assume that the Serbian Government sympathised with this aim, despite the possibility of Russian disfavour. The first Yugoslav Congress which met at Chicago in the previous March, and numbered 563 delegates, had gone further and declared themselves "sure of the good-will of our Russian brothers."

But these aspirations did not attract much notice. For Great Britain, at any rate, the war was still in its purely defensive stage. Public opinion had not yet begun to consider the struggle as an opportunity for the reconstruction of Europe on new lines. The restoration of Belgium and North France and the restitu-

¹ Barac, Document XVIII.

tion of Alsace-Lorraine was about all that most Englishmen regarded as our positive war-aims, though there was much talk of "the destruction of Prussian militarism." Time and bitter experience were needed before Britain and her Allies boldly took their stand on the platform of nationalism and appealed to the subject nations of Central Europe. In the earlier part of the war they made agreements which were in flat contradiction to their professions at its close.

It was one of these agreements which constituted the chief set-back to the Yugoslav cause in the first years of the war. In May 1915 Italy joined in the struggle. It became known that she had done so on the strength of a treaty signed at London on April 26. The contents of the treaty were kept secret, but the Yugoslav Committee were from the first alarmed lest it should include the attribution to Italy of part of the Yugoslav lands on the Adriatic. They welcomed Italy as a new ally in the common cause, but pointed out that her true interests were the disappearance of the Habsburg Monarchy's fleets from the Adriatic and its armies from the southern slopes of the Alps. If that were achieved and Yugoslavia created, Italy should wish to see in the new State a friendly nation and her pupil in Western civilisation, rather than an embittered neighbour wounded by the loss of part of her heritage. "We are not fighting simply for a change of masters," they declared. The Committee's suspicions deepened into a gloomy certainty, after Supilo had had an interview with Count Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, and become convinced that the Allies (behind the back of Serbia, the Associated Power most concerned) had bartered away the Yugoslav coast-lands to Italy. From whatever source the Committee derived its knowledge it was well informed, for its map, published early in 1916, gave the Treaty of London's territorial provisions with hardly a mistake.

The arrangements provided by the treaty were curious, and calculated to exacerbate Yugoslav feeling. Italy was to receive the whole of Gorizia-Gradisca and Istria, with their Yugoslav majorities of inhabitants; Trieste, with its large minority of Slovenes; the northern half of Dalmatia, where the Italians were numerically negligible, except at Zara; and most of the islands. Further, a careful distinction was made between Croatia on the one hand, and Serbia and Montenegro on the other. Fiume and the Croatian Coast were to go to the former; and the two latter were to divide the south Dalmatian coast, which should be neutralised. Thus, the Adriatic would become an Italian lake, and the Yugoslavs would still be divided between

two or three States, while some 700,000 Yugoslavs would find themselves under Italian rule. Evidently the Russian and Italian diplomats had imposed their countries' plans upon Britain and France.

The effects of this treaty on the Yugoslavs were deplorable from the Allied point of view. Rumours of its details quickly spread in Austria-Hungary, where the authorities were able to use it for propaganda. The Yugoslavs received the impression that their fate was no concern of the Entente. They were to be bartered about like so much merchandise. In that case they would fight for the Habsburg Monarchy, which had now found in Italy an enemy to whom the Yugoslavs would not desert as they did to the Serbians and Russians. Thus, a ridiculous situation developed. While Austria-Hungary persecuted, imprisoned, and massacred a subject race for its disaffection, that race placed its magnificent fighting personnel at her disposal. Whilst some Yugoslavs deserted to the east and fought in the Slavonic armies of the Entente, the rest stubbornly defended the Isonzo front for a Power which many of them detested.

The year 1916 was the period of blackest gloom for the supporters of united Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro had disappeared from the map of Europe. The Serbian army, with its Yugoslav volunteers, was but a remnant on Greek soil fighting its way up from Salonika. The first Yugoslav division in the Russian army, composed of deserters from Austria-Hungary, was almost annihilated in the Dóbruja. Abroad all went wrong. At home the Yugoslavs felt the full reality of the Austro-Magyar domination under which they lived.

But with the end of that year the slow dawn of hope began. In November the aged Emperor Francis Joseph at last died. His successor, the young Emperor Charles, inherited a war which, although apparently successful in the field, was fast driving the Monarchy to economic collapse. Public opinion among the subordinate nationalities was alienated from the Government of Austria. The new Monarch felt that something must be done, some new methods tried. His first proclamation promised equality to all his peoples. He removed his predecessor's ministers at Vienna. A number of prominent Slavs convicted for political crimes were released from prison. It was soon known that the Reichsrat was to meet again and, as in 1860, the representatives of the people were to be summoned to co-operate with the Government in weathering its financial storms. A milder régime had evidently begun.

At the same time a message of hope came from the Entente. In reply to President Wilson's demands for a statement of war-aims from both groups of belligerents, the Allies despatched a Note on January 10, 1917, in which they demanded "the liberation of the Slavs, the Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination." At last the Entente had come forward with a plan for the reform for the European community. They were beginning to appeal across the enemy's battle-line to the nations behind it. The Yugoslavs were given grounds for hope that they had the sympathy of the Allies.

Close upon this event followed the surprise of the Russian Revolution. The alteration of the Eastern outlook worked a profound change in the public opinion of Austria-Hungary. Russian military action became weaker and weaker till in the autumn of 1917 after the Bolshevik Revolution it ceased altogether. The relief that this military collapse brought to the governing class of Austria-Hungary, who represented the victory of the Allies as now impossible, was soon tempered by alarm at the new dangers with which Russia threatened them. Tsarism was dead. The old Orthodox bogey, which had been used to spur the Catholic Slavs to resist the Muscovite, was gone. It was not the Russian bayonets that had to be fought; it was now the Russian democratic and socialistic ideas. The new Eastern gospel had to be met with new weapons. Talk of freedom, equality, and popular government increased as the date of the Reichsrat's assembly drew near, and the repercussion was felt even in Hungary. The peculiar effect of the new situation on the Yugoslavs was that with Tsarism had gone the powerful Russian influence keeping Serb and Croat mutually distrustful. The Catholic Yugoslavs needed no longer to fear that the Serbian Government would disown them, and the Yugoslav Committee hastened in the summer to negotiate with M. Pašić for a statement of their common aspiration towards united Yugoslavia.

The entry of America into the war brought further encouragement. The great Republic was obviously disinterested in the territorial disputes of Europe. She was not bound by any dubious secret treaties. Yugoslav immigrants were more numerous in America than in any European country, and she stood for those principles of free competition and personal equality which were lacking in the conditions of the Yugoslav lands. Also her vast man-power gave promise of the ultimate defeat of the Central Empires.

On May 30 the Austrian Reichsrat met. The Slavs had

organised their forces for the coming constitutional warfare. Following the example of the Czechs and Poles, the Yugoslav representatives formed themselves, Clericals and Liberals alike, into one club under the leadership of the Slovene priest, Fr. Korošec. On the opening day of the Assembly the Yugoslav Club put forward a declaration demanding "the unification of all territories of the Monarchy inhabited by Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in one independent political body, free from all foreign domination and founded on a democratic basis, under the sceptre of the Habsburg dynasty." The Viennese press assumed that the reference to the dynasty had only been inserted from prudential motives, and denounced the Yugoslavs as traitors to the Monarchy. Certainly henceforward this "May manifesto" was taken by the Yugoslavs to represent their minimum demand. There followed an intense agitation, especially amongst the Slovenes, whose leaders were the more unrestrained by having no local autonomy to lose. The Slovene and Dalmatian deputies poured out denunciations of the Government in the Reichsrat. The Slovene clergy stimulated their people to demonstrate and sign petitions.

The movement quickly spread to Croatia. The Serbo-Croatian Coalition continued to keep on good terms with Budapest and thereby won the appointment of a patriotic Croat, Mihâlović, as Ban. But the opposition parties responded openly to the ideas of the "May manifesto." The Starčevists, from having been strictly Croatian in outlook, adopted the Yugoslav platform and drew to themselves those Serbs who were discontented with the official policy. On July 1, *Hrvatska*, the organ of the now quite isolated Frankists, lamented that "to-day 90 per cent. of the Croatian intellectuals are enthusiastic for the chimerical Yugoslavia."

It was at this time, when the idea of the Yugoslav State was being enthusiastically received within the Monarchy, that the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government combined to issue an authoritative scheme for United Yugoslavia free from all connection with the Habsburg Monarchy. Their manifesto, signed at Corfu,¹ boldly proclaimed that there should be a "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" (the inverted order of the three names was significant), which would be a "democratic and parliamentary Monarchy under the Kara-georgević dynasty." Equality of treatment was promised to the three religions, Orthodox, Catholic, and Mohammedan, and to the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. For this hypothetical

¹ July 20. See above, p. 95.

kingdom, in serene defiance of the actual map of Europe and the apparent military success of the Central Empires, was boldly claimed all the land inhabited in territorial continuity by the Yugoslav peoples. The details of the kingdom's constitution were to be settled by a Constituent Assembly, to be elected by universal suffrage.

This manifesto has been the charter of Yugoslav nationalism. It served at once as an appeal to the Entente, now no longer hampered by Tsarist prejudice, and as an ultimate aim towards which the Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary could work with the caution rendered necessary by their position. Not that they were always cautious. After several attempts by "loyalist" elements to gain approval for Trialistic schemes had been wrecked on Magyar opposition, Fr. Korošec in October 1917 boldly declared that the Yugoslav question might have to be settled "in the forum outside the Monarchy, which would be neither to the interest of the Monarchy nor of the dynasty." This new orientation of Yugoslav feeling towards an "Ententist" solution of their question was shaken by the Austro-German victory at Caporetto in October 1917, and by the compromising tone of Allied pronouncements of policy in the following winter. Mr. Lloyd George, on January 5, 1918, said that "the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our official war-aims." It was evident that the Entente had not yet made up its mind whether to appeal to official Austria-Hungary to abandon Germany or to destroy Austria-Hungary by appealing to her nationalities.

However, the revolutionary movement within the Monarchy was now well under way. The Yugoslav Club sent a protest to the Peace Congress at Brest Litovsk demanding representation there and free self-determination. This document, though suppressed by the censor in Austria, was published at Zagreb. On January 31 the *Novine* of Zagreb said that the Gordian knot of Yugoslav difficulties would have to be cut by the sword of Alexander—a reference which few could fail to apply to the Prince Regent of Serbia. The Croatian newspapers caused scandal to "loyalists" by freely discussing the merits of the Manifesto of Corfu and by upholding the necessity for a plebiscite on the question of adherence to the Habsburg dynasty. Numerous military reports show that the authorities were aware of the widespread secret organisations in the army and navy, which were inciting the troops to desert either to the Entente or towards the interior, where "Green Bands" of such refugees were formed. Mutinies occurred in various places,

the most conspicuous case being that in the fleet at Kotor (Cattaro) in February 1918, which was attributed to the Yugoslav propaganda radiating from Ljubljana, and for participation in which nearly 300 persons were tried.

But the fear of Italian pretensions to the eastern coast of the Adriatic still deterred many Yugoslavs from working with the Entente. It was therefore highly opportune that in March 1918 negotiations between Dr. Trumbić, on behalf of the Yugoslav Committee, and Signor Torre, on behalf of a large group in the Italian Parliament, with the approval of Signor Orlando, the Prime Minister, resulted in the signature of the so-called Pact of Rome (April 10). The essential points of this agreement were that each of the two nations was stated to be vitally interested in the completion of the unity and independence of the other, and that they bound themselves to settle their territorial differences on the basis of national self-determination, though with respect for each other's vital interests. Although this document could not be held binding on the Italian Government, it had the desired effect of persuading Yugoslav opinion that Italy was a sympathetic friend.

The effect of this was soon felt. It was officially announced that "the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugoslavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of the United States Government." Immediately thereafter, on June 3, the Governments of Britain, France, and Italy associated themselves with this double expression of sympathy. This, the first official announcement, and especially Italy's adhesion to it, seem to have had a marked effect within the Monarchy. The representatives of the Yugoslavs there became bolder in their speech, and, more immediately important, revolutionary movements among the Slavs spread both in the army and the navy.

An Austro-Hungarian report of June 6, 1918, speaks of desertion by Yugoslav officers and men to the Italian lines, of the valuable information given by them to the enemy, and of their incitements to desertion disseminated among the Austro-Hungarian army.¹

A month later the United States Government called attention to attempts made by the Central Powers to misinterpret its attitude to the Yugoslav question, and asserted definitely that the position of the Government was "that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule." Presumably the *Austrian* of this declaration meant

¹ Barac, Document XXXVI.

Austro-Hungarian, for by this time the attitude of the Allies towards the Dual Monarchy was very clearly defined.

In September Italy individually made a statement in regard to the Yugoslav problem which was believed at the time to indicate that an agreement in regard to the territorial question had been arrived at; unfortunately subsequent events suggested that this opinion was erroneous. The form of the statement made, however, is worth noting. The Italian Government informed the Allied Governments that it "regards the movement of the Yugoslav peoples for the acquisition of their independence and for their constitution into a free State as being in harmony with the aims for which the Allies are fighting, as well as with the aims of a just and durable peace."

The activity of the revolutionary movement increased steadily both amongst the civil population and in the army, thus preparing the way for the final dissolution of the Monarchy's armed forces at the end of October 1918. When that took place the Yugoslav National Council were able to appoint, as their Minister of National Defence, the president of the late secret committee in the army, M. Drinković.

But before the military collapse of Austria-Hungary, the civil authority of the Monarchy had begun to disappear. Already in August Fr. Korošec had presided over a Slovene National Council in Ljubljana. This council began to assume the functions of executive government, and Fr. Korošec declared that it was only preparatory to a united Yugoslav National Council shortly to be constituted at Zagreb. At last in October even the cautious Serbo-Croatian Coalition saw that the days of the Habsburg Monarchy were numbered. The Allies were advancing in the West. The Serbian army was rapidly pressing northwards through its own country towards the Monarchy's frontiers. No further truckling to the Governments of Vienna and Budapest was necessary. All that was now awaited was a word from the Allies that they would not recognise the Habsburgs as the lawful masters of the Yugoslavs. Attention was concentrated on President Wilson, who was held to be the spokesman of Allied principles. But Zagreb acted even before the expected word came from Washington. The Yugoslav National Council, representing Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Istria, and the Slovene lands, on a basis of one member to every 100,000 inhabitants, met, and on October 19 voted a resolution in favour of an "independent and sovereign State of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs."

Meanwhile Count Andrassy, the last Foreign Minister of the

dying Monarchy, was asking President Wilson what form of self-government for the subject nationalities would satisfy him. The President's reply that that was a question not for him, but for the nationalities themselves to answer, was the signal for open revolt. As the news penetrated the country the German and Magyar troops were disarmed and sent off to their own homes. The authority of the central Government had come to an end.

PART V . YUGOSLAVIA TO DATE

CHAPTER I

NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1918

ON October 29, 1918, the Croatian Parliament formally voted the revolution. Quite peacefully, though not without confusion in the general collapse of the Monarchy and owing to the homeward march of hundreds of thousands of troops in complete disorder, the administration of government was taken over by the Yugoslav National Council.

At its birth this new State was recognised as legitimate by no external Power except the Austrian Emperor, who played the part of the evil fairy by endowing it with the dubious gift of the Austro-Hungarian fleet on October 31. This act was indeed superfluous, for the Yugoslavs had already assumed control of the fleet, and informed the Allies of the fact. But if the Emperor intended to embroil the Yugoslav State (which we will call by the name given to it by its citizens of "S.H.S.," i.e. Slovenaci, Hrvati i Srbi) with the Entente, he acted ingeniously; for the Italians, in their triumphant progress over the remains of the Austro-Hungarian army, were in no mood to consider the claims of a people who, till yesterday, had been their strenuous opponents and now met them with professions of friendship and phrases about the rights of nations. The Yugoslavs were naïve in their expectation that the Italians would recognise in them fellow-opponents of the Habsburgs.

But it very soon became clear that the Yugoslav view of the situation was not that of the Italians. The S.H.S. National Council contained representatives from Gorizia, Istria, Trieste, and the rest of the late Monarchy's littoral. But the armistice of November 3 provided for the Allied occupation of exactly those territories which by the Treaty of London had been assigned to Italy, and for the surrender of the late Austro-Hungarian fleet. That the fleet and the territories concerned were not at the disposal of the Monarchy when the armistice was signed did not matter, since the Allies had never formally bound themselves to recognise S.H.S. The Yugoslavs demanded

leave to surrender both the fleet and the territories to joint Allied forces or to some Power not concerned in the local national issue. After Italian naval forces had entered the ports of Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, the fleet was so handed over to the Allied naval commanders. But the Italians proceeded to the sole occupation of Gorizia, Trieste, Istria, the islands and Northern Dalmatia, and treated these territories as annexed to Italy.

A particularly awkward situation arose at Fiume. That port bore a peculiar character. Although fraudulently annexed to Hungary proper by the Compromise of 1868, its Magyar population was small and artificial. The number of Italians was estimated in 1910 at 24,212, and of Yugoslavs at 13,350. But Fiume has an industrial suburb, Sušak, separated from it only by a narrow stream, though situated politically in Croatia. The Yugoslavs claimed that Sušak and Fiume ought now to be reckoned as one town, and, if that were done, their numbers would be approximately equal to those of the Italians. On the other hand, the Italian character of Fiume had been sedulously fostered by the Magyar Government, both as a check on Croatian development and because Italian is the commercial language of the whole Adriatic coast. Fiume accordingly was thoroughly Italian in appearance, despite the recent expansion of Croatian interests in its commerce. The town had a wide measure of self-government, used by the Italian Municipal Council to make education chiefly Italian and to maintain the Italian character to the Fiumani. Against this, it must be remembered that Fiume was a more or less Italian island in the sea of a Yugoslav hinterland, the whole country-side from the outskirts of the town to those of Trieste being Slavonic. If S.H.S. claimed a town containing 25,000 Italians, Italy could not claim it without at the same time demanding districts with a far larger Yugoslav population. Again, to S.H.S. Fiume was their one available port, served by good railway-lines, provided with adequate docks, in fact commercially indispensable to Croatia and Serbia, not to mention its late mistress, Hungary. To Italy Fiume represented no vital economic interest and would have been a remote outpost on her extreme north-eastern frontier, almost certain to be cut out by Trieste and Venice. Lastly, the Treaty of London of 1915 had expressly assigned Fiume to Croatia, and Italy could not claim Dalmatia, Istria, and so on in virtue of her treaty rights without abandoning Fiume.

At the end of October some Croatian troops disarmed the Magyars in Fiume and occupied the town, hoisting their

national flag. By November 4 Italian warships began to appear in the port. The Italian Council then appealed to Italy for annexation, while the Yugoslavs asked for the despatch of a British cruiser to Fiume. The situation was further complicated by the arrival on November 15 of the first Allied troops, a battalion of the Serbian army. The question arose, Was Fiume in the area covered by the armistice arranged on the Italian front or in that covered by the armistice between the new Hungarian State and the Allied Army of Salonika, to which the Serbians belonged? The Italian naval commander demanded the instant evacuation of the town by the Serbians, who at first refused to budge, but were persuaded to do so on receiving a promise that their place would not be taken by other troops. Hardly, however, had the Serbians gone when large forces of Italians were poured into the town, the Italian general affirming that he could not recognise the engagements of his naval subordinate. Fiume then passed into Italian occupation, the presence of small detachments of other Allied troops serving rather as an irritant than as an effective expression of joint control.

It may be well to follow up here the subsequent story of the town. Italian occupation continued for ten months, while a strenuous nationalist campaign was carried out in Italy for the annexation of both Dalmatia and Fiume. The Italian delegates at the Peace Conference, however, met with the solid refusal of President Wilson to agree to such proposals. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav lands saw their one port virtually closed to them, and communication between Fiume and Zagreb rendered extremely difficult. In September 1919 matters became yet worse. Hearing that the town was to be placed in the hands of Allied forces, the poet-aviator, known by his *nom de plume* of Gabriele d'Annunzio, who had done much for the Allied cause in the war, placed himself at the head of a band of volunteers and seized Fiume in the name of Italy. The unfortunate town was now entirely cut off from its hinterland and remained for many months officially blockaded. To the Serbs this swashbuckling adventure constituted a grievous affront, while to the Croats it was further the entire loss of the means of maritime transport to which they had been accustomed. There was some talk amongst the Yugoslavs of their also taking the law into their own hands and attacking the poet-filibuster. But wiser counsels prevailed, and, after long negotiations between the Allied and Associated Powers had finally broken down, a separate agreement was made

between Italy and Yugoslavia (the Treaty of Rapallo) on November 12, 1920, by which Italy abandoned her claims on Dalmatia (except for the city of Zara) and most of the islands, while Fiume, with a strip of territory adjoining to Italy, was constituted an independent State under the protection of the League of Nations. It remains to be seen how this arrangement will work.¹ If neither Italy nor Yugoslavia aspire to control Fiume, and the port is indeed to be free and open, it may form a bond of union amongst the various States concerned. It was a remarkable achievement of the Governments of Rome and Belgrade to have reached a pacific compromise, despite the outcries of extremists in either country. Meanwhile, the two years of Italian occupation of Fiume and Dalmatia have had the happy effect of drawing together the Croats and Serbs in a common feeling against the foreigner as perhaps nothing else could have done. The Slovenes indeed bitterly resent the loss of their compatriots in Gorizia, Trieste, Istria, and part of Carniola, whom the Treaty of Rapallo has assigned to Italy; but some form of compromise is necessary in a territory where the towns are inhabited by one nation and the country by another.

To return to November 1918. The S.H.S. National Council had difficulties within its own borders. Besides the prevailing state of excitement and some disorder, there were differences of opinion on the State's future. There were those who wanted a Republic, as being the modern and up-to-date thing to have. There were Croats who reflected that they had formed part of a Great Power, and could hardly contemplate the prospect of merging their national life in that of "oriental and barbarous" Serbia. But these were minorities, and the National Council determined to settle as soon as possible the question of union with Serbia and to press for recognition of S.H.S. by the Entente. Union with Serbia on the basis of the Manifesto of Corfu was the aim of the National Council. But how was that document to be interpreted? It had said that in the Yugoslav kingdom "the Constitution will provide . . . local autonomies delimited by national, social, and economic conditions." But it had also spoken of a united Constituent Assembly which should frame that Constitution. If the S.H.S. National Council unconditionally adhered to immediate union with Serbia, the future unitary Assembly might, under Serbian influence, provide for an essentially unitary State in which the local

¹ At present (Feb. 1923) the city is grass-grown and the port deserted.—ED.

autonomies would be of very slight value as expressions of Croatian, Bosnian, or Slovene peculiarities. Many Croats who favoured the Yugoslav union were alarmed lest that union should be effected in a "Greater Serbian" sense. Stjepan Radić, the peasant leader, expressed much Croatian feeling in his reported words that "During 800 years of struggle we have not abdicated before the Austro-Hungarians; there is no reason for an abdication before Serbia now that we are free."

It was therefore as one sovereign State to another that the National Council proceeded to approach the Serbian Government. Immediately after the Croatian Parliament's declaration of independence on October 29 the National Council announced to the Entente Powers that the sovereign State of S.H.S. had been formed, that it was prepared to enter into union with Serbia and Montenegro, and that it considered itself the friend of the Allied Powers, to whom it looked for recognition in view of their avowed principles of national self-determination. To this appeal the Entente made no reply; but a delegation led by Fr. Korošec had already before this left Zagreb for Geneva to get into touch with the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government. On November 6 they met M. Pašić, Dr. Trumbić, and representatives of the opposition parties in the Serbian Parliament. The results of this conference were published in a united declaration stating that S.H.S. and Serbia were united in one body politic, which would henceforth be represented in its external relations by a joint Ministry; but that, until the Constituent Assembly should have drawn up the Constitution of the new State, the royal Government of Serbia and the National Council of S.H.S. should continue to exercise their functions in their respective territories. The joint Ministry mentioned consisted of three Serbians and three Yugoslavs.

The delegation from Zagreb then proceeded to Paris to demand the Entente's recognition in virtue of this union with Serbia. M. Pašić preceded them to Paris. What information he gave the French Foreign Office is not known, but when the Yugoslavs presented themselves they were informed at the Quai d'Orsay that before they could receive recognition they must complete their agreement with Serbia. Their assertion that they had done so at Geneva a few days before was met with a denial. They could only draw the conclusion that M. Pašić, in his zeal for a "Greater Serbian" solution, was disowning the pact made at Geneva and that the Entente would deal with them only through the medium of M. Pašić. The delegation left Paris discouraged at finding that their

S.H.S. State was evidently regarded by the Allies as conquered territory to be handed over to Serbia.

Meanwhile, in Croatia events were hastening the union which had been attempted at Geneva and suppressed at Paris. Owing to disturbances at Zagreb, the National Council asked for Serbian troops to preserve order. These were sent to various towns throughout Yugoslavia, and soon gave the impression that they considered themselves in occupation of conquered territory. The Yugoslav volunteer troops (for which M. Pašić had promised at Geneva to demand the Entente's recognition) were disbanded, ostensibly at the order of the Entente, but accepted for enlistment in the Serbian army. As the military hold of Belgrade tightened upon Croatia, and as the Slovenes and Dalmatians, in alarm at the Italian occupation of their territories, urged speedy union with Serbia, the National Council on November 23 decided to send a delegation to Belgrade with an offer of the regency of S.H.S. to Prince Alexander. The Council's resolution provided for the immediate summons of a State Council, consisting of the National Council, fifty representatives of Serbia, and five each from Montenegro and the Vojvodina. A united Serbo-Yugoslav Cabinet should be appointed by the Regent from the members of this State Council. Administration should continue on the existing basis, and the whole scheme was to be merely provisional pending the elections for the Constituent Assembly. The reluctance of Zagreb to submit to the control of Belgrade is seen in the assertion that both the State Council and the subsequent Constituent Assembly were to meet at Sarajevo, as being neutral ground.

The National Council's offer was accepted and the "kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," so boldly prophesied at Corfu in the dark days of 1917, was now proclaimed (December 4, 1918) as an accomplished fact. But the details of Zagreb's demands were somewhat altered. Nothing met at Sarajevo. Instead, a united Cabinet was formed at Belgrade and a pre-Parliament, with a larger number of Serbian members than had been suggested for the State Council, was summoned for the spring. Control of affairs passed into the hands of M. Protić, a Serbian Old Radical leader and M. Pašić's lieutenant, and M. Svetozar Pribičević, a Serb of Croatia and leader of the Democratic party which stood for a centralised, unitary State. However much these two might disagree, as they soon did, they were both unsympathetic to the claims of Zagreb to be treated as the equal of Belgrade. Radić and others were clapped into prison.

CHAPTER II

1919 TO DATE

COUNTLESS small incidents indicated that the spirit animating the central offices of government and their local representatives was Pan-Serb rather than Yugoslav. The Croats began to grow restive, especially when the Yugoslav unit of currency, the *krone*, was declared to be worth one-third of the Serbian *dinar*, a provision necessary no doubt but galling and one that the Slovenes long refused to recognise. The letters S.H.S. also lent themselves to Croatian wit. They were declared to represent "Srbi hoće sve" (the Serbs want everything), or "Slovenaci hoće svoje" (the Slovenes want their own)—a reference to the Italian occupation of Slovene lands—or "Samo Hrvat spava" (only the Croat is asleep).

Against this growing spirit of discontent, aggravated by the economic catastrophe caused by the war and the continuance of the blockade, the centralists could urge that the new State, whose unity was as yet precarious, and around whom on every side were enemies or very dubious friends, must be firmly governed from the capital. The Serbians could not in a moment forget that their new compatriots had fought for the Habsburgs and still numbered some adherents of the old régime. Yet, despite these differences of view and the strenuous efforts of foreign agents to sow discord between Croat and Serb, the general loyalty to the national idea, the common resentment at the Italian occupation of the coast, and the common repudiation of Magyar and Romanian claims triumphed over the forces of disruption. As the months of 1919 went by, although successive Governments seemed unable to cope with their herculean task of restoring a plundered, disorganised and bewildered country; although the railway system admitted of no accurate time-tables, and many parts of the country were unapproachable except by road; although foreign trade was at a standstill and the cost of life in the towns rising fantastically;

although the self-appointed Parliament continued to carry on academic discussions without any moral right to speak for the electorate, while the political parties intrigued and manœuvred to gain control of the coming elections ; although, or possibly because, in many districts the peasants anticipated the legislature and drastically solved the agrarian question by ceasing to pay any rent for their land ; yet it became increasingly plain that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was a creation broad-based upon the adhesion of its citizens.

Yugoslavia appeared at the Peace Conference officially under the title of Serbia. Of the Great Powers, only the United States had recognised the new kingdom ; and although the Yugoslav representatives were M. Pašić of Serbia, Dr. Trumbić, the Croat, and Dr. Žolger, a Slovene, they were called the Serbian delegation. Recognition of the new kingdom was, however, tacitly accorded on May 1, 1919, when credentials were exchanged with the German delegates in the name of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and on June 2 Great Britain and France published their recognition.

The Yugoslav delegates presented a stronger case for their territorial claims than did most of the lesser nations. They made little reference to strategic or economic arguments, but based their contentions chiefly upon ethnic considerations and the self-determination of nations. To this general rule there was a small exception as regards the frontier with Bulgaria. It was intolerable, they argued, that the one Serbian railway-line southwards to Salonika should be within easy reach of Bulgarian bandits, who had frequently attacked it in the past from the little salient of Bulgarian territory at Strumica. This salient was accordingly assigned to Yugoslavia, along with a strip of land on the right bank of the Timok sufficient to protect the railway to the Danube and a larger, but very thinly populated, area of mountainous country opposite Central Serbia, in order similarly to withdraw the Yugoslav frontier from proximity to the railway and the strategic point of Pirot.

To the north-east the Yugoslavs claimed the western half of the Banat as against Romania. The difficulty of the Banat was, that while Romanians formed a large majority in the east and Yugoslavs were more numerous than either Magyars or Germans in the west, there was a central belt where no nationality had any considerable superiority, unless it were the Germans—to whom the government could hardly be given. Eventually a compromise of approximate justice was made,

and Yugoslavia, though falling short of her full claim, came to include most of her nationals.

In Bačka (between the Tisza and the Danube) there is another mosaic of nationalities, German, Magyar, and Yugoslav being inextricably mixed on the soil, to which at various times the Habsburg Emperors had invited Serbian and Swabian colonists. The towns of Ujvidek and Zombor were undoubtedly Serbian. Farther north the Yugoslav element soon became outnumbered. Yugoslavia was, however, given the benefit of the doubt, and the frontier pushed up to give her the important urban centre of Subotica (Szabadka). As regards the rest of the frontier with Hungary the line of the Drava (the old boundary of Hungary proper and Croatia) was followed, with slight exceptions in Baranja,¹ where each side was given possession of a range of hills for defence, and in the extreme west, where a small block of Slovene territory, the Prekomurje, and the Croat district of the Medjumurje, were both assigned to Yugoslavia.

Thus far, from the Danube to the Austrian frontier, the task of the map-makers at Paris had been rendered the easier by the fact that they were dealing with a great plain, where vital interests were not bound up with the possession of particular points, and where on the whole town and country-side were of the same nationality or mixture of nationalities. But from Hungary round to the sea the frontier of Yugoslavia had to traverse Alpine territories where railway-lines were few and very important. Also a line which would include all the Slovene, rural areas of the north, would also include the important and very German towns of Marburg, Klagenfurt, and Villach, the two latter being moreover on the border-line between the Slovene and German rural populations. Villach had the additional importance of forming the railway centre for connection between Vienna, Tirol, and Italy. Marburg (now Maribor) was given to Yugoslavia on the strength of its Slovene surroundings, but the Peace Conference provided that the Klagenfurt basin should be the object of a plebiscite, while Villach and its railway connection north and south were retained by Austria, to assure free Austro-Italian communication. The plebiscite resulted in favour of Austria, and the Slovenes thus saw 100,000 of their number left in that country. Coming on top of their losses to Italy, this exasperated the Slovenes, who felt that the Yugoslav kingdom, in which they had merged themselves, had culpably failed to obtain for them their just revendications. On the other hand, the Peace Conference has

¹ Between Pecs and Slatina.

given Yugoslavia a fine mountain frontier, the Karawanken ridge, with adequate lines of communication behind it.

So far, Yugoslavia has not much cause for complaint. But the thorniest territorial problem was that of the Italian frontier. Since it was generally accepted at Paris that Italy must acquire the line of Italian coast towns from her frontier to the southern extremity of Istria, it seemed to follow that she must annex an adequate hinterland, namely, that mentioned in the Treaty of London, consisting of Gorizia, Istria, and a strip of Carniola, with their half-million of Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav delegates refused to admit the justice of this claim or of its premises. The issue was complicated by the questions of Fiume and Dalmatia, upon which the Yugoslavs laid much more stress. Eventually, by the Treaty of Rapallo, Yugoslavia swallowed the bitter pill and abandoned these provinces in exchange for Dalmatia and the independence of Fiume.

Lastly, the Albanian frontier problem remains unsolved. Before the war a determination to reach the sea across the gap in the North Albanian mountains, the only route not held by a civilised Power, was part of the Serbian mentality, just as a resolve to regain Scutari was part of the Montenegrin. Now that these ambitions have been rendered superfluous, they still linger on in the minds of many Serbs. More serious is the argument that the wild Albanian tribesmen of the north are impossible neighbours, making frequent raids and committing outrages over the Yugoslav border. The frontier of 1913 is indeed unsatisfactory. It places many Albanians under Yugoslav rule and invites disturbance by not giving Yugoslavia a good line of defence against the tribesmen. When, in January 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allies, in despair of ever settling the Adriatic question, tried to induce the Yugoslav Government to come to terms by offering the bribe of Northern Albania, that Government very properly replied that they would prefer to see the Albanians under a government of their own. But the anarchic conditions of the border induced Yugoslav troops in October 1921 to penetrate into Northern Albania and to hold down the unruly population with the mailed fist. The League of Nations however intervened, and succeeded in inducing both Yugoslavs and Albanians to recognise as neutral (until its definite delimitation) a belt of territory laid down as such by the Conference of Ambassadors. The Yugoslav troops were withdrawn, and serious trouble was averted. As long as Italy claimed a protectorate over Albania, it was natural for Yugoslavia to respond by demanding accessions of

Albanian territory that would remove her frontier from the neighbourhood of her towns and the railway in the Kosovo Polje. But now that Italy has given up the thankless task of trying to control Albania, and no other Power is likely to covet it, it is to be hoped that the Government of Belgrade will be able to show that its endeavours in this area are solely directed to obtaining security for its subjects, and not to the permanent acquisition of Albanian territory.

With Greece no frontier question arose.

Delimited by the frontiers described above, Yugoslavia is a State of some 12,000,000 inhabitants, of a homogeneity remarkable in Central Europe, since, except for the Germans and Magyars of the Vojvodina and the Albanians and Bulgarophiles of Macedonia, foreign elements are negligible. The natural resources of the country are immense. In Croatia, and especially in the Vojvodina, the Yugoslavs have some of the most fertile agricultural areas of Europe. There are magnificent forests in Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, and the Slovene lands, waiting to be exploited. Bosnia also is rich in minerals, especially abundant being salt, coal, and iron. Great hopes are centred on the future development of the mining industry throughout the mountainous south. But as yet the economic strength of the whole country lies in the agriculture and cattle of its peasantry, whose sturdy fighting qualities make Yugoslavia a military Power of far greater importance than her present wealth would suggest. To-day Yugoslavia is hampered at every turn by the effects of the war. In 1919, while in Bačka and the Banat there was a superabundance of every kind of food which the inhabitants were unable to export through lack of transport, other districts at no great distance were suffering from extreme want. It is difficult to restart the few industries of the country. Isolation through the Allied blockade and the breakdown of the European railway system delayed the first beginnings of reconstruction. Political struggles and uncertainty as to the frontiers restrained constructive work and kept many men mobilised who ought to have returned to their peaceful occupations. The Serbs are determined not to come under the economic control of any foreigners. The extreme care that they are showing to avoid this has also had a retarding effect on material recovery, though it is entirely intelligible in view of their past dependence on foreign interests and foreign capital. The foreign exchange, also, is a handicap, though Serbian dinars are much more valuable than the corresponding units of the Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian currencies.

Nevertheless, each year sees some progress accomplished. The system of transport has been greatly improved. There is no lack of food. The expectations of those neighbouring countries which hoped that the elections for the Constituent Assembly would result in a vote of censure on the central Government and a demonstration of particularism were disappointed. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were at last held in November 1920. They resulted in a great diminution of the definitely Nationalist Croat and Slovene parties, but produced a Communist party of 58 deputies and a Croatian peasants' party of 50. The Opposition, which now criticised the Government less for Serbianism than for bureaucratic inefficiency, refused to accept the highly centralised constitution submitted to the Assembly. Despite the abstention of 160 deputies, the constitution was pushed through, however, and promulgated on June 28, 1921. Yugoslavia thus received the basis of her public law, and has since shown every sign of settling down to united and progressive life.

It may be doubted, however, if the framers of the Constitution will be wise if they ignore the differences between Europeanised Slovenes and barbarous Macedonians, between Dalmatian fishermen and Serbian peasants, between Croats proud of their ancient liberties and Serbs of the Vojvodina who have long looked to Belgrade as their spiritual home. If wisdom and forbearance and sympathy are shown, if the Croat and the Slovene, the Bosniak and the Dalmatian know that their local affairs are in their own hands and that they are treated in fact as well as in name as the equals of the Serbian politicians and soldiers, who have governed for the last two years, Yugoslavia may look forward with confidence to a future as prosperous as the heroic virtues and the long subjection of the race have earned.

B. ECONOMICS
THE ECONOMICS AND RE-
SOURCES OF YUGOSLAVIA

CHAPTER I

GENERAL

THE new Serb-Croat-Slovene State consists of: the old kingdom of Serbia; Bosnia-Hercegovina; Dalmatia (with very minor exceptions); Croatia-Slavonia; areas detached from Hungary, including part of the Banat of Temešvar, the Bačka, the Baranya (or angle between the Drava and the Danube), and a part of South-Western Hungary, lying beyond the Drava and the Mur; a part only of Carniola, the western portion of this province going by the recent arrangement to Italy; a very small part of Southern Carinthia, for the Klagenfurt plebiscite area has opted for Austria; and Southern Styria. The total area is estimated—meantime quite roughly—at round about 95,000 square miles, with a population of under 12,000,000.

Although its status in relation to Yugoslavia is not yet quite clear, Montenegro may also now be taken, for our present purpose, as forming part of that kingdom. Its inclusion would add about 3,500 sq. miles of territory and under 250,000 inhabitants to the above figures.

Thus the area of the whole does not greatly exceed that of Great Britain, which has, however, a population of nearly 43,000,000. Another comparison of some interest may be noted. Serbia, the largest element in the new State, had in 1914 an area corresponding roughly to that of Ireland, being about 1,000 square miles larger. The population also is closely similar, 4,500,000 in pre-war Serbia, as against about 4,400,000 in pre-war Ireland.

From these two comparisons those who are familiar with the causes generally determining density of population in Europe will at once conclude that Serbia, like Ireland, is predominantly dependent on the land in the large sense, and is not, like Great Britain, predominantly industrial, and that this is true of the Yugoslav territories as a whole. Both deductions are

justified by the facts; but, in order to grasp the economic conditions, it is essential to realise the nature of the agricultural products in Yugoslavia.

If we take the Serbia of 1912 and Bosnia together, as forming a continuous belt of land, draining to the Sava-Danube, and possessing many characters in common, we find that this area may be said to be intermediate in products between the Hungarian plain to the north and the narrow coastal strip of Dalmatia to the south-west, and that this intermediate character profoundly affects its economic relations. Croatia-Slavonia is intermediate in another sense, for parts of the territory of the former kingdom present the features, alike of climate and of products, peculiar to the Hungarian plain, while the hilly areas generally resemble the lands farther south. The areas detached from Hungary proper, again, form parts of the plain. To appreciate the transitional character of Serbia and Bosnia—Hercegovina, it will be remembered, belongs rather to the Karst zone, as does much of the interior of Dalmatia—it is necessary first of all to compare the climate and products of the Hungarian plain with those of the coastal strip of Dalmatia.

The latter, we have already seen, is typically Mediterranean. This means that the winters are mild and the summers not hot; the rainfall tends to be deficient, and most rain falls in the cooler part of the year, giving summer drought, which is not, however, so well marked as it is farther south, e.g. at Athens. This climate is relatively unfavourable to forest growth. Certain trees, it is true, can tolerate the summer drought, but, as on Mediterranean coasts in general, high forest is so near its natural limit that very little human interference will tip the balance against it, and, once destroyed, the forests are very difficult to restore. This is partly due to the presence of the goat, which is very destructive to young growth, and is the animal most frequently kept as live-stock in Mediterranean regions. This, in its turn, is the result of the fact that the scanty summer rain, and the strong summer sun, make pasture deficient during the warmer season, and thus large stock animals, such as cattle, can be reared only with difficulty. A general deficiency of wood, for fuel or construction, a general lack also of live-stock products, save such as are yielded by the goat, are thus alike characteristic. There is nothing in the climate to forbid grain production, wheat and barley being well suited to the region; but the small amount of level ground, and that limitation of fertility which we have already discussed on p. 178, prevent most Mediterranean areas from producing

grain extensively. Thus, Dalmatia does not yield cereals enough for its own use, and has to import wheat from Croatia and Bosnia. So much for the negative side. On the positive one we have the production of olives for oil, a typically Mediterranean product, which makes up for the deficiency of animal fat due to the paucity of milk cattle, and has also a considerable market abroad. More important, from the point of view of national wealth, is the vine for wine; but wine can be produced far into the interior of Europe, and is thus not limited to the zone of Mediterranean climate, as is the olive. Sub-tropical fruits form valuable products, for these, like the olive, have a limited extension to the north and into the interior. It is worth note that even dates may ripen near Ragusa.

If we look next at the Hungarian plain we find that the climate—characterised by hot summers, cold winters, and early summer rain—and the relief, especially the wide level plains, cold and wind-swept in winter, parched and dried up in high summer, are very unfavourable to tree-growth. On the other hand grain, including wheat, the most valuable of all, grows splendidly, the level surfaces, the fertile soil, and the fact that the land does not require to be cleared of trees, being all favouring factors. Similar reasons account for the flourishing live-stock industry, horses especially thriving in the plains, while the fact that cereals and other crops grow so well makes it possible to supplement the natural pastures by fodder crops. It is obvious, on the other hand, that in a country like Dalmatia, where agriculture is carried on by very primitive methods, and the yield is insufficient for the local demand, the peasant cannot afford to devote land which might grow food for man to crops for his animals.

We see from this account that, while the Dalmatian exports his oil, wine, fruit, and similar crops, the inhabitant of the Hungarian plain has a surplus of grain and of animals and animal products. Both seem, at first sight, to suffer from a shortage of wood, but it is noticeable that the plain of Hungary is encircled by forested mountains, so that the people of the plain have abundant opportunities of supplying their needs in this respect.

Turning next to Bosnia and Serbia, we find that in the first place the slopes, except where cleared for cultivation, or where local conditions are unfavourable, are densely clothed with forest, the beech being a conspicuous tree. Now beech demands a large amount of moisture during the growing season, and is intolerant of very severe winters. Wherever it occurs in

abundance, therefore, we may postulate abundant summer rain. Such a climate is relatively unsuited to wheat, which is liable to become affected with "rust." When, however, the summer rain is combined with heat, we have the climate in which maize thrives best, and, though this cereal is of American origin, it has for centuries formed the basis of the food-supply in this part of Europe. The statement just made with regard to wheat may appear, at first sight, to be contradicted by the fact that, as will be shown later, this cereal figures notably among the exports more especially of Serbia. But the explanation has been indicated above. Maize is grown much more widely, but is consumed locally, partly because it is not sufficiently valuable to pay for export to a distance. Wheat can be grown in special areas, but it is a money crop, too valuable for local use. In addition to maize and wheat, other cereals, such as barley, rye, oats, even rice locally, can be grown.

As regards live-stock there are many facts of interest. There is nothing in the climate to forbid extensive rearing of cattle for meat and milk, for land which has borne forest will, if cleared, yield abundant pasturage. In point of fact, however, at least until recently, the relatively primitive type of agriculture practised has made it difficult to raise cattle on a large scale for export. Cleared land is too valuable to be devoted to pasturage, and, as in much of Russia, the peasant is in the general case too unaccustomed to the Western habit of regarding agriculture as an industry—as distinct from a means of obtaining necessities for his own use—to take kindly to modern cattle-rearing. His cattle are primarily for draught purposes, and milk and cheese are mostly supplied by sheep or goats. On the other hand, save where, as in parts of Bosnia, religion intervenes, the pig may be said to be the characteristic animal. In the first instance the reasons were identical with those which made the animal important in the rural economy of mediæval Western Europe. It does not require large tracts of pasture land, like cattle, and the acorns and beech-mast of the forest in early days supplied it with much of its food. The facts that the flesh is very readily preserved for winter use, and that the animals fatten rapidly, are of course important. More recently, the peasant has become aware of the value of the meat for export to a distant market, and has learnt to use maize as a fattening material. Unfortunately, however, from the Serbian point of view, the rearing of pigs on grain is readily carried on in the Hungarian plain, where the woods which formed the original favouring factor in the Balkans do

not occur. Thus the nearest market tends to be closed to the Serbian pig-rearer.

One other plant deserves to be mentioned for the important part it plays in the life of the Serb. This is the plum-tree, whose fruit bulks largely, in various forms, in the total of Serbian and Bosnian exports. The temperate forest in these countries produces various fruits and seeds of indirect or direct use to man, and it is natural therefore that useful trees should be cultivated and improved. The advantage of the plum is that the fruit is readily dried (prunes), and thus can be kept for winter use or exported to a distance without the risk of loss which attends the sale of fresh fruit. It can also be preserved with or without sugar, by boiling, and forms finally a source of plum brandy, much relished by the Serbs. In parts of Dalmatia, it may be noted, the wild cherry is collected, sun-dried, and converted into the liqueur maraschino, which is both exported and used at home.

From this account it will be clear that Serbia and Bosnia have for disposal in the world market a certain amount of grain, plums in their varied forms, the products of the live-stock industry, especially the flesh of the pig, and, in the case of Bosnia particularly, wood. But unfortunately none of these are in demand in the immediately adjacent part of Hungary, which also is in search of a market for grain and the products of its live-stock industry. On the other hand, the lands immediately round the Mediterranean, and notably Italy, the nearest, do require wood, meat, hides, dairy produce and so forth, and also grain. But while the slope of the land is such that export for Serbia and Bosnia alike is easiest in the northward direction, the Dinaric Alps make direct access to the sea, especially for goods of great bulk in proportion to value, difficult. That Serbia and Bosnia alike face the lands the inhabitants of which are their commercial rivals, and turn their backs on their nearest customers, is a fact which has much bearing alike on the economic and political history of both countries.

Before proceeding to elaborate this point, however, we may say a few words in regard to minerals and industry. True coal is at best rare in Yugoslav lands, but brown coal or lignite is common, though not yet worked on a very large scale. Resources of water-power would appear to be considerable, but meantime are only utilised on a relatively small scale, mostly on the margins of the new State, e.g. in Dalmatia, and then with Italian or German capital. As to other minerals opinions vary considerably; some authorities believe that the mineral

wealth has been greatly exaggerated, others hold that valuable deposits await investigation and exploitation. Serbia has a considerable amount of copper, Idria in Carniola has valuable deposits of quicksilver; but the latter beds fall into the area assigned to Italy under the recent agreement. Iron ores occur in Serbia and in Styria, but the most important iron workings of the latter province are outside the Yugoslav State. Generally we may say that, for the present at least, the minerals are not a great asset, and such development as has been carried on has been done with foreign capital and under foreign management.

The want of capital, the absence of mineral coal, of the energy and capital required to develop water-power, and the limited supplies of iron, combined with the present characteristics of the people, exclude any notable development of large-scale industry. On the other hand, as in Russia, domestic industries are carried on widely, the peasants striving to produce most of their own requirements in clothing, utensils, and appliances. As in Russia, a considerable amount of taste, skill, and ingenuity is often manifested in the working up of the available local raw material, such as wood, wool, flax, hemp, hides, and so forth. In Bosnia the Austro-Hungarian Government endeavoured to encourage these home industries, and the peasants are stated to be particularly artistic. The difficulties of marketing, however, and the cost of collection, as in Russia, make the profits to the actual workers small. In Serbia also the Government has endeavoured to promote industry, e.g. the carpets and rugs of Pirot; but hitherto without very great success. For machinery and modern appliances the country is practically dependent upon imports.

Although the above description refers primarily to Serbia and Bosnia, it is generally applicable to most of the Yugoslav lands. We may therefore think of those lands in general as well wooded, and containing a population principally engaged in agriculture. That agriculture is of the type which Western Europe regards as primitive, for only surplus products, after local needs are satisfied, are exported. This helps to explain the fact that, while the physical conditions favour livestock-rearing, the putting down of arable land to sown grass and clover, so familiar a custom in the West, is largely alien to the peasants' habits. The large acreage devoted to maize, and the place this cereal takes in the local economy, is another indication of the fact that agriculture here is not yet industrialised; for in Western Europe generally all sections of the

community tend to eat wheaten bread, even where this cereal cannot be locally produced.

Now, without committing oneself wholly to what is called the economic interpretation of history, it may be said that these facts throw much light upon the events which have led up to the founding of the Yugoslav State. They must also be kept in mind in any forecast of its future.

We have to notice, first, that the opposition of the Magyars to the "subject" nationalities, Slav and other, has always been much fiercer than that of the other partner in the Dual Monarchy. Austria, indeed, in harmony with her character as a highly heterogeneous State, has often seemed rather to yield, at any given moment, in the direction of the severest pressure, than to follow a consistent line of policy. Within Hungary the strongest party has been that of the Magyars, who represent agriculture, and within Austria that of the Germans, who, till the recent rise of industry among the Czechs of Bohemia, may be said to have been the sole representatives of large-scale industry. The attitude of the two parties to the South Slavs has been determined by their respective interests.

Since most of the South Slavs inhabited areas which, to a greater or less extent, were capable of producing commodities similar to those yielded by the Hungarian plain, they were, as already stated, actual or potential economic rivals of the Magyars. At the present time, with the memory of war privations fresh in our minds, and with the present world shortage of food-stuffs and agricultural raw material, it may well seem absurd to suggest that competition for markets affected the relations of the two peoples. But we have to remember that the greater part of the nineteenth century was the period of cheap food and cheap raw material, due largely to the rapid opening up of lands beyond the seas, especially, of course, the Americas. The nature of these lands, especially those of virgin soil, made it possible to produce food for export under conditions with which the agricultural lands of Eastern Europe could not easily compete. Again, the development of ocean transport, behind which the land transport of Eastern Europe lagged very markedly, made it possible for overseas commodities to reach the developing markets of Western Europe at the minimum of cost for freight. With the growth of industry there, again, and the rapid increase of population, the Western market steadily increased, and the profits of industry led to a raising of the standard of comfort which was bound to affect

Eastern Europe, where the mass of the people seemed, in comparison, to be poverty-stricken and depressed.

To compete with the products of the New World the agriculturists of Eastern Europe had, therefore, to sell at the lowest possible margin of profit. While the total profits were thus diminished, the ruling classes, whose wealth consisted in their lands, tended to raise their standard of living, in correspondence with the general rise in the industrial West. Such a result could only be obtained by depressing the economic condition of the actual cultivator, whether small-holder or agricultural labourer. Thus we find that in Croatia-Slavonia, where both large and small properties occur, the large properties contain the most fertile land, and were favoured by the system of taxation; the small holdings, on the other hand, are generally limited to relatively infertile areas, and are heavily burdened with debt. In the Banat, before the war, the wages of the agricultural labourer were so low that meat was a luxury, and potatoes and maize, with milk and butter in spring and summer, are stated to have formed the only articles of food available in some parts. Under such conditions the real importance of the "racial problem" was that it made exploitation of the peasants easier.

This explanation of the Magyar attitude affords, however, no solution of the problem why the Pan-Germans were willing to co-operate with the Magyars in keeping down the subject nationalities. The problem is one, in point of fact, which requires careful analysis.

We must, in the first instance, look for a moment at the conditions which prevailed in the West, e.g. in Britain, during the period of the development of large-scale industry. As has been already hinted, industry there, and the growth of population upon which industry depends, demanded large supplies of cheap food and cheap raw material, brought overseas from the new lands. Those new lands owed their development, and therefore their capacity for large-scale production, to the capital, skill and organising ability of the Old World, primarily that of Britain. These new lands, therefore, were for long more or less in economic dependence on the older ones; imports of food and raw material really represented interest on capital sunk. Now Germany, and to a much greater degree Austria, from a variety of causes had but little share in early days in these developments, and large-scale industry within them was later in origin. They were, however, contiguous with the wide plains of Eastern Europe, parts of which shared with America the

feature of great fertility, and a climate well suited to grain production. The tendency, in Germany and Austria alike, was therefore to regard these lands as European "colonies," whose mission it was to supply the needs of growing industry. In order to compete in the world markets with the older industry of Britain, it was necessary that the products of these lands, whether food or raw material, should be cheap, and an alien population was more easily exploited than a native one.

In other words, before the war, alike in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, the tendency was to seek to obtain the necessities of industry, so far as possible, within the political limits of the State, but chiefly from areas inhabited by the various kinds of Slavs, or, in Austria-Hungary, the Romanians. Some of the effects on the adjacent areas are well brought out in a recent article by Prof. Day, Professor of Economic History at Yale University, and a member of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference as specialist on Balkan affairs. The article contains an elaborate analysis of the pre-war commerce and commercial approaches of the four "Balkan" States, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The result is to show that these four States traded little with each other, for all, especially the first three, showed a general similarity of products. But their external trade displayed the very curious feature that while North-Western Europe, especially Belgium and Britain, were their best customers, it was from Austria and Germany that they bought most of their manufactured goods. He finds the explanation of the first fact in the dense population of North-Western Europe, and the demand there for agricultural products of all kinds. The fact that the small country of Belgium took over 28 per cent. of the exports of the four countries, while Austria-Hungary took under 10 per cent. and Germany 8 per cent., he explains as a result of the methods which the two latter countries took to protect their own agriculturists from competition, with a view to encouraging home production. That Austria-Hungary was able to furnish 23 per cent. and Germany nearly 26 per cent. of the imports into the four countries, as against about 3 per cent. supplied by Belgium, he ascribes not wholly to geographical proximity, but to "push" and energy; political conditions had doubtless also some influence. Nor must we forget, what Prof. Day does not mention, that in e.g. the Banat and Transylvania the peasants were far worse off than in free Serbia and Bulgaria, so that the cost of production of food and raw material must have been proportionately lowered.

Prof. Day's article refers to pre-war conditions. The war period itself saw the formulation of the grandiose *Mittel-Europa* scheme. With this scheme, in this country especially, the name of Naumann is usually associated, but there is much evidence to suggest that Naumann was only a populariser, putting, with a perhaps indiscreet candour, into precise form ideas which had been floating in the minds of many—which formed indeed the economic basis of the German-Magyar alliance. The essence of the scheme was the formation of a great, *continuous* land-State, which should supply, so far as might be, all the needs of industry, and be supplemented by tropical dependencies yielding those products which could not be obtained within Europe and the adjacent parts of Asia. The attack on nationality in the West which the scheme involved was due to the desire to obtain deposits of iron-ore and great ports; the attack on the Serbians and Romanians to the desire to obtain full control of fresh agricultural lands, those within the two Empires having been shown to be insufficient. The co-operation of Magyars was ensured by the fact that the keeping of Serbians and Romanians in permanent subjection was, as already shown, to the interest of the great landowners. It should, however, be clearly realised—and it is a point upon which Naumann is very insistent—that there was not, as was often supposed in this country, a direct attack either upon "nationality" or upon "subject races" as such. To the Pan-Germans, at least, it was the ulterior aim which was regarded as important.

It may be said that, so far as the South Slavs were concerned, the distinction is of little importance. But the fact remains that for the deliberate stirring up of race-feeling, with all its dangers for the future, this country cannot be held guiltless. In the later stages of the war it was the purpose of the Director of Propaganda here, cynically avowed, to stimulate race hatreds in Austria-Hungary with the purpose of weakening the military strength of the Monarchy, and, whatever the possible justification of this course as a war measure, its effect must increase the difficulties of the new Yugoslav State. For, if the foregoing analysis of economic trends is accurate, it is clear that, whatever is the solution of the problem, it is not to be found in setting South Slav against Romanian, or even against Magyar. The agricultural peoples of Eastern Europe are more likely to lose than to gain if they complicate their problems by rivalries with each other. Nor must we forget the elementary fact that from Italians, Magyars, and Germans alike

the South Slavs have much to learn, and that their first needs are peace, stability, and free intercommunication. If prosperity in pre-war days, in Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dalmatia, and so forth, was hindered by artificial barriers, the introduction of new barriers due to racial hatred is not likely to mend matters, and excessive emphasis on supposed racial characters is full of danger to all parties.

The problem to-day is not indeed one into which racial characters need enter at all. In essence that problem has been greatly modified by the fact that, in future, the competition of the overseas lands is likely to be far less intense than it has been in the immediate past. For, in the first place, many of the fertile lands in, e.g. Canada and the United States, have been largely ruined by continuous cropping, and in the second the States at least are approaching the condition when the increasing population is likely to make them importers rather than exporters of food on balance. The agricultural areas in Eastern Europe have, therefore, first of all to increase their productivity, and second to banish from the minds of men the general belief that agriculture means poverty and continuous toil for the cultivator, while industry means vast wealth for some and a measure of well-being for most sections of the community. To bring about the latter change they must seek steadily to raise the standard of comfort within, and they are more likely to effect this by combination than by perpetuation of enmity, which can only lead to ruinous competition. If South Slav, Romanian, Bulgar, and Magyar are to remain bitter enemies the one of the other, all alike will suffer, and all, in fact if not in name, will be but dependents of the industrial West.

CHAPTER II

THE INDIVIDUAL KINGDOMS AND PROVINCES

As has been already explained in detail, parts of the territories of Yugoslavia are but fragments detached from larger units. In regard to these, therefore, it is impossible to give detailed statistics of production, commerce, and finance. Such details have necessarily to be confined to those areas which formed political units before the constitution of the new kingdom.

Serbia.—It might be supposed that, in the case of the kingdom of Serbia, at least, complete and satisfactory recent figures would be available. But we have to remember, in the first place, that Serbia obtained a large accession of territory from the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. These new territories were not completely organised before the outbreak of the recent war, and the facts obtainable in regard to them deal with potentialities rather than with actual conditions; for the change of allegiance from Turk to Serb brought with it profound economic differences. Again, Serbia, with but short intervals, was practically at war from 1912 to 1918, so that the last complete figures available relate to the year 1911. Finally, even these figures have to be accepted with certain qualifications, for the "tariff war" with Austria lasted from 1906 to 1911, and its effects are visible in the figures for 1911. Thus, we have to admit that the material available is scarcely sufficient to enable us to forecast the probable future position of Serbia in the new kingdom; it allows us, at most, to make some deductions as to economic trends.

Before 1913 Serbia had an area of 18,644 square miles, with a population of about 3,000,000; the new territories added an area of 15,075 square miles, with a thin population of about 1,500,000. The average density over the whole area was 134 per square mile, practically the same as in Ireland; but in the old territories this reached the considerably higher figure of 156 per square mile.

Elaborate figures, such as those available for Great Britain, which give the average annual value of agricultural and industrial produce, do not exist, but there are enough to bring out some interesting facts. Thus, of a total of approximately 12,000,000 acres in the old territories, an area approaching 4,000,000 acres was cultivated—that is, was either ploughed or devoted to vineyards, orchards, etc. As a comparison, we may note that in Scotland, with an approximate acreage of 19,000,000, about 4,750,000 acres is arable or devoted to permanent grass. Serbia is thus relatively rich in land capable of cultivation. Further, while in Scotland much of the arable land is put down to sown grass, in Serbia in 1909 no less than 3,072,000 acres were laid down to cereals, and the acreage is steadily increasing. Of the total nearly 1,500,000 acres were devoted to maize, and less than 1,000,000 to wheat; this shows that other cereal crops are relatively insignificant. The only other crop occupying a large area of land is the plum-tree, which covers about 350,000 acres. But there are a number of minor crops, including sugar-beet, hemp, flax, vegetables, tobacco, the vine for wine, and so forth.

As has been already indicated, the land is mostly divided up into small holdings, worked by the owners and their families. As to actual size, the majority of the holdings are under 25 acres, and a number are under 10 acres. It is still customary to assert that agriculture is carried on by primitive methods, and that the yield is consequently low; but there can be no doubt that the statement is losing its accuracy so far as yield is concerned. Thus, the wheat-fields in 1911 produced 7.6 cwts. per acre. This is much less than in Bulgaria, which shows nearly 14 cwts. per acre, but we cannot ascribe the difference wholly to the superior skill of the Bulgar, for his lands are more definitely within the wheat-zone than most of those of Serbia. The maize yield is less satisfactory, for while it is generally assumed that it should produce double the weight of the more valuable grain, the average yield in Serbia, as in Bulgaria, is only between 9 and 10 cwts. per acre. But it is possible that part of the explanation at least is to be found in the fact which explains also the rather low yield of oats in Scotland, despite the skill of the Lowland Scottish farmer. In both cases the grain concerned is well adapted to the climate, and tends to be grown wherever the conditions make a crop of sorts possible. This production from all kinds of lands, high-lying and low, good and mediocre, reduces the average yield.

The areas most favourable to cereal production in Serbia are,

as one would expect, the low grounds adjacent to the Danube-Sava line, and the larger river-valleys. Thus the Mačva, a swampy plain in the angle between the Sava and the Drina, on the Bosnian border, is important, also the Morava Valley, and, in the north-east, the plains in the regions where the rivers Mlava, Pek, and Timok join the Danube.

We have already spoken of the plum, but a word may be said in regard to tobacco and wine, both interesting crops. Tobacco is a state monopoly, as in Bosnia, but the old territories are less suited to the crop than those acquired during the Balkan Wars, especially Serbian Macedonia, and it is unlikely that there is much future now for the plant in the old territories. The vine was formerly grown extensively for wine, but phylloxera played great havoc. Since the product formed a valuable export, efforts were made by the State to overcome the pest. But, since various parts of Yugoslavia are well fitted for wine-production, it is again unlikely that there is much future for the industry in the original Serbian territories.

Natural pastures are extensive, and help to account for the large live-stock industry, of which something has already been said. In 1911 there were about 1,000,000 cattle, about 900,000 pigs, 4,500,000 sheep—a fact which reflects the generally mountainous nature of the country—well over 500,000 goats, and a comparatively small number of horses. The horses are of light breed, and, though Serbia exported a certain number, it imported all those required for military purposes.

About 31 per cent. of the whole area was in 1911 under forest, and yet there was a considerable import of wood. Her forests are not indeed of great value to Serbia, partly because those within easy reach have been largely destroyed, and roads and railways are not sufficiently developed to make the working of the remaining areas a profitable undertaking. As contrasted with Bosnia, also, Serbia has not an adjacent market which can be easily reached.

In 1911 the total value of the exports was £4,677,000. In this total minerals, chiefly copper, accounted for about £400,000, and almost the whole of the remainder was agricultural produce. The largest single item was furnished by the products of the live-stock industry in the large sense, which amounted to £1,400,000, fresh and salted meat being the most important element in the total. Cereals came next, with a total of £1,333,000, the items in order of importance being wheat, maize, and barley. Finally, prunes and fresh fruit accounted

for a total of £742,000. The other items were of minor importance.

In the same year the imports were valued at £4,617,000, by far the most important single items being iron and steel goods and textiles. The small import of foreign luxuries, e.g. coffee, is remarkable, as showing that the peasants still depend primarily upon what they produce on their own lands.

In 1911 the revenue was £4,806,000 approximately, as against an expenditure of £4,803,000. It is obvious that such a budget does not leave much margin for great outlays. On Jan. 1, 1915, the public debt was nearly £36,000,000.

The new territories differ notably from the old alike in their products and in the system of land tenure. Under Turkish rule, although there were a number of small holdings, much of the land was held, as in Bosnia, by great Moslem landowners, the cultivators being largely Christian peasants. As in Turkish lands generally, methods of cultivation were very primitive, and the yield small. The percentage of land cultivated was also low, about 8 per cent. of the whole, though it is certain that a far greater area could be brought under the plough. There are extensive forests, and considerable mineral wealth, which still requires investigation. Of special crops, mention may be made of the poppy for opium, tobacco, the mulberry for silkworms, rice, and the vine. In regard to the area as a whole, however, one has to speak of possibilities rather than actualities. In 1914 the exports reached over one million, opium, tobacco, fruit, and raw silk, in order of importance, being the chief items. The natural outlet is by the Vardar Valley and Salonika, rather than northwards.

Bosnia-Herzegovina.—These two provinces together cover an area not greatly superior to that of the old territories of Serbia, including 19,768 square miles as against 18,644 square miles for the latter, but are more thinly peopled, the total population being under 2,000,000, and the mean density about 96 per square mile. Herzegovina, with an area of 3,531 square miles, differs from Bosnia in being less densely wooded, though the Austrian Government did a considerable amount of planting, and in being better fitted for tobacco and vine than for grain production. Of Bosnia we may say that, except for its more extensive forests, which covered half the total area at the time of the Occupation, it generally resembles Serbia, the differences being chiefly due to recent political history rather than to any real contrast either of climate or products. Thus, livestock-rearing is carried on extensively; in cereal production maize

greatly predominates over wheat ; plums, combined in Bosnia with many other kinds of fruit, are widely grown. As in Serbia, also, the population is predominantly agricultural, and the proportion of the total area under cultivation is much the same as in Serbia.

The nature of the differences from Serbia can be readily grasped by considering the changes in political status. Under the Turk the semi-servile peasants were unwilling to produce more grain than they could help, for not only were the crops tithed by the State, under very oppressive conditions, but the landlord also claimed his share. Since, further, as in Turkish lands generally, no assistance was rendered by the Government to agriculture in any form, and methods were exceedingly primitive, the yield was small. Live-stock was either not taxed at all or only lightly, and could be more readily concealed from overlord, tax-gatherer, or robber ; it was thus preferred by the peasant, who had no motive for toiling over lands which might in the end feed another. Naturally, however, even the live-stock industry was carried on in primitive fashion, the cattle, as in mediæval Europe, being half-starved in winter, and little care given to selection for breeding purposes. In sum, however, under the Turk Bosnia was chiefly a pastoral country.

The occupying Power set itself, in the first place, to improve agriculture, with very marked effects, especially on the production of potatoes, tobacco, plums, and cereals. Efforts were also made to improve the breeds of stock and the methods of rearing. In regard to cereals, despite the increased amount produced, little was left for export, and wheat was even imported, presumably chiefly for the official class ; but, as in Serbia, the live-stock industry contributed largely to the export trade, meat being especially important. The fact that modern agriculture was well developed in the Dual Monarchy, and that Bosnia-Hercegovina, as we have seen, ranked as a "colony," made it possible for the country to develop rapidly during the Occupation, for technical skill and capital were available in a way that they were not in Serbia.

Capital and technical knowledge, again, have been important in the development of the Bosnian forests, both for conservation and improvement and in marketing. The forests, with rare exceptions, are Government property, and the forest department has done much to improve the condition of the woods, left in a very bad state by the Turks, and to protect them from further damage by fire, grazing animals, and destructive felling. Again,

for Bosnia much more than for Serbia, markets for wood are near at hand; Italy, for example, takes 40 per cent. of the wood exported, and foreign capital was more easily attracted to an area under the control of a great State than to a small Balkan country like Serbia. Thus we find that, in very marked contrast to Serbia, wood and wood-products form the largest single item in Bosnia's export trade, the average annual value exceeding £1,250,000. The live-stock industry comes next, with about one million, while cereals are relatively unimportant.

Another contrast to Serbia, due partly to the influx of foreign capital, and partly to the greater mineral wealth, is the (relatively) considerable production of iron-ore and iron goods and various chemicals, including explosives. Water-power also is more extensively used than in Serbia.

As regards the direction of trade this was chiefly northwards, and internal to the Monarchy. It was, further, with Austria rather than with Hungary, for, broadly speaking, Bosnia supplied food and raw material to the industrial population of the former country, and received in turn manufactured goods. The nature of the dependence is well shown by the appearance of tobacco as a considerable item in both exports and imports. In other words, the raw tobacco was exported and the Bosnians had to buy back manufactured tobacco for their own use. Such external trade as there was took place with Italy, which bought much timber and some live-stock, exported through the Dalmatian ports, Trieste, or Fiume, and to a smaller extent with countries farther afield, which took chiefly timber, exported through the same ports. Trade with other Balkan countries was insignificant. This was partly, no doubt, due to the political frontier; but, so far as Serbia is concerned, was primarily the result of the essential similarity of products. It is indeed one of the difficulties before Yugoslavia that her component parts have little motive for trading with each other, and this may complicate their relations. The sudden change of status of Bosnia-Hercegovina from an Austrian colony to a quasi-independent unit is almost sure to give rise to a difficult period in its economic relations.

The total trade of Bosnia-Hercegovina was considerably greater than that of Serbia, partly owing to the presence within it of a large official class, and, especially during the Balkan Wars, of a considerable army. Thus, in 1911 the exports were valued at over £5,000,000, and the imports at nearly £6,500,000. In 1913 the exports had increased to £5,750,000 and the imports to over £8,250,000. Public receipts and expenditure, on the

other hand, were notably smaller, both approaching £3,000,000 in 1913.

Dalmatia.—This province is poor and backward, the seat of intensive emigration, and has suffered much from the fact that the divergent economic interests of the interior and the coastal belt, with its islands, have been complicated by the racial conflict. Communication is chiefly carried on by water, and the necessary railway connections with the interior will be costly to construct. Further, Dalmatia's chief products, wine and olive-oil, are produced round the Mediterranean shores generally, so that competition is great, and the suggestions which have been made for the development of minor industries suited to the coastal climate, such as cut flowers, scents, essences, and so forth, would have to face the severe competition of those of the better organised French Riviera belt, which has direct connection with the chief markets. The Austrian Government made some attempt to develop the tourist industry, and some South Slav authors have laid stress upon this as a possible source of future wealth. But, though in areas sheltered from the *bora*—a bitterly cold and very strong wind in winter—the climate is favourable, and the coastal towns have many objects of interest, it will be difficult to displace the existing Mediterranean resorts from public favour; the language also is a difficulty, especially as efforts will doubtless be made to reduce the prevalence of Italian.

Dalmatia has an area of 4,956 square miles, or about three-fifths of that of Wales, and a population of about 645,000, or three-tenths that of Wales. The density is 130 per square mile, and is thus intermediate between that of Serbia and Bosnia. But it is worth note that Italy, with which Dalmatia presents certain resemblances, has a mean density of 326 per square mile.

As regards the nature of the surface percentage figures are of some interest, if only because in several cases they are markedly deceptive. Thus, about 30 per cent. of the total is entered as covered by forests; yet Dalmatia produces practically no wood. No less than 46 per cent. of the total area is described as pasture, and yet the Dalmatian live-stock industry is carried on with great difficulty, and the cattle especially are very poor. As regards wood, we have already indicated some of the reasons for the contrast between statistics and reality. Wasteful methods, the keeping of many goats, the partial destruction of forest to increase pasturages, have all combined to reduce the original woods to the condition of thickets,

incapable of producing marketable timber. We have also suggested, in speaking of the Mediterranean climate, a reason for the difficulties of stock-rearing. In Dalmatia generally it is not only the summer drought, but the actual scarcity of water, owing to the way in which it disappears in the limestone, or occurs only at the bottom of deep inaccessible gorges, which makes squabbles over wells as every-day an experience as it was in the time of the Hebrew patriarchs.

Stock-rearing is mostly carried on in the interior, where the pastures occur, and there also are found the scanty arable lands, forming 12 per cent. only of the total area. On the coast and in the islands, on the other hand, occur the vineyards, olive groves, and the mulberry-trees and chestnuts which combined cover only some 8 per cent. of the total, but are of great importance from the point of view of export. Grain, as already stated, is produced in amount insufficient to supply local needs, and there is a considerable import. It is curious to note, however, that in the interior, as in Serbia and Bosnia, maize occupies the largest acreage, wheat coming next. Imported grain, chiefly for the use of the people of the towns of the coast, is wheat, not maize. It is generally true that the inhabitants of Mediterranean coasts eat wheat, not maize, like the peoples of the Balkans. Part of the explanation is doubtless that maize cannot be locally produced, but we have also to remember that the Serbs supplement their maize diet with animal fat and flesh, both difficult to come by on the coast. Without these supplements maize is an inadequate food-stuff.

Among the live-stock sheep predominate, as one would expect, but neither their wool nor their milk is of much value. Goats come next, though goat-rearing was discouraged by the Government on account of the damage done to the woods; cattle and pigs are alike few in number, and the former are of little value.

That the natural wealth of Dalmatia has always been concentrated in the coastal belt and the islands becomes clear when we compare with the above facts those relating to the production of oil and wine. Dalmatia produced over one-quarter of the total wine of Austria, almost one-half of the total being exported; it produced also by far the largest part of the olive-oil. In addition to its use within the country, and its export, the oil is of much importance in connection with the sardine industry, sardines being the most valuable and most abundant of the fish caught off the coast. The fisheries form a valuable accessory resource to the coastal peoples.

Of the minerals, lignite, salt, and asphalt have a certain importance, but the total output in 1913 was only valued at £30,000.

No precise figures are available in regard to external trade, but most of this was with other parts of the Dual Monarchy. Italy, however, had a certain share, and a considerable amount of Italian capital is invested in the country. The budget figures are small, revenue and expenses running about £200,000 in 1910.

Croatia-Slavonia.—This kingdom had an area of 16,360 square miles, and is thus intermediate in size between the old and new territories of Serbia. It had a population of 2,622,000, giving a mean density of about 160 per square mile, and is thus the most densely peopled of the Yugoslav lands discussed here. But there is a large amount of emigration, suggesting that, at least under pre-war conditions, the land was approaching saturation. The population is not so markedly agricultural as in Serbia, some 8 per cent. being engaged in industries, which were steadily increasing. But these industries are for the most part concerned with the working up of agricultural raw material, especially food-stuffs, which were largely sent to Austria in a manufactured, or partially manufactured, condition.

The land is for the most part productive, waste ground occupying but a small part of the total. Thus, it is estimated that one-third of the total acreage is arable or garden ground, one-third is forest, and most of the remainder pasture or meadow.

Cereals are extensively grown, and are estimated to reach a mean annual value of over £9,500,000. It is curious to note, however, that the percentage of land put down to such crops is notably less than in Serbia, being about 17 per cent. of the total area as against about 25 per cent. in the latter country. But, as compared with Serbia, we find that a relatively large area is devoted to fodder crops, such as hay, clover, etc., which is one of several indications that agriculture is of a more advanced type than in Serbia. There is, further, a considerable amount of land devoted to the vine, though the vineyards have been much affected by pests in recent years. In addition, such crops as potatoes and orchard fruits occupy more space than in Serbia. As regards the cereals grown, the conditions are much the same as in the areas already discussed. Thus, maize predominates notably, alike in acreage and in amount produced; it is also the most valuable crop. Wheat comes next in acreage,

produce, and value; rye is, however, more important than either oats or barley—a Central European feature.

Wine is largely produced, the average annual value of the product being over £1,250,000. A certain amount of this is exported, as are also beer and spirits.

Livestock-rearing is carried on largely, cattle being especially important. In 1911 there were well over a million head of cattle in the country, much care and attention being given to cattle-rearing, which is favoured by the richness and abundance of the pastures. Pigs are rather more numerous than cattle, and these two animals are very characteristic of the country. Sheep are less important, most of the pastures being apparently rich enough for more valuable animals, but horse-breeding is carried on with success. Live-stock is by far the most important export of the country, though there are unfortunately no figures to indicate its destination.

The forests are not only extensive but valuable, being especially noted for the variety and size of the trees. Oaks are especially abundant in Slavonia, and cask-staves and railway sleepers made from the timber are extensively exported. In addition to all the usual European hardwoods, conifers occur abundantly on the higher hills, and the wood is an important export. Next to live-stock, wood and wood-products form the most important single item in the list of exports. It should be noted, however, that the Serbo-Croats complained bitterly that their forests had not received the same amount of attention from the State as had those of Hungary proper.

Minerals are not of great importance. As in other parts of Yugoslavia, deposits of lignite occur, and are worked especially in the Agram (Zagreb) district, the average annual product being valued at about £80,000. There are iron ores in the Karst area and elsewhere, but they are not of much value.

Though the coast-line of Croatia is practically useless from the point of view of commerce, the fisheries are of some value, cod being caught in the Gulf of Quarnero.

No precise statistics in regard to commerce exist, Croatia-Slavonia having been regarded as part of Hungary. Trade was, however, carried on almost exclusively within the Monarchy. Of the revenue of the kingdom 56 per cent. went to Hungary for common expenses, chiefly for railways and the postal system, and 44 per cent. was reserved for internal administration. All accounts were, however, kept in Budapest.

Carniola.—For the reasons already given it is not possible to say anything in detail of the various fragmentary parts of

Austrian and Hungarian territory included in Yugoslavia. Even in the case of Carniola the old Austrian statistics are vitiated by the fact that a considerable part of the province has been assigned to Italy. The portion thus lost includes not only the mines and town of Idria, but the Vipacco (Wippach) Valley, notable for its production of wine, fruit, maize, and other crops, as well as for the not unimportant trout-fishing of the stream.

The whole province had an area of under 4,000 square miles, with a population of about 500,000. It is important for the great variety of its produce, due to the relief and position. Thus, it includes the slopes of the Alps, with woods, pastures, and livestock-rearing; the Karst country, with extensive forests in places, especially of deciduous trees, and pastures, but thinly peopled; and the small plains, notably those of the Sava and its tributaries, often producing a great variety of crops. Laibach is the only large town, and is the natural centre.

About 45 per cent. of the total area is forested, about 34 per cent. is pasture land, and about 14 per cent. arable. Grain is not produced in sufficient amounts for local use, and wheat is imported from Hungary to supplement the local product. It is characteristic that more land is devoted to wheat than to maize, that oats and rye are important crops, and that by far the largest area of ploughed land is given up to potatoes; the importance of the three last-named is an indication of the extent of mountainous land, with a severe climate, and no lack of rain. On the other hand, the sheltered lower grounds, especially the river-valleys, produce wine and many kinds of temperate fruits, such as apples, pears, plums, cherries, table grapes, and so forth.

The extensive pastures make live-stock rearing important, and in Upper Carniola—that is, the Alpine section—cattle and horses are the chief animals kept. The dairy industry would appear to be increasing, but is less well developed than in the Alpine districts inhabited by Germans, Austrians, and Swiss, the cattle being largely reared for draught purposes or for meat. Horses are exported both northwards to Bavaria and southwards and westwards to Italy. In the Karst area, with poorer pastures, sheep generally replace cattle and horses, and yield a coarse wool. Goats here supply milk, but efforts have been made to keep down their numbers in order to protect the forests. Pigs are of less importance than in Croatia-Slavonia.

As contrasted with Dalmatia, where the *métayer* system prevails, and with Croatia-Slavonia, where both large and small

properties occur, the land in Carniola is freehold, and divided up into a very large number of small holdings. As contrasted with Bosnia, also, the forests are predominantly private and not state property, and most holdings contain some forest land, where firewood can be cut. This is one of the difficulties in the way of efficient forest conservation. There are, in addition, many communal forests. A peculiar feature of the peasant holdings, associated with their diversity, i.e. combination of woods, arable land, and pastures, is that they consist of a series of scattered plots, which makes efficient working difficult. Agricultural methods are primitive.

A considerable variety of minerals is present, but except for quicksilver these are not of great importance. Lignite is mined, as in most Yugoslav lands, and there are deposits of iron, lead, etc. There are few manufactures, those which occur being chiefly concentrated round Laibach. No statistics are available in regard to trade.

Montenegro.—Though the position of this barren and rocky kingdom in relation to Yugoslavia remains obscure, a word or two may be said in regard to its resources. The total area is about 3,500 square miles, or considerably less than half that of Wales, and the population is a quarter of a million. The mean density is about 67 per square mile. Agriculture is the chief occupation, but is carried on mostly by the women, the men being primarily warriors. Except in the low-lying grounds near the coast, the soil is very poor. Nearly the whole country is a mass of rocky hills and forests, with but occasional patches of cultivation in stony basins where a certain amount of detritus and soil has collected. The methods are primitive in the extreme, and the yield is small. As usual, maize is the chief crop, but tobacco, oats, potatoes, barley, and so forth are also produced, while on the short coast-line the olive is grown for oil, and the vine is cultivated for wine in favoured areas. In the east and north forests occur, but the absence of roads makes it impossible to utilise the timber. Live-stock is reared as in Bosnia and Serbia; but food, especially in the interior, is scanty and difficult to obtain. The imports in 1914 greatly exceeded the exports, and in that year the budget showed a large deficit.

C. MISCELLANEOUS

APPENDICES

DEFENCE

ARMY

DURING the War 757,343 men were raised in Serbia, exclusive of 70,000 Yugoslav volunteers. The losses in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to 450,000.

At the end of 1919 the new Army of Yugoslavia had begun to take shape, and by March 1920 it amounted to approximately 200,000 men. Owing, however, to questions of finance, the strength of the Army budgeted for the year 1922-23 is only 109,000.

Military service is universal and compulsory. New conditions of service are under consideration. The present conditions are :

Active Army.—Cavalry and Artillery two years with the Colours, all other arms eighteen months.

National Army.—This is divided into three Bans. The 1st Ban supplies all the Active Army and its reserves, ages 21-30. The 2nd Ban, ages 31-38. The 3rd Ban, ages 39-45.

Landsturm.—Liability of service between the ages of 18-21 and 45-50.

The Active Army, which is organised in four Army Areas, comprises sixteen Infantry and two Cavalry Divisions. The Infantry of each Division consists of three Regiments each of three Battalions. The Field Artillery organisation is not yet complete. Each of the four Armies has one Heavy Artillery Regiment.

Armament.—Rifle: the Serbian 7 mm. Mauser, the Austrian 8 mm. Mannlicher, and various French types.

The artillery comprises French 75 mm. guns, 155 mm. Schneider howitzers, and Austrian Skoda heavy and field guns.

NAVY

The Austro-Hungarian Navy was handed over by the Emperor Karl to the ex-Austrian Yugoslavs in 1918; but it did not long remain in their hands, for by the armistice terms it was split up, about half the fleet going to France and the other half to Italy. A good many of the ships had been seriously damaged by the Yugoslavs before handing over.

The construction of a Yugoslav Navy has not yet proceeded very far.

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INDEX

A

- Aehrenthal, Baron, 67, 68, 72, 132, 213
 Agram trials, the, 175, 176, 214
 Albania, relations with Montenegro, 132, 133; 197; frontier, 248
 Alexander of Serbia, first prince (Karageorgević), 50; deposed, 52; 56
 Alexander of Serbia (Karageorgević), Regent and King, 140, 223, 244
 Alexander of Serbia (Obrenović), 62; murdered, 63
 "Apis," 94
 Austria (-Hungary), relations with Serbia, 25-36, 42, 51, 55, 61, 62, 65, 66; annexes Bosnia, etc., 68; tries to reform Macedonia, 71; ultimatum to Serbia, 78-81; attacks on Serbia repulsed, 80-85; joins in crushing Serbia, 87-90; occupies Serbia, 96-98; driven out, 101; relations with Montenegro, 111, 114, 119, 126, 127, 130, 131; attacks and occupies do., 135, 137; occupies, 159-163, and annexes, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 163; 172; relations to Yugoslav movement, 191, etc.; 208, 209-213; divisions of, 220; new Emperor, 229; 232
 Austro-Hungarian lands, former, 147-200; origins of inhabitants, 148, 149; geography, 149-154; history, 155-200; resources, 267-275; bibliography, 283
 Avars, the, 177, 178

B

- Balkan War, of 1912, 73-76, 133; of 1913, 77, 133
 Bašići, 108, 109
 Ban, the, of Croatia, 172, 173, 175, 209, 215, 231
 Belgrade, 25, 27, 28, 32, 38, 39, 42, 43, 54, 55, 58, 81, 82, 85, 88, 101
 Berlin, Congress of, 59, 127, 210
 "Black Hand," the, 94
 Bogomils, 155, 156, 182

- Bosnia, 126, 147, 154; history of, 155-164; conquered by Hungary, 155; capture by Turks, 157; Austrian occupation, 159-163; population, 161; annexation, 163; 173, 192, 193, 210, 211, 213, 217; murder of Archduke, 218; 225; resources, etc., 267-269; bibliography, 283
 Bosnia-Hercegovina, resources of, area and population, 267; agriculture and forestry, 268-269; minerals and livestock, 269; trade, 269; bibliography, 283
 Branković, Vuk, 22, 23; George, 23, 108, 109
 Bulgaria, 18, 19, 58; war with Serbia, 62; 66; Church, 71; 71-74; beaten by Serbia 1913, 77; attacks Serbia 1915, 86-89; brutality in Serbia, 98, 99; 203
 Byzantines, 16, 19, 20

C

- Carinthia, 148, 151, 186, 194, 198
 Carniola, 148, 149, 151, 197, 198; area, population and resources of, 274; minerals, 275
 Carso (*v.* Karst)
 Cattaro (Kotor), 118, 119, 137, 143, 197, 233
 Cetinje, 109, 111-113, 117, 128, 131, 135-137
 Christianity, conversion of Serbia to, 15
 Church (*v.* under country headings)
 "Compromise, the," Austrian Ausgleich (of 1867), 170-173, 188, 209
 "Compromise, the," Hungaro-Croat (of 1868), 168, 171, 209, 210, 213
 Constitution (*v.* under country headings)
 Corfu, 90, 92, 96; Pact of, 95, 200, 231
 Croatia, 148, 152, 153, 155, 166; history, 165-176; Turkish occupation, 166; under Hungary, 166; soldiery, 167; Jellačić, 170; under

- Austria, 170; the Nagoda, 171, 172;
Diet, 172, etc.; the Resolution, 174;
Fiume railway, 174, 212, 215, 216;
Agram trials, 175; 181, 198;
characteristics, 205; 209, 212, 220,
226
Croatia-Slavonia, resources of, area,
population, agriculture, 272; live-
stock, forests, fisheries, trade, 273
Cuvaj, 215, 216
- D
- Dahis, the, 39, 43
Dalmatia, 148, 151, 153, 155, 165, 172;
history, 177-184; Church, 177, 178;
relations with Venice, 179, etc.;
with Turks, 182, etc.; under
Venice, 183; under Austria, 183;
198, 199; characteristics, 207; 226;
climate, area, population and re-
sources of, 270-272; livestock, agri-
culture and fisheries, 271; trade, 272
Danilo (first Bishop-Prince of Montene-
gro), 112-114
Danilo II, 123, 124
Danilo, Crown Prince, 131, 132
Draga, Queen, 63
Dualism, 170, 209
Dušan, Stefan, 15, 19, 20, 21, 108
- E
- Education (*v.* under country headings)
- F
- Fiume (Rjeka), 170, 172, 174, 197, 198,
208, 209; troubles 1918-20, 240-242
Frankists, 217, 231
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, murder
of, 78; 131, 164, 217, 218, 220, 224
Friedjung, Dr., 175, 176, 214
- G
- "Greater Serbia," 221, 223, 243
Greeks, 33, 70, 71, 86, 87, 100, 249
- H
- Hercegovina, 18, 126, 132, 147, 154;
history of, 155-160; name, 156;
Turkish rule, 157-159; occupation
by Austria, 159-163; annexation,
163; 192, 193, 210, 217; resources,
267
Hungary, 13, 19, 25, 27, 42, 60, 148,
155-157, 165; revival, 167; 170-
174, 208; relations with Croatia and
Slavonia, 209-216; 240, 247
- I
- Illyrian Provinces, 118, 168-170, 178,
208
Istria, 148, 177, 197-199, 248
- Italy, 72, 197-199, 228; Pact of Rome,
233; 234, 239; at Fiume, 240-242
Ivan Beg, 109, 110
- J
- Jellačić, 51, 170
- K
- Kállay, Baron, 210
Kara George, 39-47, 119
Karageorgević dynasty, Alexander,
50; deposed, 52; 56; Peter, 58, 60;
King, 63-65; 77, 129; dynasty,
131; Alexander (present ruler), 140;
Regent, 244
Karst (Carso), 150-153, 156, 167, 254
Khuen Hedervary, Count C., 173, 174
Knez Lazar, 22, 23
Komitajis, 71, 72
Korošec, Dr., 226, 231, 232, 234, 243
Kosovo, 12, 15, 22, 89, 103, 108
Kraljević, Marko, 22
- L
- Lazar (*v.* Knez Lazar)
Lissa, 183, 184
Ljubljana (Laibach), 197, 215, 233, 234
Lloyd George, Mr., 232
London, Treaty of, 1915, 196, 228
Lovčen, Mt., 136, 137
- M
- Macedonia, 19, 70-79; reforms, 71;
fighting in, 77; 86; Serbian army
transferred to, 90, 91, 96; Bulgari-
ans, etc., cleared out of, 100, 101
Masaryk, Professor, 211
Michael of Serbia, 50, 53-55; murdered,
56; 125, 159
Milan of Serbia, 50, 56-61; King, 62;
resigns, 62
Military Frontier Province, 167, 171
Miloš of Serbia, 45-49, 52
"Mittel-Europa" scheme, 262
Mohacs, battle of, 165, 166
Monastir, 72, 76, 91
Montagu, Lady M. Wortley, journey
in 1717, 31
Montenegro, general, geography, 107,
253; resources, 107, 127, 275;
Church, 110-112; education, 110,
127, 130; position of women, 124;
customs, 124, 130, 133; constitu-
tion, 125, 127, 132; Skupština, 127-
130, 132, 138, 141; area and popu-
lation, 275; bibliography, 281
Montenegro, history, Balkan War
1912, 73, 74, 133, 134; expansion
(map), 75; origins, 108, 109; early
history to 1690, 108-111; wars with

Turkey, 108-118, 124-126, 133;
Bishop-Princes, 112-122; relations
with Turkey, 119, 121, 127, with
Napoleon, 118, 119; development,
125, *et seq.*; army organised, 125, 126;
133, 136, 138; first constitution,
125; second do., 127; relations
with Serbia, 126, 129, 132, 133, 136;
Treaty of Berlin, 127; government,
128-130; Great War, 135-139;
occupation by Austrians, 138-140;
coalition with Serbia, 140, 141, 200;
chronology, 142, 143
Montenegro, treaties, Karlowitz 1699,
111; Passarowitz 1718, 114; Sis-
tova 1791, 116; Jassy 1792, 116;
San Stefano 1878, 127; Berlin 1878,
127
Mürzsteg Programme, 71

N

Nagoda, the, 171, 172, 174
Natalie, Queen, 62
Nemanja, Stefan, 15, 17, 18, 156
Nicholas, Prince and King of Montene-
gro, 124-141; character, 130, 131,
135, 136; King, 133; his treachery,
135, 136, 138, 139; bolts to France,
138-141; death, 141
Novi Pazar, Sanjak of, 159, 160, 163,
164

O

Obrenović dynasty, Miloš, 45-49, 52;
Milan, 50; 56-61; King, 62;
resigns, 62; Michael, 50, 53-55;
murdered, 56; 125, 159; Alexander,
62; murdered, 63

P

Pašić, M., 93-96, 230, 243-246
Pasvan-oglu, 38, 39
Peter the Great (Russia), 113, 114
Peter I of Montenegro, 116-120
Peter II, 120-124
Peter, Prince, 137, 138
Peter of Serbia, 58, 60; King, 63-65;
77, 129
Petrović dynasty, 112-141; Danilo,
112-114; Sava, 114, 117; Vasilije,
114; Peter I, 116-120; Peter II,
120-124; Danilo II, 123, 124;
Nicholas, 124-141; dangers to, 125

R

Radović, M., 129, 131, 140
Ragusa, 178-181, 204, 207
Rapallo, Treaty of, 242
Raška, 11, 16
Rauch, Baron, 175, 212, 215

Rome, Treaty of, 1917, 197; Pact of,
1918, 233
Russia, relations with Serbia, 27, 29,
33, 42, 44, 50, 51, 58, 65; tries to
reform Macedonia, 71; relations
with Montenegro, 113-119, 127, 130,
132; and the Yugoslavs, 197, *et seq.*;
198, 222

S

St. Sava, insurrection of, 25
Salonika, capitulates to Greeks, 73;
Serbian army to, 90, 91; 100
Sava, Bishop of Montenegro, 114, 117
Scutari (Skadar), 108-110, 133, 137, 138
Serbia, army, formed, 54, 62, 69; in
Great War, 80-101; beats back
Austrians, 80-85; crushed by Aus-
tria, Germany and Bulgaria, 86-91;
retreat to Adriatic, 88-90; trans-
ferred to Salonika and fights in Mac-
edonia, 90, 91; takes Monastir, 91;
victory in Macedonia, 100-102
Serbia, economics, products and re-
sources, 12, 13, 67, 265-267; im-
ports, 13, 66; agriculture and fruit,
265-267; cereals, 265; livestock,
266; foreign trade, 266, 267
Serbia, general, geography, 11-14;
rivers, 11, 12; religion, 15, 17;
Church, 17, 18, 25, 33, 48, 72;
education, 71; area and population,
264; bibliography, 280
Serbia, history, early history, 15-23,
religion, 15, 17; law in force, 21;
Turkish conquest, 22-28; subjec-
tion to Turkey, 30-40; revolt, 40-
45; second revolt, 46, 47; auton-
omy (1829), 48; army formed, 54;
Turkish War, 58; relations with
Powers, 58-62; Milan becomes
King, 61; Bulgarian War, 62;
accession of Peter, 63; Balkan
War 1912, 73-76; Balkan War
1913, 77; Austrian ultimatum to,
78-81; attacked by Austria, 80-85;
crushed by Austria, Germany and
Bulgaria, 86-91; resuscitation, 92-
95; occupation by enemy, 96-99;
victory, 100, 101; chronology, 103,
104; establishment of Yugoslav
Kingdom, 101, 102
Serbia, Skupština, 42, 45, 47, 54, 57,
62, 63; at Corfu, 94-96
Serbia, treaties, Karlowitz 1699, 26;
Passarowitz 1718, 27; Belgrade
1739, 28; Kuchuk-Kainarji 1774,
33; Sistova 1791, 34; Bucharest
1812, 43; Akkerman 1826, 48;
Adrianople 1829, 48; Paris 1856, 52;

San Stefano 1878, 58; Berlin 1878, 60; Serbo-Austrian 1881, 60; Serbo-Bulgarian 1912, 72; Greco-Bulgarian 1912, 73; Serbo-Montenegrin 1912, 73; London 1913, 74; Bucharest 1913, 78

Serbia, wars, Serbo-Turkish, 22, 43; of 1876, 58; Austro-Turkish, 26, 27, 34; Russo-Turkish, 27, 33, 34, 43; of 1877, 58; Serbo-Bulgarian, of 1885, 62; Balkan War, 1912, 73; 1913, 77; Great War, 80-101

Serbo-Croatian language, 10, 97, 162, 169

Serbo-Croats, 148, 174, 190, 204, 208, 227

Serbs, characteristics, 206, 208; differentiated from Serbians, 220; 221, 225

"S.H.S." State (v. Yugoslavia), 239, 242-246, 253

Skanderbeg, 109

Slavonia, 148, 153; definition, 166; history, 165-176; comes under Turks, 166; under Hungary, 166; under Austria, 170; 198, 205, 223, 253, 254, 260; products, 272, 273

Slovenia and Slovenes, 148, 151, 152; history, 185-189; Church, 185, 187, 189; the Reformation, 186; education, 188; 193-195, 197; characteristics, 205; 208, 209, 220, 226; absorbed in S.H.S., 231, 239; 245-247, 250

Starčevist Party, 215, 217, 231

Stefan of Montenegro, 108

Stefan Mali, 115, 116

Strossmayer, Bishop, 173, 208, 211

Styria, 148, 194, 198

Supilo, Dr., 222, 228

T

Tisza, Count, 216

Tomasić, Dr., 175, 215

Trialism, 176, 219-221, 223, 232

Trieste, 123, 152, 197, 220

"Triune Kingdom," the, 171, 172, 205, 208, 210

Trumbić, Dr., 222, 233, 243, 246

Turks, relations with Serbia, 20, 22, 24-28, 30, 40, 44, 46, 48, 55, 68; Revolution of 1908, 72; war with Italy, 72; beaten in Balkan War, 1912, 73-76; wars and relations with Montenegro, 108-127; Bosnian revolt, 126; capture Bosnia, etc., 157; occupation of Slavonia, etc., 166; 210

U

Urož, 18, 19, 21, 22

V

Vasić, trial of, 214

Vassilije of Montenegro, 114

Venice, 20, 21, 108-110, 179-183

Venizelos, M., 72, 87

Y

Yugoslav movement, 26, 50, 95, 96; establishment of S.H.S. Kingdom, 101; beginnings of, 174; history of, 190-244; volunteer corps, 193, 229, 233, 244; propaganda, 195; communities abroad, 196; rise, 208; eclipse, 211; movement progresses, 212; Agram trials, 214, 215; different solutions, 219-222; outbreak of Great War, 225; sufferings of Yugoslavs, 224, 226; committees in London and Chicago, 227; Allies interfere, 230, 233-235; May manifesto, 231; Pact of Corfu, 231; of Rome, 233; Zagreb declaration, 234; revolt, 235; consummation, 239

Yugoslavia, definition, 147, 253; beginnings of, 174; Yugoslavs during the Great War, 190-244; 199; the Yugoslav race, 203-207; language, 203; education, 204; established as S.H.S., 239-244; recognition, 243; proclamation, 244; boundaries, 246-248, 253; resources and population, 249, 253; constitution, 250; Assembly, 250; exchange, 249; Serbianism, 250; geography, 253; climate, 254; products and resources, 255-261; rivalries and racial problems, 262, 263; army and navy, 279; bibliography, 280-283

Yugoslavia, resources of, general, 255-261; forests, 254, 255; crops, etc., 256; plums and pigs, 257; minerals, 257, 258; industries, 258-260; agriculture, 258-260; foreign trade, 261

Z

Zagreb (v. also Agram), 208, 213, 214, 220, 225, 226, 232, 234

Zara, 179-182, 212, 242

Zeta, 18, 108, 109

Zupan, 15, 16

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